



THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1973–86

HISTORY AND MEMORIES
OF AN INSTITUTION

Work carried out on the initiative of the
European Commission with the participation
of and testimony by former European officials

Cover illustration:

On 29 May 1986, the European flag is raised for the first time outside the Berlaymont — the Commission's headquarters in Brussels — at a ceremony to celebrate its official adoption by the Community institutions. The institutions are represented (from left to right) by: Charles Rutten, Dutch ambassador to the European Communities, representing the Council Presidency; Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission; Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament; and Carlo Ripa di Meana, member of the European Commission responsible for institutional matters. The adoption of the European flag, symbol of the union of the peoples of Europe, is the embodiment of the political and institutional advances of the time.

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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1973-86

HISTORY AND MEMORIES OF AN INSTITUTION

Editors:

Éric Bussière, Vincent Dujardin, Michel Dumoulin, Piers Ludlow,
Jan Willem Brouwer and Pierre Tilly

in collaboration with Élisabeth Palmero

Foreword by J. M. Barroso, President of the European Commission

*Work carried out on the initiative of the European Commission
with the participation of and testimony by former European officials*

European Commission

Foreword



José Manuel Durão Barroso,
President of the European Commission

The history of the European Commission has overlapped with and fed into the history of European integration for more than 60 years.

This history is that of an institution which is unique, and which has been able to develop experience and know-how that is irreplaceable when it comes to promoting and defending the European general interest. It is also the history of men and women committed to serving a common cause, working day in, day out to build a united Europe, which has since become the European Union.

When the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union on 10 December 2012, my thoughts were with the men and women who had come before us. In my acceptance speech, I referred with pride, emotion and gratitude to the memory of Europe's founders. I also stressed the responsibility of my generation, and of those to come, to sustain this exceptional undertaking, this common endeavour that is the European Union.

To move forward and build the future, we must know our past. As President of the European Commission, I wanted through this work to make the history of the institution accessible to all and to revive the memory of its many participants. The approach is original: the aim was not to write an official history of the European Commission, but to hear the testimony of people who were there at the time and to allow the researchers to conduct their work in an independent and innovative fashion, thanks to unprecedented access to the archives and original sources. A similar project had already resulted in the publication of a volume about the institution's formative years between 1958 and 1972.

This book continues the history of the Commission from 1 January 1973, the date of the first enlargement of the European Communities, with the arrival of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, until the end of February 1986, with the signing of the Single European Act, just after the accession of Spain and Portugal.

These years are sometimes neglected in our collective memory. The term ‘Euro-sclerosis’ is often used to describe the period. They were certainly difficult years. Democracy was struggling to assert itself in a Europe that was still divided and riven by Cold War tensions. The energy and economic crises intertwined and led to a breakdown of the growth model and a transformation of the social and productive structures inherited from the post-war period. Action by the Communities remained limited and their legitimacy was sometimes questioned, while the global challenges of development, energy supply and the organisation of the international financial system were crying out for increasingly European responses.

This work and the reminiscences it contains shed new, refreshing light on the period by highlighting the fundamental progress made by Europe and by the Commission.

Firstly, in terms of political values and rights, the enlargement of the Communities, growing as they did from six to nine Member States in 1973, then to 10 with the accession of Greece in 1981, and to 12 in 1986, constituted a major geopolitical upheaval. While southern Europe was rediscovering democracy, western and eastern Europe were growing closer together: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was concluded with the participation of all the Member States. In 1980, *Solidarność* was born in Poland. Democracy was advancing on the continent and the foundations of a united Europe were being laid. As a young man in Portugal, these realities and these hopes shaped my political commitment and my European awareness.

Secondly, in terms of the institutions, the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage and the emergence of the European Council marked decisive turning points. It was also at this time that Europe established its place in the world, with the recognition of the Community’s role at G7 summits and in a number of international forums. Within the Commission itself, collective responsibility remained the guiding principle — as it does today — but working methods moved with the times and new practices saw the light of day.

Lastly, in terms of policies, the enlargement of the Communities went hand in hand with a deepening and widening of the Commission’s spheres of action. The period would prove to be extremely fertile: the first proposals for economic

and monetary union, consolidation of the momentum of the internal market that went far beyond the purely economic aspects, establishment of a regional policy embodying European solidarity, modernisation of the cooperation and development policy, consolidation of the common agricultural policy and embryonic policies on the environment and education — the foundations of a more extensive European integration were considerably strengthened, or at the very least the ground was prepared.

The lessons of history show what we are doing now in a new light, and there are numerous parallels with certain present-day issues. What stands out for me in this period is that, despite, and sometimes thanks to, the difficulties, Europe did in fact take significant steps forward, which made and continue to make history. The Commission played its part to the full, with lucidity and discretion, but also with responsibility, conviction and commitment.

Everyone who reads this work will have his or her own point of view and expectations. Any bias is that of the authors and their interpretation may, of course, give rise to debate, but their analysis is all the more interesting because it reflects a diversity of perspectives and sources. Combined with the reminiscences collected, this book therefore opens a new window on a key period in our history — a window which the reader of today and tomorrow may choose to open even further.

The work of the researchers who saw this project through is deserving of praise. Their task was not simply to understand and describe the issues of the day; they also had to take ownership of the subject matter. They were able to do so with the expected academic rigour, but also with a form of empathy and human curiosity that brings the Commission of the time back to life and allows us to share in its daily existence.

I should also like to extend special thanks to the former Commission officials involved. Retired officials have accompanied this project every step of the way, contributing their experience, wealth of knowledge and enthusiasm, while respecting the authors' editorial freedom. Their contribution was not merely invaluable; it was indispensable.

Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the very many people active at the time who enriched this project with their recollections, which are now accessible in the historical archives of the European Union. Their voices are forever the institution's collective memory, and their work lives on.

I wish you an enjoyable read.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a stylized, flowing script that ends with a long horizontal stroke.

Contents

Foreword	5
Building new momentum: 1973–86	15
<i>Vincent Dujardin</i>	
Part One — Administrative structures and staff	31
Introduction	33
<i>Jan Willem Brouwer</i>	
Chapter 1	
The Commission's organisation, office locations and staff	35
1.1. Dynamics of organisational change	35
<i>Michel Dumoulin</i>	
1.2. The eternal question of location	52
<i>Charles Barthel</i>	
1.3. Consolidating the European civil service	61
<i>Michel Mangenot and Katja Seidel</i>	
François-Xavier Ortoli: a vision marked by permanence and change	71
<i>Éric Bussière</i>	
Chapter 2	
The Commission as a body	77
2.1. The commissioners	77
<i>Michel Dumoulin</i>	
2.2. The cabinets	86
<i>Michel Mangenot</i>	
2.3. The Spokesman's Group (later the Spokesman's Service)	95
<i>Michel Dumoulin</i>	
Chapter 3	
The Secretariat-General and the Legal Service	103
3.1. The Secretariat-General	103
<i>Michel Dumoulin</i>	
3.2. The Legal Service	115
<i>Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez</i>	

Part Two — Administrative culture and methods	121
Introduction	123
<i>Jan Willem Brouwer</i>	
Chapter 4	
Working methods	125
4.1. Coordination and decision-making process in the Commission	125
<i>Michel Mangenot</i>	
4.2. The Commission's strategy for the design and implementation of European policies: between pragmatism and conviction	131
<i>Filippa Chatzistavrou</i>	
4.3. Interest groups: a necessary evil?	137
<i>Pierre Tilly</i>	
Roy Jenkins: momentum regained but interrupted	143
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Chapter 5	
The impact of the first enlargement	151
<i>Piers Ludlow, Jürgen Elvert and Johnny Laursen</i>	
Chapter 6	
An administrative culture in transition	169
<i>Michel Mangenot</i>	
Chapter 7	
'It was European Brussels, not Belgian Brussels': life for European officials outside the institutions	181
<i>Michel Dumoulin</i>	
Part Three — The Commission and the changing Community system	193
Introduction	195
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Gaston Thorn: an embattled visionary	201
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Chapter 8	
Relations with the European Council	207
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Chapter 9	
Relations with the Council	213
9.1. The Council of Ministers	213
<i>Michel Mangenot</i>	
9.2. The Commission and Coreper: between cooperation and rivalry	221
<i>Filippa Chatzistavrou</i>	

Chapter 10	
Relations with the European Parliament	231
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Chapter 11	
The politics of the Community budget	243
<i>Piers Ludlow and Pierre-Olivier Laloux</i>	
Part Four — The Commission at work: policies and actions	259
Introduction	261
<i>Éric Bussière</i>	
Chapter 12	
Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy	263
<i>Éric Bussière</i>	
Chapter 13	
Research: towards a new common policy	277
<i>Arthe Van Laer</i>	
Chapter 14	
Competition at the service of the market	291
<i>Laurent Warlouzet</i>	
Chapter 15	
Economic and monetary affairs: new challenges and ambitions	301
<i>Éric Bussière and Ivo Maes</i>	
Chapter 16	
Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy	313
16.1. Adjusting a flagship policy: the common agricultural policy in the 1970s and 1980s	313
<i>Katja Seidel</i>	
16.2. Creating a 'blue Europe': the common fisheries policy	328
<i>Katja Seidel</i>	
Chapter 17	
Regional policy: a tangible expression of European solidarity	337
<i>Pierre Tilly</i>	
Chapter 18	
Free movement of workers, social rights and social affairs	351
<i>Sylvain Schirmann and Pierre Tilly</i>	
Chapter 19	
Transport policy in transition	369
<i>Éric Bussière and Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez</i>	

Chapter 20	
At the centre of a web of interdependence: energy	377
<i>Éric Bussière</i>	
Chapter 21	
Environmental and consumer protection	385
<i>Christian Van de Velde</i>	
Chapter 22	
Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics	393
<i>Guia Migani</i>	
Chapter 23	
Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics	413
<i>Angel Viñas, Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez and Éric Bussière</i>	
Chapter 24	
The Mediterranean challenge	429
<i>Piers Ludlow, Filippa Chatzistavrou, Angel Viñas, Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez and Jürgen Elvert</i>	
Chapter 25	
At the service of the European citizen: information policy, a people's Europe, culture, education and training	445
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux</i>	
Jacques Delors: surfing the crest of the European wave	465
<i>Piers Ludlow</i>	
Annexes	473
Timeline 1973–86	475
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux</i>	
Organisation charts of the Commission	481
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux</i>	
Composition of the Commission	513
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Christian Van de Velde</i>	
The Commission, international organisations and multilateral agreements	527
<i>Élisabeth Palmero</i>	
Committees	537
<i>Filippa Chatzistavrou</i>	

Sources and guide to further reading	555
Sources	557
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Élisabeth Palmero</i>	
Guide to further reading	567
<i>Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Élisabeth Palmero</i>	
Tables and index	623
List of authors	625
Index of names	627
List of acronyms	635
Acknowledgements	643

Building new momentum: 1973–86

From the time of the enlargement of the European Communities to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom on 1 January 1973, followed by Greece on 1 January 1981 and Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986, to when the Single European Act was signed in February 1986, 13 years had elapsed. This period before the revival of the mid-1980s is often presented as one of stagnation, given the hopes that had been aroused by the summit at The Hague in December 1969. However, this volume shows that, in spite of a less favourable climate, the series of advances that was made in the second half of the 1980s followed on from the plans, ideas and changes introduced in the 1970s.

A difficult environment

By 1973, the European Economic Community (EEC) had established the customs union and the common agricultural policy (CAP), and there were already plans for developing new policies. However, over the next few years the climate grew gloomier. Europe went through a period of what has been described as ‘Eurosclerosis’, or a prolonged and destabilising crisis. Above and beyond the short-term economic fluctuations, a radical transformation in the world economy was under way, marked by the beginning of the era of globalisation. Following the economic and monetary shocks of the early 1970s — the monetary crisis, the energy crisis when the price of petrol quadrupled in a few months and the ensuing social problems — the time was not right for European enthusiasm and ambitious integration plans: instead it was a time for inward-looking action and protectionist reflexes. A Eurosceptic wind was blowing, even amongst the populations of the founding nations.

Furthermore, although the United Kingdom had only recently joined the EEC, its government — backed by a large share of public opinion — continued to harbour doubts as to the wisdom of this move. The outcome of the referendum of 5 June 1975 failed to dispel all these doubts, which only became stronger over the question of the United Kingdom's contribution to the the Community budget. When she became prime minister in 1979, Margaret Thatcher began campaigning 'to get our money back'.

As for the Commission, the empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 had reduced its authority and power whilst making it even keener to achieve consensus through a series of compromises. In 1973, the institution had not regained the strong voice it enjoyed prior to 1965. Dialogue with the other institutions therefore became even more essential for effective action. But the decreased use of voting within the Council impeded the legislative work instigated by the Commission. However, the prospect of establishing the internal market, which was a major goal for the Commission throughout this period, would eventually enable it to change this trend. If the subject areas to be handled by the Commission only increased, the same was true for the Council and hence for the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), cooperation with which would vary from one Presidency to another.

In this difficult European context, it was not easy for the Commission to make its mark or to bring new projects to a successful conclusion by fully exercising its roles of initiation, execution and representation in relations with non-member countries or international organisations. Working independently of the Member States and using ad hoc methods, the Commission had to look after the general interest and not the interests of one or other of its members, but it was nevertheless periodically faced with very real national influences. Yet when such national interests existed, they were tempered by the Commission's decision-making process and the composition of the *cabinets* (private offices) and departments, which reflected a range of sectoral and national sensibilities.

New institutional challenges

On the institutional front, the Commission faced the possibility of being weakened by the creation of the European Council in 1974, which was formally recognised in the Single European Act of 1986. There were signs of misgivings within the Commission following the Spierenburg report of September 1979 — submitted to Roy Jenkins — and its recommendations on reducing the number of commissioners. In 1979, the European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage for the first time, with the particular goal of engaging citizens with the European project and its organisations, and redressing the oft-cited 'democratic deficit'. The Commission therefore intended to take more account of this institution than in the past. In any event, the fact that they had been elected

by universal direct suffrage led the members of the European Assembly to call for new powers with ever-increasing conviction. As for the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, some saw it as further encouragement for these countries to strengthen their democratic systems — a fact that did not escape the notice of the Nobel Peace Prize jury in 2012 ⁽¹⁾.

Enlargement which made the Community less homogeneous in economic and social terms and more diverse in terms of political traditions combined with the broadening of the Community's policy agenda to necessitate substantial institutional change. But while such changes were openly called for during the period covered by this volume, they would for the most part be implemented after 1986.

The Commission was often faced with what was presented as a choice between widening and deepening, even though new accessions could in fact also encourage deeper integration. In 1973, the EEC had undergone its first enlargement. Its nine Member States had 256 million inhabitants, compared with 245 million in the USSR and 207 million in the United States ⁽²⁾. In addition, the EEC had consolidated its status as the world's leading trading power, causing some qualms in the US ⁽³⁾. Following the first enlargement and establishment of the customs union, the external relations of the Community (and hence the Commission's role in that field) were transformed. This was particularly true of relations with the US and Japan but also more widely. The Community's *sui generis* character led it to take part in multiple international negotiations.

The 1973 enlargement also brought about a revision of the association agreement between the Community and its associated overseas countries and territories, since around 20 Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) were to benefit from the new association agreement between the Community and 46 ACP countries signed in Lomé in 1975. Advances were made not just in this area, but in the whole of the EEC's development cooperation policy between 1973 and 1986, largely at the Commission's prompting.

As for the CAP, it retained its status as the largest common policy, and was not changed radically after the first enlargement. Nevertheless, the Commission faced some considerable challenges in this area, among them the proverbial butter mountains and milk lakes, successive enlargements and multiple rounds of

⁽¹⁾ The press release states: 'In the 1980s, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Communities. The introduction of democracy was a condition for their membership.'

⁽²⁾ Bitsch, M.-T., *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours*, 4th edn, Complexe, Brussels, 2004, p. 195.

⁽³⁾ See in particular a highly significant letter from John B. Connally (Secretary of the Treasury) to Richard Nixon on 12 June 1971. See also Zimmermann, H., 'Western Europe and the American challenge: Conflict and cooperation in technology and monetary policy, 1965–73', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 6, No 2, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 101.

negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Fisheries policy, meanwhile, remained a controversial issue due to the divergent interests of the Member States. The Commission therefore had to seek solutions during fraught negotiations.

Adaptation, innovation and reform


Successive enlargements and the development of new policies inevitably had an impact on the Commission, which had constantly to adapt or reform, whether in terms of its structure, location — the question of its seat had still not been settled — workforce or the regulations governing the European civil service. Nevertheless, there was no revolution in the administrative culture, but rather a very gradual evolution. The Secretariat-General retained a central role in organising the administrative machine and maintained vital links with the Parliament and the Council. Émile Noël's tenure as secretary-general of the Single Commission lasted from 1968 until 1987. The Legal Service meanwhile was modernising and played its full part in establishing an ever stronger European legal system.

The 1973 enlargement had an impact on the internal organisation of the Commission — witness the significant development of the translation and interpreting services. It also had an effect on policies. Enlargement increased the Community's importance on the global stage and led to a new diversity of interests and points of view. It encouraged, for instance, more favourable attitudes to free trade within the Commission.

A similar diversity was shown by the interest groups hovering around the Commission, which were as varied as the fields they covered but which the Commission had to take account of — whether they were professional associations, such as agricultural organisations, or more specific bodies. In the absence of set rules, the Commission followed a 'sectoral' approach until the mid-1980s, favouring professional associations that were well established in the Brussels coterie. Preparations for the Single European Act and the increasing number of bodies that the Commission had to deal with brought about a change in its approach and perspective.

Four Colleges of commissioners facing the challenges of the day

Between 1973 and 1986 there were four Colleges and 45 commissioners. The Colleges of this period had different styles, statutes and dynamics, but the



In the wake of enlargement and with the number of officials rising, the Commission had to develop new buildings, despite the ongoing disagreement about the official site of the Community.

Commission managed to operate in a generally collegial spirit, regardless of how influential each president was. There was also notable progress in the workings of the cabinets, where sensitivities relating to national interests gradually gave way to the search for consensus.

The Ortolí Commission consisted of 13 members as a result of the 1973 enlargement. Its success in encouraging cooperation amongst commissioners lent

more weight to their joint decisions. This was even more necessary in view of the creation of the European Council, a meeting of the heads of state or government attended by the president of the Commission. The international context had also convinced the president that the Communities' responsibilities had to increase. The general climate had an adverse effect on the Commission's work and it was struggling to cope with the renegotiation of the United Kingdom's accession conditions and the crisis in relations with the United States. Even so, the Commission intended not only to retain the initiative on social policy, transport and aid to developing countries, but also to create a regional and an environmental policy. However, the resolutions of the Paris Summit of October 1972 could only be implemented very gradually. For example, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was not created until 18 March 1975. Despite the modesty of the fund's initial budget, this was a key moment in the period covered by this volume, with the birth of a regional policy giving concrete expression to European solidarity.

The Ortolí Commission was also deeply involved in the debate about Greek accession. In 1976, there were doubts as to Greece's capacity to become a member, doubts which were shared by several Member States. Under Jenkins, the 'new cold war' context and the evolution of German and French attitudes altered the situation. The Member States finally supported Greece's candidacy, as much for political or geopolitical reasons, in view of its strategic location, as for economic ones. The prospect of a new government taking office in 1981 led to fears of the accession being challenged, since Andreas Papandreou's Pasok party had promised a referendum on the issue once in power. Rather than renegotiating, Athens obtained temporary derogations from Community policies and an increase in aid ⁽¹⁾. With the accession of Greece on 1 January 1981, the European landscape changed slightly, even if the European Communities increased in size by only 9.4 million inhabitants.

With the selection of Roy Jenkins as president of the Commission, championed by the leaders of Germany and France, the reins passed to a man who enjoyed a certain prestige both within his own country and abroad, and who had also been one of the supporters of British accession to the EEC. Jenkins failed, however, to make the British government more 'European': the Callaghan government decided not to join the European Monetary System (EMS), whilst Thatcher fought for revision of the British contribution to the European budget. Under Jenkins's Presidency, other strong personalities, such as the former president, Ortolí, who stayed on as vice-president, and Étienne Davignon, played a major role, whether in relation to economic and monetary union, the battle against protectionism or the steel crisis. One of the Commission's roles was to

⁽¹⁾ Gerbet, P., Bossuat, G. and Grosbois, T. (eds), *Dictionnaire historique de l'Europe unie*, André Versaille, Brussels, 2009, p. 546.



François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) hands over to Roy Jenkins (on the left), 6 January 1977.

prevent the establishment of new barriers to trade. In its interpretation of the *Cassis de Dijon* judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979, the Commission seized the opportunity to make a conceptual break with the past and encouraged the process of opening borders, at the instigation of Étienne Davignon in particular.

Although Jenkins did not succeed in transforming the workings of the Commission as he had set out to do, it was under his aegis that the Commission was admitted to G7 meetings. His attempts to assert a stronger European economic identity and to revitalise the process of monetary integration led to the creation of the EMS in 1979, albeit in a different form from what he had envisaged. Nevertheless, the Commission had shown that even in a discouraging climate it could exercise its power of initiative vis-à-vis the Member States. This was further demonstrated by the Commission's activities on the international front, especially during the GATT negotiations, its 1978 action plan for implementing the single market, its social policy, its work on renewal of economic and in-



Roy Jenkins (on the left) hands over to Gaston Thorn (on the right), 6 January 1981.

dustrial structures, and its research policy. Indeed, research was one of the areas in which European integration advanced most in this period, becoming an official policy in its own right under the Single European Act.

Between 1981 and 1985, the Thorn Commission struggled to make its mark in a still difficult climate, even though several commissioners such as Davignon and Ortoli already enjoyed a firmly established reputation. Davignon had to deal with the deepening crisis in the steel industry. He also managed to forge close ties with the European electronic and computing industry and to launch major research programmes such as Esprit. Under Thorn, however, the Commission found itself largely sidelined from the discussions leading up to the Fontainebleau budgetary compromise of June 1984. In the event, the content of the deal struck was not radically different from Thorn's suggestions of the summer of 1981, which had been rejected by the European Council. The solution was thus found in the context of a wider recovery plan, drawn up at the Council's request with the aim of reforming the CAP and supporting common policies in the energy, industry, research and regional policy sectors. It was this type of revitalisation or development plan that provided a focus for the Commission throughout the period: it had already drafted a report on the Community's future in

cealed behind this argument was the French president's fear that he would lose the support of farmers in south-west France in the presidential elections. Were Spain and Portugal to join, the EEC would have a surplus of wine, fruit and vegetables. In addition, both countries faced considerable economic and social challenges, which had in fact been assessed by the Commission. The decisive breakthrough would only be made in June 1985.

Even so, the successes achieved in European integration after 1985 originated for the most part in this period, including the internal market, monetary issues, political cooperation and the adoption of majority voting.

With the arrival of Jacques Delors, who led the Commission for 10 years, the rate of progress would soon accelerate. The Commission played a dynamic role. After the 1986 enlargement, it gained three commissioners, growing from 14 to 17 members. The Fontainebleau Summit finally enabled the question of the British contribution to be resolved. Yet although the economic situation was improving, European leaders had not forgotten the painful setbacks of the 1970s and the need for substantial reform. Under Delors, who could also turn to the reinvigorated Franco–German alliance of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl for support, the Commission succeeded in seizing the opportunities that came its way and was astute enough to focus initially on creating a single market by 1992. The goals of extending majority voting, increasing the European Parliament's legislative role, achieving monetary integration, laying down an environmental policy and becoming more active in foreign policy, competition and justice and internal affairs now seemed within reach. For the first time, Delors managed to establish the Commission's influence within the European Council, seeing it as an opportunity rather than a threat. Relations with the Parliament and the Council also improved, as did public perceptions of 'Europe'. In addition, the Delors Commission brought in new personalities, untainted by the difficulties of the preceding years.

The proposals in the Commission's White Paper on the creation of a single market formed the core of the Single European Act drawn up in December 1985. The Commission played a major part in preparing this text, and in its signing in February 1986. Creating the single market thus became a key task for the Commission in terms of economic and social cohesion, social and research policy, the removal of internal borders, education and culture. There was consistency during the 1973–86 period in the construction of a social Europe. To begin with, a social action programme was adopted, followed by various initiatives in fields as diverse as health and safety at work, equal opportunities, social security for migrant workers and social dialogue. From 1984, the Commission helped to launch a dialogue between European social partners and to incorporate a social dimension into the single market project. Similarly, the accession of Spain and Portugal encouraged an increase in financing for re-

gional policy, as these countries had high rates of unemployment and inflation coupled with lower salaries. In 1986, Spain's unemployment rate was twice the Communities' average, and its GDP per capita was only 77 % of that of the Community of Twelve, whilst Portugal's GDP was only 55 %. Ireland's accession in 1973 had already increased the gap between the richest and poorest regions of the Community. Yet the third enlargement, like the earlier entry of Greece, required steps to be taken to reduce the gap in economic performance between the North and South, and to encourage a more uniform Community through an intensified regional policy, driven by the Commission.

Between history and memory

This work was written following a call for tenders by the Commission, and follows on from the book *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, edited by Professor Michel Dumoulin, who also initiated this volume. Contributions were made by 22 professors, including several holders of a Jean Monnet Chair in history, and researchers from 15 universities and research centres. In alphabetical order, they are: Charles Barthel (Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg), Jan Willem Brouwer (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Netherlands), Éric Bussière (Université de Paris IV — Sorbonne, France), Filippa Chatzistavrou (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Eliamep), University of Athens, Greece), Vincent Dujardin (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Michel Dumoulin (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Jürgen Elvert (Universität zu Köln, Germany), Pierre-Olivier Laloux (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Johnny Laursen (Aarhus Universitet, Denmark), Piers Ludlow (London School of Economics, United Kingdom), Ivo Maes (Banque nationale de Belgique, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Michel Mangenot (Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France), Guia Migani (Université François Rabelais, Tours, France), Élisabeth Palmero (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez (Saxo Institute, Københavns Universitet, Denmark), Sylvain Schirmann (IEP Strasbourg, France), Katja Seidel (University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom), Pierre Tilly (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Christian Van de Velde (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Arthe Van Laer (KADOC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium), Angel Viñas (Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain) and Laurent Warlouzet (London School of Economics, United Kingdom).

To facilitate their work, all the authors were given access to the Commission's archives; a large number of documents had been declassified, giving the researchers privileged access. Since it would be impossible for historians to do their work without the assistance of archivists and librarians, our warmest thanks go to Jocelyne Collonval and her colleagues at the Commission's Historical Archives

Service, who played a major role throughout the process, starting by welcoming researchers and declassifying documents.

It is worth recalling that it was in the 1970s that Deputy Secretary-General Christopher Audland launched a scheme to preserve the archives of the European Communities. With the support of Émile Noël, he prepared a proposal for a regulation on the consultation and systematic storage of the institutions' documents. The archives of the European Communities, managed by the European University Institute in Florence, accordingly welcomed researchers from 1986. The personal archives of Audland and Noël now form part of the numerous private collections deposited there, following the example of Ortoli. The Commission has its own archive service based in Brussels, which was established in 1983 ⁽¹⁾.

Alongside this unpublished material and the rich body of historical work set out in the bibliography, 244 former Commission officials and commissioners were interviewed. Oral testimony can undoubtedly produce two different individual perspectives, those of the interviewer and interviewee, but it increases the range of sources available and offers a glimpse into the minds of those involved in events. Such testimony helps to avoid the writing of a 'bureaucratic' or disembodied history; it brings a more human dimension to the account and makes it easier to recreate contexts and evoke settings. The interviewee can reveal much which is not written down. In this way, oral history sometimes enables the gaps left by archives to be filled in, whilst requiring that historical criticism be adapted to the technique's peculiarities. In gathering people's testimonies, the historian creates new documents and gains the opportunity to compare oral testimony with the available documentation, and even to use these archives to make witnesses react or to stimulate their memories. The interviews conducted and used in compiling this book have been transcribed and validated by the witnesses, and will be made available to researchers on the historical archives website of the European University Institute in Florence. These new sources, whether written or oral, together make up a plentiful and rich collection of resources enabling researchers to shed new light on the Commission's activities between 1973 and 1986.

Following the example of the volume on the history of the Commission between 1958 and 1972, this work applies the concept of 'negotiated interpretation' defined by the public history movement, which has four characteristics: '(i) witnesses and historians engage in a joint investigation of the past; (ii) in response to a commission by an institution; (iii) to serve an educational purpose,

⁽¹⁾ 'European Oral History', interview with Christopher Audland by R. Ranieri as part of the 'Voices on Europe' programme, 11 July 1998.

for example for the institution's staff; and (iv) with due regard to the ethical rules on personal privacy' ⁽¹⁾.

The work was coordinated by the Université catholique de Louvain. An editorial committee was set up in autumn 2012, charged with harmonising texts and communicating with the Commission. The members of the committee were Jan Willem Brouwer, Éric Bussière, Vincent Dujardin, Piers Ludlow and Pierre Tilly. Mention must be made of the crucial work done by Élisabeth Palmero, who as research officer played an important part in the project's day-to-day progress. Valérie Delporte facilitated each person's work by running an efficient secretariat.

This work benefited from the guidance and comments of a steering committee organised by the Commission's Secretariat-General, which brought together active and retired colleagues — Jacqueline Lastenouse, Paolo Ponzano, Georges Rencki, Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi and Jean-Claude Eeckhout. Their suggestions and comments gave rise to plenty of discussions and even debates with the historians, which were sometimes passionate, but always enriching — by bringing differing viewpoints together, the consortium of researchers was ultimately able to form its own opinion.

This book benefits from rich illustrations thanks to the work of Étienne Deschamps. We would also like to thank all those who contributed to gathering and processing the illustrations at the Commission's audiovisual library, the Publications Office and the Joint Research Centre.

Seizing the opportunities

For the Commission, the overall picture of the period from 1973 to 1986 is one of strong continuity with the Treaty of Rome, with guidelines drafted for new policies that are still being developed today, such as the internal market, innovation, research, regional policy, energy and the environment. Between the first and third enlargements, the Commission demonstrated continuity in its objectives and in the means of achieving them. The period was therefore characterised more by consistency than by revolution. With its permanent structure and role as initiator, the Commission has fostered continuity in the European project. This is how objectives such as the internal market have been maintained since the 1960s, how the need to complete that market was presented in similar terms in both the 1970s and the early 1980s and how policies launched at the start of the 1970s — whose roots sometimes go back even further — have been

⁽¹⁾ Dumoulin, M., 'Inventing things as they went along', in *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, p. 17.



On 29 May 1986, the European flag was raised for the first time in front of the Berlaymont in a ceremony marking its official adoption by the Community institutions. These last were represented (from left to right) by Charles Rutten, permanent representative of the Netherlands and representative of the Dutch Presidency of the Council, Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament, and Carlo Ripa di Meana, the member of the Commission responsible, amongst other things, for institutional matters and a people's Europe.

pursued in the longer term. The permanence of the European project thus forms the core culture in the Commission's administration.

Similarly, aside from the increase in the European Parliament's powers and the creation of the European Council, the existing institutional system did not undergo profound changes, but rather adaption. During the 1970s some of its partners within the institutions and in the Member States in particular were indeed tempted by a return to greater autonomy in implementing national policies, and were less willing to invest in the logic of European policy coordination. It did not prove easy to turn a deaf ear to protectionist voices, or to stop seeking solutions on a national or global scale and not on a European one. However, these tendencies did not in the end prevail, and by the early 1980s the Member States were once more inclined to follow the Commission's lead and to turn to Europe as a means of overcoming economic stagnation.

A number of obstacles to progress thus melted away. President Mitterrand showed himself willing to make compromises, particularly concerning enlargement, and Germany and France decided to resolve the conflict over the British budget — this clearly helped matters. Another positive element was the advent in 1985 of a new president of the Commission, who was experienced, determined and willing to work with the Member States' governments rather than in spite of them, at precisely the moment when they needed to forge ahead.

The Chinese word for 'crisis' is made up of two characters: the first means 'danger' and the second means 'opportunity', while the word for opportunity (or chance) is itself made up of this character combined with a second that means 'to know'. Weighing up, discerning and understanding the difficulties of the time, whilst reflecting on the potential opportunities to be grasped — these were the Commission's goals between 1973 and 1986, a period in which we can perceive the origins of the new momentum provided by the Single European Act.

VINCENT DUJARDIN



Part One

Administrative structures and staff



On 16 and 17 September 1978, the Jenkins Commission spent a weekend 'of reflection' in Comblain-la-Tour, in the Belgian Ardennes, to discuss the main problems facing the Community and the Commission. The principal topics broached during the informal weekend, held outside the framework of the Commission's weekly Wednesday meetings, were first and foremost the setting up of a study group — to be led by Dirk Spierenburg — on the administrative reforms required by the institution, but also the future of the Community budget, the common agricultural policy and the forthcoming European Parliament elections and their repercussions for the Commission. From left to right: Finn Olav Gundelach, Christopher Tugendhat, Antonio Giolitti, François-Xavier Ortoli, Henk Vredeling, Roy Jenkins, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Claude Cheysson, Richard Burke, Lorenzo Natali, Raymond Vouel, Guido Brunner and Étienne Davignon.

Introduction

Faced with the first enlargements and the new tasks it had to take on, the Commission had to constantly demonstrate its ability to adapt. The following chapters concern its political and administrative structures, its places of business, its staff and the staff regulations. During the 1970s, the Commission underwent changes with regard to both its structures and procedures, as it was called on simultaneously to deal with a variety of challenges.

The first was that of the successive enlargements and consequently the integration of new officials. But the emergence of new concerns was not without impact either. The 1970s saw the development of new policies, which involved the creation of new services. The number of Commission officials and other staff rose from almost 6 000 in 1973 to over 10 000 in 1985. The drive for efficiency in the administration also prompted developments: financial control, planning and evaluation, and computerisation. The problem of setting up the services also had to be dealt with, in particular with regard to their scattered location in Brussels and in other European cities. The dynamic triggered by the enlargements and various reorganisations collided with the fact that the Commission was unable to implement a long-term buildings policy until the Member States resolved the headquarters issue. In the period

1973–86, the status of Brussels as headquarters was merely provisional.

The second part of this section deals with the College, and primarily with the commissioners, that is the four Colleges and the 45 individuals who successively held these positions, each with its own field of competence, between 1973 and 1986. The president has a key role in the working of the institution, but the individual commissioners and the size of their countries of origin obviously also have a bearing, even if the institution operates on a collegial basis.

The role and working of the cabinets (private offices), essential components of the Commission, depends largely on the personality of the commissioner and the nature of the portfolio for which he or she is responsible. How the work is allocated and methods of working can also vary. Within the cabinets, to an even greater extent than within the College, the sensitivities connected to national interests increasingly gave way to a culture rooted in collegiality and consensus-seeking.

Obviously, throughout this period the Commission was still searching for an effective system of communication. The chapter dedicated to the Spokesmen's

Service deals in particular with the delicate period of the joint management of this service and the Directorate-General (DG) for Information.

The third part of this section is devoted to the Secretariat-General and the Legal Service. The former has a central place in the organisation of the administrative machine, serving the College and its

president. It also provides a link to the Parliament and the Council. The years 1973–86 also saw the consolidation of the essential role of the Legal Service, which gained even greater prestige as a centre of excellence and leadership on European integration issues.

JAN WILLEM BROUWER

Chapter 1

The Commission's organisation, office locations and staff

1.1. Dynamics of organisational change

In 1973, the Commission of the European Communities was a very young institution, three aspects of which should be highlighted from the outset. For one thing, its administrative culture testified to the difficulty of getting some very different national administrative cultures to cohabit effectively. For another, its very youth meant it was less susceptible to suffer from the ossification that can affect older structures. Lastly, its characteristic dynamism, which bore the imprint of the changes generated by the 1967 Merger Treaty and then by the first enlargement, stemmed from the role assigned to it by Article 155 of the EEC Treaty, that is 'in ensuring that the provisions of the treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied'. But the Commission did not restrict itself

to merely being the 'guardian of the treaties', seen by some as a passive role. On the contrary, on the basis of those same treaties, it used its right of initiative to seize the 'windows of opportunity' that opened up or even to create its own ⁽¹⁾, in order to take initiatives which might or might not come to fruition. In this sense, by assuming an executive role, the Commission acted as both a laboratory and an incubator.

Responding to internal and external challenges

To perform this role, which meant taking on board developments in the Community's institutional structure and particularly in the workings of the institutional triangle comprising the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, it relied

⁽¹⁾ Crama, L., 'The European Commission as a multi-organisation: Social policy and IT policy in the EU', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 1, No 2, 1994, pp. 195–217.



In the interests of a more efficient and economical organisation of Europe's administrative machinery, the Commission closed down many of its branch offices in Brussels at the start of the 1970s and began moving officials to the Schuman area.

on the existence of administrative structures. The Commission was formally composed of the College of Commissioners, the Secretariat-General, directorates-general (19 in 1973, 20 in 1977, 22 in 1986) and services, offices and agencies. However, an examination of its structures cannot be confined to a formal presentation. The organisation of the civil service and the nature of the administrative process and its development must also be taken into account ⁽¹⁾ — even if the distinction between institutional organisation and institutional procedures is rather difficult to identify ⁽²⁾.

As illustrated by the changes in the organisation chart, which, moreover, was deemed too 'concise' by the Court of Auditors ⁽³⁾, the structures evolved partly in response to internal needs and partly in response to external challenges. The Commission adapted its administrative structure in line with its role in drawing up and implementing the ever-growing and increasingly complex body of legislative texts and binding rules intended to translate the objectives set out in the treaties. But the evolution of the organisation chart also reflected, probably in a more spectacular fashion, the growing concern to respond to the economic, social and technological challenges faced by European society in a global environment marked by North–South and East–West divides. These two imperatives — internal and ex-

⁽¹⁾ Gualmini, E., 'Restructuring Weberian bureaucracy: Comparing managerial reforms in Europe and the United States', *Public Administration*, Vol. 86, No 1, 2008, p. 76.

⁽²⁾ Bulmer, S. J., 'The governance of the European Union: A new institutionalist approach', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No 4, 1993, p. 360.

⁽³⁾ Court of Auditors, *Annual report concerning the financial year 1983 accompanied by the replies of the institutions*, OJ C 348, 31.12.1984, p. 103.

ternal — required a dynamic of administrative reforms that affected both structures and procedures.

It is striking to note the extent to which the *General Report on the Activities of the European Communities*, which offers so few details about how the structures evolved, regularly and emphatically refers to the studies and reports examining the workings and coordination of departments. The Commission, like other institutions, is marked by the essentially vertical nature of its chain of command. This means that the coordination between directorates-general can be particularly difficult ⁽¹⁾.

That said, the main consideration, namely that of collegiality, without which the dynamics of the institution, which was 'a fundamentally fragmented body' ⁽²⁾, would have been inconceivable, was not exercised solely at the level of the College of Commissioners. It started with the mid-level officials in the directorates-general ⁽³⁾. In other words, although the Commission was embodied by its commissioners, it was also embodied by its officials, who had a wide range of profiles and personalities, some career-driven, some driven by European activism.

In the main, the Commission was based in and worked in Brussels ⁽⁴⁾, although its departments were somewhat spread out across the city. In April 1975, a short- and medium-term programme adopted the principle of grouping those departments in three areas around the Schuman roundabout. Some of its activities, however, were conducted in Luxembourg and elsewhere. In particular, Luxembourg was host to the Statistical Office, the Office for Official Publications of the European Communi-

ties, the Euratom Safeguards Office (Directorate E of DG XVII (Energy)) and parts of DG V (Social Affairs). From 1977 on, most of these departments, which until then had been spread out around the city, were brought together in a building constructed on the Kirchberg plateau. Also worth mentioning are the four establishments that made up the Joint Research Centre (JRC), which were located respectively in Belgium (Geel), Germany (Karlsruhe), Italy (Ispra) and the Netherlands (Petten), but with administrative coordination established in Brussels under the authority, from 1981 on, of Stelio Villani, Deputy Director-General of DG XII (Science, Research and Development).

Without dwelling here on the College of Commissioners, the Secretariat-General and the Legal Service, which are discussed further below, it is important to bear in mind that structural changes took different forms depending on the underlying reasons. There were a number of types of change.

Different patterns of development

The first was that of a directorate or a service which subsequently became a directorate-general. Here are four examples. Directorate D of the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI) was responsible for fisheries. In 1977, it became the Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG XIV). The Administration of the Customs Union Service was transformed into DG XXI under the name Customs Union and Indirect Taxation in 1986. Responding to the needs created by successive enlargements, in 1981 Directorate E, Interpreters and Conference Services, of DG IX (Personnel and Administration), became the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service (SCIC) ⁽⁵⁾, the head of which initially held the grade of director before acquiring

⁽¹⁾ Nugent, N., *The Government and Politics of the European Community*, 2nd edn, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, pp. 69–72.

⁽²⁾ Smith, A., 'Why European Commissioners matter', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, No 3, 2003, p. 140.

⁽³⁾ Bulmer, S.J., 'The governance of the European Union: A new institutional approach', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No 4, 1993, p. 361.

⁽⁴⁾ See section 1.2, 'The eternal question of location'.

⁽⁵⁾ This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5: see box 'The challenge of the first enlargements for the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service (SCIC)', pp. 166–67.

‘Finding solutions is a task for the administrations concerned’

‘The organisation of the service, the choice of working methods and their adaptation to the changing demands made upon it must be achieved in such a way as to ensure efficient use of staff and sound financial management. It is incumbent upon the relevant administrations to find solutions to the problems that arise in these areas’ ⁽¹⁾.

‘Staff, methods of management and evaluation’

‘As a result of in-depth review of the structures and operation of its departments ..., the Commission was able to reorganise 10 or so directorates-general and to redeploy staff within departments as required by the objectives and priorities which the Commission had set itself.

In view of this constructive experience and the growing complexity of structures and administrative procedures the Commission decided that it wanted to have permanently at hand means of regularly and systematically adjusting the structures and establishment plans of its departments and of improving its organisation methods. It therefore set up an “Establishment, Organisation and Evaluation Department” and an inspection system for certain specific sectors of activity’ ⁽²⁾.

Computerisation

‘The data-processing strategy for the years 1985–90 defined in 1984 is being steadily implemented. The architecture options adopted, notably the multi-manufacturers procurement policy and the adherence to common standards, have now been vindicated by the approach and options adopted by the main computer manufacturers and large multinationals.

In 1986 ... some 100 new projects are being developed: traffic on the data-transmission network tripled in volume in 1986; total computing power (mainframe and distributed) should increase sixfold and storage capacity fourfold between 1985 and 1990; some 40 local minicomputers and almost 400 microcomputers are to be installed each year between 1986 and 1988’ ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Court of Auditors, *Annual report concerning the financial year 1978 accompanied by the replies of the institutions*, OJ C 326, 31.12.1979, p. 137.

⁽²⁾ EC Commission, *Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1975*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 21.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, pp. 46–47.

director-general status. A further example was the response to a social challenge. The service for the environment and consumer protection inherited the number of the old Directorate-General for the Internal Market to become DG XI (Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety) in 1981, with responsibility for the latter inherited directly from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) ⁽¹⁾.

In the second scenario, administrative bodies were brought together and merged. This was the case for DG III (Industrial and Technological Affairs) and DG XI (Internal Market), which merged in 1977 to become DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs).

The third case, which was similar, involved the creation of a new directorate-general for policy areas which until then had been the responsibility of one or more other DGs. One example is the creation in 1986 of DG XXII (Coordination of Structural Instruments), which took over activities that until then had been covered by DG VII and DG XVI.

The case of the Spokesman's Group, which became the Spokesman's Service, was rather special ⁽²⁾. For a short time (only a few years) it was incorporated into the Directorate-General for Information (DG X) so that information and communication could be placed under one sole authority, in this case the president of the Commission.

Lastly, it should be noted that, in addition to the cases we have mentioned here concerning the evolution of existing structures, the period in question saw the birth of working groups or task forces, which over time, because of their remit, warranted continuity or led to organisational adjustments. For

example, 1981 saw the creation of a task force on 'Industrial innovation and support to telematics coordination', which was close to DG XIII (Information Market and Innovation). Five years later, the task force, now known as 'Information and telecommunications technologies', was placed under the authority of a director-general. The astonishing scientific and technological progress made in the sectors in question more than justified the existence of an ad hoc structure. Developments in another area — small and medium-sized enterprises, which occupied a major place in the economic and social fabric — could be considered unusual. This sector came under Directorate F of DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs), when a specific task force was set up at the start of 1986.

It would be impossible to describe in detail the changes in the Commission's structure in this period, particularly since the elimination of part of a title of an administrative unit did not necessarily mean that the corresponding tasks had disappeared with it. DG V (Employment and Social Affairs and Education) was a good example of this ⁽³⁾. Its Directorate D was in charge of working conditions and migration policies. The latter disappeared from the organisation chart in 1986 but this did not mean that the Commission had suddenly lost interest in this important area.

This last example also illustrates how important it is to weigh up carefully the words used. The rechristening of the Spokesman's Group as the Spokesman's Service when it was integrated into DG X was not insignificant. Likewise, the fact that in DG VI (Agriculture), Directorate B responsible for agricultural legislation had been split into two to create a Directorate B.II more specifically focused on issues relating to 'quality' and 'health' was a good illustration of the new and growing concern about veter-

⁽¹⁾ On the process leading up to the creation of DG XI, see Cini, M., 'Administrative culture in the European Commission: the cases of competition and environment', in Nugent, N. (ed.), *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission*, Macmillan, London, 1997, pp. 71–88.

⁽²⁾ See section 2.3, 'The Spokesman's Group (later the Spokesman's Service)'.

⁽³⁾ See Pierson, P., 'The path to European integration: A historical institutional analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No 2, 1996, pp. 123–163.



1973–77



President Ortoli, François-Xavier (FR)

HoC: de Margerie, Philippe
(1973–76)
Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis
(1976–77)



I — External Relations (VP) Soames, Christopher (UK)

HoC: Hannay, David

DG: Wellenstein, Edmund (1973–76)
Hijzen, Theodorus (1976–77)



II — Economic and Financial Affairs (VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)

HoC: Froschmaier, Franz

DG: Mosca, Ugo



III — Industrial and Technological Affairs

Spinelli, Altiero (IT)
1973–76

HoC: Perissich, Riccardo

Guazzaroni, Cesidio (IT)
1976–77

HoC: Perissich, Riccardo



(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)
for steel
1976–77

HoC: Trappeniens, Félix

DG: Grierson, Ronald (1973–74)



IV — Competition Borschette, Albert (LU) 1973–76

HoC: Sunnen, Robert

Vouel, Raymond (LU)
1976–77

HoC: Sunnen, Robert

DG: Schlieder, Willy



V — Social Affairs (VP) Hillery, Patrick John (IE) 1973–76

HoC: Fitzgibbon, Edwin


DG: Shanks, Michael (1973–75)
Degimbe, Jean (1976–77)



VI — Agriculture Lardinois, Petrus Josephus (Pierre) (NL)

HoC: Wijnmaalen, Hans

DG: Rabot, Louis Georges



VII — Transport (VP) Scarascia Mugnozza, Carlo (IT)

HoC: Jacoangeli, Giuseppe
(1973–75)
Toledano-Laredo, Armando
(1975–77)

DG: Le Goy, Raymond



VIII — Development and Cooperation

Deniau, Jean-François (FR)
1973

HoC: Chapperon, Jean

Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1973–77

HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)

DG: Krohn, Hans-Broder



IX — Personnel and Administration

Borschette, Albert (LU)
1973–76

HoC: Sunnen, Robert

Ortoli, François-Xavier (FR)
1976–77

HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis

DG: Baichère, Pierre



X — Information (VP) Scarascia Mugnozza, Carlo (IT)

HoC: Jacoangeli, Giuseppe
(1973–75)
Toledano-Laredo, Armando
(1975–77)

DG: Ronan, Seán

**XI — Internal Market****Gundelach, Finn Olav (DK)**HoC: Caspari, Manfred (1973–74)
Petersen, Niels Helveg (1974–77)

DG: Braun, Fernand

**XVI — Regional Policy****Thomson, George (UK)**HoC: Morgan, Gwyn (1973–75)
Jenkins, Michael (1975–77)

DG: Ruggiero, Renato

**Secretary-General****Noël, Émile (FR)****XII — Research, Science and Education****Dahrendorf, Ralf (DE)**

1973–74

HoC: Gläsner, Hans

Brunner, Guido (DE)

1974–77

HoC: Möhler, Rolf

DG: Schuster, Günter

**XVII — Energy and Nuclear Safety****(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)**HoC: Somers, Jean (1973–75)
Vanden Abeele, Michel (1975)
Trappeniers, Félix (1976–77)DG: Spaak, Fernand (1973–75)
Williams, Leonard (1976–77)**XVIII — Credit and Investments****(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)**

HoC: Froschmaier, Franz

DG: Nicoletti, Antonino

**XIII — Scientific and Technical Information and Information Management****Dahrendorf, Ralf (DE)**

1973–74

HoC: Gläsner, Hans

Brunner, Guido (DE)

1974–77

HoC: Möhler, Rolf

DG: Appleyard, Raymond

**XIX — Budgets****Deniau, Jean-François (FR)**

1973

HoC: Chaperon, Jean

Cheysson, Claude (FR)

1973–77

HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)

DG: Van Gronsveld, Jozef

**XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation****(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)**

1973–77

HoC: Somers, Jean (1973–75)
Vanden Abeele, Michel (1975)
Trappeniers, Félix (1976–77)**Guazzaroni, Cesidio (IT)**

1976–77

HoC: Perissich, Riccardo

DG: Alban-Hansen, Erik

**XX — Financial Control****Deniau, Jean-François (FR)**

1973

HoC: Chaperon, Jean

Cheysson, Claude (FR)

1973–77

HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)

DG: Facini, Carlo

**Legal Service**Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director-General: Much, Walter (1973–74)**Spokesman's Group**Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Spokesman: Olivi, Beniamino**Statistical Office**Commissioner: Dahrendorf, Ralf, then Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Mayer, Jacques**Administration of the Customs Union**Commissioner: Gundelach, Finn Olav
Director: Pingel, Klaus**Environment and Consumer Protection Service**Commissioner: Scarascia Mugnozza, Carlo
Director: Carpentier, Michel**Joint Research Centre**Commissioner: Dahrendorf, Ralf, then Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Caprioglio, Pietro (1973–74),
then Villani, Stelio (1974–77)**Euratom Supply Agency**Commissioner: Simonet, Henri
Director-General: Oboussier, Félix**Office for Official Publications of the European Communities**Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director: Knaff, Louis N. (1973–74),
then Verheyden, Walter (1975–77)



1977–81



President Jenkins, Roy (UK)

HoC: Tickell, Crispin



I — External Relations

(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)

HoC: Froschmaier, Franz

DG: Denman, Roy



V — Employment and Social Affairs

(VP) Vredeling, Henk (NL)

HoC: Cohen, Robert (1977)
Barendregt, Nel (1978–81)

DG: Degimbe, Jean



IX — Personnel and Administration

Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)

HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
Neville-Jones, Pauline
(1980–81)

DG: Baichère, Pierre



II — Economic and Financial Affairs

(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier
(FR)HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis
(1977–78)
de Boissieu, Pierre (1978–81)DG: Mosca, Ugo (1977–78)
Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (1979–81)

VI — Agriculture

(VP) Gundelach, Finn Olav
(DK)HoC: Larsen, Arne (1977)
Løkkegaard, Knud (1978)
Lyrtoft-Petersen, Erik (1978–81)DG: Rabot, Louis Georges
(1977–78)
Villain, Claude (1978–81)

X — Spokesman's Group and Directorate-General for Information

(P) Jenkins, Roy (UK)

HoC: Tickell, Crispin

Spokesman and DG:
Ruggiero, Renato (1977–78)
Perlot, Enzo (1978–80)

III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs

Davignon, Étienne (BE)

HoC: Paemen, Hugo (from 1978)
Defraigne, Pierre
for industrial affairs
(from 1978)

DG: Braun, Fernand



VII — Transport

Burke, Richard (IE)

HoC: Hogan, John

DG: Le Goy, Raymond



XII — Research, Science and Education

Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)

IV — Competition

Vouel, Raymond (LU)

HoC: Sonnen, Robert

DG: Schlieder, Willy




VIII — Development

Cheysson, Claude (FR)

HoC: Soubestre, Philippe

DG: Meyer, Klaus

Burke, Richard (IE)
except for international nuclear
relations (Davignon, Étienne)
1980–81

HoC: Hogan, John

DG: Schuster, Günter





XIII — Science, Research and Development (until October 1980)

Information Market and Innovation

Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80

HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)

Davignon, Étienne (BE)
1980–81

HoC: Paemen, Hugo

DG: Appleyard, Raymond



XVII — Energy

Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80

HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)

Davignon, Étienne (BE)
1980–81

HoC: Paemen, Hugo

DG: Williams, Leonard



Secretary-General

Noël, Émile (FR)



XIV — Fisheries

Gundelach, Finn Olav (DK)

CC: Larsen, Arne (1977)
Løkkegaard, Knud (1978)
Lyrtoft-Petersen, Erik (1978–81)

DG: Gallagher, Eamonn



XVIII — Credit and Investment

(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier (FR)

HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis (1977–78)
de Boissieu, Pierre (1978–81)

DG: Nicoletti, Antonino



XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation

Burke, Richard (IE)
for taxation

HoC: Hogan, John

Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)
for financial institutions

HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
Neville-Jones, Pauline (1981–82)

DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus



XIX — Budget

Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)

HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
Neville-Jones, Pauline (1980–81)

DG: Strasser, Daniel



XX — Financial Control

Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)

HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
Neville-Jones, Pauline (1980–81)

DG: Facini, Carlo

Legal Service

Commissioner: Jenkins, Roy
Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter

Statistical Office

Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director-General: Dornonville de la Cour, Aage

Customs Union Service

Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne
Director: Pingel, Klaus (1977–79),
then Klein, Friedrich (1980–81)

Environment and Consumer Protection Service

Commissioner: Natali, Lorenzo,
for the environment, and
Burke, Richard, for consumer protection
Head of service: Carpentier, Michel

Joint Research Centre

Commissioner: Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Villani, Stelio

Euratom Supply Agency

Commissioner: Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Mennicken, Jan-Baldem

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

Commissioner: Tugendhat, Christopher
Director: Verheyden, Walter

Enlargement and Nuclear Safety

Commissioner: Natali, Lorenzo (IT)



XVI — Regional Policy

Giolitti, Antonio (IT)

HoC: Cafagna, Luciano

DG: Mathijssen, Pierre



1981–85



President Thorn, Gaston (LU)

HoC: Ries, Adrien (1981)
Spaak, Fernand (1981)
Durieux, Jean (1981–85)



I — External Relations

(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)
including nuclear affairs

HoC: Rhein, Eberhard (1981–84)

(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
for enlargement and overall
Mediterranean policy

HoC: Pensa, Paolo



DG: Denman, Roy (1981–82)
Fielding, Leslie (1982–85)



III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs

(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
for industrial affairs

HoC: Defraigne, Pierre (1981–83)
Paemen, Hugo (1983–85)

Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
for the internal market

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich



DG: Braun, Fernand
Task force: Information and
Telecommunications Technologies (from 1983)
DG: Carpentier, Michel



VII — Transport

Contogeorgis, Giorgios (EL)

HoC: Yennimatas, Ioannis

DG: Steele, John Roderic



VIII — Development

Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1981

HoC: Soubestre, Philippe (1981)



II — Economic and Financial Affairs

(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier
(FR)

HoC: de Boissieu, Pierre

DG: Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso
(1981–83)
Russo, Massimo (1983–85)



IV — Competition

Andriessen, Frans (NL)

HoC: Trojan, Carlo

DG: Caspari, Manfred



V — Employment and Social Affairs, Education

Richard, Ivor (UK)

HoC: Hughes, Aneurin

DG: Degimbe, Jean



VI — Agriculture

Dalsager, Poul (DK)

HoC: Juul Jørgensen, Ove


DG: Villain, Claude



IX — Personnel and Administration

O'Kennedy, Michael (IE)
1981–82

HoC: Fitzgibbon, Edwin



Burke, Richard (IE)
1982–85

HoC: Hourican, Liam

DG: Morel, Jean-Claude



**X — Information****(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)**

HoC: Pensa, Paolo

(P) Thorn, Gaston (LU)
for the Spokesman's Group

HoC: Durieux, Jean

DG: Froschmaier, Franz

Spokesman: Santarelli, Manuel

**XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation****(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)**HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline (1981–82)
Lever, Paul (1982–85)

DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus

**XVI — Regional Policy****Giolitti, Antonio (IT)**

HoC: Perissich, Riccardo

DG: Mathijssen, Petrus (Pierre)

**XI — Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety****Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)**

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich

DG: Andreopoulos, Athanase

**XVII — Energy****(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)**

HoC: Paemen, Hugo

DG: Audland, Christopher

**XII — Science, Research and Development****(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)**

HoC: Paemen, Hugo

DG: Fasella, Paolo

**XVIII — Credit and Investment****(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier (FR)**

HoC: de Boissieu, Pierre

DG: Nicoletti, Antonino (1981–82)
Cioffi, Enrico (1983–85)**XIII — Information Market and Innovation****Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)**

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich

DG: Appleyard, Raymond

**XIX — Budget****(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)**HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline (1981–82)
Lever, Paul (1982–85)

DG: Strasser, Daniel

**XIV — Fisheries****Contogeorgis, Giorgios (EL)**

HoC: Yennimatas, Ioannis

DG: Gallagher, Eamonn

**XX — Financial Control****(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)**HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline (1981–82)
Lever, Paul (1982–85)

DG: Facini, Carlo

**Secretary-General****Noël, Émile (FR)****Legal Service**

Commissioner: Thorn, Gaston

Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter

Joint Interpreting and Conference ServiceCommissioner: O'Kennedy, Michael, *then* Burke, Richard
Director: Van Hoof, Renée**Statistical Office**

Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne

Director-General: Dornonville de la Cour, Aage (1981–82), *then* de Geus, Pieter (1983–85)**Customs Union Service**

Commissioner: Narjes, Karl-Heinz

Director: Klein, Friedrich

Joint Research Centre

Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne

Director-General: Villani, Stelio (1981–82), *then* Dinkespiller, Jean-Albert (1982–86)**Euratom Supply Agency**

Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne

Director-General: Mennicken, Jan-Baldem (1981–83), *then* von Klitzing, Georg (1983–85)**Office for Official Publications of the European Communities**Commissioner: O'Kennedy, Michael, *then* Burke, Richard

Director: Verheyden, Walter



1985–86



President
Delors, Jacques (FR)

HoC: Lamy, Pascal

**I — External Relations****De Clercq, Willy (BE)**

HoC: Schaub, Alexander



Cheysson, Claude (FR)
for Mediterranean policy
and North–South relations

HoC: Soubestre, Philippe



(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
for enlargement

HoC: Pensa, Paolo

DG: Fielding, Leslie

**II — Economic and Financial Affairs****Pfeiffer, Alois (DE)**

HoC: Dibelius, Otto

DG: Russo, Massimo

**III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs**

(VP) Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
for industrial affairs and information
technology

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich



(VP) Cockfield, Arthur (UK)
for the internal market

HoC: Fortescue, Adrian

**IV — Competition****Sutherland, Peter (IE)**

HoC: O'Toole, Richard

DG: Caspari, Manfred

**V — Employment, Social Affairs and Education****Pfeiffer, Alois (DE)**for employment
HoC: Dibelius, Otto

Sutherland, Peter (IE)
for social affairs
and education

HoC: O'Toole, Richard



(VP) Marín, Manuel (ES)

HoC: Gómez-Reino Lecoq, Santiago

DG: Degimbe, Jean



Matutes, Abel (ES)
for the SME Task Force

From 1986

HoC: Prat y Coll, Juan

DG: Braun, Fernand

Task force: Information
and Telecommunications
Technologies (up to 1986)

DG: Carpentier, Michel

Task force: Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (from 1986)

Director: Mayhew, Alan

**VI — Agriculture****(VP) Andriessen, Frans (NL)**

HoC: Trojan, Carlo

DG: Legras, Guy

**VII — Transport****Clinton Davis, Stanley (UK)**

HoC: Meadows, Graham

DG: Steele, John Roderic
(1985–86)

Peña Abizanda, Eduardo
(from 1986)

**VIII — Development****(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)**

HoC: Pensa, Paolo

DG: Frisch, Dieter

**IX — Personnel and Administration**

(VP) Christophersen, Henning (DK)

HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne

DG: Morel, Jean-Claude (1985–86)
Hay, Richard (from 1986)

**X — Information, Communication and Culture****Ripa di Meana, Carlo (IT)**

HoC: Perissich, Riccardo

DG: Froschmaier, Franz



XI — Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety

Clinton Davis, Stanley (UK)
HoC: Meadows, Graham



Varfis, Grigoris (EL)
for consumer protection
(from 1986)

HoC: Mitsos, Achilleas

DG: Fairclough, Anthony John
(from 1986)



Secretary-General

Noël, Émile (FR)



XII — Science, Research and Development

(VP) Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich

DG: Fasella, Paolo



XVI — Regional Policy

Varfis, Grigoris (EL)

HoC: Mitsos, Achilleas

Pfeiffer, Alois (DE)

HoC: Dibelius, Otto



DG: Mathijsen, Pierre (1985–86)
Landaburu, Eneko (from 1986)



XIII — Information Market and Innovation

(up to 1986)

Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation

Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)

HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich

DG: Appleyard, Raymond (to 1986)
then Carpentier, Michel

Task force: Information and Telecommunications Technologies

DG: Carpentier, Michel



XVII — Energy

Mosar, Nicolas (LU)

HoC: Peters, John (1985–86)

Thurmes, Fernand (from 1986)

DG: Audland, Christopher
(1985–86)



XIV — Fisheries

(VP) Andriessen, Frans (NL)

HoC: Trojan, Carlo



Cardoso e Cunha, António José Baptista (PT)

HoC: Cabral da Fonseca, Eurico Luís

DG: Gallagher, Eamonn



XVIII — Credit and Investments

Pfeiffer, Alois (DE)

HoC: Dibelius, Otto

Matutes, Abel (ES)

HoC: Prat y Coll, Juan

DG: Cioffi, Enrico



XIX — Budgets

(VP) Christophersen, Henning (DK)

HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne

DG: Strasser, Daniel (1985–86)
Morel, Jean-Claude (from 1986)



XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation

(up to 1986)

Financial Institutions and Company Law

(VP) Cockfield, Arthur (UK)

HoC: Fortescue, Adrian

DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus (until 1986)
Fitchew, Geoffrey



XX — Financial Control

(VP) Christophersen, Henning (DK)

HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne

DG: Facini, Carlo

Legal Service

Commissioner: Delors, Jacques

Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter

Spokesman's Service

Commissioner: Delors, Jacques

Spokesman: Paemen, Hugo

Joint Interpreting and Conference Service

Commissioner: Delors, Jacques

Director: Van Hoof, Renée

Statistical Office

Commissioner: Pfeiffer, Alois

Director-General: Ronchetti, Silvio

Customs Union Service (up to 1986)

Commissioner: Cockfield, Arthur

Director: Klein, Friedrich

Joint Research Centre

Commissioner: Narjes, Karl-Heinz

Director-General: Dinkespiler, Jean-Albert (1985–86),
then Contzen, Jean-Pierre (from 1986)

Euratom Supply Agency

Commissioner: Mosar, Nicolas

Director-General: von Klitzing, Georg

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

Commissioner: Mosar, Nicolas

Director: Verheyden, Walter

inary matters. Yet another example is provided by DG XII (Research, Science and Education), which became Science, Research and Development in 1981, when that DG created a new directorate dealing with ‘energy R & D strategy’, the name of which constituted a whole programme in itself, since in the wake of the second oil crisis, a strategy had to be developed for this vital sector along with provisions to implement a research and development approach undoubtedly inspired by corporate culture.

While the organisation chart and its evolution might reveal some broad tendencies in the dynamics at work, it provides little or no information on the importance of certain structures, such as the translation service of DG IX which was part of Directorate D, Translation, Documentation, Reproduction and Library. With 955 translators by the end of 1985, the service soon became a completely separate directorate ⁽¹⁾.

Efforts to respond to internal and external challenges not only meant adapting vertical structures, but also (as already mentioned) efforts towards horizontal coordination, which was barely taken into account in the organisation chart ⁽²⁾, and a quest for efficiency.

The quest for efficiency

As already noted, the General Report was so discreet as to be practically silent on the nature of the changes that occurred within the Commission’s internal organisation. However, it had a lot to say, albeit in very general terms, on how the institution was on a perpetual quest for ever greater efficiency — a quest

for efficiency which raised the question of what objectives were set and what means were deployed, and how to monitor the achievement of those objectives and the use of those means.

Objectives

In terms of objectives, we must concentrate on the essentials. Every year the Commission president or — as was the case in February 1974 — one of its vice-presidents gave a policy address in the European Parliament, certain points of which were set out in more detail in an additional memorandum which was published afterwards ⁽³⁾. At the very end of the period studied here, there was a symbolic change. In February 1986, Jacques Delors presented the Commission work programme for that year to the MEPs. This presentation was based on a document which had been sent to Parliament in advance. It was the subject of a debate during which the president answered questions from the MEPs ⁽⁴⁾. In addition to this type of general policy statement which, it must be said, acquired a clearer outline and content under Delors, we must point out that until 1984 it was up to the Commission to set out its priorities for each president of the Council before the latter took office. However, things were to change. From that point on, the Commission was faced with the work programme of rotating Council Presidencies, which formalised the objectives for their particular 6-month term.

The fact that these two changes took place in a short space of time was no coincidence. It also explains why ‘the main lines of the modernisation policy endorsed by the Commission in September 1985’

⁽¹⁾ European Commission, *History of Translation at the European Commission*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2010, pp. 24–25; see also box ‘The translation services’ in Chapter 5, pp. 164–165.

⁽²⁾ Except in regard to the relations between DG II and the European Investment Bank or between the Statistical Office and the services of the European institutions based in Brussels.

⁽³⁾ The text of the policy address and that of the additional memorandum were published in the *General Report on the Activities of the European Communities* in 1973, 1974 and 1975. From 1976 to 1983 they were published separately.

⁽⁴⁾ See ‘Programme of the Commission for 1986: Statement by Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, to the European Parliament and his reply to the ensuing debate, Strasbourg, 19 February 1986’, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 1, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986.

were incorporated in an action plan, which aimed 'to set clear objectives for each department within the framework of the annual work programme adopted by the Commission and to focus efforts on them' ⁽¹⁾.

Management and organisation ⁽²⁾

The will clearly expressed here was not really anything new. Indeed, in 1980, on the basis of the report from a group of members of the Commission chaired by François-Xavier Ortoli, the Commission adopted a set of measures aimed at implementing the recommendations of part 3 of an earlier report on administrative policy, the 1978 Spierenburg report ⁽³⁾. Furthermore, it is worth noting that from 1975 the Commission created an Establishment, Organisation and Evaluation Department as a permanent means of 'regularly and systematically adjusting the structures and establishment plans of its departments and of improving its organisation methods' ⁽⁴⁾. But it is curious, to say the least, that while the Court of Auditors took pains to point out that the Commission was the only European institution with such a department ⁽⁵⁾, it was not until 1981 that a mention of it was made in the organisation chart, where it was shown as attached to the deputy director-general of DG IX. In practice, it is difficult to measure the impact of the action of this department and of the Spierenburg and Ortoli reports, but one thing that emerged nevertheless was the Court of Auditors' comment in 1983 that 'an explanation based on duties performed, regarding the total number of posts and their distribution

between departments was not directly available at the Commission', which made it 'desirable, both for the Commission and for the budgetary authority, to have a more complete method for assessing workloads and more operational criteria for determining the posts required' ⁽⁶⁾. This undoubtedly sheds more light on one of the reasons for drawing up the plan of September 1985. The strategy for implementing that plan involved the organisation of a seminar on 25 and 26 April 1986 entitled 'Management and organisation' aimed at directors-general, while a series of further seminars were held for directors, heads of divisions and specialised departments, and assistants to directors-general, followed, in 1987, by measures for other categories of staff ⁽⁷⁾.

Financial resources and the monitoring of their use

Achieving objectives involving the mobilisation of human resources also meant deploying financial resources and monitoring them.

The budget ⁽⁸⁾ was the responsibility of DG XIX. Its structure, which became somewhat simplified over the years, was a faithful reflection of its mission, as it was organised into three directorates, the names of which in 1986 — 'Expenditure', 'Resources' and 'Budget Execution' — pointed to an evident concern for efficiency. Monitoring was both internal and external. The latter took several forms which involved, to varying degrees, the Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors, whose first report covered the year 1977. Internal financial monitoring was the responsibility of DG XX (Financial Control) and its director-general was called

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44.

⁽²⁾ These aspects are explored in more detail in Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1980*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 30.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, *Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1975*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 21.

⁽⁵⁾ Court of Auditors, *Annual report concerning the financial year 1978 accompanied by the replies of the institutions*, OJ C 326, 31.12.1979, p. 137.

⁽⁶⁾ Court of Auditors, *Annual report concerning the financial year 1983 accompanied by the replies of the institutions*, OJ C 348, 31.12.1984, p. 103.

⁽⁷⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44. These aspects are explored in more detail in Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

⁽⁸⁾ On the budget, see Chapter 11, 'The politics of the Community budget'.

the financial controller. From 1981 on, DG XX was also responsible for monitoring expenditure on social and regional policy (DGs V and XVI, respectively) and in 1986 its remit was extended to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). Responsibility for overseeing the growing number of external offices and delegations was assigned to the Secretariat-General in 1982.

Evaluation

Another task which became increasingly important for the institution was evaluating the results achieved in relation to the objectives set and assessing the costs involved. In this respect, the September 1985 plan seems to have been a major turning point. However, we need to be careful here since it is obvious that, as was the case elsewhere, certain practices were being employed well before they were reflected in the organisational structure. Notwithstanding this caveat, an examination of the 1986 organisation chart shows some examples of what constituted a general trend: ‘development analysis and forecast’ and ‘general programming questions’ in DG VIII, ‘implementation of programmes’ in DG XI, ‘*ex post* evaluation’ in DG XVI and ‘economic and financial assessment’ in DG XIX. It is also worth noting that all these administrative units were under the direct authority of the director-general or the deputy director-general of the DG concerned.

The challenge of computerisation

During the 1970s and the early 1980s, informatics came under the domain of DG IX, in which a new directorate specifically for this sector appeared in 1981. At the same time, a management committee for data processing in the Commission acted as a sort of computer user group. The priority then was calculating officials’ salaries, managing the budget and general documentation. Performing these and other tasks, including those of the Statistical Office, required a computing centre equipped with large computers, the choice of manufacturer of

which owed more to political motivations (prioritising European production) than to managerial logic (reliability and efficiency of resources) ⁽¹⁾. The difficulties of the European IT industry now meant the problem had to be tackled head-on at a time when microcomputers were being introduced by Microsoft and Apple. The challenge was consequently twofold: introducing these office tools across the board was an entirely natural part of the Commission’s modernisation policy, as computerisation made it possible to streamline work ⁽²⁾, increase efficiency ⁽³⁾ and thus increase productivity ⁽⁴⁾; at the same time the Commission also had to address a considerable number of technical problems and organise its services. Some people found this dual challenge impossible to resolve, to the point where in June 1981 the Parliament passed a resolution recommending that an agency be set up to handle all the institutions’ data-processing activities ⁽⁵⁾. Although this never got off the ground, the recommendation illustrated a concern that was emphasised by international consultants at the time, namely ‘the gradual strengthening of the planning function and preparation of an action plan to secure more effective management of data processing in the Commission’ ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ De Michelis, A., ‘The difficult years: From 1981 to 1985’, in De Michelis, A. and Chantraine, A. (eds), *Memoirs of Eurostat: 50 Years Serving Europe*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2003, p. 115.

⁽²⁾ EC Commission, *Eleventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1977*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1978, p. 38.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Seventeenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1983*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1984, p. 29.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, *Nineteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1985*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986, p. 46.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, *Fifteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1981*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1982, p. 38.

⁽⁶⁾ *Ibid.*

Emergence of 'new public management' at the Commission

The concerns raised and reforms prompted by the formal administrative structure and by the organisation of the civil service and of administrative procedures and processes testify to the penetration of managerial thinking at the Commission ⁽¹⁾. The neo-liberal wind blowing from the United Kingdom and then the United States with regard to administrative matters had a decisive impact at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, as it brought with it the practice of 'new public management' (NPM), whose 'more value for money' motto

was emblematic of a doctrine that was perhaps not as straightforward as it might seem ⁽²⁾.

The aim of NPM was not to dismantle public organisations but to 'save' them, by importing into the public sector the body of knowledge, techniques and best practices which had proven efficient in the private sector. The conviction that reforms of a mainly organisational nature would improve administrative performance ⁽³⁾ drove a movement which, it has been said, is probably older than is generally thought ⁽⁴⁾.

MICHEL DUMOULIN

⁽¹⁾ Gualmini, E., 'Restructuring Weberian bureaucracy: Comparing managerial reforms in Europe and the United States', *Public Administration*, Vol. 86, No 1, 2008, p. 76.

⁽²⁾ Pollitt, C., *Managerialism and Public Services*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.

⁽³⁾ Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M., 'Les stratégies de réforme administrative en Europe: essai d'évaluation comparative', in Meillon, J. (ed.), *Les réorganisations administratives. Bilan et perspectives en France et en Europe*, Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, Paris, 2008, pp. 115–140.

⁽⁴⁾ This issue is explored in more detail in Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

1.2. The eternal question of location

It was during a slack period in the summer, when most European officials had left on holiday, that one of them — he must have postponed his leave — invented the ‘Brussels EEC office allocation game’. Created with a great deal of humour, it was easy to explain: on a board containing as many boxes as there were buildings occupied by the Commission, the white pawns (ordinary officials) competed with the black pawns (directors-general and financial controllers) to divide the entire staff of the Communities between 4 206 offices, while scrupulously matching the various administrative subdivisions with the corresponding number of offices, meeting rooms and parking spaces to which they were each entitled. ‘Obstacle’ and ‘surprise’ cards announcing, for example, the unexpected creation of a DG for astronomy which had to be crammed into an already over-full building were another feature of this European version of Monopoly. A further feature was the rule that no game was ever ‘finished, only adjourned!’⁽¹⁾.

By poking fun at the unfortunate repercussions of the chronic lack of space, the game’s creator — his name is unfortunately not known — was of course seeking to pillory the not always comfortable working conditions which prevailed in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg. He was, moreover, not the only one to be irritated by the persistent problems created by the question of where to house the Community institutions. For its part, the Commission had for years been battling against the red tape imposed on it in this area. Unfortunately, the difficult issues involved had forced it to make do with a policy of gradual improvements, which did not always

mean, however, that the fruits of its efforts were not worth mentioning.

In search of more efficient planning

Albert Borschette, Permanent Representative of Luxembourg and later European Commissioner for Competition from 1971 to 1976, pondered over the matter from the beginning of the 1970s. As manager of the European Executive’s financial resources, he was quick to discover that one of the roots of the problem lay in the strictly arithmetical correlation between the staff budget and the funds available to rent office space intended to accommodate new recruits determined according to a rigid system whereby an official’s grade determined the size of office he or she was entitled to⁽²⁾. In these circumstances, it was simply impossible to plan properly because the fact that the budget was adopted annually meant the Commission was back to square one at the end of each financial year. Underlying this was obviously the eminently political question of the location of the institutions, an issue which was never settled during the period covered here and which explains the various prevarications which made it impossible to pursue an efficient buildings policy with a long-term perspective.

However, this short-termism, which could be justified ‘as long as the size of the staff remained modest’, eventually turned into a nightmare. Since there was often no more spare space in existing buildings, the slightest increase in staff resulted *ipso facto* in a need to rent whole floors of offices in other buildings, which were often difficult to find in the immediate vicinity of the general area in which the Community institutions were located. Moreover, alternative accommodation was often situated in buildings that had originally been built for other purposes. Con-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, Document by Enrico Angelini, ‘Jouez avec nous ...’, 1977.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, ‘Problems of office accommodation and storage space faced by the Commission in Brussels’, SEC(74) 2858, 10 July 1974.

sequently, they did not necessarily meet the specific needs of the departments which were to be accommodated there. Before they could move in, therefore, modifications of varying degrees were necessary. Apart from causing delays, this also obviously increased rents, especially as the Commission, faced with an urgent need to billet its troops, found itself in a weak position in respect of landlords.

The lack of offices therefore forced senior managers in the Berlaymont to put up not only with seeing their staff dispersed across various districts of Brussels, but also with some DGs having to be split over a number of sites unless they were prepared to move wholesale, unit by unit, as soon as a broadening of their tasks and, hence, an expansion of their workforce made relocation inevitable. As Borschette stressed, 'it is well known that moving is the worst option for expanding operations because of the disorganisation it creates, the damage it causes to furniture and, above all, the cost it imposes on the Community' because it usually gave rise to a loss of space of up to 8–10 % ⁽¹⁾. This phenomenon, which might seem odd at first sight, was due to the fact that moving a department away from the centralised general services inevitably gave rise to a duplication of space allocated to reception areas, archives, documentation and technical installations. It also goes without saying that this also led to an increase in the posts to be filled — and of course the salaries to be paid.

In short, learning from the bottlenecks that emerged, particularly at the time of the first enlargement in 1973 when the arrival of the Danes, Irish and British presented the bodies of the Community with an unprecedented upheaval, Borschette shortly afterwards established a buildings policy which made a clean break with the mistakes of the past. Instead of reviewing the matter year by year, the Council finally allowed the Commission to draw up a multiannual plan. The first one covered the

period 1976–80. It was innovative in a number of respects. For example, it granted DGs 'expansion reserves', enabling them in future to deal with the immediate situation without too many hitches or pointless moves. Medium-term projections allowed increases in staff equivalent to a minimum office space of 9 000 m² a year to be anticipated. As a result, it also made sense to remodel the relationship with property developers in the private sector. Since the Commission would in future be able to commit itself 1 to 2 years before the buildings likely to suit it were completed, it could take precautionary action to get the architects responsible for the finishings of buildings under construction to take account of its requirements from the outset. This proved successful, saving both time and money ⁽²⁾.

This dual advantage was accompanied by a much more efficient European civil service. This was an automatic result of the fact that forward planning simultaneously cleared the way for the administrative machinery to be better distributed and assembled around a single centre of gravity. At the same time, it was an ideal way of shaking off a series of unfortunate legacies from the time when the hurried establishment of the initial Community bodies had required the governments of the host countries to do their utmost to meet the urgent demand for offices coming from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The problem was particularly serious in Luxembourg. At the start of the 1970s, the Commission maintained barely 1 400 officials there, but they occupied as many as 17 separate buildings spread right across the city. It was therefore unrealistic to expect any close cooperation between the staff concerned. Borschette therefore urged his former boss, Prime Minister Pierre Werner, to come to his rescue by speeding up the construction of the Jean Monnet building in Kirchberg. Once completed in the mid-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, 'Problems of office accommodation and storage space faced by the Commission in Brussels', SEC(74) 2858, 10 July 1974.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 148/1988 220, Letter from Albert Borschette to the President of the Council Garret FitzGerald, 21 April 1975.



Constructed in 1975, the Jean Monnet building on the Kirchberg plateau is the headquarters for the European Commission departments in Luxembourg.

1970s, this ‘strictly utilitarian, no-luxury’ complex absorbed virtually all of the Commission’s staff in the grand duchy. Day-to-day business immediately felt the benefits, if only because it was now possible to do away with the tiresome shuttle services which transported mail from one department to another. The improvement in staff morale was palpable, their hierarchical superiors noted ⁽¹⁾.

A similar concentration also took place in Brussels. There the Commission was striving as far as possible to eliminate the various outposts which it maintained in the city centre by bringing staff close to the Schuman roundabout where, according to a ‘plan to house all departments within a geographical perimeter to encourage the institution’s smooth functioning’ ⁽²⁾, the future European district was to

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, Commission memo, 6 September 1974.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg’, SEC(74) 4771, 9 December 1974; ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situation at the end of the third quarter of 1976’, COM(76) 710 final, 6 January 1977.

be established around the Berlaymont, which was becoming the 'representative building of the Commission'.

The Berlaymont would eventually house only the Commission itself and those departments directly attached to it or whose mission related more specifically to European activities of which the Berlaymont had become a symbol. All other administrative entities were sooner or later destined to leave the headquarters as replacement offices gradually became available around the main centre of power. Thus, for example, the removal of all financial and administrative services towards the brand new triangle formed by the Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée/Blijde Inkomstlaan, Avenue de Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan and Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat was scheduled to take place from 1976 ⁽¹⁾.

Prospects and limitations of the new buildings policy

While the policy of rationalisation launched by Borschette was still fairly tentative and highly respectful of the established order, that of his successors proved to be considerably bolder. Indeed, faced with a series of hold-ups resulting from disagreements with the Belgian authorities concerning the building at Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 120 in Brussels, the senior management of DG IX (Personnel and Administration) developed a self-assured approach. Jean-Claude Morel, its director-general, and his colleagues wanted Europe to stop restricting itself to its traditional role of tenant. This was basically prompted by the Court of Auditors. As early as 1979, the guardians of budgetary rectitude had calculated that becoming the owner of the 50 000 m² included in the urban development plan for the



Commissioner Albert Borschette's aim in redeploying the various DGs was to transform the Berlaymont into the flagship building of the Commission, a building housing 'the Commission alone and the departments directly attached to it'.

abovementioned site would cost Europe exactly the equivalent of six times the annual rent that it would otherwise have to pay for the same building ⁽²⁾! It was no contest. Although there were many who warned the Commission against the heavy workload and risks that an overall shift in policy of this nature would involve, it was not put off the idea ⁽³⁾. Ultimately, the advantage to be gained from Europe transforming itself into the developer of a building which it would itself own was much too tempting. And let there be no mistake: it was not just about saving money but more about freeing itself further from the yoke of governments.

Despite the obvious progress achieved over the period 1973–86 as regards the location of the institutions, one should not exaggerate the Commission's margin of manoeuvre to the extent of suggesting that everything in the garden was rosy. Far from it. Although it put up a good fight, the Communities' Executive was overtaken by events. However much it expanded into new office space, the accession of

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, 'Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg', SEC(74) 4771, 9 December 1974; 'Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situation at the end of the third quarter of 1976', COM(76) 710 final, 6 January 1977.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 55/1995/9, 'L'écho de la Bourse', 16 October 1986.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, Note from Michael Loy to Paolo Cecchini, 31 March 1982.



Not noted for its beauty or luxury, the building opened in Luxembourg's station district in 1973 to house the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities is above all functional. The Office's Management Committee was closely involved in the building's design.

the Mediterranean countries, combined with the breathtaking pace of new recruitments dictated by the growing powers of the Communities, immediately killed off any hope of ever reaching the end. A particularly striking example would serve to illustrate its Sisyphean task. In 1973, when the keys to a building which had been built close to the central railway station in Luxembourg were handed over, the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (OPOCE) was allocated premises which, for the first time in its 20-year history, allowed it to house all of its staff at the same address. Designed according to plans drawn up in line with the precise instructions of OPOCE's Management Committee, the building met the needs of its 209 officials perfectly.

Exactly 10 years later, this harmonious coexistence was at an end. Apart from the arrival of Greek and, soon after, Spanish and Portuguese officials, which increased the staff to 353, the growing role played by computers in publishing made substantial changes imperative. As a result, centrifugal forces gained the upper hand over the move towards concentration. Reluctantly, OPOCE was again forced to split off part of its staff, who were relocated to another building pending the completion of major works at the main premises ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 63/1988/853, 'Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments: Situation at the end of September 1983'; COM(83) 796 final, 10 January 1984; interview with Lucien Emringer, 17 December 2010.

European officials fearful of the creating a 'European ghetto' in the centre of Brussels ⁽¹⁾

Some European officials are sometimes far from happy about the new building they are being promised. 'Brussels, capital of Europe, capital of ugliness' read leaflets posted in the corridors of the Charlemagne building, which houses the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. Since last November, the Staff Committee, a kind of trade union delegation representing all Council officials, has been fighting to prevent the construction work from giving rise to a series of office blocks separating European officials from the people of Brussels and transforming the workplace environment into a 'bunker' removed from

the life of the city. But also because they [the members of the Staff Committee] have had enough of being criticised by local residents who feel that the transformation of the city centre into a desert of office blocks is the fault of the 'Eurocrats'. The officials in question are unhappy about the fact that the existing buildings, and in particular the colossus that is the Berlaymont, have turned the area into a sort of European administrative district. But this urban destruction would, they feel, be made much worse by the new building.



In the 1980s, protests began to be heard against the European Communities' 'administrative bulimia'. The movement involved not only natives of Brussels, but also European officials who were conscious that the Schuman area was becoming a ghetto.

⁽¹⁾ Vaes, B., *Le Soir*, 18 April 1980.

It was not only factors inherent to the process of integration which put a damper on those singing the praises of extreme centralisation in the name of efficiency. From the 1980s, influenced by environmental concerns aroused by the ‘alternative’ movements, a vociferous opposition to the European Communities’ ‘administrative bulimia’ emerged in the Belgian capital. The planned demolition of two thirds of the buildings on a parcel of land bordered by Rue Froissart/Froissartstraat and Rue de Comines/Komenstraat in order to build a new headquarters for the General Secretariat of the Council set the cat among the pigeons. Angry at having been deceived by false promises concerning the preservation of their old houses, the inhabitants of the district were quick to rise up. They were soon joined by a crowd of Brussels residents supported — remarkable though it may sound — by Solidarité européenne, a non-profit association set up by the Union Syndicale trade union, which represented the staff of the Communities. The ranks of those Community officials who were concerned about the damage caused by the ‘anti-urban policy of the EEC’ were growing by the day. After all, were Community employees not themselves victims, in the same way as the local population, of the creation around the Berlaymont of a vast ‘mono-functional’ zone which ‘excluded residents, businesses and services’ and in which one had the impression of being trapped in a ghetto ⁽¹⁾?

However, the main obstacle to the development of a long-term buildings strategy in the Schuman area was to be found elsewhere. It was linked to the absence of any official decision concerning the location of the European institutions. As long as complete uncertainty prevailed as to the single ‘seat’ referred to in the treaties, the Commission was unable to define a long-term buildings plan ⁽²⁾.

The inextricable history of the ‘precarious’ and ‘provisional’ working places

Following the adoption of a kind of *modus vivendi* at the end of the tough negotiations on the Treaty on the Merger of the European Executives (8 April 1965), the battle for the seat of the institutions between Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg became less intense as long as the three cities seemed willing to make do with sharing them amongst themselves ⁽³⁾. This truce was, of course, not the same as a genuine peace given that they each sought to nibble away at the respective share allocated to the others with the unspoken aim of creating *faits accomplis* which might, once the dispute was finally settled, act in their favour. For example, the Luxembourgish government resolved in the mid-1970s to build a plenary chamber in Kirchberg capable of hosting the larger number of members of the Common Assembly that would result from the first direct elections scheduled for 1979. Would this not be an ideal opportunity to consolidate the country’s position as a place where certain short and/or extraordinary sessions could be held? The habit which the parliamentarians had adopted for several years of holding some of their sessions in Luxembourg had suited Gaston Thorn, the then prime minister, well. He was therefore no longer ready to give up something that had apparently been heaven-sent thanks to a fortunate combination of circumstances, particularly since the presence of European deputies also served as an argument to prevent the transfer of certain Commission officials to Brussels. In Belgium, the office of Leo Tindemans opted for similar tactics. He proposed the construction of a huge auditorium intended to make it more likely that MEPs would settle in Brussels by seducing them with benefits

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 55/1995/9, *Le Soir*, 13 November 1984. See also the interview with Ivo Dubois and Guy Van Haeverbeke, 7 November 2011.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situation at the end of the third quarter of 1976’, COM(76) final, 6 January 1977.

⁽³⁾ See Dumoulin, M. and Lethé, M., ‘The question of location’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 273–286.



The expansion of the Community's offices in Brussels was a good deal for the Belgian capital: at the end of the 1980s, internal Commission memos estimated the benefit gained from the presence of European officials at about USD 1.1 billion.

such as being able to hold their plenary sessions in the same location as their political groups and parliamentary committees. All these intrigues inevitably provoked vehement protests from the French government and a Strasbourg lobby determined to defend the acquired rights of the Alsatian capital tooth and nail.

The dormant conflict between the three cities was ultimately accompanied by a trial of strength between a Council of Ministers that was strongly attached to its prerogatives as to the choice of seat and a European Parliament emboldened by being elected by universal suffrage and a stronger awareness of its mission. The fervour of MEPs to demonstrate their independence vis-à-vis the Member States was reflected in the adoption in March 1981 and February 1983 of two resolutions

to cease meeting in Luxembourg and to withdraw most of the 2 600 officials working there in the Parliament's Secretariat-General. As a result, the dispute was taken over by the lawyers. The action for annulment initiated by the grand duchy against these two resolutions, which it considered to be incompatible with the MEPs' mandate, did not, however, bring any of the clarification hoped for by many interested parties. While the Court of Justice of the European Communities acknowledged that the democratic representatives of the citizens were entitled to determine their agenda as they wished, the judges nevertheless expressed 'reasonable doubts' as to the precise extent of the European Parliament's powers of internal organisation, which was limited in legal terms by the prohibition to which it was subject on fully or partially transferring its Secretariat-General in law

or in fact ⁽¹⁾. Consequently, apart from being able to open ‘antennae’ in Strasbourg and Brussels, the bulk of Parliament’s administrative and technical staff had to stay in Luxembourg, even though there would in future not be any further sessions there. The judges had wisely played the ball back into the politicians’ court. It was now up to them to find a way out of a situation that had largely gone awry.

The Luxembourgish prime minister was, incidentally, the first to realise that only a political solution would be able to lead Europe out of the impasse which poisoned relations between the various partners more each day. During the famous Stuttgart Summit in June 1983, i.e. before the final Court verdict was handed down, Pierre Werner announced that he would shortly submit ‘a lasting solution to the question of location’. Although driven by an honest desire to put an end to a ‘regrettable quarrel’ once and for all, his plan failed ⁽²⁾. It was probably a question of bad timing. In reality, the relaunch of Europe was taking up too much of the attention of the heads of state or government for them to want to become embroiled in a bidding war which, as they all knew only too well, would require delicate handling.

For the Executive and other Community bodies, this meant continuing to wait until a more auspicious negotiating climate emerged, which would not in fact happen before the late 1980s/early 1990s, i.e. after the period covered by this work. It does not therefore concern us, except to point out that the Commission would quite radically change its approach in the meantime, a shift which came

about shortly after the interlude before the Court of Justice. Before the judgments were handed down in 1983 and 1984 respectively, the Community Executive had always taken care to stay out of the dispute, even at the risk of being reprimanded by the president of Parliament for its silence ⁽³⁾. Was this because the Commission genuinely believed that the choice of location did not fall within its mandate? Or should the reason for its passivity be sought more in a fear that a resolution of the issue might come at its expense, i.e. that it might have to cough up and offset the departure of certain European Parliament departments in one direction or another by sending some of its services to Luxembourg if the latter were ever to be compensated for the wrongs resulting from MEPs’ hotheaded choices ⁽⁴⁾? Who can tell?

It is certain, however, that from the end of the 1980s/start of the 1990s, the debate on the establishment of agencies such as the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and the European Environment Agency ⁽⁵⁾ went hand in hand with a shift towards a more dynamic policy. Without going as far as to claim that the Commission would surreptitiously and unlawfully try to secure a transfer of powers, it seems undeniable that those around Jacques Delors at least wanted to have their say. Moreover, since at the same time Delors clearly opted in favour of a polycentric Union based on the existence of three working places, it must be assumed that he was not entirely disinterested in resolving the question of location 40 years after it had come into being ⁽⁶⁾. But that is another story.

CHARLES BARTHEL

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, Information note from the Legal Service of the Commission, 1984; HAEC, SI(84) 54 of 24 January 1984 containing the annex to the memorandum presented by the Luxembourg government to the Athens European Council, 4 December 1983.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, ‘Mémorandum sur l’adaptation des structures institutionnelles présenté par le gouvernement du Grand-Duché au Conseil européen d’Athènes’, 4 December 1983.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, Note from M. A. Feffer to President Gaston Thorn, 8 May 1984.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 148/1991/58, Note from J.-J. Schwed to H. Étienne, 29 September 1981.

⁽⁵⁾ See Chapter 21, ‘Environmental and consumer protection’.

⁽⁶⁾ Centre d’études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman (CERE), ‘La question du siège’, Note from the Luxembourgish delegation, February 1988.

1.3. Consolidating the European civil service

The years 1973–86 saw the consolidation of a European civil service model which had achieved stability in terms of recruitment method and practices, but which was also growing and changing in response to the development of Community policies.

Staff regulations, staff practice

The European civil service is governed by the staff regulations, of which the Commission is the guardian. The staff regulations division formed part of the first directorate of DG IX (Personnel and Administration), which was headed by Dieter Rogalla between 1970 and 1981. Rogalla drew on this long experience when he produced his authoritative work on the European civil service ⁽¹⁾.

The decision to opt for a career-based civil service, in which officials were appointed under staff regulations laid down by law rather than employed under contracts of employment, as was the case in some international organisations, was taken in 1956 under the aegis of the ECSC by René Mayer, who headed the High Authority, and Jacques Rueff, the first French judge at the Court of Justice of the ECSC. These two men can be seen as the ‘fathers’ of the staff regulations; by contrast, Jean Monnet favoured a more flexible system of rotation with the national civil services which would be more business-friendly. The staff regulations were explicitly based on the rules applicable to *Beamten* in Germany and to all civil servants in France from 1946 onwards. The idea was to prevent the Member States

exercising direct influence over the recruitment and careers of European civil servants.

The decision to pursue the European civil service option reflected a concern to ensure its independence, embodied in the ideal of the civil service as an instrument of Community policy.

However, when it was set up in January 1958, the EEC Commission practised contractual recruitment, until the adoption in 1962 of a second set of staff regulations, the EEC–Euratom staff regulations, by the regulation of 14 June 1962, which entered into force on 1 July of that year. This took over the ECSC career system while introducing a clear distinction between the arrangements applicable to officials and to ‘other servants’. According to the former director of personnel, Gianluigi Valsesia, the 1962 staff regulations were ‘the administrative Bible of the day’ ⁽²⁾, but following the Merger Treaty a single set of staff regulations was adopted on 29 February 1968 which ended the remaining specific arrangements applicable to the ECSC. These merged staff regulations were subsequently amended on several occasions following proposals from the Commission — in 1972 (when the staff regulations ceased to apply to Euratom research employees), in 1973 (equal treatment for female staff) and in 1976, 1977 and 1978–79 (simplification of basic salaries). More wide-ranging reforms were shelved in 1982 ⁽³⁾.

The staff regulations provide for strict rules on recruitment (only by way of competition, on a broad geographical basis), rights (like the right to strike) and responsibilities (public service obligation, loyalty to the institution). As in any career-based civil service, the Commission takes action if these obligations are not discharged. The body that legally exercises this power is termed the Appointing Authority, and in the Commission's case this body was DG IX. Lastly, the staff regulations laid down rules governing car-

⁽¹⁾ *Dienstrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften*, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Cologne ... Munich, 1981.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Gianluigi Valsesia, 10 February 2011.

⁽³⁾ See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.



Cartoon entitled 'rêve hiérarchique' ('hierarchical dream'), published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 436, 8 October 1982.

eer advancement/promotion based on a fixed grading scale comprising four grades (A, B, C and D). For administrative grades (A grade staff), promotion was possible from grade A8/A7 to grade A3.

However, posts at the top of the administrative hierarchy (A1 (directors-general) and A2 (directors)) were regarded as 'political' and, in accordance with Article 29(2) of the staff regulations, were exempt from the competition rule, which generated considerable talk of officials being 'parachuted in' by national governments ⁽¹⁾. Here, a distinction should be made between structural appointments, when a new Member State joined the EU, the aim being to ensure that

posts were filled immediately at all levels of the hierarchy, and direct nomination by the Member States to certain 'strategic' posts, although these tended to occur less frequently. One-off appointments, like that of Guy Legras in 1984 to the post of director-general for agriculture, continued to be made even at the end of the period under review. Because of the special arrangements for appointing A1/A2 grade officials, specific conditions also applied when they left the Commission. Under Article 50, their employment could be terminated in the interests of the service, which was not the case for A3 grade heads of division or any other European civil servants.

As the years went by and the staff grew, there was an increase in the number of administrative complaints against the Commission lodged by members of staff under Article 90 of the staff regulations: the number rose from around 10 a year at the end of the

⁽¹⁾ See Spence, D., 'Staff and personnel policy in the Commission', in Edwards, G. and Spence, D. (eds), *The European Commission*, John Harper Publishing, London, 1997, pp. 62–96; Michelmann, H. J., 'Multinational staffing and organisational functioning in the Commission of the European Communities', *International Organisation*, Vol. 32, No 2, 1978, pp. 477–496.

1960s to around 20 at the beginning of the 1970s and to 50 in 1981. The Commission responded on 22 September 1978 by proposing to the Council that an administrative tribunal be set up to examine complaints before they were lodged with the Court. But fears that a precedent would be set for other sectors and concerns about the legal basis for this amendment meant that discussions got bogged down in the Council. The European Civil Service Tribunal would not be set up until the Treaty of Nice was signed in February 2001, some time after the establishment of a court of first instance.

Staff numbers rise

As a result of successive enlargements and the development of Community policies, the total number of Commission officials and members of staff, excluding 'other servants' and outside staff, rose by 70.15 % between 1973 and 1985.

Year	Total staff numbers
1972	5 708
1973 (March)	5 965
1975	7 457
1977	7 846
1979	8 448
1980	8 684
1981 (May)	8 857
1982	9 433
1983	9 682
1984 (March)	9 863
1985	10 150

NB: Statistics are not available for all years.

Staff numbers grew more slowly in the Commission than in the other institutions. Comparable data are not readily available. However, over the 10-year period (and especially over the 5 years following the 1973 enlargement), the Commission workforce in-



'The fall of Icarus'. Article 50 of the staff regulations hangs over grade A1 and A2 officials like the sword of Damocles. Liable to 'fall' at any moment, it threatens 'those who have been lucky, or unlucky, enough to move faster than others up the hierarchy of grades, if not of values'. (Illustration published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 427, 25 November 1981, p. 53.)

creased at a much slower rate (93 % less) than the General Secretariat of the Council.

Year	Council staff	Percentage increase	Commission staff	Percentage increase
1970	603		5 008	
1975	1 475	144.61 %	7 457	48.90 %
1980	1 593	164.17 %	8 684	73.40 %
1985	1 790	196.84 %	10 150	102.67 %

The increase in staff was greatest for linguists (LA), followed by assistants (B) and ushers (D), although the latter were fewer in number than administrators and secretaries, who increased at a slower rate than staff as a whole. The increase in translators and interpreters is easily explained by successive enlargements. The increase in B grade staff perhaps reflected a greater burden of management (as opposed to advisory) tasks. Nevertheless, the total number of officials does not seem excessive given that the Commission's remit was expanding.

Trends in A grade staff

Year	Staff	Percentage increase
1972	1 625	—
1977	2 133	31.26 %
1980	2 254	38.70 %
1984	2 561	57.60 %

Trends in B grade staff

Year	Staff	Percentage increase
1972	1 039	—
1977	1 663	60.05 %
1980	1 872	80.17 %
1984	2 099	102.02 %

Trends in C grade staff

Year	Staff	Percentage increase
1972	2 183	—
1977	2 743	25.65 %
1980	3 029	28.75 %
1984	3 427	56.98 %

Trends in D grade staff

Year	Staff	Percentage increase
1972	297	—
1977	381	28.28 %
1980	422	42.08 %
1984	535	80.13 %

Trends in LA grade staff

Year	Staff	Percentage increase
1972	548	—
1977	1 032	88.32 %
1980	1 117	103.80 %
1984	1 213	121.35 %

A surprising decline in the number of job applicants was recorded in this period. Director-General Jean-Claude Morel noted that competition results suggested a deterioration in the number and quality of applicants after 1977. The number of applicants for the A grade general competition fell by almost 43 % from 1977 to 1982 (8 903 against 5 086), something that was all the harder to understand when a new Member State had joined and, as Morel put it, the jobs crisis should have encouraged more people to apply. The decline was qualitative too, with applicants significantly less well qualified, to judge from the number of applicants who passed the competition. The director-general's general impression was that good applicants were few and far between, and that it would not be easy

to continue recruiting well-qualified staff with sufficient experience ⁽¹⁾.

Accordingly, the Commission launched a new recruitment policy at its meeting of 23 November 1983 ⁽²⁾. By 1984, arrangements would be in place to organise competitions for administrators more regularly. On an experimental basis, it also planned to hold A8 competitions for young graduates without professional experience. Competitions for administrators had hitherto been held for grade A7 posts, i.e. for graduates with experience, because, unlike most Member States at the time, the Commission and the other European institutions did not really train their new recruits. Lastly, the Commission extended the age limit for these A grade competitions from 32 to 35.

A competitions	
In 1972	In 1982
Law	Law
Economics	Economics
Political and social sciences	Administration
Agriculture	Agronomy
Finance/accounting	Technical
Statistics	Customs

What were the causes of this recruitment crisis? According to Jean-Claude Morel, there were several: changing perceptions of Europe, which was seen as symbolising failure rather than hope for the future, the emergence of more liberal economic theories which called the civil service into question, the difficulties of expatriation, in particular the fact that officials' spouses struggled to find work in Brussels, and worsening career prospects.

The recruitment situation varied considerably between the Member States. A 1979 memo on the subject summed up the problem as follows: 'a permanent surplus of Belgian applicants, not enough Dutch applicants, a large number of Italian applicants of low calibre and the inability of the Irish to meet the language requirement, a problem which also affected the British, although to a lesser extent' ⁽³⁾.

During the accession negotiations, the United Kingdom requested a quota of 18 % of the total number of Commission staff. By way of a reaction, Italy was awarded 20 additional A4/A5 officials. However, British officials accounted for only 8.37 % of the Commission's total workforce in 1975 and no more than 9.61 % 9 years later. The percentage of A grade officials remained stable, declining from 15.10 % in 1975 to 14.41 % in 1984. As the country in which most Commission departments were located, Belgium continued to be exceptionally well represented, with its nationals accounting for 26.15 % of the workforce in 1975 — a figure which remained virtually unchanged in 1984 (26.91 %) — and 13 % on average of A grade officials.

Uneven progress in gender equality

The proportion of female members of staff remained stable during the period under review. In 1972, they numbered 2 509 (44.07 % of the total workforce of 5 692); by 1982, their number had risen to 4 191 (44.45 % of the total workforce of 9 433). Although the overall percentage of women staff was maintained, no progress was made in reducing the significant imbalances between grades in the 10 years under review.

⁽¹⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 451, March 1984, pp. 28–29.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Communication from Richard Burke, SEC(1983) 1801/1, 10 November 1983, and memorandum to the members of the Commission, SEC(1983) 1801/2, 21 November 1983.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 81/1984/75, GO/24, Note from the Secretariat-General of 20 November 1979 to the members of the group charged with examining how the third Spierenburg report should be followed up, comprising a document from DG IX of 19 November 1979.

Total staff broken down by Member State

	BE	DK	DE	IE	EL	FR	IT	LU	NL	UK	Total
1975	1 795	223	1 148	136	7	1 039	1 153	368	419	575	6 863
1984	2 628	361	1 314	215	397	1 300	1 620	461	528	939	9 763

A grade staff broken down by Member State

	BE	DK	DE	IE	EL	FR	IT	LU	NL	UK	Total
1975	265	73	371	59	5	369	351	57	126	297	1 966
1984	333	74	458	86	122	500	414	59	157	371	2 574

Directors-general broken down by Member State

	BE	DK	DE	IE	EL	FR	IT	LU	NL	UK	Total
1975	4	1	7	1	0	7	7	1	4	6	38
1984	5	2	8	1	1	7	8	1	4	9	46

Proportion of women	1972	1982
A	6.09 %	7.93 %
LA	37.40 %	45.00 %
B	40.42 %	38.74 %
C	81.63 %	81.45 %
D	1.01 %	7.80 %

More specifically, not a single higher A grade post was occupied by a woman. There was no female director-general in 1972, and although two women were appointed to grade A1 posts later in the decade, by 1982 there was no female director and only three female heads of division. The lower the grade, the higher the percentage of women, a general rule which continued to apply throughout the 10 years, except that the percentage of women in A5 posts (chief administrators) doubled in the period under review.

Proportion of women	1972	1982
A1	0.00 %	4.34 %
A2	0.89 %	0.00 %
A3	0.00 %	0.61 %
A4	2.99 %	4.62 %
A5	5.30 %	10.00 %
A6	15.00 %	14.28 %
A7	16.25 %	14.59 %

Although gender equality was guaranteed by the staff regulations and the judgments of the Court of Justice, the Commission could hardly remain unaffected by the dominant conventions in the Member States at the time. Accordingly, women were most heavily represented in C grade posts, since most typists and secretaries were female, and in the linguistic departments, where they accounted for 45 % of staff.

The year 1975 was the UN International Women's Year, which the Commission marked with a communication and a proposal for a directive on equal treatment for women in the Community ⁽¹⁾. According to Jacqueline Nonon, a DG V official who championed the directive: 'We lit the fuse that year' ⁽²⁾. With a view to practising what it preached, the Commission started to examine the situation of its own female officials. A survey which it conducted showed that 55 % of women felt that their current job did not reflect their skills or education ⁽³⁾, suggesting that women were often overqualified, as exemplified by C grade women officials with university degrees. In 1978, the Commission set up a working group on equal opportunities and treatment for women which found inequalities in recruitment and promotion. Once again, this particular issue tied into broader concerns about gender equality in the Community. At the end of 1981, the Commission adopted the 1982–85 Community action programme on the promotion of equal opportunities for women. That year, it took steps to put its own house in order by setting up a committee on equal treatment for women and men, later renamed the Joint Committee for Equal Opportunities. Its objectives were to improve recruitment, training and career development for women and to provide better social infrastructure and working time arrangements. These measures eventually produced change, albeit at a slow pace because what was involved was a shift in attitudes rather than mere amendments to the rules.



The president of the Commission pays tribute to the European civil service by presenting Commission staff with the Robert Schuman medal for 20 years of 'good and loyal service'.

Career management

These years marked the start of a problem of career structure in the A grades. Excessive growth in the number of chief administrators and irregular waves of recruitment eventually resulted in promotion to senior management positions being blocked. Between 1970 and 1974, the number of A4 posts rose from 330 to 518 (188 additional posts, a 57 % increase), whereas over the same period the number of A3 posts rose by only 39, from 257 to 296 (a 15 % increase). This was aggravated by the fact that a proportion of these coveted A3 posts were given to staff external to the Commission. Thwarted career prospects were damaging staff morale, as was pointed out in the 1979 Spierenburg report, which suggested that outside recruitment of A3 officials be limited to a minimum ⁽⁴⁾. The relatively slow advancement on the career ladder of Commission civil servants becomes evident when their careers are compared with those of Council officials. The president of the Staff Committee of the Commission raised this issue in a memo sent to the director of personnel, Jeremy Baxter, in 1979: 'The discrepancies between arrangements for Council officials and Commission officials are enormous. Normal career progress at the Commission starts when normal career progress at the Council ends' ⁽⁵⁾. Whereas Council officials

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, adopted a year after Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women; HAEC, 'Communication of the Commission to the Council on the equality of treatment between men and women workers', COM(75) 36, 12 February 1975.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jacqueline Nonon, 25 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 365 ('Women' special edition), December 1975, pp. 1–48.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, 'Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services' (Spierenburg report), 24 September 1979, pp. 94–102.

⁽⁵⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 405, September 1979, pp. 58–59.

were appointed to grade A4 between the ages of 32 and 42, on average Commission officials achieved that grade between the ages of 42 and 50, resulting in a bottleneck in the age pyramid in terms of promotion and access to the highest grades.

The question of career progress was a recurring concern at the Commission during the period under review: active career management, mobility within the institution, training needs and the possibility of reducing the normal retirement age from 65 to 60. In the early 1980s, mobility was introduced, at first tentatively, to aid career planning. As suggested in the Spierenburg report, a committee was created under the chairmanship of Secretary-General Émile Noël to consider internal candidates for A2 and A3 vacancies. Moreover, the Commission pledged to fill 80 % of A3 posts with internal candidates ⁽¹⁾.

Policy developments and staff trends

From 1973 to 1986, the Commission's workforce grew considerably, from nearly 6 000 in 1973 to over 10 000 in 1986 ⁽²⁾. The 1970s saw the emergence of several new policy areas. Regional policy had its origins in the early 1960s, but the DG for Regional Policy (XVI) was not put in place until 1967; Environment and Consumer Protection (XI) and Fisheries (XIV) became DGs in their own right in 1981 and 1977 respectively. Other DGs and departments were added over time. At the same time, the DGs set up in 1958, like External Relations (I) and Agriculture (VI), continued to play a major role in the Community, developing and extending their policy areas. The new kids on the block and the well-established DGs competed for staff reserves. This section looks at which areas stagnated or even

lost personnel and which gained vital human resources in the period under review.

Looking at individual DGs, among the growth champions were DG I, DG VI and the DG for Development (VIII). External relations was clearly an expanding policy area in the period. The DG shouldered several important tasks such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and enlargement negotiations; moreover, the expansion of the network of representatives of the Community in third countries, the trade agreement with China and negotiations with east European countries were among the priority areas of the Commission in the early 1980s ⁽³⁾. Accordingly, DG I grew by 178 posts between 1973 and 1986 to a staff of 417. DG VIII was another expanding policy area which accumulated new responsibilities in the period. As a result of the Lomé Convention alone, the DG grew by 42 members of staff in 1976 ⁽⁴⁾. Over the period DG VIII grew from 313 to 444 members of staff. As a fully developed Community policy, agriculture had always absorbed a large workforce in the Commission and the DG accumulated further responsibilities over the period, for example in 1979 veterinary control and the management of the co-responsibility levy. The period 1973–86 saw the DG's staff rise from 591 to 733.

As a new policy area, DG XVI also did rather well, growing from 80 to 153 staff. The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975, as well as two enlargements that brought countries with structurally weak regions into the Community, provided credible reasons for expanding this DG for Regional Policy. By contrast, DG XIV struggled at first to expand much beyond the initial staff it was allocated from DG I and DG VI on its foundation. A Council decision

⁽¹⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 424, June 1981, p. 35.

⁽²⁾ Permanent posts. Rectifying Budget No 3 of the European Communities for the financial year 1973 (OJ L 366, 31.12.1973, p. 21); Final adoption of the general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1986 (OJ L 358, 31.12.1985, p. 84).

⁽³⁾ See, for example, HAEC, BAC 163/1999/33, IX/1042/80, EC Commission, 'État Justificatif motivant les emplois demandés dans l'avant-projet de budget 1981, Part II, "Élargissement"', July 1980.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 163/1999/32, Extract from a Council document, R/2381/75 (FIN 639) of 2 October 1975, on the Commission's request for staff.

Long-established versus new directorates-general ⁽¹⁾

Year	External Relations (DG I)	Agriculture (DG VI)	Transport (DG VII)	Development (DG VIII)	Fisheries (DG XIV) (since 1977)	Regional Policy (DG XVI)
1973	239 (105 A officials)	591 (270)	128 (54)	313 (130)	—	80 (39)
1978	323 (145)	592 (242)	123 (51)	385 (165)	49 (22)	116 (44)
1982	385 (167)	674 (261)	123 (50)	431 (183)	71 (27)	133 (50)
1986	417 (182)	733 (283)	136 (54)	444 (185)	104 (46)	153 (57)

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, 'Statistiques du personnel' series published by DG IX: BAC 3/1984/30, Statistiques du personnel 1969–73 (1973); BAC 18/1986/347, Statistiques du personnel au 31 décembre 1978; BAC 345/1991/330, Statistiques du personnel au 31 décembre 1982; BAC 163/1999/83, IX/F/1 (85) D/2364, Note from R. Weber to E. Brackentiers of 20 December 1985 with annexes concerning Horizon Mi-86, 19 December 1985.

NB: The figures correspond to the total number of staff in the different DGs, with those in parentheses representing the A grade officials.

firming up policy in the area of fishing was pending for a long time, which held staff development back. The DG received additional posts once the development of the policy accelerated in the early 1980s, for example with the implementation of an inspection system ⁽¹⁾. Its staff grew from 51 in 1979 to 104 in 1986.

Staff development stagnated in a number of DGs during the period. One example is the DG for Transport (VII); as Chapter 19 in this volume shows, the policy, a ‘bastion of nationalisms’, made hardly any progress before the mid-1980s ⁽²⁾. With 128 officials in 1973 and 136 in 1986, the lack of progress in this policy area was reflected in stagnating staff numbers. A DG with a surprisingly negative staff balance was Economic and Financial Affairs (DG II), with 237 in 1973 against 210 in 1986, peaking at 249 in 1983. Most likely this loss of staff in 1986 was due to a temporary rise in vacant posts. However, while the policy field developed considerably during the 1970s, culminating in the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, DG II arguably remained a small and rather elite service of high-

level policy analysis and theoretical work rather than one performing staff-intensive routine management tasks ⁽³⁾. The DG for Competition (DG IV) grew slowly, from 248 staff in 1973 to 268 in 1986. In principle, competition was an ambitious policy area in which the Commission was potentially very powerful, but it remained a secondary field of action until the 1980s ⁽⁴⁾. The slight increase in personnel the DG experienced in the early to mid-1980s largely coincided with the policy field experiencing a new dynamism and DG IV playing a more assertive role in liberalising a number of economic sectors.

In a period characterised by budgetary constraints, the Commission found itself in the difficult position of having to strike a balance between the need to build up and staff new services and the need to maintain and further develop its long-established DGs. DGs could hope to expand their departments only if this was justified by concrete policy developments.

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⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(82), Minutes No 661, meeting of 22 September 1982, p. 29.

⁽²⁾ See Chapter 19, ‘Transport policy in transition’.

⁽³⁾ See Chapter 15, ‘Economic and monetary affairs: new challenges and ambitions’.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 14, ‘Competition at the service of the market’.

François-Xavier Ortoli: a vision marked by permanence and change

François-Xavier Ortoli (1925–2007) has never been thought of as one of the ‘fathers’ of Europe, and yet he was one of the main players in the putting into practice of the European idea. His involvement stretched over many years: he was director-general for the internal market from 1958 to 1961, president of the Commission from 1973 to 1976, vice-president for two terms from 1977 to 1984 and subsequently, through various bodies representing industry, a determined supporter of the establishment of the single market — Objective 1992 — and of economic and monetary union (EMU).

Upon graduating from the École nationale d’administration (ENA), France’s national college of administration, which he entered in 1947, Ortoli joined the civil service in the *inspecteur des finances* (financial officer) grade, bringing with him the spirit of the Resistance and the reforming ethos of the immediate post-war years. He began his career in the Finance Ministry’s Directorate for External

Economic Relations (DREE), a department with an inbuilt insistence that France had to find its place on the international stage. He was not a militant supporter of the European cause but that he was indeed a supporter was never in any doubt: his support was the outcome of internationalism coupled with a hope for reconciliation between peoples. Hence his interest in the European project driven by Robert Schuman and Schuman’s chief-of-staff, Bernard Clappier. In 1957, Ortoli became head of the external trade policy department at France’s Ministry of Finance, and found himself tracking the beginnings of the implementation of the Treaty of Rome. When Robert Lemaignan was appointed commissioner in Brussels, Ortoli agreed to go with him to head his private office. A meeting with Robert Marjolin, vice-president of the Commission, a few weeks later, decided the shape of his career. He was appointed director-general for the internal market, becoming the youngest, and one of the most influential, directors-general at the Commission, where he stayed until 1961.



Sicco Mansholt (on the right) hands over to François-Xavier Ortoli (on the left), 6 January 1973.

This Brussels experience explains the course his career took thereafter. Placed in charge of the SGCI, the body coordinating France's European policy, he was soon combining that position with the role of chief-of-staff to Georges Pompidou, the prime minister. When Pompidou became president, Ortoli served as France's minister for research and industrial development from 1969 to 1972. He built his major projects — aerospace, nuclear energy, information technology and telecommunications — around the integration of his country into Europe. His return to Brussels in 1973 as the first French president of the Commission was the culmination of a stage in his career that made him the leading French expert on European affairs. As it had been for other French commissioners before him, the reaction among his colleagues was initially doubtful. He did share Pompidou's view, after all, that in the European institutional structure the Commission



Since the 1960s, Commission presidents have developed a strategy of communication and relations with the press. President Ortoli at a press conference on 28 May 1975.



The European Parliament has the power to scrutinise the activities of the European Commission and can remove it by a motion of censure. Like his predecessors, President Ortoli explains the content of his policy to the Parliament at its session in Strasbourg in May 1975.

should act essentially as a driving force, with the political decisions being taken by the Member States. But very quickly, as a member of his private office recalls, opinions changed: ‘Who’s this French Gaullist they’re sending us? It’s Pompidou, heir to de Gaulle, he’ll go on talking about a homogenised soulless Europe’, and then, after Ortoli’s first speeches in January, February and March 1973, *Agence Europe* wrote: ‘This time there’s no doubt a shift has taken place; we’re dealing with a genuine European’ ⁽¹⁾.

In Paris, in October 1972, EEC Member States had set themselves the ambitious objective of transforming the relations between them into a European Union. Ortoli supported the project enthusiastically, because he was strongly aware of the close inter-

play between the Community sphere proper and the sphere of cooperation between states. The economic situation at the beginning of the 1970s — the economic crisis and the energy shock — only strengthened these links. The policy areas in which the Commission was working, both old and new, were taking on a more and more political dimension: monetary questions, trade relations, cooperation, Mediterranean policy and energy policy. President Ortoli’s first speech to the European Parliament, in February 1973, ‘Defining European identity’, demonstrates a sharp awareness of this reality.

Ortoli stamped his authority on the College of Commissioners through his grasp of most of the matters it was dealing with. But he also provided an impetus within the Commission in the form of a strong adherence to the collegiality principle, which lent greater weight to the decisions taken. The gen-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, 10 September 2010.



The creation of the European Council was regarded as a relative weakening of the Commission's political importance; the Commission was initially excluded from the discussions on European political cooperation. President Ortoli attempted to remedy this situation. Here he is arriving at the European Council in Luxembourg in April 1976.



François-Xavier Ortoli during the swearing-in ceremony of the Commission under his Presidency and of the new judges of the European Court of Justice under the Presidency of Robert Lecourt, Luxembourg, 6 January 1973.

eral context was scarcely favourable, however, given the trend towards a renationalisation of policy in the Member States as a result of the economic crisis of the 1970s; the position of the Commission in the institutional structure was also weakened by the creation of the European Council in 1975. On these subjects Ortoli asserted himself less, convinced as he was that nothing was to be achieved by attempting to force the hand of the Member States. This sometimes brought him into conflict with men like Spinelli, whose federalist principles and character were far removed from his own. Nevertheless, during his term in office he managed to preserve what was essential, while gradually coming round to the view that the powers of the European institutions had to be broadened: 'People expect the Commis-

sion to have ideas, to convey momentum, to stimulate European creativity, but that is not possible without a strong European structure. You cannot conduct policy through permanent negotiation. To try to resolve everything through a form of cooperation that rejects any sort of pooling of interests, and insists on unanimity, is to take the superstructure for the structure, to deny the means, to deny the narrative, to refuse any permanence, it is clearing the way for a Europe of empty resolutions' ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Quoted by Noël Bonhomme in Badel, L. and Bussière, É., *François-Xavier Ortoli: l'Europe, quel numéro de téléphone?* Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2010, p. 140.

These years were also the point of departure for a long-term European endeavour that goes some way towards explaining Ortoli's decision to remain in Brussels, with the agreement of the then French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in 1976. He was vice-president of the Commission with responsibility for economic and financial affairs until 1984, in the Commissions led by Roy Jenkins and Gaston Thorn. Far from making his position difficult, the fact that he was a former president gave him a measure of influence over his colleagues, an influence shared by some of the other commissioners such as Étienne Davignon, and though relations with Roy Jenkins in the first year of his Commission were not easy, very soon a balance was struck. In these years his conviction grew that further responsibilities had to be transferred to the Communities, most notably in the economic sphere. He strengthened the expertise available to the Commission, and used his personal influence with the Member States, and notably with France in 1983, to promote greater convergence between national policies. This approach was guided by a reading of current events that led his thinking very early on to centre on globalisation, which, he felt, had to be organised around three poles: the United States, Asia and a Europe that needed, imperatively, to assert its interests at the international level.

One of his co-workers sums up his tenure at the interface between pragmatism, long-term thinking and action that was sometimes discreet but always went to the heart of things: 'Ortoli, he was

a visionary ... there was all this technical ground-work done during the Thorn Commission that wasn't talked about, but there was a lot of laying of foundations done at that time, by people like Ortoli, Davignon or the German commissioner Narjes, men like that, who did a lot of spadework, and when Jacques Delors took over Ortoli certainly convinced him that the time had come to take the initiative, and in the situation that presented itself, for economic and political reasons, he had the very article there ready, he had only to pull out the Single European Act, all the preparatory stuff had been done' (¹).

When François-Xavier Ortoli became chairman of the oil conglomerate Total in 1984, he was following a well-trodden path for former high-ranking French civil servants. In those years, and then in 1989 when he became chairman of the French employers' association CNPF International, he turned his mind to the processes of regional integration and played an essential part in setting up the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). And yet he viewed these huge projects in terms of their interaction with matters European, which is why he took part in the foundation of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), and then in 1987 in the foundation of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE), organisations that backed the drive to relaunch European economic and monetary integration in the second half of the 1980s.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE

(¹) Interview with Yves-Thibault de Silguy, 20 July 2010.

Chapter 2

The Commission as a body

2.1. The commissioners

There were four Commissions between 1973 and 1986, with a total of 45 members. With successive enlargements, the number of commissioners — two each for the big countries, one each for the small ones — rose from 13 in 1973 to 14 by 1981, and then to 17 by 1986.

The commissioners, whose offices were located in the Berlaymont building, held Wednesday's weekly meeting on the 13th floor ⁽¹⁾. Others also attended these meetings: the secretary-general, Émile Noël, seated to the left of the president, the deputy secretaries-general, whose duties were taken over by a single official in 1977, the director-general of the Legal Service, the president's head of cabinet, the spokesman, the director-general for information, the interpreters and the head of the registry. It

was the latter's task to draw up the minutes, which would then be reviewed by Noël and distributed on Thursday. Finally, civil servants could be invited to take part on an ad hoc basis, depending on which topics were on the agenda. Noël noted that the formality which had prevailed in the past disappeared while François-Xavier Ortoli's Commission was in office. 'Members called each other by their first names even in session. Discussion was thus more direct, with more cut and thrust,' he wrote, also noting a tendency to limit the number of civil servants invited to the meetings, to ensure that discussions were as free as possible ⁽²⁾.

The College of Commissioners was an all-male body with an average age of about 50. This meant that there were often significant age gaps between the younger and the older members. The most striking example of this was in the Delors Commission; the Spaniard Manuel Marín was 36 when he took office, whilst Arthur Cockfield, from the United Kingdom, was 68.

⁽¹⁾ See also Bitsch, M.-T. and Conrad, Y., 'The College of Commissioners: a new type of public authority', in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 181–204.

⁽²⁾ Simonet, H., *Je n'efface rien et je recommence*, 'Politiques' series, Didier Hatier, Brussels, 1986, p. 96.

Legal background and experience of national politics

Nearly half of the commissioners had legal training, while some also held other degrees, particularly in economics or humanities. Very few had an educational background diverging from the norm. The British commissioner, Christopher Soames, had trained at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The Irish commissioner, Patrick Hillery, was a doctor by profession. Finally, a number of commissioners stood out as regards the way in which they had acquired their training. The German commissioner, Karl-Heinz Narjes, had studied the subjects in which he was later to qualify in post-war Germany while a prisoner of war in Canada, then the United Kingdom. His compatriot Alois Pfeiffer had studied social economy and labour law at night school. The Danish commissioner, Poul Dalsager, had trained on the job in the banking sector. Jacques Delors, who had qualified in banking at the Centre d'études supérieures de la banque while working at the same time, was 'like [Jean] Monnet, an outsider' ⁽¹⁾. Unlike Jean-François Deniau, François-Xavier Ortoli and Claude Cheysson, he had not attended the ENA (École nationale d'administration) and 'had a career that was atypical for a Frenchman' ⁽²⁾. In his case, this was due mainly to the war — a war that had marked the lives and memories of many commissioners — and its aftermath. Their experiences varied widely. Some had fought in their country's armed forces (Roy Jenkins, Christopher Soames, George Thomson and Claude Cheysson) or in the Resistance (Antonio Giolitti, Lorenzo Natali, François-Xavier Ortoli and Edgard Pisani). Others, like Wilhelm Haferkamp, 'a confirmed anti-Nazi' ⁽³⁾, and Albert Borschette, who had been conscripted and forced to serve with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front,

fought against their will. Some had been injured (Natali). Others had been prisoners in the Allied camps (Narjes and Pfeiffer) or had been arrested by the Nazi police, like Gaston Thorn, a young teenager at the time, or the Dutch commissioner, Henk Vredeling, who nursed strong anti-German feelings after his captivity in Buchenwald. As for Altiero Spinelli, sentenced to banishment by a fascist court well before the war, it was in Ventotene prison camp, together with Ernesto Rossi, that he wrote the 'Manifesto' which was later to inspire European federalists.

Taking into account compulsory labour service which some, such as Delors, had managed to escape, but others, Pierre Lardinois among them, had been unable to avoid, over a third of the commissioners had experienced war. In other words, that particular generation of commissioners brought together men who tended to share a common view, 'not necessarily intellectually but emotionally ... that the Community was there in a way to prevent the worst things happening again in terms of European conflict' ⁽⁴⁾. Over the years, however, generational change gradually eroded the role of memory as a wellspring of action. The Delors Commission stands out as the first one to include members who were not only born after 1945 (Manuel Marín and Peter Sutherland) but also came from countries which had remained neutral during the Second World War.

As regards political experience, many Commission members (33 in all) had been members of their national parliament (29), a regional parliament (one) or the European Parliament (three) after the 1979 elections, before taking up their duties as commissioners. Twenty-seven had been members of a national government on one or more occasions. Another had served in the government of a German *Land*. Claude Cheysson was a Commission

⁽¹⁾ Narjes, K.-H., *Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit Michael Gehler*, Centre for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 2004, p. 72.

⁽²⁾ Ibid., p. 60.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Hayden Phillips, 2 February 2011.



Text of the solemn declaration made and signed by the members of each new Commission in front of the European Court of Justice. The swearing of the oath was the subject of a written question (No 2086/80) to the Commission on 5 March 1981 by five MEPs (Schmid, van Minnen, von der Vring, Wiczorek-Zeul and Walter): 'On the basis of what provisions do the members of the Commission take their oath of office (the solemn undertaking required under Article 10 of the treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission) before the Court of Justice and not before the European Parliament although political supervision of the Commission is one of Parliament's duties and Parliament has the right to dismiss the Commission?' President Thorn replied for the Commission on 22 April 1981: 'There are indeed no treaty provisions which dictate that the solemn undertaking required by Article 10 of the Merger Treaty be administered by the Court of Justice. The main justification for the present practice is that this solemn undertaking is an individual act by each commissioner concerning binding legal obligations, the violation of which can only be adjudicated by the Court pursuant to Article 10 of the Merger Treaty. In contrast, the commissioners' responsibilities vis-à-vis the Parliament are political and collective in nature.' (OJ C 129, 29.5.1981, p. 1.)

member before becoming a government minister, and subsequently returned to the Commission. Finally, three commissioners (Jean-François Deniau, Karl-Heinz Narjes and François-Xavier Ortoli) had served in the European civil service for varying periods of time before becoming commissioners.

Six diplomats and two civil servants accounted for most of those who had not served as a member of parliament or a government minister. Whilst two German commissioners had a background in trade unionism, Alois Pfeiffer was the only one who lacked any other experience, in contrast to Wilhelm Haferkamp.

A certain level of turnover

Successive Commissions, most of which bore the stamp of their members' legal backgrounds and experience of national politics, brought together over a 4-year period men from often strikingly different national cultures, despite what they had in common as regards their training and their experience of war and politics. The 4-year term of office, renewed once or more in some cases, was not necessarily completed by all members. The Ortoli Commission, for example, lost Albert Borschette, who died in office, Jean-François Deniau, who was appointed to a ministerial post, Ralf Dahrendorf, who was offered the post of director of the London School of Economics, Patrick Hillery, who became president of the Republic of Ireland, and Altiero Spinelli, who stood as an independent candidate on the Partito Comunista Italiano list in the 1976 general elections ⁽¹⁾. The Thorn Commission also lost several of its members. Finn Olav Gundelach, an old hand in politics, died just 8 days into his term of office. Claude Cheysson and Michael O'Kennedy became ministers in May 1981 and

⁽¹⁾ Chevallard, G., *L'Italia vista dall'Europa: testimonianza da Bruxelles*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2008, p. 179.

March 1982 respectively. Finally, François-Xavier Ortoli and Edgard Pisani left office at the very end of their mandates.

There was quite a high level of turnover in the Ortoli and Thorn Commissions, raising questions as to the degree of importance which some commissioners attached to their role, and their perceptions of it.

A leap into the unknown

The president was always selected on the basis of a consensus negotiated between the Member States. Talks would start several months before the inauguration of the new Commission. When recruiting the people he wanted to work with him in Brussels, including civil servants, the future president consulted the Member State governments, it being their prerogative to appoint Commission members by common accord, in accordance with the treaties (Article 158 of the EEC Treaty and Article 11 of the Merger Treaty). Since the big countries had two Commission posts, one of them was allotted to a member of the party in government, the other being assigned to someone from the opposition. The fact that Delors' Commission included both Cheysson and Delors himself broke this unwritten rule.

During the preparatory stage, close contact was maintained with the secretary-general, Émile Noël, to familiarise the future commissioners with the intricacies of their institution's administration and with its civil servants. The services prepared files that were not overly dense, covering the establishment plan, the departments, how the Commission worked, how to draw up the relevant documents, relations between a cabinet and the corresponding directorate-general, and so on. However, Noël was not the only person to be consulted. Future Commission presidents and members sought the advice

of elder statesmen, Max Kohnstamm ⁽¹⁾ being the one whose name comes up most often.

Once the composition of the Commission had been decided, it was time to divide up duties among its members. As may readily be imagined, responsibilities were carved up in such a way that far less attention was paid to the wishes of those most directly affected — including the president — than to certain governments' desire to have 'their' commissioners wielding authority over a particular policy area ⁽²⁾. DG VIII is a textbook example of this, being essentially a French fiefdom. In certain cases a portfolio might be allotted after a government had vetoed the nomination of a commissioner by another Member State. Thus the Dutchman Henk Vredeling, one of the two commissioners not selected personally by Roy Jenkins ⁽³⁾, was also blocked by the Germans, who were averse to having him in charge of agriculture — despite his credentials as a trained agronomist and an acknowledged expert in the field ⁽⁴⁾. A different situation arose in the case of a commissioner whose government had considerable hopes for him, but who confounded expectations by taking too independent a stance. Cockfield was a striking example. Having rapidly 'gone native', he wrong-footed 10 Downing Street, so that Margaret Thatcher soon found herself at odds with her old friend ⁽⁵⁾. Ivor Richard, a British member of Gaston Thorn's Commission from the ranks of the Labour

⁽¹⁾ A diplomat and historian, Max Kohnstamm was a former secretary of the ECSC High Authority and a former colleague of Jean Monnet. He occupied the posts of secretary-general and vice-president of the Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe (Action Committee for the United States of Europe) until 1975. He was the first president of the European University Institute in Florence, from 1976 to 1981.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.

⁽³⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 10.

⁽⁴⁾ Braak, B. (van den), 'Een Nederlandse machtspoliticus machteloos in Brussel: Henk Vredeling, lid van de Europese Commissie (1977–88)', in Baalen, C. (van), Braak, B. (van den) and Voerman, G. (eds), *De Nederlandse Euro-commissarissen*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 189.

⁽⁵⁾ Thatcher, M., *The Downing Street Years*, Harper Collins (paperback), 1995, p. 468; HAEU, 'European Oral History', Arthur Cockfield, 'Voices on Europe', 24 August 1998, by Andrew Crozier; Cockfield, F. A., *The European Union: Creating the Single Market*, Wiley Chancery Law, London, 1994.



Le Confiteur des Commissaires

*Je confesse à mon Gouvernement tout puissant,
À la Commission toujours impuissante,
À Saint Schuman,
À Charlemagne,
Aux Saints-Pères des Traités de Rome
Que j'ai beaucoup failli
Par pensées sans paroles,
Par paroles sans pensées,
Par actions d'omission
Et par omission d'actions
Dans mes propositions.*

*Ils se frappent trois fois la poitrine en disant,
une fois pour eux, une fois pour leur chef de cabinet
et une fois pour leur chef de cabinet adjoint
Mee culpa, mee culpa, mee maxima incapacitaj!*

*C'est pourquoi je supplie
Les ministres tout puissants,
Les Représentants toujours permanents,
Les honorables parlementaires,
Les juges austères,
Et mon personnel indulgent
De bien vouloir pardonner mes erreurs
Et me conduire à l'Europe éternelle,
Ou au prochain banquet des Neuf
Et ne m'écartez jamais des sommets
Mais délivrez-moi de l'inflation.
Par notre Secrétaire général
Omniprésent,*

Eurkamees.

The commissioners' confession or act of penitence. Montage created in 1974 based on the cover page of the *Courrier du personnel* and the text of the 'commissioners' Confiteur', 1974.

opposition, was informed by a telephone call from the foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe, that his mandate would not be renewed and that his successor's name would be announced within the next 10 minutes ⁽¹⁾!

The responsibilities to be assigned are said to have been carved up at a session known as 'the night of the long knives', although the sense of drama conjured up by this allusion to one of the bloodier events of contemporary history is no doubt something of an exaggeration. After Ortoli, whose approach was

more conventional ⁽²⁾, Jenkins (at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire), Thorn (at L'Hôtellerie de Gaichel) and, finally, Delors (at Royaumont Abbey) organised a preparatory session at a spot conducive to informal exchanges. The main purpose of the get-together was to give people an opportunity to get to know each other, as some of the commissioners-to-be had never met. Meetings of this kind held the odd surprise even for those who were acquainted. 'I even spotted Lorenzo Natali wandering about the corridors ... at around seven in the morning, in

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ 'In the days leading up to the first meeting [6 January 1973] the new president, Mr Ortoli, had spoken at great length with each member of his team. At the meeting itself, a break in proceedings allowed him to talk with them in twos and threes to iron out any last-minute snags. By early evening he had secured the unanimous agreement of the full Commission', Noël, É., *The European Community: How it works*, 'European perspectives' series, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1979, p. 100.

his pyjamas, clutching a towel and searching for one of the few bathrooms,' Jacques Delors reminisced ⁽¹⁾. Cockfield recalled that it was at the Royaumont seminar that he introduced the custom of serving bread with butter at Commission meals. Referring to the Community's butter mountains and the huge farm subsidies involved, he playfully mocked the practice of not serving butter at table, while at the same time underlining how differences in cultural practices often lie in the detail ⁽²⁾. More seriously, the meeting was also designed to round off any sharp edges — at a safe distance from Brussels and the accredited press — as regards the allocation of portfolios. However, it was vital for the president to play his role effectively from the outset. Whilst both Jenkins and Delors were able to strike a swift balance between the different forces at play within the College of Commissioners, it was not the same for Thorn. Richard Burke compared him to 'an elective monarch surrounded by powerful barons' ⁽³⁾. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the preparatory meeting held at Gaichel to have any meaningful outcome, either immediately or in the future ⁽⁴⁾.

A complex role

The reference to barons is significant. Ortoli, Jenkins and Delors came from big countries. Thorn, who inherited eight members of the previous Commission, including the former president, Ortoli — who, to the amazement of the British, was also a vice-president of the Jenkins Commission — hailed from the Community's smallest country. These two factors were crucial. According to Richard Burke, 'presidents suffer or do not suffer in relation to the territorial size of the Member States they repre-

sent' ⁽⁵⁾. Consequently, the barons — whom some describe as a sort of 'phantom cabinet' ⁽⁶⁾ in which Étienne Davignon, disappointed at not having been chosen as president and carving out an 'empire of portfolios' for himself, played first fiddle — made life difficult for Thorn. In the presence of Davignon, Thorn was like 'a rabbit facing a mongoose' ⁽⁷⁾. He 'thought we were going too far. Then, when we stopped talking, he thought we were undermining him. So it wasn't easy,' according to Davignon ⁽⁸⁾, who set his stamp on things from the outset of the Thorn Commission; the latter's inaugural address clearly bears his mark.

Beyond these considerations, the chief problem was the very nature of the Commission and the status of its president and members. 'The Commission is the guardian of the treaties; it is the executive arm of the Communities; it is the initiator of Community policy and exponent of the Community interest in the Council,' noted Émile Noël ⁽⁹⁾. And when Ortoli opened the 234th meeting of the Commission — the first he chaired — on 6 January 1973, he called on his colleagues to take 'collegiate action on the basis of solidarity'.

However, good intentions are one thing, reality another. Henri Simonet confessed that he did not join the Commission 'with the fervour of a crusader' ⁽¹⁰⁾. He was not alone. New members were confused. Their role was neither that of a minister nor that of a top civil servant, even if that was

⁽¹⁾ Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 195.

⁽²⁾ HAEU, 'European Oral History', Arthur Cockfield, 'Voices on Europe', 24 August 1998, by Andrew Crozier.

⁽³⁾ HAEU, 'European Oral History', Richard Burke, 'Voices on Europe', 21 April 1999, by A. Lovett.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEU, 'European Oral History', Richard Burke, 'Voices on Europe', 21 April 1999, by A. Lovett.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011. Several witnesses used the expression 'the gang of four' to describe the group comprising Davignon, Haferkamp, Natali and Ortoli.

⁽⁷⁾ Denman, R., *The Mandarin's Tale*, Politico's Publishing, London, 2002, p. 211; interview with Christopher Tugendhat (17 August 2010), who described Thorn as being like a rabbit frozen in the light of a projector.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Noël, É., *Les rouages de l'Europe*, 2nd edn, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1979, p. 23.

⁽¹⁰⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

Margaret Thatcher's view of the Commission president ⁽¹⁾. The hybrid status of commissioners, particularly if they have held ministerial responsibilities in their native country, requires a sometimes lengthy period of adjustment to both the administration in which they are working and a culture of governance different from that prevailing in their own country. The Commission 'must believe in its innate necessity', as an outside observer has written. It must display both vision and prudence. In short, it must err neither on the side of utopianism nor of technocracy ⁽²⁾. More prosaically, Delors took the view that 'a commissioner's place is in the kitchen', since the Commission both provides impetus and acts as a mediator to bring governments' viewpoints closer together ⁽³⁾. A commissioner must, in fact, have 'the right qualities of being like a minister, a political animal, and yet like a *fonctionnaire* [official] as well. You have to combine those two ...' ⁽⁴⁾.

Whatever the terms in which it is described, the action taken by the commissioners — which, according to Ortoli's declaration in 1973 — was to be 'collegiate ... on the basis of solidarity' was criticised 6 years later in the report of the Three Wise Men ⁽⁵⁾. The Commission 'doesn't really give the impression of being a team; it's the president's actions or those of individual members which have made the most impression on the outside world' ⁽⁶⁾.

Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities ⁽⁷⁾

'Article 10

1. The Commission shall consist of seventeen members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt ⁽⁸⁾.

...

Only nationals of Member States may be members of the Commission.

The Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not include more than two members having the nationality of the same state.

2. The members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Communities, be completely independent in the performance of their duties.

In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks.

...

Article 11

The members of the Commission shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States.

Their term of office shall be four years. It shall be renewable.'

Working together as a team was indeed a tricky matter, with the gap between Community solidarity and national interests accounting for much of the difficulty. Despite the formal rule, this disparity meant that the commissioners, some of whom hurried back to their own countries each weekend, like

⁽¹⁾ Thatcher, M., *The Downing Street Years*, Harper Collins (paperback), 1995, p. 558.

⁽²⁾ Soutou, J.-M., *Un diplomate engagé. Mémoires, 1939–79*, Éditions de Fallois, Paris, 2011, p. 499.

⁽³⁾ Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 248.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ See the introduction to Part Three and section 9.1, 'The Council of Ministers'.

⁽⁶⁾ Quoted by Rogalla, D., *Fonction publique européenne*, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1982, p. 298.

⁽⁷⁾ OJ L52, 13.7.1967, p. 2.

⁽⁸⁾ First sub-paragraph of paragraph 1, as modified by Article 15 of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal.

Ortoli ⁽¹⁾ and Cheysson, were subject to influence by their capital or party. ‘You are there partly as a Labour Party politician, as a member of a Labour Party ... and you’re also there as a representative of the country ... I didn’t regard myself as being totally detached from British politics,’ said Ivor Richard, another commissioner who returned home every weekend ⁽²⁾.



Following the submission to President Jenkins of the Spierenburg report on the structures, organisation and personnel policy of the Commission on 24 September 1979, the *Courrier du personnel* (No 406, 15 October 1979, p. 37) published this cartoon together with a short story entitled ‘Les conseils d’Esculape’ (the advice of Aesculapius), under the name of Eureka: ‘Once upon a time, there was a king who ruled over an imaginary kingdom.

Tired of hearing from all quarters that his kingdom was badly governed, he summoned Aesculapius. “Sire,” said Aesculapius, “if the sickness is imaginary, we will treat it accordingly; if it is real, we will do likewise. In either case we will examine it and we will tell you what we think on the next ides.” On the ides, Aesculapius gave his advice and reported to the king on his consultations: “In my opinion, Sire, you do not have enough power and you are, by Zeus, too good-natured. Increase your power and your kingdom will be the better for it. The weak love the strong and admire them. And if one day you too should fall ill — power soon weakens those who abuse it — come back and see me! If the sickness is imaginary, we will treat it accordingly and, if it is not, we will do just the same.”

⁽¹⁾ Denman, R., *The Mandarin’s Tale*, Politico’s Publishing, London, 2002, p. 211.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.

Cultural compromise and political compromise

Consequently, some commissioners appeared hesitant to commit themselves fully to the project, as it was not easy to ‘leave behind [national politics] for a time, officially at any rate’ ⁽³⁾. Moreover, aside from the obvious fact that language could be an issue, not so much in the context of Commission meetings as in that of personal contacts between commissioners — Poul Dalsager, for instance, spoke only Danish — relations between them could be marked by considerable cultural differences. Henk Vredeling, who in 1979 described the atmosphere between strong Commission members as ‘icy’ ⁽⁴⁾, was himself far too Calvinistic in the eyes of his southern colleagues ⁽⁵⁾, between whom ‘there was a sense of belonging to the same family ... a familiarity. I sat next to one or other of them, and we used to joke during meetings,’ Grigoris Varfis reminisced. ‘It would be my Spanish or my Italian colleague. Delors would get annoyed when he saw us having a laugh’ ⁽⁶⁾.

Some laughed on the other side of their faces. There were commissioners who left memories of stinging ripostes that were often barbed with cutting humour. Simonet, Soames, Davignon and Cockfield were among those whose sallies of wit did not always win them friends.

Of course, the commissioners, both collectively and individually, did not exist in a vacuum. The members of their cabinet ⁽⁷⁾ played a decisive role, with an occasional major conflict between a commissioner and a director-general, for instance.

⁽³⁾ Simonet, H., *Je n’efface rien et je recommande*, Didier Hatier, Brussels, 1986, p. 97, and interview between Harry Kreisler and Frans Andriessen, 26 October 1993, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, ‘Conversations with History’.

⁽⁴⁾ *Vrij Nederland*, 12 May 1979.

⁽⁵⁾ Braak, B. (van den), ‘Een Nederlandse machtspoliticus machteloos in Brussel: Henk Vredeling, lid van de Europese Commissie (1977–88)’, in Baalen, C. (van), Braak, B. (van den) and Voerman, G. (eds), *De Nederlandse Euro-commissarissen*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 208.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Grigoris Varfis, 6 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ See section 2.2, ‘The cabinets’.

However, more generally, it was the working methods of certain commissioners that tended to pose problems. The Dutchman Lardinois, for example, who had ‘a pathological loathing of any kind of memorandum’, was particularly difficult to work with, since what he liked to call his ‘room for manoeuvre’ considerably reduced the effectiveness of his civil servants, who were wary of venturing out into virtually uncharted territory ⁽¹⁾. More generally, the British commissioners were disconcerted by the system prevailing at the Commission, seen as being more *dirigiste* than that operating in London, since the cabinet acted as a filter both between commissioners and their civil servants and between the commissioners themselves ⁽²⁾. This was undoubtedly one of the reasons, personal affinities aside, why some commissioners, Haferkamp and Soames among them, made sure to meet outside the Commission at a good restaurant — or

chez Davignon, who had a passion for the culinary arts. Others again, like President Roy Jenkins himself, maintained good working relations with their colleagues whilst avoiding developing any personal links ⁽³⁾.

However, it was precisely because of the differences between the members of the Commission that — paradoxically — a cultural compromise gradually emerged ⁽⁴⁾. This represented the blending of different identities and allegiances in the name of a common project which individual commissioners took to heart with admittedly varying degrees of intensity. However, collectively they were helping gradually to establish a *sui generis* public authority with the capacity to seek and achieve political compromises.

MICHEL DUMOULIN

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ See comments by Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., ‘La Commission européenne du compromis culturel à la culture politique du compromis’, *Revue de Science Politique*, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, p. 432.

2.2. The cabinets

The cabinets (private offices) are an important part of the Commission: they support the work of the members of the Commission and they help bring the principle of collegiality to life, but they also raise the question of how much influence Member States have at the heart of the Commission. Consequently, one of the difficulties of analysing the role of the cabinets is that of establishing a balance between these two aspects: the heart of Community collegiality for some, and a vehicle for intergovernmentalism for others. To resolve this seeming conflict, we shall look first at what are the cabinets within the Commission and then at who are the members of the cabinets, in particular those of presidents.

What are the cabinets? Organisational structure and role within the Commission

The history of the cabinets is not entirely straightforward. They came into being at the same time as the High Authority as, from the summer of 1952, each member needed very close collaborators to set up the institution. From 1952 to 1956, before there were any staff regulations, these collaborators were not fundamentally different from the first Community officials, who were also recruited on a contractual basis. In 1958, the first commissioners arrived in Brussels with one or two aides. For example, François-Xavier Ortoli served as head of cabinet to Commissioner Robert Lemaignan for a few months before becoming the first director-general of the DG for the Internal Market.



Altiero Spinelli's cabinet on the eve of his departure, from left to right: Massimo Bonanni, Claus Stoffmann, Gianfranco Rocca, Altiero Spinelli, Riccardo Perissich and Eugenio Pino. Altiero Spinelli remained at the Commission for 6 years until 1976, but was never totally at ease with the complex Community machinery. Finding the constraints of the role of commissioner and administering a bureaucracy hard to bear, he quit the Commission in the spring of 1976. He subsequently played an important role in the European Parliament. (*Courrier du personnel*, No 476, July 1986.)



'Heads of cabinet had tremendous power. Monday was the day of the heads of cabinet meeting and that's where things were decided. What the heads of cabinet didn't decide on Monday would be decided by the commissioners on Wednesday.' (Interview with Louis Kawan, 5 March 2012.) A meeting of heads of cabinet in 1975, chaired by Émile Noël (not present in the photo).

The word cabinet, which is taken from the Belgian and French politico-administrative system with its ministerial private offices, may not seem very apt in a Community context. The cabinets were originally made up of two people who were soon called head of cabinet (*chef de cabinet*) and deputy head of cabinet (*chef adjoint de cabinet*) and not director and deputy director, as at national level, to show clearly that they did not perform the same functions.

At national level, the cabinet director was the minister's political right-hand man, whereas the head of cabinet was simply in charge of logistical and organisational matters. This terminological modesty reflected an initial wish not to compete too much with the true heads of the Commission's administration, i.e. the directors-general. But this different name did not stop the head of cabinet from gradually taking on the role of cabinet director, albeit of a much

smaller cabinet fulfilling a different function. While a ministerial cabinet would have 20 to 80 members, the cabinet of a commissioner originally had only two members ⁽¹⁾, a figure that rose gradually to five (A grade) members: head of cabinet, deputy head of cabinet and three members. The president's cabinet was granted one, then two, additional members ⁽²⁾.

As for the actual role played by the cabinets in the functioning of the institution ⁽³⁾, it increased in importance with the (written, then empowerment) procedures set up for the smooth running of College meetings.

However, this did not mean that each cabinet carried the same weight in terms of importance. The president's cabinet, which for years remained a *primus inter pares*, had specific prerogatives and occupied a special position. The head of the president's cabinet, unlike the other heads of cabinet, was present at Commission meetings although, at the time, he sat, not 'at the table', but just behind the secretary-general, Émile Noël, who was seated on the president's left.

During meetings of heads of cabinet, the president's head of cabinet was seated next to the secretary-general. The president's head of cabinet had additional powers of coordination and chaired heads of cabinet meetings in Émile Noël's absence. The importance of the other cabinets was much more variable.

This difference in clout depended on various factors — the reputation of the commissioner, the importance of his portfolio, the personality of his head of cabinet and the political weight of the Member State the commissioner came from — but it was also based on each cabinet's vision of its role. Naturally, officials who were familiar with the role of cabinets

in their Member State had an advantage over those who were not. For example, in 1973, Michel Vanden Abeele moved from the cabinet of Henri Simonet, the Belgian minister for economic affairs, to Simonet's cabinet in his new capacity as vice-president of the Commission. He continued his career with Presidents Ortoli, Jenkins and Thorn, spending a total of 9 years in these various cabinets.

The cabinet of President (subsequently Vice-President) Ortoli was very French in its approach. Its members improved or rewrote documents from the directorates-general. The cabinet acted as a filter between the commissioner and the departments. Other cabinets, unfamiliar with the role of filter, simply played the part of intermediary or link between the directorates-general and their commissioner, or simpler still acted as the DG's mouthpiece.

From 1967, a key feature of a cabinet's work consisted in taking part in the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet on Monday afternoons ⁽⁴⁾. For example, in a journalist's biography of Christian Blanc, Edgard Pisani's head of cabinet from 1981 to 1982, the author summarises this activity as follows: 'On Mondays, all the heads of cabinet meet ... they reach agreement on certain dossiers, while disagreeing on others. On Wednesdays, the commissioners approve the proposals of their heads of cabinet and discuss any outstanding business' ⁽⁵⁾. This collegial style of work through meetings was adopted by all members of the cabinets and the number of 'special' meetings rose; these meetings brought together the sectoral advisers of each cabinet to discuss a specific subject. The 1970s thus saw the development of a veritable cabinet culture.

With regard to the allocation of portfolios among members, a common practice seems to have devel-

⁽¹⁾ Two members, one secretary and one typist in 1958.

⁽²⁾ In January 1973, the structure was as follows: each commissioner's cabinet consisted of five A-grade, two B-grade and six C-grade members. The president's cabinet had in addition one more A, B and C grade members.

⁽³⁾ See Chapter 4, 'Working methods'.

⁽⁴⁾ In 1965, Walter Hallstein called an ad hoc meeting of cabinets for the first time to prepare the ground for difficult discussions, but it was Jean Rey who institutionalised the practice.

⁽⁵⁾ Faujas, A., *Christian Blanc l'inclassable*, Balland, Paris, 2002, p. 49.



The cabinets derive their chief importance from the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet, a collegiate body that helps the Commission take decisions, but in a very organic way, as it has the job of tidying up the Commission agenda. If all the heads of cabinet are in agreement, the issue is treated as an 'A' item and the Commission can focus on the two or three difficult items on the agenda. Of course, for this mechanism to work — Émile Noël was always a respected and fierce guardian of the practice — coordination is required at different levels, both internally and externally. The role of the cabinets is, firstly, to work well with their directorate-general. The DGs, where the expertise lies, are the defenders of orthodoxy and have a very rich interaction with the cabinets, which endeavour to meet what they consider the political expectations of big countries or small countries with a particularly sensitive issue and, at the same time, of the sector concerned by the commissioner's portfolio: agriculture, industry, etc. The cabinets generally have a better idea of what is going on in these sectors than the DG, which is more focused on the specific issues, although the DG has its own contacts in the world of industry, but usually at an expert level.' (Interview with

Pierre Defraigne, 13 October 2010.)

oped: the head of cabinet took charge of general co-ordination, the deputy head of cabinet looked after the commissioner's portfolio and the other members divided up other commissioners' portfolios between them. A variation on this model was that the commissioner's portfolio might also be divided up between several members. In this way, each member kept an eye on both part of 'his' commissioner's portfolio and one or more portfolios of other commissioners. In both cases, this was the main difference compared with a ministerial cabinet, where the members specialised and worked only in the minister's policy area. Working with other portfolios was crucial to the effectiveness of a Commission cabinet, measured in terms of its capacity to participate in meetings (special meetings, then heads of cabinet meetings) and discuss the portfolios of commissioners other than their own. From this point of view, a cabinet which focused too much on one sector had less influence within the Commission's structures.

In the case of the president, the configuration was more specific in that he did not have a sectoral portfolio apart from oversight of the cross-cutting departments: the Secretariat-General, the Legal Service, the Spokesman's Group, the Security Office and the interpreting service. There were two exceptions to this, however, with Gaston Thorn focusing on culture and Jacques Delors on monetary affairs.

The allocation of tasks between the main members of presidents' cabinets shows some continuity: political cooperation was the responsibility of the head of cabinet (or the deputy head under Delors ⁽¹⁾), while economic and financial affairs and agriculture enjoyed a special status and were generally handled by the deputy head or the 'number 3' (for example, under Jenkins) or even by the head of cabinet in the

case of agriculture under Thorn ⁽²⁾. However, there were also some differences in the allocation of responsibilities: the Jenkins cabinet, with its systematic recourse to dividing up sectors, differed clearly in this respect from the Thorn cabinet, which did not divide sectors up at all, while the Ortoli cabinet lay somewhere in between. The Jenkins cabinet also differed in that the research sector was part of the shared workload of the head of cabinet, whereas it did not even appear in the list of areas of responsibility of the highest three members under the other presidents. Some differences were more structural, such as entrusting the task of monitoring European Council and G7 meetings to the head of the president's cabinet from 1981, with the cabinet becoming the president's 'sherpa', similar to the approach adopted by the heads of state or government.

Finally, with regard to the cabinets' internal working methods, two models coexisted. The first consisted in centralising everything around the head of cabinet, who monopolised direct relations with the commissioner. The second was more collegial in style, being characterised by a greater involvement of each member in the life of the cabinet. Under the first model, which was followed by Ortoli's heads of cabinet, and in particular by Pierre de Boissieu, from 1977 to 1984, the members of the cabinet had very little direct contact with their 'boss'. The second model, which was followed under Jenkins and involved sharing numerous areas of responsibility, was characterised by frequent meetings of the whole cabinet. The spokesman occupied a special place within the cabinet as he enjoyed the commissioner's special trust. He was also a member of the Spokesman's Group, which was attached to DG X (Information) from 1977 to 1981.

⁽¹⁾ It was Pascal Lamy's deputy who took over this and who also became the Commission's political director, i.e. its representative in European cooperation policy meetings.

⁽²⁾ In the first Delors cabinet, economic and financial affairs and monetary affairs were managed by the cabinet 'number 4', Jérôme Vignon. Agriculture was dealt with by the 'number 3', Michel Jacquot.

Portfolios of the members of the president's cabinet

ORTOLI CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-General, Legal Service and Spokesman's Group) in 1976

Head: general coordination of work, general and political matters, institutional matters;

plus, for policy areas shared with a member of cabinet: external relations, political cooperation, development.

Deputy head: economic and financial matters, regional policy, budgetary matters, transport;
plus, as a shared policy area: agriculture.

Adviser 1: 'dialogue', energy and Euratom, ECSC matters, research, education, technology.

JENKINS CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, information and Spokesman's Group) in 1979

Head: coordination and general functions;

plus, for policy areas shared with a member of cabinet: political cooperation; external relations and development; research and science; North-South dialogue; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad).

Deputy head: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, enlargement, agriculture, fisheries;
plus, as a shared policy area: transport; environment and consumer protection; competition.

Adviser 1: economic and financial affairs; coordination of Community funds; budget, financial control, European Investment Bank, ECSC, credit and investments, financial institutions and taxation; regional policy, employment and social affairs;
plus, as a shared policy area: industry and internal market; customs union.

THORN CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesman's Group, culture and Security Office) in 1981

Head: management of the cabinet, general coordination; preparation of European Council and economic summit meetings; political cooperation; agriculture and fisheries; personnel and administration.

Deputy head: economic and financial affairs, credit and investments, relations with the European Investment Bank; Statistical Office; industrial affairs and internal market; competition, budgetary matters, mandate of 30 May and coordination of financial funds.

Adviser 1: external relations and development; North-South relations; Security Office; Secretariat-General; preparation of Council meetings (General Affairs); relations with Member States.

DELORS CABINET 1 (portfolio: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesman's Group, Security Office, Conference and Interpreting Service and monetary affairs) in 1986

Head: management of the cabinet, general coordination; president's personal representative for the preparation of economic summits; industrial policy;

plus, as a shared policy area: Conference and Interpreting Service; Security Office.

Deputy head: external relations and trade policy; political cooperation; North-South relations; Mediterranean policy; cooperation and development; Secretariat-General;

plus, as a shared policy area: European Parliament; personnel and administration.

Adviser 1: agriculture; enlargement; environment; consumer protection.



Jacques Delors (on the right) and his head of cabinet, Pascal Lamy (on the left), at the seminar in Royaumont Abbey. 'Pascal Lamy had been a deputy director in my private office when I was minister for finance and the economy. He had been a student of mine at the ENA. Afterwards, with Émile Noël's invaluable assistance, we tried to put together a cabinet that was more European than French.' (Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.)

Who are the cabinet members?

Let us focus on the members of the president's cabinet and examine two main factors in their profile: their nationality and their professional background. With regard to nationality, the situation described by Hans J. Michelmann ⁽¹⁾ in 1978, whereby most cabinet members were from only one Member State, slowly changed and gave way to a more even distribution of nationalities, i.e. the commissioner's nationality and others, in particular Belgian and German.

⁽¹⁾ Michelmann, H. J., *Organisational Effectiveness in a Multi-National Bureaucracy: The Case of the Commission of the European Communities*, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1978.

President's cabinet	Non-nationals
Ortoli (1976)	2 BE, 1 DE
Jenkins (1979)	1 BE, 1 LU, 1 DE
Thorn (1981)	2 BE (head and deputy head), 2 IT, 1 FR, 1 UK, 1 DE (2nd deputy head)
Delors (1985–86)	1 DE (deputy head), 1 UK, 1 BE

The next question is whether the members of the president's cabinets came from national administrations or from within the Community civil service. A clear trend can be observed here with the number of Community officials increasing.

President's cabinet	National civil servants	Community officials	Others (and not recorded)
Ortoli	5	3	0
Jenkins	6	3	1 (international civil servant) + 1 not recorded
Thorn	4	7	0
Delors (1985–86)	2	3	2 + 2 not recorded

While Ortoli's cabinet was dominated by French civil servants ⁽¹⁾ and Jenkins's by national civil servants, Thorn's cabinet broke the mould. All three of his heads of cabinet were Community officials: Adrien Ries, Fernand Spaak and Jean Durieux. Delors' deputy head of cabinet in 1985, Günter Burghardt, was also an internal candidate. Is it thus possible to draw conclusions about a link between the profile of the head of cabinet and the management of the cabinet? The answer to this question is influenced by the career aspirations of the heads of cabinet who were Community officials. It is true that some heads of cabinet coming from national administrations then wished to remain in the Commission. A leading example of this was Renato Ruggiero, a brilliant Italian diplomat who was working in the permanent representation and who in 1970 became head of cabinet to Franco Maria Malfatti. After spending some time in Sicco Mansholt's cab-

inet, he became a director-general (for regional policy) and then spokesman for Jenkins. His successors, under Ortoli and Jenkins, did not follow the same path as they left the Commission at the same time as their president.

Even though the French heads of cabinet were appointed at a much younger age, their career path was fairly similar to that of their British counterparts. But how did this practice affect the Commission? Was a head of cabinet from outside the Commission more independent from the Community civil service as he was not seeking to make a career in it? This is what might be called the Paye model, named after Jean-Claude Paye, head of cabinet to Raymond Barre from 1967, who managed the difficult transition with the Ortoli Commission at the end of 1972 before leaving Brussels for a new position in the French civil service.

President's cabinet	Heads of cabinet	Age when appointed	Position after leaving
Ortoli 1973–75	Philippe de Margerie	35	Working in the private sector (Hachette)
Ortoli 1976–77	Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac	33	SGCI, Paris
Jenkins	Crispin Tickell	47	Ambassador to Mexico
Thorn (Jan. 1981)	Adrien Ries	48	Director DG VI
Thorn (Feb.–June 1981)	Fernand Spaak	58	Deceased in June 1981
Thorn 1981–84	Jean Durieux	57	Adviser <i>hors classe</i> then director-general
Delors	Pascal Lamy	38	Crédit Lyonnais (1994)

⁽¹⁾ His heads of cabinet all came from the *grands corps de l'État* (major state bodies): one member of the Council of State, one from the Inspectorate General of Finance and one from the Diplomatic Corps, in chronological order.



François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) and his head of cabinet, Philippe de Margerie (on the left) (1976).

A possible side effect of this external profile of heads of cabinet who were only ‘passing through’ the institution was that it could lead to a renationalisation of the Commission. At all events, this was the view taken by many directors-general, such as Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, according to whom ‘the members of the cabinets have two unfortunate characteristics: they are nationalistic and they care only about their own career’ ⁽¹⁾. The close ties between heads of cabinet and their own capital could lead to the maintenance of certain types of information flow. Pierre Bockstael, a head of division first in DG IX (Personnel and Administration) and then in DG X (Information), remembers, for example, that

instructions from the Foreign Office found their way into heads of cabinet meetings ⁽²⁾.

But a national interest, however strong or however powerfully conveyed, came up against a work culture firmly anchored in collegiality and consensus building, as no cabinet could impose its views, whether national or sectoral — not even the president’s. A distinction must be made here between heads of cabinet and other cabinet members. Even if heads of cabinet retained a stronger national allegiance, the years 1973–86 saw the beginning of a more general trend towards denationalisation ⁽³⁾ and communitarisation of the cabinets.

MICHEL MANGENOT

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, note from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to Nick Stuart, 26 February 1979. ‘Caring only about their own career’ refers here both to Community officials and to ‘national’ civil servants, the only difference being that the former focused on the Commission, whereas the latter did not necessarily do so.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010, see section 9.1, ‘The Council of Ministers’.

⁽³⁾ Egeberg M., ‘The denationalisation of cabinets in the European Commission’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 48, No 4, 2010, pp. 775–786.

2.3. The Spokesman's Group (later the Spokesman's Service)

In 1973, the Commission decided to restructure the offices in charge of information policy, which had repeatedly sparked sharp debate since 1958 ⁽¹⁾. Amongst them was the spokesman's department, now named the Spokesman's Group, whose main task was to keep the journalists accredited to the Commission informed of the Commission's activities; the reorganisation was emblematic of the wish of successive presidents to 'transform the department so as finally to set up an effective system of communication' ⁽²⁾.

Keeping journalists informed

The number of accredited journalists was large. It continued to increase from year to year, to the point where Brussels became 'one of the world's great centres of international press activity', along with Washington and New York ⁽³⁾. There were 271 journalists in 1973, and more than 400 in 1986; in 1983, they were made up of 43 different nationalities ⁽⁴⁾. They represented the press, radio and television networks and press agencies.

The information provided to journalists by the Spokesman's Group took many forms: daily press briefings for the latest information, weekly press conferences given by the spokesman for more de-

tailed information on the weekly meetings of the Commission and press conferences given by the president or by commissioners, sometimes jointly with prominent visitors. These activities went hand in hand with press releases and information memos issued to the press, and provided a platform for 'the presentation of the Commission's official views as promptly and effectively as the political role and specific nature of its functions permit' ⁽⁵⁾.

Although the centre of Community activity was in Brussels, information had also to be channelled to the outside offices, i.e. the press and information offices in the Member States and the delegations in non-member countries, so that they could brief their partners in the local press. For every statement made in the press room by the spokesman or a member of the Spokesman's Group, therefore, and for every meeting of the Council at which the spokesman was present, a BIO (bureau information only) note was sent by telex ⁽⁶⁾. In addition, from 1977 until April 1981, a 'Tuesday telex' was drawn up by Paul Collowald, director of decentralised information at DG X, 'working closely with the spokesman'. The aim of the Tuesday telex was 'to put recent events in the Communities into their context and outline the main issues, and at the same time to maintain solid links between the centre and the periphery, including at the human level' ⁽⁷⁾.

The Commission itself had to keep abreast of the news and to be aware of what was written and said about it. This was the reason behind the daily press review, which was based on an analysis of a constantly expanding number of press sources.

⁽¹⁾ Spanier, B., *Europe, anyone? The 'Communication Deficit' of the European Union Revisited*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1980*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 37.

⁽⁴⁾ Bastin, G., 'Les journalistes accrédités auprès des institutions européennes à Bruxelles. Quelques signes de changement d'un monde du travail', in Georgakakis, D. (ed.), *Les métiers de l'Europe politique. Acteurs et professionnalisations de l'Union européenne*, Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 2002, p. 118.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, *Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1975*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 25.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Martin Vasey, 20 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.



On 4 May 1973, François-Xavier Ortoli (centre) delivers the activity report after 4 months of his Presidency of the Commission. Ferdinando Riccardi, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of *Agence Europe*, wrote some months after the new president took office: 'From the outset of his Presidency, Mr Ortoli has surprised us ... He has shown a readiness to vigorously defend positions founded on the difficult concept of common interest. His statements have struck quite a different chord, however. Several quite dull and, frankly, disappointing interviews have given way to a distinctly new tone. "I genuinely believe that we are witnessing the birth of a nation," he announced in Lille. "The necessity exists. A bit of idealism and faith is all we need now ... " His favourite metaphor for the role of the Commission in the current phase of European integration also reveals the character of the man: "Giving daily expression to political will."' (Riccardi, F., 'Ortoli, le Français qui mène le Marché commun', *Réalités — Revue de Paris*, No 330, July 1973, p. 46.)

Ups and downs

Whatever the theoretical approach, the importance attached to information meant that the Spokesman's Group, as it was called from 1973 to 1985, or the Spokesman's Service, as it was called thereafter, went through numerous changes of circumstances. This was an inevitable result of the jockeying for influence that went on and the often ambiguous conduct of those involved. Some commissioners were known to be great communicators, and commissioners generally sought to embody the Community as they were expected to do. But most commissioners were also anxious to see their role highlighted in the press, and especially the press in their own country. This concern for opinion in a particular country,

or even a particular region, led to a certain amount of deviation from the principle that the Commission should communicate a single message even though it speaks through many voices. In practice, the job of delivering the Commission's message fell to the Spokesman's Group. But each member of the group found himself or herself covering the words and actions of a particular commissioner in the area for which he or she was responsible. Members of the group had sometimes to work at maintaining close contact with the directorates-general they covered, in order to obtain information at source, and sometimes to give priority to their commissioner and his or her private office or cabinet. As summarised by Giancarlo Chevallard: 'All the successive spokesmen tried to create a large but closely knit group. But the



A native of Treviso and holder of a doctorate in law from the University of Padua, Beniamino (known as 'Bino') Olivi (1925–2011) was a magistrate at Milan's Court of First Instance before joining DG IV in 1959. Deputy head of cabinet to Vice-President Caron in 1960, he was appointed spokesman the following year. He served in that role until 20 January 1977, when he bade farewell to the assembled press. Speaking on behalf of the journalists that day, the German Henry Schavoir, Brussels correspondent of the German press agency in Hamburg, said: 'Your task has been thankless, but you succeeded in making yourself heard and not being stifled by the bureaucracy. You set about it the right way through your daily efforts. It was you who opened this press room. Before you there was an air of secrecy about these corridors. Thanks to you, this press room has become a real "European news exchange".' (Clément André, 'Une bourse de nouvelles européennes. La salle de presse de la Commission', *Courrier du personnel*, No 379, 28 February 1977, p. 35.)

fact that everyone in reality depended on their own commissioner meant that this did not really work, because your promotion prospects depended on how you got on with your commissioner, and quite a few lost their jobs because their commissioner did not want to work with them any more' ⁽¹⁾.

The problems faced by the group were compounded in 1977, when the distinction that had been made between 'the spokesman's job, which is to inform,

i.e. to deal with the media,' and the job of DG X, which was to communicate ⁽²⁾, was diluted by a reform that placed the DG and the Spokesman's Group under the sole supervision of the president of the Commission, with the new director-general of DG X, Renato Ruggiero, also becoming the spokesman ⁽³⁾.

The reform was prepared before Roy Jenkins took office, and called for him to replace the spokesman of the time, Bino Olivi. Olivi was a lawyer by training, and had been spokesman since 1961. He felt that he was there 'to serve other people's truth'; he believed that 'if you really want to do politics, you can't run a press service just to be nice to people' ⁽⁴⁾. He was perceived as being a little arrogant in his dealings with the press room, 'which he controlled to an amazing degree' ⁽⁵⁾, and is sometimes said to have invented press relations at the Commission ⁽⁶⁾.

Olivi reacted very badly to his painful removal, owing to what he saw as the terrible way in which he was treated by the British ⁽⁷⁾. His removal triggered a spirit of revolt ⁽⁸⁾, but most importantly it inaugurated a period of instability, because Ruggiero 'was a solid man, but he couldn't hope to do two full-time jobs' ⁽⁹⁾. Ruggiero focused more on his role as spokesman, and created 'a rather odd situation' ⁽¹⁰⁾ which some did not hesitate to describe as a habit of imposing a *fait accompli* on those he was working with ⁽¹¹⁾. Be that as it may, internal communication

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011, and Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEU, 'European Oral History', in Olivi, B., 'The European Commission Memories', 26 January 2004, interviewed by M. Dumoulin and M. Rancon.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Jean Somers, 4 October 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Bastin, G., 'Une politique de l'information? Le "système Olivi" ou l'invention des relations de presse à la Commission européenne', in *La communication sur l'Europe. Regards croisés*, Centre d'études européennes de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 2007, pp. 125–136.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Ibid.

⁽¹¹⁾ Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.



Born in Naples in 1930, Renato Ruggiero (centre) was awarded a doctorate in law by his home-town university and embarked on a career in Italy's diplomatic service in 1953. Appointed head of President Malfatti's cabinet in July 1970, he briefly acted as adviser to President Mansholt before being awarded the post of director-general of DG XVI. In 1977, he combined the role of spokesman with that of director-general of DG X, but left the Commission the following year. He returned to Brussels in 1980 as Italy's permanent representative to the European Community.

channels became blurred. Hayden Phillips, deputy head of cabinet to Jenkins, kept a close eye on the activities of DG X, which Ruggiero left to one side, and an official from DG X, Aneurin Hughes, was appointed adviser to the director-general and was effectively senior to the two directors. The damage to lines of communication spread to the Spokesman's Group, where Roy Jenkins placed a man in whom he had confidence, Roger Beetham.

The Ruggiero period was born of a desire to control information and the sources of power it represented, and set out to break with the approach taken previously. Despite the problems it caused, the new approach was pursued for the entire Jenkins Presidency. Although Ruggiero resigned in September 1978, to be replaced by another Italian, Enzo Perlot, it was not until the arrival of Gaston Thorn as president in 1981 that the Spokesman's Group



1982: Étienne Davignon (centre) holds a press conference accompanied by the spokesman, Manuel Santarelli (right). A member of the Jenkins Commission, then vice-president in the Thorn Commission, Étienne Davignon was considered a great communicator. 'Whenever he came to the press room, it would be packed out', Willy Hélin, a member of the Spokesman's Group, reported. He was renowned for his repartee. Here is an example: on 6 August 1982, Davignon and Haferkamp went to Washington to sign a memorandum of understanding with Secretary of State for Trade Malcolm Baldrige on exports of Community steel to the United States. On Saturday, on his return to Europe, Davignon learnt that David Roderick, the head of US Steel, had told Reuters that the agreement should be considered null and void. That Monday, the vice-president appeared in the press room and announced: 'I would really like to know which one of them is the president of the United States, Mr Roderick or Ronald Reagan!' The line 'went global'. (Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.)

was once again separated from DG X, 'in the light of past experience', as the General Report soberly put it ⁽¹⁾.

The new spokesman was Manuel Santarelli, who had a great deal of experience in communication, as he had already been the deputy spokesman in Olivi's time. He shared Olivi's loyalty to the Com-

mission. Like Olivi, he was a generalist rather than a specialist, and like him he was also an arbitrator who worked hard to apply the principle that the Commission must present a united front, which meant trying to ensure consistency between the statements made by the various members of the Spokesman's Group ⁽²⁾. It could be a thankless task, as some members of the group would fail to mention the preparation of a media coup by their

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Fifteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1981*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1982, p. 35.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Nikolaus van der Pas, 9 June 2010.

commissioner ⁽¹⁾, or an announcement that their commissioner had dissociated himself or herself from a vote of the whole Commission ⁽²⁾.

Maintaining consistency

The most difficult part of the spokesman's job, therefore, was to maintain consistency, and to ensure that everyone else was maintaining consistency, between what the president of the Commission was asking for and what was said on the Commission's behalf in the press room. To achieve this aim, the members of the Spokesman's Group, who incidentally numbered only three women at the time ⁽³⁾, would meet every day in the middle of the morning on the first floor of the Berlaymont to prepare the midday press briefing. The press briefings were held in French. Each briefing was generally quite short, but it could sometimes become turbulent owing to the questions asked. There was only one exception to the rule that the working language was French. If a commissioner was present at the press conference, there would be interpretation for the commissioner if necessary ⁽⁴⁾. The rule requiring French lasted until 1995; the justification was that 'as everyone should understand the same thing, only one language should be used' ⁽⁵⁾. The practice could sometimes lead to comical misunderstandings.

A classic moment

'The members of the Spokesman's Service had to speak in French. One member's French was not the best. One day, during a press briefing, he made his announcement, and then took questions from the floor. He was asked [in French, but the conversation translates easily into English]: "Can the Commission confirm the rumour that President Jacques Delors is going to resign?" He replied: "Unfortunately not." The press room erupted. He hurriedly added that "The word 'unfortunately' referred only to my ability to answer your question" ⁽⁶⁾.

A good atmosphere in the press room

'The bar was in the same room. This immediately created a convivial atmosphere, because when we had finished we would stay for a coffee or a beer with the journalists. The other thing that helped create a convivial atmosphere was that the spokesmen sat at a table on the same level as the journalists' table. There was no psychological distance created, we were not making grand speeches from a rostrum' ⁽⁷⁾.

The convivial atmosphere in the press room continued for a long time ⁽⁸⁾. But the climate slowly changed. The change was attributed to the British press, who were present in large numbers and who competed hard in a context where European issues often made headlines in their papers ⁽⁹⁾. Asked whether there were changes following the entry of Spain and Portugal, other eyewitnesses comment that the Spanish journalists were 'very aggressive, but in a positive sense ... they spent their time writing negative comments about their government

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.

⁽³⁾ Liselotte Klein (1973–78), Christine Boon (1980–84) and Françoise Le Bail-Elles (1985–89).

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁶⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.

⁽⁸⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.

The Spokesman's Group (later the Spokesman's Service) in figures

Year	Accredited journalists	Daily briefings	Weekly press conferences with the spokesman	Press conferences with the president or commissioners	Press releases and information memos	BIO notes
1973	271				305	
1974	258	200	40	30	302	
1975	260				297	
1976	260				297	
1977	274	203	42	37	451	
1978	285	195	33	45	415	
1979	316	181	34	66	450	
1980	320	185	36	28	480	
1981	340	183	44	40	350	280
1982	365	240	44	40	1 900	850
1983	360	240	44	30	3 000	800
1984	360	200	42	25	2 600	720
1985	390	190	46	65	3 800	753
1986	403	185	47	50	> 4 000	400

Source: European Commission, General Reports from 1973 to 1986.

through a European filter', thus reflecting the left–right tensions that could be felt in the press room ⁽¹⁾.

Many journalists did not content themselves with the official statements made at the midday press briefings. They often made telephone calls, or asked for meetings, so that they could get more details or discuss the implications of a measure at greater length ⁽²⁾. Informal contact might continue over lunch at one of the restaurants near the Berlaymont frequented by some members of the Spokesman's

Group ⁽³⁾. Friendly relations were essential because, although the members of the Spokesman's Group had the task of keeping public opinion informed of what it needed to know, they had to face the fact that the public was not interested, and found European news boring. The journalists posted in Brussels had difficulties of the same kind. The stories they sent to their papers were considered boring by their editors, who could brush them aside with a peremptory 'we are not interested!' ⁽⁴⁾. The public's lack of information on matters European was not solely the

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Nikolaus van der Pas, 9 June 2010, and Martin Vasey, 20 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 3 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

Commission's fault. But it was the Commission's responsibility to change the state of affairs.

Draconian measures

Jacques Delors, who was himself 'an excellent spokesman' ⁽¹⁾, introduced draconian reforms ⁽²⁾. As well as renaming the department the Spokesman's Service, he introduced the principle that there should be one spokesperson for two commissioners, with the spokesperson being of a different nationality to the commissioners ⁽³⁾. Delors wanted to avoid the tendency for commissioners

to choose 'someone with the same nationality and often the same political leanings to be their representative in the Spokesman's Group', and he gave the spokesman the right to select his or her own staff in the future ⁽⁴⁾. This decompartmentalisation provoked strong opposition ⁽⁵⁾, but it probably helped to improve the flow of information at a time when major projects, such as 'a citizen's Europe', were being undertaken, and it was vital that 'the spokesperson for the Commission should more than ever try to represent the common interest' ⁽⁶⁾.

MICHEL DUMOULIN

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Hugo Paemen, 17 March 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Hugo Paemen, 17 March 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Santarelli, M., 'L'information du citoyen européen', in Dassetto, F. and Dumoulin, M. (eds), *Naissance et développement de l'information européenne. Actes des journées d'étude de Louvain-la-Neuve des 22 mai et 14 novembre 1990*, 'Euroclio' collection, 'Études et documents' series, Peter Lang, Bern ... Vienna, 1993, p. 72.

Chapter 3

The Secretariat-General and the Legal Service

3.1. The Secretariat-General

Falling within the remit of the president of the Commission, the Secretariat-General, headed by Émile Noël, was at the heart of the bureaucratic machine. The hub of the institution's internal activities, it also played a key role in relations with the other institutions.

Appointed secretary-general of the single Commission in 1967, Noël was a workaholic. The time when Walter Hallstein had sought to confine the Frenchman to the role of executive secretary had long since passed. As the incarnation of the Community system and a believer in collegiality rather than the president's right-hand man ⁽¹⁾, Noël was adept at

step-by-step policymaking, keen as he was to act in a way which would see the states form an ever-closer community. He had therefore gradually fashioned a tool which served as an interface, performing various executive tasks yet also taking some — often low-key — initiatives.

Well-versed in the history of the institution and its practices, Noël was like the captain of a ship who knew his vessel down to the smallest detail. He also knew its strengths and weakness, including those of its crew, which explains in particular the importance he attached to staff promotion.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.



‘Émile Noël was a great organiser, but without following the rules that administrations usually apply. He established a certain balance between personal contact and the formal administrative structure.

I’m talking about his office because he made sure that the usual administrative rules were followed throughout the Commission. But he had a rapport with his colleagues that had a formal administrative side, sure, but there was a human side to it as well.’

(Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.)

Promotion Committee

‘All the directors-general were present and every item was prepared well in advance. Whilst I was still assigned to the Directorate-General for Administration and Personnel, I remember this meeting being considered a very important moment because it was the point at which decisions would be taken on all those matters that had been prepared over the course of lengthy consultation procedures. The meeting took place in the evening and was preceded by a small buffet. The next day the officials would find out what had happened ... If any directors-general tried to call any of the Secretariat-General’s proposals into question, they would be put in their place by the latter in no uncertain terms’ ⁽¹⁾.

A British deputy secretary-general

In 1973, the Secretariat-General was looking for a second breath of fresh air in the light of enlargement. On the one hand, Noël now had an enlarged role ⁽²⁾ and on the other hand, he had to reckon with the arrival of a second deputy secretary-general in March 1973. In addition to Klaus Meyer, from Germany, who would be responsible for overseeing relations with the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) until his departure in September 1977, Christopher Audland, from the United Kingdom, would import the administrative culture of his home country. Arriving from the British diplomatic corps, Audland had ‘a terribly military side’ ⁽³⁾. He was imposed on Noël, ‘perhaps as an alternative solution’ ⁽⁴⁾, given the failure to appoint a new secretary-general, as wished by some, whether or not they dared to admit it ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Jean-Claude Eeckhout, Daniela Napoli and Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

The two men had opposite ways of governing. The secretary-general had the benefit of experience, an in-depth knowledge of the issues and a network of officials ‘who often took the initiative to contact him in writing for instructions’ ⁽¹⁾. Audland, however, was looking to promote ‘bureaucratic standardisation’ ⁽²⁾. ‘Passionate about procedures,’ he assigned Aneurin Hughes, also from the Foreign Office and responsible for the ‘Internal Coordination’ administrative unit, to draw up a manual of procedures ⁽³⁾. The first version of this working tool, the development of which continues to this day, dates back to July 1976 ⁽⁴⁾. And it did not stop there. Overseeing the preparation of the General Report and the drafting of the monthly *Bulletin of the European Communities*, he progressively introduced internal coordination meetings at the Secretariat-General.

Together with the Legal Service, he was also behind the arrangements introduced in 1974 for monitoring how Community legislation was being transposed into national law ⁽⁵⁾.

Responsible for the programme for computerising administration ⁽⁶⁾, which proved particularly long ⁽⁷⁾ and complicated both on a technical level, due to how disordered the systems were, and on a cooperative level, with services located in Brussels and Luxembourg ⁽⁸⁾, Audland became the sole deputy secretary-general in September 1977, occupying the position until December 1981. At this point, he handed over the reins to his compatriot Michael Jenkins, who was then replaced in September 1984 by Horst Günter Krenzler, from Germany, whom

the government in Bonn had wanted to succeed Noël after his retirement.

A deputy secretary-general who would not become secretary-general

‘As deputy secretary-general, I had to represent the Commission both in Coreper and in the context of European political cooperation (EPC) ... In Coreper, my representatives included [Marcell] von Donat ... For EPC, there was a very good United Kingdom official, Simon Nuttall ... It was a doubly heavy weight to bear ... I was also appointed to represent the Commission in Berlin on difficult and in part very specific affairs relating to the four-power status [of Berlin]. There was one other important matter, namely working with [Émile] Noël. The secretary-general, legendary figure that he was, actually wanted another deputy. However, Gaston Thorn and Étienne Davignon had me appointed ... As a result, I initially had some difficulties with Noël, however cooperation prevailed between us ... What interested him was the development of the Community ... The federal government wanted me to take over from Noël as secretary-general ... They absolutely wanted a German secretary-general within an international institution. Jacques Delors would always say: ‘It’s out of my hands.’ Then it turned out that at the Fontainebleau Summit Margaret Thatcher had struck a deal with the French president: the future secretary-general would be British’ ⁽⁹⁾.

Opinions are divided as to Audland’s motives. Some believe that ‘no doubt in order to compensate for Noël’s authority, which he could not rival, he wanted to have procedures he could turn to in order to familiarise himself with matters and take action under a more hierarchical process, rather than one based on direct contact with the official responsible’ ⁽¹⁰⁾. For others, ‘this British approach of imposing new procedures and different working methods

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Audland, C., *Right Place — Right Time*, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2004, p. 242.

⁽⁵⁾ Ibid., p. 245.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ The *Courrier du personnel* did not introduce the regular column on the computerisation of the work of officials, entitled ‘Le bit baladeur’, until May 1984.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Dieter Koenig, 6 May 2011.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

could ... be considered a “strategy for conquering” the administrative territory of the Commission’ which incidentally ‘significantly improved the style of Community procedures which were somewhat “old-fashioned”’ ⁽¹⁾. At the same time, it meant to some extent ‘breaking free from the Franco–Italian shackles’ around the method of governance then in force at the Secretariat-General ⁽²⁾.

The balance between what his critics referred to as the empiricism of Noël, for whom it was ‘the role rather than the grade that mattered’ ⁽³⁾, and Audland’s resolve to establish a hierarchy, is emblematic of the trend which took hold during the second half of the 1970s. It was at this time that the General Reports began to mention very discreetly under the staff section the in-depth examinations into how the Commission operated and how it was structured. In other words, the issue of “managing” ⁽⁴⁾ rather than administering’ was raised ⁽⁵⁾.

Be that as it may, ‘it was not the Directorate-General for Administration that could have made Noël restructure his departments’ ⁽⁶⁾. Or, as Ivor Richard used to say: ‘This place will never change as long as Émile is there’ ⁽⁷⁾. There were two areas in which nothing would change. The first was implementation, which bore the hallmark of the secretary-general. The second, for want of a name, can be described as discreet initiatives with sometimes far-reaching consequences. Developments in these

two areas explain why there were nine administrative units at the Secretariat-General in 1973, and 13 by 1986.

Implementation

Very much mindful of its independence ⁽⁸⁾, the Secretariat-General, with its ‘highly isolated departments’ ⁽⁹⁾, carried out regular tasks at differing speeds.

Working for the College

For the meetings of the College on Wednesdays ⁽¹⁰⁾, minutes would need to be drafted which Noël would read through meticulously. This job, as with many other tasks related to the meeting, was carried out under the responsibility of the director of the registry, ‘an entirely central unit since it was one of the few units working exclusively for the Commission as a College and not for its president or particular members of the Commission’ ⁽¹¹⁾. Frans De Koster held the position of director of the registry and was succeeded by Rodolphe Gachot in February 1980.

However, the Secretariat-General and in particular its chief would not settle for the work of a notary. The meeting of the College, if it was to fulfil its function, needed to be prepared and its outcomes interpreted. This meant work both beforehand and afterwards.

Noël, who ‘knew all the dossiers almost by heart’ ⁽¹²⁾, would chair the Monday meeting of the heads of cabinet, other than on the rare occasions when he

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010, and Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011: ‘Audland, who was rather austere, brought efficiency, pragmatism and clarity with him ... It made a very positive contribution to Community work and the way the Commission was run.’

⁽²⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.

⁽⁵⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 383, 28 July 1977, and EC Commission, *Thirteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1979*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1980, p. 36: ‘The management and organisation studies carried out during the year were mainly concerned with the implementation of improvements in organisation, methods and administrative procedures suggested by studies on the operation and structure of Commission departments completed in 1978.’

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ See Chapter 2, ‘The Commission as a body’.

⁽¹¹⁾ Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010.

⁽¹²⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

would be called away to attend Coreper ⁽¹⁾. Disliking the fact that certain heads of cabinet ‘had a habit of sending their number two or number three’ as a replacement ⁽²⁾, he did not chair this meeting, which represented an opportunity to oil the wheels, out of a sense of duty, but rather did so in order that the president’s cabinet need not take on this role and could therefore ‘express certain wishes, certain political lines more directly’ ⁽³⁾. From 1977–78 onwards, special meetings of the heads of cabinet were held ⁽⁴⁾, generally attended by a delegated cabinet colleague. These meetings would address technical matters, which increased in number and complexity as the responsibilities of the Community grew ⁽⁵⁾.

In keeping with Noël’s philosophy and style, the Wednesday meetings of the College, prepared on the previous Monday, would require feeding back to the directorates-general. On Thursdays, he would therefore chair a meeting of the directors-general, which some would avoid attending. This was probably because Noël ‘often used this meeting ... to “give a lecture”, in other words to say that now was not the time to present a particular document, that it would not go through, nor was it likely to go through in the next fortnight or month because it had been presented far too early and prompted a number of objections’ ⁽⁶⁾.

Knowing his flock and keen to complete the picture, the secretary-general would make sure a meeting was held on Fridays with the assistants to the directors-general to ensure messages had got through, sometimes explaining in greater detail what had been said to the directors-general the day before.

Relations with the Council

The gifts of diplomacy and political skill exercised by Noël within the Commission, accompanied by an exceptional knowledge of the matters at hand, also shone through in relations with the Council and Coreper for which the agenda for the Thursday meeting ‘was largely based on the decisions and discussions of the Commission’ ⁽⁷⁾. Deputy Secretary-General Meyer had responsibility in this area, which was passed on to Audland in 1977 and then to his successors.

In short, what did the Secretariat-General of the Commission do? As Paolo Ponzano explains: ‘Prior to Council and Coreper meetings, it contacted officials from the Council but gradually also the Presidency, often to test an idea in order to find out what the sensitive areas for the delegations were — should a compromise need to be proposed. Contact was made by telephone, which gradually became common practice across the institutions. Meetings with the Commission and its Secretariat-General would be convened by the Presidency in order to discuss matters before each meeting. In those days, a lot was done by telephone. Noël’s Secretariat would call its counterpart headed by Niels Erbsøll, Secretary-General of the Council, or vice versa, when very sensitive matters were being referred over to the meeting of the ambassadors (Coreper II) and even more so when the conclusions of the European Council were being drafted’ ⁽⁸⁾.

But the role of the Secretariat-General did not stop there. At least until 1977, Noël was able to keep ‘half an ear’ on the Special Committee on Agriculture. His role was almost that of a clerk ‘noting what appeared important in the preparations for the Council’ ⁽⁹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ In this case, the meeting would be chaired by the president’s head of cabinet. Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Explained in greater detail in section 4.1, ‘Coordination and decision-making process in the Commission’.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout and Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Klaus Meyer, 20 October 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with François Benda, 2 November 2010.

From the second half of 1975, the Secretariat-General also participated in the Antici Group, acting through one of its officials. Named after the Italian diplomat, Paolo Antici, who was the first to chair the group, it was made up of one official from each permanent representation, one official from the General Secretariat of the Council and one from the Commission. It was responsible for ‘approving the minutes of the weekly Coreper meetings and preparing the agenda for the next meeting’ ⁽¹⁾. Over time, the role of its members and, as such, of the designated official from the Commission’s Secretariat-General would be extended.

Relations with the Parliament

The Secretariat-General was also responsible for relations with the European Parliament, which, as with relations with the Economic and Social Committee, fell within the remit of the deputy secretary-general. There was only one exception to this rule. Admittedly it did not last long, but it was nevertheless testimony to the flexibility which was often required of the Secretariat-General. In 1976, David Marquand, a former British member of Parliament for the Labour Party and a close friend of President Jenkins, was appointed chief adviser in the Secretariat-General. As he himself remembers: ‘This was a kind of deal between Jenkins and Émile Noël.’ The president considered his compatriot and friend as a kind of private parliamentary secretary who was a member of neither the cabinet nor the Secretariat-General. Initially, his role was to focus on relations with the Parliament. However, the president quickly stopped developing this area of activity, and so the ‘pontifical legate on heretical territory’, as Noël would jokingly refer to him, returned to England ⁽²⁾.

The role of the members of the Antici Group

‘The result of obscure circumstances, the primary duty of the Antici Group was for its members to wait outside the door to the meeting room where the European Council took place. They were the personal manservants to the heads of government, raised to the level of plenipotentiaries. Only they could enter the meeting room if ever a head of government required anything. I was the Antici assistant to President Delors. I brought him documents, aspirin or informed his wife if, once again, the meeting would be running over. Every head of government had his or her own Antici assistant. The Antici Group would sit around a table in front of the Council meeting room. The heads of government would summon their Antici assistants much as servants were once called to the lounge, by pressing a buzzer. If a C, for Commission, appeared in the black box, I knew I was required inside ... Assistants entered the room very quickly and left very slowly. Then they would each tell the rest of the group outside what they had heard. By piecing together all this information, we were more or less able to follow what was being negotiated. We wrote it down on a piece of paper and passed it on to our delegations. The ministers and ambassadors in office would be informed on the basis of these rather arbitrary notes ... It was quite unbelievable. But fascinating ...’ ⁽³⁾.

This anecdote is indicative of the importance of the Secretariat-General, which had duties with an undeniably political impact, one example being the production of the General Report.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. He is the author of *Brüsseler Machenschaften: Dem Euro-Clan auf der Spur*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1975.

The ‘Commission’s business card’ ⁽¹⁾

Imposed by Article 18 of the Merger Treaty, the *General Report on the Activities of the European Communities* had to be submitted to the President of the European Parliament in February. It was hugely important as far as Noël was concerned as it was ‘a way for him to convey messages’ ⁽²⁾. He considered it the ‘Commission’s business card’, which required a huge amount of work and had to be ‘accurate, obsessively meticulous and could not have a single mistake. The actions of the Commission were always checked and double-checked to be sure that what was being said was true!’ ⁽³⁾.

As material proof of the importance which Noël attached to the exercise, it was ‘the secretary-general who drew up the contents page, submitting it to the Commission for approval by written procedure’ ⁽⁴⁾. However, it was a contents page with a given focus as ‘the directorates-general would be asked to address certain matters and not others’ ⁽⁵⁾.

The procedure for drawing up the report was rather special, both in terms of how it was done and the length of time it took. On the one hand, it was very carefully crafted, with the directorates-general being asked for contributions, whilst also drawing on the monthly bulletin (discussed below), which provided a valuable basis on which to work ⁽⁶⁾. These contributions, which would have to be checked to make sure that what was written corresponded with reality ⁽⁷⁾, tended to create another type of problem. Some ‘directorates-general provided better contributions than others, to the extent that sometimes when one ... was clearly inferior ... the contribution from a very good DG would be offered, under the

table, to show the type of text Émile Noël was looking for,’ reported Jean-Claude Eeckhout ⁽⁸⁾. On the other hand, the work of checking, selection and harmonisation, which would entail redrafting, had to be done very quickly because ‘this report covered the whole year right up to 31 December and had to be available in all languages, in book form, 6 weeks later,’ in the words of Ivo Dubois ⁽⁹⁾. However, for the officials responsible for this particularly onerous and stressful task, their troubles were not yet over. The report contained an introduction which was written by the person responsible for the report. It firstly had to be checked by the deputy secretary-general and then finally by the secretary-general, whose reading of it would be ‘extremely rigorous’ ⁽¹⁰⁾.

As the icing on the cake, so to speak, Christopher Audland ‘added his two cents worth and introduced the memorandum annexed to the address on the programme, which was a more technical text’ that would also need to be finalised ⁽¹¹⁾. This additional memorandum would be phased out following the departure of its creator and replaced by the programming of the Commission’s activities.

‘And the raccoon?’

The programming exercise itself was introduced by Hans Beck, a former member of Wilhelm Haferkamp’s cabinet, who was assigned to the Secretariat-General where ‘he completely overhauled Audland’s system’ ⁽¹²⁾. It involved inviting the directorates-general to document the initiatives they were proposing to launch over the coming year. The replies, which were submitted to Noël for his opinion and comments, would inevitably evoke *Inventaire*, the 1946 poem by Jacques Prévert, so much so that in reading the end result of the programme, the secretary-general would be prompted

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Ibid.

⁽¹¹⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽¹²⁾ Ibid.

to add a comment directly inspired by the poem to emphasise the confusion, disorder and lack of structure to the text submitted to him: ‘a series of small dots followed by a single sentence “and the raccoon”’⁽¹⁾.

‘Cuckoos’ eggs’⁽²⁾

Like the bird that hosts the cuckoo’s egg, the Secretariat-General played a sometimes decisive role in introducing new subject areas within the Commission. In particular, these would be areas which did not initially fall within the remit of the Communities. This incubator role taken on by the Secretariat-General required ‘vision since it meant looking beyond the Community *acquis*, courage since it would involve entering unexplored territory, power since new approaches would have to be imposed on lawyers and Community “fundamentalists”, and finally strategic ability since it was vital to proceed in a way which did not offend the sensibilities of the Member States, whilst still ensuring that decisive initiatives were implemented’⁽³⁾.

The conditions were clear, as were the motives. The topics that the Secretariat-General would place in incubation often came under the responsibility of several directorates-general. It was therefore important for them to be entrusted to a department which would ensure coordinated management whilst taking advantage of the fact that, until the 1982 interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters, amounts could be entered in the budget even without a legal basis⁽⁴⁾. In this respect, it should be said that the Secretariat-General was responsible for managing subsidies not necessarily because it had to, but because by giving out subsidies Émile Noël could consolidate a position of

power⁽⁵⁾. Noël would therefore use but not abuse this power, including for subsidies coming under the *ad personam* category, which harsher tongues would call his slush fund. A slush fund it was not, because from setting up the first Centre for European Studies in the United Kingdom to supporting the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, the boost it offered was always subject to written procedure⁽⁶⁾.

While any claim to be exhaustive would be illusory, it is worth mentioning, in addition to initiatives such as organising and consulting the historical archives⁽⁷⁾, those initiatives which targeted areas as diverse as the inspection of external delegations and offices, culture and emergency aid. Such initiatives would always be in response to a request, be it internal or external, long term or short term.

Inspection of delegations

Noël believed he should have a special relationship with the heads of the press and information offices. Two or three times a year he would therefore send an official from the Secretariat-General to visit one or more of these offices. Based on interviews with the staff and the head, a report would be sent to Noël, who would not divulge its content, not even to the director-general of DG X⁽⁸⁾. As well as illustrating once again how Noël would exercise personal power, this more or less informal inspection would sooner or later also pave the way for an innovation that had an impact on the Commission’s growing presence in EU and non-EU countries.

In 1982, the Commission decided to establish a unit responsible for inspecting the external offices

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Audland, C., ‘The historical archives of the European Union: Their opening to the public, management and accessibility’, *The Journal of the Society of Archivists*, Vol. 28, No 2, 2007, pp. 177–192.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.

and delegations ⁽¹⁾. Checks would focus on the one hand on their actual functioning, and on the other hand on their financial management. Inspired by the system introduced by DG VIII for inspecting projects supported by the European Development Fund (EDF), responsibility was assigned to Eduard Weimar, formerly of the European Agency for Cooperation, who had moved to the Secretariat-General. The decision to place the unit there was somewhat surprising. It was the result of a 'huge fight between DG I and DG VIII. With neither of them wanting to back down, a third player [Noël] was all too happy to take it on,' and so he made off with the prize, Eduard Weimar laughingly recalls, adding that DG X was also involved but had less of a say in the matter, as the other two DGs carried more weight ⁽²⁾.

European Youth Forum

At the end of the 1970s, the economic crisis, together with the alarming results of surveys into how young Europeans felt about Europe, led to the creation of the European Youth Forum in 1979. In conjunction with the Parliament and the Commission, various activities geared towards this section of the population were organised, including a campaign about youth employment ⁽³⁾. In principle, there was no reason why the Secretariat-General should get involved, or indeed the social partners, for whom an office had been created in 1977. So once again the same thing happened. Amid a particularly gloomy climate, initiatives were lacking and, with several DGs proving incapable of cooperating, the Secretariat-General played the role of incubator, although over time responsibilities were grouped in a single administrative unit: in 1986 the forum and the of-

fice were brought together with relations with the Economic and Social Committee.

Emergency aid

On 28 August 1977, a particularly devastating tornado hit the small town of Ronchi on the Riviera di Versilia, Tuscany. At that time, Umberto Stefani, the owner of a small house in the region, was principal adviser for relations with Coreper II at the Secretariat-General. With the support of Commissioner Lorenzo Natali, he spearheaded the initiative to create an interservice group for emergency aid to Member States ⁽⁴⁾.

What was new about it was not so much that emergency aid was to be provided, since the principle was already being applied with respect to non-EU countries by DG VIII ⁽⁵⁾; rather this was an attempt to coordinate and achieve economies of scale with the funds used to help victims of disasters occurring in Member States. This was at a time when 'a disaster culture' was developing outside of the Commission, particularly in the Council of Europe ⁽⁶⁾. Up to that time, certain directorates-general would take action as part of their sectoral responsibilities, ranging from agriculture to transport. However, since this involved having to manage budget lines which had little funding and were difficult to access, the opportunity was seized in 1977 to go beyond 'emergency intervention which would generally be a symbolic gesture, albeit reported on in the press, with a photo of the cheque being handed over to the beneficiary ... in favour of pursuing more serious matters where the Regional Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and other sources would need to be used,' whilst ensuring everything was coordinated. Over time, this coordination led to the creation of a network

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Sixteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1982*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983, p. 28.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Sixteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1982*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983, pp. 37–38.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Umberto Stefani, 9 June 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

of specialists active within the disaster units in the different directorates-general ⁽¹⁾.

Culture

In December 1981, Robert Grégoire was appointed to head the unit for cultural questions, a position in which he would stay until his retirement in May 1985 ⁽²⁾. The creation of this unit is interesting in itself. It is no secret that at that time, as Grégoire writes, ‘all our governments would have protested against attempts by the Community to meddle with what they would have portrayed, with varying degrees of hypocrisy, as the core of their sovereignty ... Community action was not supposed to attract attention. It was meant to evolve almost out of sight’ ⁽³⁾. However, at the same time, the Thorn Presidency gave momentum to a cultural policy, as is evident from the president’s speech of 24 November 1981 to the European Parliament’s Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport. This momentum was also apparent from the space now set aside for culture in the General Report. Yet no directorate-general was capable of hosting this cuckoo’s egg. Once again, the Secretariat-General would serve as the incubator for an area it was not intended to take care of ⁽⁴⁾.

Forward planning

A group of advisers appeared on the organisation chart of the Secretariat-General in September 1977. It was created on the request of Roy Jenkins ‘as an extension to the cabinets and to swell the number of trusted people’ ⁽⁵⁾, as illustrated by the case of David Marquand referred to earlier. In practice, this meant that the few of-

ficials at the Secretariat-General responsible for forward planning were left to themselves. Present when the group was established, Eduard Weimar remembers: ‘Nobody knew what they were supposed to do or how they were supposed to do it, where intervention was possible or what help could be requested’ ⁽⁶⁾. The arrival of Michael Jenkins 2 years later, in May 1979, brought no change to the situation since he prepared dossiers for the medium term, particularly on budgetary matters, and without asking anything of anyone. In 1981, when Jenkins replaced Audland as deputy secretary-general, Michel Vanden Abeele took over the helm: ‘A point for consideration by the cabinet,’ he reported ‘... our small team has worked a little on the medium-term prospects for Europe ... We tried to launch the idea of a Europe at different speeds ... We produced some good work but there was no political will to use it’ ⁽⁷⁾. Did this will exist in 1983 when Jean-Louis Lacroix replaced Vanden Abeele? According to Jérôme Vignon, who led the forward studies unit after Lacroix’s untimely death, it was only with Jacques Delors, who was initially somewhat bemused as to the use of such a body, that ‘the group headed by Jean-Louis Lacroix was called on directly to make a substantive contribution to institutional affairs, on matters which really concerned everyday work. It was a sort of extra cabinet’ ⁽⁸⁾.

Given the many varied and often complicated duties of the Secretariat-General, this begs the question as to how it fulfilled an essential function, namely sending out information to its own officials but also to the whole Commission and, of course, to an even wider public.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ ‘Au revoir Monsieur Culture’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 464, May 1985.

⁽³⁾ Grégoire, R., *Vers une Europe de la Culture, du Théâtre à l’action communautaire*, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 62.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 25, ‘At the service of the European citizen: information policy, a people’s Europe, culture, education and training’.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Jérôme Vignon, 4 April 2011.



On 8 and 9 January 1985, Jacques Delors summoned the members of his new Commission to Royaumont Abbey, a former Cistercian monastery in Asnières-sur-Oise, some 30 kilometres north of Paris, before their first meeting in Brussels. Only Claude Cheysson, who was busy with the negotiations for Lomé III, failed to turn up. Referring to his time working with Pascal Lamy and Émile Noël from August 1984 during his tour of the capitals, Jacques Delors wrote in his memoirs: 'From the outset I received the enthusiastic support of one of the founding fathers of Europe, Émile Noël, ... the foremost secretary-general of the Commission since its creation. He had become such a key part of the Commission that you couldn't help but wonder sometimes whether it was he who had put his mark on this policy or that decision' (Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 182). Hence the observation by one witness to 'intellectual conflicts between Noël and Delors' that Delors 'admired Noël's independent spirit' (interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010), while another commented that, in 1985, 'the president's cabinet began to whittle away the secretary-general's powers' (interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010).

Information

Under Noël, there was no real, established procedure for circulating information within the Secretariat-General or, on a larger scale, across the Commission departments, despite the existence of a standard hierarchical channel for passing on information. At the registry, Lucien Depaus set up a simple but extremely effective system involving a team of around 20 people which allowed internal documents to be circulated quickly ⁽¹⁾. The monthly bulletin was a further source of information, the culmination of a very complicated and extremely demanding journalistic exercise which laid the

foundations for ‘the entire body of information about the activities of the Commission and the Community’ ⁽²⁾. Moreover, without expanding on the role played by the external *Daily Bulletin* from Agence Europe, it should be mentioned that in the 1970s, as well as having the *Courrier du personnel*, officials could also call ‘Informaphone’ from their work telephones in Brussels, then Luxembourg (1 March 1973) and ultimately Ispra (November 1978), in order to listen to the Commission’s daily news bulletin ⁽³⁾.

So everything would have been for the best in the best of worlds ‘had there not been this oral circu-



Administratively part of DG IX, not DG X or the Spokesman's Group as many officials believed, the Informaphone was used by Émile Noël every Wednesday night to inform interested members of staff about the results of the Commission meeting. Original illustration published in the *Courrier du personnel*, No 377, 20 December 1977, p. 98.



The *Official Journal of the European Communities* (P series) which, in April 1958, replaced the *Official Journal of the European Coal and Steel Community* (A series), created in 1952, was split into two series in 1968: L (legislation) and C (information and notices). Like a factory with a multitude of tasks to complete every day, the Official Journal, which has become increasingly automated since 1979 both in its composition and distribution, is published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities in Luxembourg in all the official languages of the Member States (other than Irish) from the date of their accession.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Frans De Koster, 14 October 2010. In an additional note, he wrote: ‘For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that there was an “office for secret documents”, with a statistics unit as of 1975 for cooperation with delegations in certain non-EU countries.’

⁽²⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.

⁽³⁾ According to the *Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1973* (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, p. 96), each daily bulletin received about 1 000 calls in 1973.

lation of information within a special network' ⁽¹⁾ which many of those involved refer to as Noël's network. This explains not only why certain officials had access to the secretary-general without having to go through the usual channels, but also why others felt they were at the mercy of successive leaks, the origin of which lay in what Noël wished or did not wish to share.

What this meant was that the concept of transparency was largely unheard of, as illustrated by Noël's refusal to publish the Commission organisation chart for fear of junior officials being put under pressure by Member States or lobbyists ⁽²⁾.

Towards modernisation: management and organisation ⁽³⁾

Even if, at the end of the period covered by this volume, 'it is clear that the Secretariat-General was where the power ultimately rested in terms of how the Commission arrived at a decision' ⁽⁴⁾, the fact remains that in September 1985, the College approved the policy lines for modernising the European civil service ⁽⁵⁾. The following year an action plan was developed, the aim of which was to motivate every official by more clearly defining their responsibilities and improving the way information was circulated ⁽⁶⁾. As in other areas of Commission life, one period had well and truly drawn to a close, and another was beginning.

MICHEL DUMOULIN

3.2. The Legal Service

As early as 1965, President Walter Hallstein had made the memorable statement that the European Community's only weapon was the law: 'The Community is not merely a creation of law. There is virtually no other holder of public power that is, like the Community, exclusively dependent on law in order to carry out its functions. The Community has no administrative infrastructure, no direct power of coercion, no army and no police. Its only tool, its only weapon, is the law that it establishes' ⁽⁷⁾.

Indeed, the Commission's lawyers, organised within the influential Legal Service, battled on various fronts, in particular at the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. Pioneering research on the history of European law shows clearly that the Legal Service played a fundamental role in establishing a Community law which was 'constitutional' in nature, in opposition to those who wanted to reduce it to one of several branches of international law.

The director-general until 1969, Michel Gaudet, left a lasting mark on his colleagues, in particular because of his ability to allow a teleological interpretation of the treaties to emerge, which went hand in hand with the primacy and direct effect of European law in relation to national law ⁽⁸⁾.

Gaudet's successors tried to retain and consolidate that direction, at the same time modernising the

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ For further details see Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ See section 1.1, 'Dynamics of organisational change', and Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

⁽⁶⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44.

⁽⁷⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Walter Hallstein on 17 June 1965 to the European Parliament in the legal debate on the report '*Priorité du droit communautaire sur celui des États membres*', cited by Louis, J.-V., 'Community law 50 years on', in Baquero Cruz, J. and Closa Montero, C. (eds), *European Integration from Rome to Berlin 1957–2007: History, Law and Politics*, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009, pp. 65–91.

⁽⁸⁾ On Gaudet, see Dumoulin, M., 'The administration', in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 219–239.

service in order to adapt it to the enlargement and deepening of the Community. This was facilitated by the fact that, exceptionally, his successors Walter Much and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann had worked in the Legal Service for a long time. This explains why, in the period covered by this volume, the service was able to maintain an *esprit de corps* unparalleled inside the Community administration.

The staff and organisation of the Legal Service

When Gaudet left in 1969, Walter Much provided that continuity until his death in 1975. He had already been Gaudet's deputy after being the last director-general of the Legal Service of the ECSC before the legal services of the three communities merged in 1967. While working at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1950 he had also taken part in the preparatory negotiations for the Treaty of Paris as a member of the German delegation led by Walter Hallstein. Shortly afterwards, he had joined the ECSC's new legal service, which was headed by Robert Krawielicki from its inception until 1966. At the head of the Legal Service, Much received very solid support from Gérard Olivier, an ENA graduate and French prefect, who had also come from the ECSC's legal service, which he had joined in 1955. Olivier did not leave the Legal Service until 1972, after 17 years, and was replaced as deputy director-general by the Italian Giancarlo Olmi, who stayed in office until 1987.

Olmi played a rather important role since, between Walter Much's premature death in 1975 and the appointment of his successor, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, in March 1977, he was acting director-general for a long period because of the opposition to having a German in place as director-general ⁽¹⁾, at a time when that post was the subject of a certain rivalry between France and Germany. The deadlock was

broken by the arrival of President Roy Jenkins and the resolution of a political conflict within the ruling coalition parties in Germany.

Ehlermann's 10 years at the helm can be seen as a period of modernisation which helped to increase the prestige of the Legal Service as a centre of excellence at the vanguard of European integration. This was achieved by retaining the best traditions from the earlier period, while Ehlermann himself was a pure product of the Legal Service, which he had joined in 1961. Having worked for 8 years under Olmi on complex common agricultural policy issues, Ehlermann turned to institutional matters in 1969 under the supervision of Olivier. He was therefore the linchpin of the Vedel Committee secretariat set up at the request of Commissioner Altiero Spinelli to reform the functioning of the European institutions. This career path was interrupted in 1973, when the French commissioner, Claude Cheysson, suggested that he become a director in financial control, where he was responsible for the first amendment to the Treaty of Rome with the adoption of the Budgetary Treaty ⁽²⁾, before returning to the Legal Service.

More modernisation followed when Ehlermann highlighted the horizontal and collective aspect of the service in 1977 by making the rotation of its lawyers obligatory. This was made easier by the fact that the College had not determined once and for all the internal structure of the Legal Service (which comprised some 10 thematic teams and several horizontal groups headed by grade A2 managers).

Rotation, at least for young lawyers, was an accepted principle but was applied only occasionally. It was Ehlermann who made it systematic within the service. It was necessary to prevent lawyers from being too influenced by the directorate-general they were advising and becoming too set in the ways and

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jean Groux, 25 June 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEU, 'European Oral History', Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 'The European Commission memories', 29 January 2004, interview by Y. Conrad and M. Rancon.



Family photo of the Commission's Legal Service, 1979. Its director-general, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, believed that 'the strength of the Legal Service lay in its ability to see a problem from different angles or perspectives and to combine those facets of often very complex problems.' (Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.)

routine of their field. Mobility would give them an overview of Community law, enabling them to draw up opinions that took account not only of the sector covered but also of other sectors, thereby promoting the consistency of Community law. Moreover, when mobility later became general policy in the Commission, the service could point out that it already operated such a policy.

The modernisation brought about by Ehlermann within the Legal Service did not stop at rotation. It also concerned better dissemination of information within the service and wider participation in administrative management. In other words, managers were consulted more often on administrative matters, including promotions. Lawyers could have a voice through a 'transparency group', while secretaries had a system of self-organisation and were consulted on changes in assignment.

Furthermore, the Legal Service was not cut off from the outside world. Ehlermann also expanded the policy of opening up the world of Commission lawyers to universities. While Gaudet was in charge, he deliberately encouraged contacts with law societies and lawyers' associations by financing the creation of the International Federation for European Law (FIDE) and specialised journals, but his successor went a step further. Ehlermann became personally involved with the academic world as a lecturer at the College of Europe in Bruges between 1971 and 1981 and subsequently at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). He even 'rather encouraged colleagues who were wondering whether or not to leave the service and teach, and therefore embark on an academic career' ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.

This opening up further cemented the Legal Service's place as a cornerstone of the legal community, a process that had been begun by Gaudet. In addition, there was the introduction of regular lunches with the 'rival' legal service of the Council, so it cannot be said that the Legal Service was an ivory tower. Its value came from the quality and versatility of its staff, because the service was relatively small in relation to the impact it had on the development of European law. In 1974, there were only 66 A grade, 17 B grade, 44 C grade and 13 LA officials. The latter were responsible for reviewing the legal and linguistic concordance of legal documents and for translating written pleadings. They were also pioneers in the use of computers in the legal world through the creation of the CELEX database ⁽¹⁾. That database of all Community legislative acts made online consultation in French possible from 1981, before making it available in the main official languages in 1985. This primacy of the French language should come as no surprise because French remained the predominant working language both within the service and in the deliberations of the Court of Justice, despite the enlargement of 1973, which had no immediate effect in this regard.

Beyond that, the attitude introduced by Ehlermann was above all to attach less importance to grade than to the value of legal opinions expressed within the Legal Service during the process of drafting advice ⁽²⁾.

The functions of the Legal Service

We should bear in mind that the two essential functions of the Legal Service, as already outlined in the

previous volume, were (and still are) to provide legal advice to the Commission and its departments and to represent the Commission before the Court of Justice.

With regard to the first function, the opinion of the Legal Service was necessary to allow the Commission to consider a decision, proposal or any other formal position. That involved intense preparatory work by the operational departments, which avoided as far as possible submitting a draft act to the College without a favourable opinion from the Legal Service. Moreover, a commissioner could not carry out the empowerment procedure if the Legal Service did not give a favourable opinion: in that case the commissioner lost the power to decide alone and had to submit the proposed decision to the College.

This mechanism, which the Commission had wanted from the outset, gave the Legal Service considerable influence. Its prestige was enhanced by its role as the Commission's advocate before the Court. The Commission could find itself in the position of a plaintiff before the Court, in particular in infringement proceedings against the Member States, or a defendant where a Member State or a company petitioned for one of its decisions to be annulled. In addition, it systematically made observations on requests for a preliminary ruling referred to the Court by a national court. In all these cases, a member of the Legal Service was appointed by the Commission as an agent and given wide discretion.

Unlike the operational departments, the Legal Service is not supposed to receive instructions from the members of the Commission on the content of legal opinions. It is subordinate to the president only in administrative terms. Furthermore, the director-general of the Legal Service takes part in all meetings of the College. This enables the Legal Service to build up a wealth of information, in the same way as the Secretariat-General.

⁽¹⁾ Bernet, H., 'Les racines: histoire de CELEX 1963–86', *25 years of European law online*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, pp. 11–25; Interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean-Claude Sécché, 14 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Informal interview with Giuliano Marengo, 11 June 2013.

The role of the Legal Service in the development of European law, 1973–86

According to a number of accounts, contemporaneous and more recent works ⁽¹⁾, we can conclude that Gaudet's legacy was the project of developing the European legal order as a type of 'constitutional' law that was very different from classical international law.

By virtue of its role as the Commission's agent before the Court of Justice, the Legal Service made a substantial contribution to the functioning of the European legal order through the developments in case-law from 1983 to 1986, in particular in the fields of external relations and the completion of the single market. The common theme of this contribution was to defend solutions that developed the principles on which the system of treaties was based in order to promote the process of Community integration, while not falling into the trap of the maximalist positions adopted by those who advocated going further than, or even counter to, the provisions of the treaties. In short, the Legal Service acted as a counterbalance: if one commissioner wanted to go too far in legal terms, it acted as a brake; if another was too cautious, it encouraged the commissioner to be bolder. Furthermore, its position often allowed it to find a legal solution bridging departments that were defending diverging positions.

By way of example, we can cite the notable advances in the field of external relations. Until the beginning of the 1970s, legal theorists took the almost unanimous view that the Community did not have the power to conclude international agreements outside the few cases expressly provided for in the treaties. Despite that, following an appeal by the Commis-

sion in the well-known *AETR* case ⁽²⁾, the Court affirmed the view that there was a 'parallelism' between the Community's internal and external competences, which it later had the opportunity to develop further in subsequent cases (see in particular Opinion 1/76 on the draft agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels).

The recognition of these implicit powers had opened the way to broad interpretations concerning the possibility of the Community taking action as an actor under international law. The question of the Community's power to conclude agreements with its international partners alone (exclusive competence) or with the Member States (mixed competence) had been the subject of rather lively political and legal disputes, such as the case of the International Rubber Agreement in 1978 and the agreements concerning other commodities (wheat, sugar, cocoa, coffee, tin). On this matter the Legal Service had maintained an ambitious position, albeit less maximalist than that advocated by some in the Commission, and that position was finally accepted by the Court of Justice in its judgments.

The Legal Service then focused its attention on the question of the effects of the international agreements concluded by the Community with non-member countries or international organisations. There were two schools of thought among legal writers: a classical school, based on dualist theory, which rejected out of hand any direct effect of international agreements and in any event required transposition by national legislation, and another school closer to the Community system itself, based on monistic theory and personified by Ehlermann, which was in favour of recognising, under certain conditions, the direct effect and also the primacy of

⁽¹⁾ European Commission, *Thirty years of Community law*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983; Gilsdorf, P., 'Le service juridique de la Commission', unpublished manuscript, Legal Service, Brussels, 2003. The author would like to thank the Legal Service library for making this manuscript available.

⁽²⁾ Judgment of 31 March 1971 in Case 22/70 *Commission v Council* [1971] ECR 263.

these agreements ⁽¹⁾. The Court of Justice did not settle this question of principle, instead preferring to adopt a more flexible position based on the specific characteristics, terms and spirit of each category of agreement. Thus, with regard to free trade and/or association agreements with non-member countries, aimed at creating a single market in imitation of the Community's internal market, the Court followed the monist argument (see the *Kupferberg* judgment ⁽²⁾) by allowing the possibility of the direct effect of these agreements; later, this case-law would be clarified by the need for a clear, precise and unconditional obligation (see the *Demirel* judgment ⁽³⁾). By contrast, the Legal Service never sought to push the Court to recognise a direct effect of more 'traditional' international agreements, such as the GATT agreement (see the *International Fruit Company* judgment ⁽⁴⁾).

The 1970s and 1980s were also the decades in which an effective internal market within the Community was actually established, thanks not only to the legislative activity, which would culminate in the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, but also to the Court's extensive case-law that exploited and developed the relevant provisions of the EEC Treaty, essentially using a teleological interpretation of the objectives pursued by the treaty. We can restrict ourselves here to recalling the advances in the free movement of goods that enabled the removal of many 'hidden' restrictions to the detriment of goods

from other Member States (starting with the *Dassonville* judgment ⁽⁵⁾) and the confirmation — in the absence of harmonised Community rules — of the principle of mutual recognition of national legislation protecting essential interests that had primacy over the free movement of goods (starting with the *Cassis de Dijon* judgment ⁽⁶⁾). Once again, the solutions worked out by the Court of Justice were based to a large extent on the positions taken by the Legal Service. These went much further than the arguments supported by the prevailing doctrine, which regarded the prohibition laid down by the treaty as concerning only national measures discriminating against products from other Member States ⁽⁷⁾.

Indeed, in almost every field we can find evidence of action by the Legal Service to ensure the smooth functioning of the European machine. We should, for example, credit it with finding the solution to the crisis caused by the Council's inability to set agricultural prices at the start of the 1980s. In the absence of such price-setting, were the Member States to be allowed to regain their freedom of action, leading to the collapse of the common agricultural policy? The Legal Service took the view that, on the basis of the principle of continuity of government, the old prices continued to apply. The Commission, by following that argument, was able to prevent a major crisis ⁽⁸⁾.

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⁽¹⁾ Gilsdorf, P., 'Le service juridique de la Commission', unpublished manuscript, Legal Service, Brussels, 2003, p. 36. The author would like to thank the Legal Service library for making this manuscript available.

⁽²⁾ Judgment of 26 October 1982 in Case 104/81 *Kupferberg & Cie* [1982] ECR 3641.

⁽³⁾ Judgment of 30 September 1987 in Case 12/86 *Demirel* [1987] ECR 3719.

⁽⁴⁾ Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 *International Fruit Company and Others* [1972] ECR 1219.

⁽⁵⁾ Judgment of 11 July 1974 in Case 8/74 *Dassonville* [1974] ECR 837.

⁽⁶⁾ Judgment of 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 *Rewe* [1979] ECR 649.

⁽⁷⁾ European Commission, *Thirty Years of Community Law*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1982.

⁽⁸⁾ Lamoureux, F., 'Les pouvoirs de la Commission en cas de vide juridique du fait de la carence du Conseil', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 277, May 1984, pp. 215–224.



Part Two

Administrative culture and methods



An essential cog: few European meetings could have functioned without the Commission interpreters, who quickly became renowned as some of the most expert in the world.

Introduction

As conceived by the negotiators of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is a *sui generis* institution combining the political responsibility of an executive, administrative expertise and defence of the European general interest. Although the experience it accumulated during the 1960s enabled it to define its methods of operation at the heart of the Community institutional system, the years that followed saw a number of changes resulting from the consequences of shifts in the political balance, as well as internal adjustments.

The Commission's influence in the legislative process was weakened as a result of the pursuit of consensus arising from the Luxembourg compromise. Voting in the Council became uncommon, thereby slowing down the legislative process driven by the Commission on the most challenging issues. The establishment of the internal market, which was a key aim of the work carried out in the late 1970s, was one of the areas in which the Commission was able to counteract this trend, first under the Presidency of Gaston Thorn and then under that of Jacques Delors. The single market was only made possible by a return to the voting procedure in the Council.

The Commission also took into account in its initiatives and actions the role of interest groups, includ-

ing trade associations, such as farming organisations, and more specific bodies. While the lobbies tried to influence decisions, the Commission, for its part, tried to benefit from their expertise to enhance the scope of its action. The Commission's interlocutors also became more and more diverse in view of the ongoing expansion of Community policies between 1973 and 1986.

Did the arrival of new members alter the administrative culture or practices established under the Community of Six? The challenge was primarily political. It was linked to the relative economic poverty of Ireland, and to the persistence of a Eurosceptic opposition in Denmark and the United Kingdom. The Commission exercised discretion in the 'renegotiation' of the accession treaty requested by the British government. But the 1973 enlargement had a number of effects on Community policies. Although the fundamental transformation of the common agricultural policy (CAP) demanded by London did not materialise, regional and trade policies were reinvigorated. The enlargement also had administrative implications. The arrival at all levels of three sets of nationalities went smoothly. The Danes and Irish were quickly integrated into the system, thanks to diligent commissioners and well-prepared officials. However, for several years the British experienced some diffi-

culties in recruiting officials to available posts. The outcome of this was a relatively low number of British officials in the Commission in the early days.

The administrative culture was, however, subject to influences which largely transcended the specificities of national cultures. At an internal level, beyond the role played by the cabinet, the Secretariat-General continued to emerge as a key player at the heart of the coordination and decision-making process, under the authority of the president.

During this period, a significant driving force was the relationship between ‘bureaucratisation’ and ‘managerialisation’, a process which the Commission sought to introduce in order to make better use of its skills and resources. In spite of the sometimes drastic recommendations of certain reports, the period 1973–86 was ultimately a time of gradual transition or maturing of the Commission’s administrative culture, rather than a revolution.

JAN WILLEM BROUWER

Chapter 4

Working methods

4.1. Coordination and decision-making process in the Commission

The particularity of the Commission's working methods lies in its position in the European political system, where its role is more one of administration than implementation. It combines a Franco-British tradition of hierarchical interministerial arbitration and a key role for the Secretariat-General with a Germanic culture of ministerial independence or autonomy and strong directorates-general.

To this is added a tradition of collegiality dating back to the High Authority when, we should remember, 'portfolios' did not exist. This collective tradition is close to the Swedish administrative model, in which ministers do not have authority over the departments, since they are generally grouped into autonomous agencies. This model was chosen from the outset to prevent any states from exerting exces-

sive influence on a file and thus to neutralise direct national influences. The complexity of the Commission's model for internal decision-making and working methods lies in this 'patchwork', to quote Jacques Ziller ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission is both a governmental structure with commissioners and cabinets (as in Belgium and France) and at the same time a bureaucracy with directorates-general managed according to a strict hierarchical principle. Two internal coordination networks therefore coexist: a political network of cabinets, in particular that of the president, and an administrative network of the directorates-general and the Secretariat-General. The distinctive feature and great originality of this model is that both networks have been progressively organised around one key person, the secretary-general, who has authority over the Secretariat-General, has chaired the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet since 1967 and has always attended the College meeting alongside the president.

⁽¹⁾ Ziller, J., 'De la nature de l'administration européenne', *Revue française d'administration publique*, No 95, 2000.

The Commission has one last special feature: the duality between formal and informal channels in the decision-making process. The formal decision-making channels (interservice consultation between directorates-general, meetings of ‘special heads of cabinet’ and ‘*hebdo*’ (weekly) meetings of the heads of cabinet) are supplemented by other informal co-ordination channels such as the weekly meetings of the directors-general and their assistants, the real impact of which is difficult to assess.

British membership ⁽¹⁾ initially had very limited consequences. This was the case, for example, for the presentation of documents as of 1977. In this respect, we could refer to the instructions drafted at the request of President Roy Jenkins and signed by Christopher Audland concerning the memos to him and the answers to parliamentary questions ⁽²⁾.

Memos ‘à la Jenkins’

1. Speaking briefs

- Talking points
- Defensive points

2. Background briefs

The most noteworthy point here is that the 1973 enlargement resulted in the Commission having to explain its working methods, in use since 1958 and formalised in 1967. This involved above all re-

Files for the president

The task of coordinating the preparation of files for the President of the European Commission for his travels in the Member States or third countries, the idea for which dates back to the Malfatti/Mansholt Commission, has been carried out without exception by the Secretariat-General since the Ortoli Commission. It involves coordinating the preparation of files for the Commission president for visits to Member States and non-EU countries. A similar system was set up to prepare the files for the President of the European Council. In both cases, the Secretariat-General, working together with the president’s head of cabinet, asks for contributions from the departments, drafted with the agreement of their own cabinets, and coordinates them to give the file a coherent policy approach. In his role as deputy secretary-general, Christopher Audland developed instructions on the format of contributions from the departments. His instructions, based on Foreign Office practice, distinguish between speaking briefs (comprising talking or defence points) and background briefs. They were included in the manual of procedures and continued to apply after Audland’s departure.

Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi

minding newcomers of the rules, but at the same time formalising or settling existing methods. For instance, the first manual of procedures dates back to May 1976. Before Roy Jenkins arrived, Émile Noël explained the Commission’s working methods at great length, in English, to his (future) head of cabinet, Crispin Tickell, who was still in the Cabinet Office in London, essentially to show him that changing them would be pointless ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter 5, ‘The impact of the first enlargement’.

⁽²⁾ For Philippe Petit-Laurent, member of the cabinet of François-Xavier Ortoli: ‘The British fitted into the structure without any difficulties, sometimes with some very remarkable personalities, but they were far from causing a revolution. By way of anecdote, what I remember of the arrival of the British, as a young official at the time, is that they had really improved the procedure for answering parliamentary questions by setting up a system for replying to the questions raised by European MEPs: there were the replies themselves but also “background briefs” and “supplementary questions”. Whereas, before, each department provided the response they thought fit in a non-standardised fashion. The British had structured the procedure somewhat and I thought that this was a very good reform’ (interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010).

⁽³⁾ HAEU, Émile Noël papers EN-2536, Letter from Émile Noël to Crispin Tickell, ‘The Commission’s working methods’, Brussels, 19 November 1976.

Collegiality in practice

The division of portfolios between commissioners ⁽¹⁾ was adjusted over this period. While nine commissioners easily shared the various Community policies from 1958 to 1967 (and then from 1970 to 1972), this was not the case with 13 and then 14 members. Under Walter Hallstein, there were as many commissioners as there were directorates-general. However, the expansion of Community powers was not enough to give substantial fields to the five new members. It was therefore necessary to create new portfolios (e.g. for taxation and industry) by dividing up certain large sectors of activity. Furthermore, certain directorates-general could be allocated to more than one commissioner. The Jenkins Commission tried to solve this problem: between 1977 and 1981, a directorate-general was answerable to only one commissioner.

How could collegiality be preserved in an enlarged Commission? The discussions centred first on how the meetings of the College were organised. Their purpose was to refocus the meeting of the commissioners on essentially political questions. They provide a general illustration of the inherent tension in the Commission between a sectoral approach and collective responsibility. Under François-Xavier Ortoli, the Wednesday meetings were very long: they started at 10.00 and often ended at 19.00. Items on the agenda were examined from 10.00 to 11.00, after a series of formal adoptions (in particular the conclusions of the heads of cabinet), leading up to lunch at 13.00. Time was made at 15.00 for an exchange of political opinions on current issues, before finishing with the agenda between 16.00 and 19.00.

Starting with Jenkins, the meetings were held in two stages: formal adoptions and then the agenda and current issues together. Jenkins tried to achieve

consensus systematically (sometimes also recording differences of opinion in the minutes). Under the Thorn and Delors Commissions, voting became essential. One of the specific features in these years was the friendly interaction, and even complicity, between some of its members.

From year to year, the workload was lightened and the items included on the Commission's agenda on Wednesdays were cut down, thereby logically shortening the duration of the meetings. The written procedure, introduced in 1960, became the tacit procedure: the number of decisions rose from 850 in 1962 to 2 500 in 1967 and almost 4 000 in 1973–75. In 1968, the empowerment procedure ⁽²⁾ was introduced as part of the common agricultural policy. As of 1978, no fewer than 6 000 decisions were adopted in this manner, on behalf of the College but by one commissioner, and under specific conditions.

Developments in the decision-making process strengthened the influence of the cabinets almost automatically: a growing number of items were dealt with as early as Monday at the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet. This meeting, held on an occasional basis under Walter Hallstein, became weekly under Jean Rey and was permanently scheduled for Monday afternoons at the start of the 1970s. It was the time to discuss the items on the agenda of the College meeting, during which areas of agreement between heads of cabinet were endorsed without discussion by their 'bosses', the commissioners. The Commission reproduced here the procedure followed by the Council for 'A' items (endorsed beforehand by the permanent representatives). In relative terms, the heads of cabinet of the commissioners are the functional equivalent of the permanent representatives for the members of the Council.

⁽¹⁾ See section 2.1, 'The commissioners'.

⁽²⁾ The College may empower one or more of its members to take management or administrative measures on its behalf. It may also instruct one or more of its members to adopt the definitive text of any instrument or of any proposal, the substance of which has already been determined in discussion.

The 1970s saw the more significant development of ‘special heads’ or ‘special heads of cabinet’ meetings on Thursdays and/or Fridays. These meetings, intended to cover technical and specific issues, brought together specialised advisers from the various cabinets under the authority of a cabinet member of the president or the commissioner responsible for the policy in question. They prepared or clarified items on the agenda of the ‘*hebdo*’, the weekly meeting of the heads of cabinet.

Administrative coordination in action

The second internal coordination mechanism is administrative, under the aegis of the Secretariat-General. In this respect, these years were also characterised by the professionalisation of methods, although coordination sometimes remained difficult. Despite being a director-general himself, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann claimed in a memo to Nick Stuart, a member of President Jenkins’s cabinet, in February 1979 ⁽¹⁾: ‘Coordination does not work well because there is no cohesion between directors-general: they do not form a body (like the heads of cabinet), they work together only on a sporadic basis.’

Yet interservice coordination was overhauled in 1975, with a change from non-permanent to standing groups. This coordination arose progressively from the relations maintained by the directorates-general with each other in the preparation phase for Commission initiatives. In 1975, a working group on the matter was created, and chaired by Willy Schlieder, Director-General for Competition ⁽²⁾. His report was adopted by the Commission on 15 July 1975 and explained by the Secretariat-General in a procedural note in September: ‘The Commission considers it essential to

further develop team spirit and cooperation on all levels between officials. Suitable interservice coordination should guarantee that the proposals submitted to the Commission reflect the most relevant and balanced opinion of the departments and avoid any unnecessary discussions between Commission members on technical problems, thereby allowing them to dedicate their time to the important policy aspects of their decisions’ ⁽³⁾. To foster this practice as early in the procedure as possible, the obligation to date all final documents submitted to other departments for their opinion was introduced. In the event of ‘insurmountable divergences of opinion’ within standing groups, ‘objective reference must be made to them in the document submitted to the Commission by the responsible department’.

Interservice coordination was to be formalised after the Delors Commission under the name ‘interservice consultation’ (CIS). However, other coordination mechanisms also existed, which were informal. Every Thursday morning, the secretary-general called together the directors-general to inform them of the College decisions at the meeting which only a few of them had attended. Indeed, apart from the director-general of the Legal Service, the spokesperson and the registrar, the ‘sectoral’ directors-general attended only for the discussion of the agenda items concerning them. The changes were brought about by Jacques Delors, who would be the first president to maintain direct contact with the directors-general and convene regular meetings for them, thereby fostering a more important procedural role for the president.

Lastly, the start of the Hallstein Commission saw the introduction of a meeting for the assistants to the directors-general: ‘Noël’s children’, as he liked to call them. On his departure in September 1986, he chaired his 1 000th meeting. Officially, the assistant

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, ‘Problèmes administratifs’, Memo from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to Nick Stuart, 26 February 1979.

⁽²⁾ Since DG IV (Competition) was in principle less concerned, there are two possibilities: either a more ‘neutral’ chair could be chosen or DG IV could be more involved in this procedure.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/272, Memo from Christopher Audland, Deputy Secretary-General, to the directors-general and heads of service, SEC(75) 2864, 17 September 1975.

to the secretary-general convened the Friday meeting from 9.00 to 12.30, but Noël attended it regularly to tell them about the Commission meetings. This unchanging ritual started with: ‘This is what the Commission said on Wednesday’. It was both a tool for disseminating information and a means of exerting influence by the secretary-general, who then followed the careers of his ‘children’, many of whom became ‘Noël boys’, members of Noël’s information network within all the services, and not only at the level of the directors-general.

Where two coordination networks meet: the secretary-general

These two coordination networks within the Commission were gradually placed in the hands of one person: Émile Noël. His central role was consolidated over this period, since in addition to the meetings of heads of cabinet, which he chaired every Monday, he chaired the weekly meetings of the directors-general and also of their assistants. He found himself at the junction of these two networks, and could thereby control all the information and internal coordination mechanisms. It would take the arrival of Jacques Delors and his head of cabinet Pascal Lamy for the first changes in the nature of relations between the Presidency and the Secretariat-General to come about.

The matter of the secretary-general chairing the meeting of heads of cabinet was debated from the outset. According to Gérard Olivier, deputy director-general of the Legal Service, Renato Ruggiero, head of cabinet to Franco Maria Malfatti, would like to have chaired it in 1972: ‘Ruggiero would have done so willingly, but no one succeeded in challenging Émile Noël. He was an astonishing character. The good thing was that men like Émile Noël and Edmund Wellenstein ⁽¹⁾ always managed

to get on well. It was not easy at the start because Wellenstein could have been an equally good secretary-general’ ⁽²⁾. But it became a well-established practice and many of the president’s heads of cabinet, seated at his right, acknowledged his chairmanship skills, a sometimes formidable art ⁽³⁾. For Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, the second head of cabinet to President Ortoli, he had ‘very deft authority, and we were all bowled over by him’ ⁽⁴⁾.

In 1986, after Noël’s departure, ‘Lamy asked Delors to chair the weekly meeting, but the position was coveted by David Williamson, the new secretary-general, who was aware of how the Commission worked’ ⁽⁵⁾. Lamy intended to take advantage of the departure of Noël, whose methods were judged by the Delors Cabinet to be rather outdated, particularly his conciliatory style during the meetings of heads of cabinet ⁽⁶⁾. However, tradition was upheld by the new secretary-general. Between 1985 and 1986, there was a severe culture clash for 18 months between Noël, the 64-year-old keeper of the flame, and Lamy, 38 years old, who represented a new generation of senior officials and was nicknamed ‘the Exocet’.

In the Secretariat-General, Noël was flanked between 1973 and 1977 by two deputies. One was German: first Helmut Sigrist, from 1958, when Noël was still only executive secretary, followed by Klaus Meyer from 1969 to 1977 (deputy head of cabinet to Hallstein). The second was British in the person of Christopher Audland, from 1973 to 1981. They formed a Franco–German–British trio, and then a Franco–British duo following Meyer’s departure, from 1977 to 1981. Without changing the culture of the Secretariat-General, Audland made an

⁽¹⁾ Director-general of DG I (External Relations).

⁽²⁾ HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Gerard Oliver, ‘The European Commission memories’, by G. Bossuat and M. Rancon, 29 January 2004.

⁽³⁾ Bossuat G., *Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission européenne*, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, pp. 158–159.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, 10 September 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Maria Pia Filippone, 8 July 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Endo, K., *The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 117.

impact thanks to being more organised than Noël, who, having founded the system, practised a rather sophisticated form of DIY. Furthermore, Audland attached importance to keeping French as the working language, while taking care to avoid any abuse of its dominant position ⁽¹⁾.

Schedule challenges

One of the major challenges in this period, apart from putting the finishing touches to the coordination procedures, was to improve the scheduling of Commission activities. A series of gradual adjustments relating to own-initiative proposals can be observed. On 1 January 1974, the obligation to provide a schedule of procedural phases for each proposal was introduced: this was the establishment of the ‘timetable annex’ ⁽²⁾. It was used by the Secretariat-General to create and update a schedule of all proposals. Noël referred to it as a ‘schedule follow-up’. The Secretariat-General thus centralised a fundamental element of the Community

decision-making process: time management. After the introduction in 1979 by Daniel Strasser ⁽³⁾, director-general for budget, of the financial statement (a prerequisite for any measures in staff matters) for new proposals, the form for including a document on the Commission agenda was integrated into the system on 1 September 1980. On a more political level, in 1978, Jenkins introduced the annual programme, which is annexed to the speech delivered by the president before the Parliament at the start of each year. In order to give it substance, the president held an informal 2-day seminar every September on the development of general policy guidelines for the upcoming year. Its implementation was entrusted to a group chaired by the secretary-general and composed of one representative of the president and two directors-general, in rotation. These scheduling efforts were to continue in the early 1980s following the reports by Spierenburg and the Three Wise Men ⁽⁴⁾, although they did not succeed in covering all Commission activities.

MICHEL MANGENOT

⁽¹⁾ Take, for instance, the call to order addressed to Roland de Kergorlay, Deputy Director-General for External Relations, concerning a meeting held by the latter in French because no interpreting was available. Audland pointed out to him that he could not have it assumed that French was the default language, ‘without giving any explanation or expressing any regret’, HAEC, BAC 488/1988/7, Memo from J. N. Stempels to R. de Kergorlay, 28 June 1974.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 488/1988/7, Memo from Émile Noël to the directors-general, SEC(73) 4766, 10 December 1973.

⁽³⁾ Following the Commission decision of 19 October 1977, ‘each time a new proposal is submitted to the Council, its implications in terms of staff must be clearly specified’, Memo from Daniel Strasser to the directors-general and heads of service, 8 November 1978.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’, and the introduction to Part Three.

4.2. The Commission's strategy for the design and implementation of European policies: between pragmatism and conviction

The practice of consensus which stemmed from the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 considerably weakened the Commission's influence in the legislative process, as recounted by its various presidents ⁽¹⁾. Without calling into question the existing practice of consensus for the adoption of instruments, the Paris Summit of 9 and 10 December 1974 advocated more frequent voting as well as implementation and management powers for the Commission.

The Commission entrusted its departments with ensuring that proposals were formulated as far as possible on a majority legal basis, and also with identifying those fields most suitable for the use of qualified majority voting ⁽²⁾. There were only a few such fields. Following the Commission's request, the Legal Service examined the matter of 'potential powers' and possible problems linked to their transfer ⁽³⁾. The Commission underlined the validity of this practice of taking 'small steps', which had been developed since 1975 ⁽⁴⁾; between 1976 and 1977, the

number of Commission proposals rose by 29.9 %. This momentum did not persist because the number of proposals remained stable between 1978 and 1985 (see table 'Statistical overview of legislative work by the Commission, 1978–85', page 132). The Commission exercised its right of initiative in the framework of established Community powers (internal market, agriculture, trade policy, transport, etc.), Directorates-General III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs) and VI (Agriculture) being the most active in this field.

Despite the increase in executive action, the Commission's legislative activity remained stable between 1978 and 1985. In 1978, with a view to the upcoming enlargements, the Commission reiterated its position (in a communication 'General considerations on the problems of enlargement', referred to as the 'Fresco' ⁽⁵⁾) in favour of applying the conclusions of the Paris Summit of 1974, referred to above. The criteria established at the meeting in Comblain-la-Tour from 15 to 17 September 1978 ⁽⁶⁾ set priority fields for the Commission: agricultural and fisheries policy, economic and monetary union (EMU), enlargement and external relations.

By defining priority objectives for legislative action, Roy Jenkins stated for the first time that monitoring the application of Community law was as important as making it. At the instigation of Étienne Davignon, the Secretariat-General inaugurated the assessment of action taken by the Commission through the quarterly examination of pending proposals and the planning of policy priorities with a view to establishing a genuine legislative pro-

⁽¹⁾ Group of independent personalities, IRB/14, Summary record dated 26 February 1979 of the meeting held in Brussels on 23 and 24 February 1979 (quote from François-Xavier Ortoli); Interview with Roy Jenkins, *Courrier du personnel*, No 402, 14 March 1979; Quote from Gaston Thorn, *Courrier du personnel*, No 430, 12 February 1982.

⁽²⁾ On this subject, see the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean-Claude Séché, 14 June 2011.

⁽³⁾ BAC 83/1984/251, 'Le service juridique ne manque pas de se pencher sur les éventuels problèmes que poserait aux États membres le transfert des compétences potentielles dans le cadre d'un futur traité instituant l'UE', Note from the Legal Service, 13 June 1975, JUR/1773/75 — BP/fg.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 50, January 1978, 'Rapport du Groupe interservices sur les questions institutionnelles liées à l'élargissement' (Kergorlay Group) sur 'Les adaptations des traités entraînées par l'élargissement'.

⁽⁵⁾ 'Communication from the Commission to the Council on the transitional period and the institutional consequences of enlargement', *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 2, 1978.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, BAC 408/1991/203, Note from the Secretariat-General, SEC(79) 516, March 1979. These criteria, based on both the cost and the effectiveness of the Commission's working method, favour legislative action without excluding incentive or coordination actions, guide the development of proposals in non-economic sectors of the 'grey area' and propose using the principle of subsidiarity in advance.

Statistical overview of legislative work by the Commission, 1978–85 ⁽¹⁾

Year	Legislative proposals ^(a)	Variation (% calculated by the author)	Executive autonomous instruments with or without comitology ^(b)
1978	654		4 799
1979	542	– 17 %	4 764
1980	753	39 %	5 901
1981	590 ^(d)	– 22 %	6 044
1982	646	9 %	5 280
1983	544	– 16 %	6 101
1984	559	3 %	5 220
1985 ^(c)	654	17 %	7 490

^(a) Proposed legislative instruments (regulations, directives and decisions), as well as recommendations and opinions on draft legislative instruments transmitted to the Council.

^(b) Acts adopted by the Commission, i.e. EEC regulations, general and individual ECSC and EEC decisions, EEC directives and ESCS and EEC recommendations and opinions.

^(c) In 1985, the number of instruments increased considerably compared with 1984. This phenomenon is the result of preparation for enlargement of the Communities to include Spain and Portugal and the increase in legislative work as soon as the Delors Commission took office.

^(d) The significant decrease in instruments from 1980 to 1981 can be explained in part as the result of the new Commission being established.

Planning

With enlargement, the General Report presented by the Commission each year ⁽²⁾ included, by way of introduction, the address on the programme for the following year, delivered by the president of the Commission to the European Parliament, accompanied by a text giving a more technical description of the initiatives envisaged, referred to as the supplementary memorandum annexed to the address on the programme. This procedure was followed by the 1973, 1974 and 1975 reports and disappeared with the departure of its designer, Deputy Secretary-General Christopher Audland. The address on the programme and the annexed memorandum were no longer published as an introduction to the General Report. Moreover, the supplementary memorandum was replaced by a new type of programming exercise introduced by Hans Beck, who had previously been a member of the Haferkamp cabinet before working for the Secretariat-General.

What is the difference between the two exercises? The supplementary memorandum was drawn up by the Secretariat-General on the basis of contributions from the departments, in accordance with the policy priorities set in the address on the programme which the president was to deliver to Parliament, and which had been approved by the College. The planning system devised by Hans Beck took the opposite approach. The departments were asked to present their programmes, to be discussed during a process which led to the Commission adopting its priorities. When the new system was put into practice, the work of the departments was most probably not sufficiently monitored and directed, and the end result was rejected without pity by Émile Noël. It would take years before an effective programming system was established.

Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi

⁽¹⁾ In 1985, the number of instruments increased considerably compared with 1984. This phenomenon is the result of preparation for Community enlargement to include Spain and the increase in legislative work as soon as the Delors Commission took office.

⁽²⁾ See section 3.1, 'The Secretariat-General'.

gramme ⁽¹⁾. As regards the application of the law, a monitoring system was established to follow up infringements and complaints in the Member States regarding Community legislation, the effects of which gradually became apparent (see table below).

Statistical overview of Commission decisions on infringements and complaints ⁽²⁾, 1978–85

Year	Number
1978	—
1979	370
1980	751
1981	579
1982	291
1983	1 028
1984	1 584
1985	1 265

Cases where the Commission used its prerogatives when negotiating its proposals in the Council were relatively rare ⁽³⁾. Indeed, it was not in the Commission's interest to amend its proposals to achieve a qualified majority in the Council when the Council reached a decision by consensus on Presidency compromises. The 1978 food aid programme was the only case of a real 'political' withdrawal. It was withdrawn by Claude Cheysson, Commissioner for Development, after the Council had watered

down the proposal ⁽⁴⁾. It was only in February 1986 that the vice-president of the Commission, Arthur Cockfield, requested, without success, that the Council vote on the Commission's proposal and not on the Presidency compromise ⁽⁵⁾.

Monitoring the application of Community law: an example of the Secretariat-General's coordination role

In the pre-litigation phase, explicit provision is made in the treaty for monitoring the application of Community law. Depending on the issue, this involves the directorates-general and, in all cases, the Legal Service. The arrangement established in 1974 ⁽⁶⁾ gives a significant coordination role to the Secretariat-General. Thanks to this coordination, the College has been able to guarantee fair treatment for both the Member States and the matters at issue.

Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi

In order to maintain the momentum, the Commission turned towards new fields which were not always covered by the provisions of the treaties. It presented new initiatives in the social field — including four directives adopted between 1974 and 1980 — and in the energy sector ⁽⁷⁾. The Council was parsimonious in adopting the Commission's proposals for new common policies. In some cases, it changed them from mandatory actions to simple

⁽¹⁾ The idea of a legislative programme arose at the meeting in Comblain-la-Tour, where it was suggested that the Commission approve a declaration each year on the political priorities which could later become the general outline of a work programme. The same applies to the report by the Three Wise Men, which stipulated that 'The timing and terms of its proposals should be determined by a programme of policy and operational objectives, adopted when it is appointed and revised at least once a year', HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, Council of the European Communities, 'Report on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three [Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin] to the European Council, October 1979', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1980, p. 53.

⁽²⁾ *Sui generis* decisions which were not covered by Article 189 of the EEC Treaty or Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty.

⁽³⁾ 'Pending proposals' which came up against significant difficulties in the Council, in whose adoption the Commission continued to express interest.

⁽⁴⁾ File note, Secretariat-General — Directorate D, 'Relations with the Council', PP/ev/2001-168, 30 April 2001, Annex 1.

⁽⁵⁾ This proposal concerned the Council's change to the legal basis of the Commission proposal concerning a customs convention.

⁽⁶⁾ See section 3.1, 'The Secretariat-General'.

⁽⁷⁾ 'The Commission insisted that it was necessary to distinguish between binding legislative action and other actions. In order for new initiatives to be adopted more easily in the Council, it was better for them to be presented using a binding legal basis', HAEC, BAC 49/1987/855, Note from Deputy Secretary-General Christopher Audland to the directors-general, SEC(78) 4685, 24 November 1978.

recommendations ⁽¹⁾. On the basis of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty or with no specific legal basis in the treaties, the Commission submitted proposals in fields in the grey area, thereby developing strategies to bring policies into the Community field ('creeping competences') ⁽²⁾. Across all fields, such incursions often started with a formal request from the European Councils to the Commission ⁽³⁾, and not with the Commission directly — whether it concerned an overall policy or a one-off action — and less frequently with a national ministry. The Commission's influence was thus often to be found below the level of the European Councils ⁽⁴⁾.

From 1980, following the Court's judgment of 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 *Cassis de Dijon* ⁽⁵⁾, the Commission introduced a new qualitative approach to the legislative method. Thanks to this approach, harmonisation would be underpinned by the principle of mutual recognition. On this basis, the Delors Commission would subsequently considerably develop secondary legislation on the internal market, which would extend to all technical regulations on products ⁽⁶⁾.

The first legislative programme was developed in 1981. In September of that year, Gaston Thorn announced the implementation of new Community policies or actions on the organisation of working time, industrial innovation and the implementation of Community programmes (the social action programme, the multiannual research and development programme and the integrated Mediterranean programmes). In the field of regional development, Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84 introduced Community priorities and established multiannual socioeconomic development programmes based on global co-financing which replaced the system of financing individual projects.

Between 1970 and 1986, the increasing delegation of implementing powers to the Commission, pursuant to Article 155(4) of the EEC Treaty, gave rise to a proliferation of management and regulatory committee procedures, thereby conferring a more important role on the Member States and, consequently, the Council ⁽⁷⁾. The Commission wanted the Council to stick to the single system of the regulatory committee with a 'safety net', which allowed the Council a period of 3 months in which to amend the implementing measures proposed by the Commission. To this was added the 'aerosols' statement in the Council minutes in 1974, whereby the Commission undertook to take account of a prevailing tendency for the Member States to oppose an implementing measure in order to avoid the Commission taking action which would run counter to the majority position of the national delegations. The so-called 'double safety net' procedure, on the other hand, allowed the Council to reject a Commission implementing measure by a simple majority vote, thereby preventing its entry into force. However, in practice, the Secretariat General of the Council not-

⁽¹⁾ The issue of the Commission's independence was underlined in the report by the Three Wise Men, October 1979, p. 54. According to the treaties, the Commission may either refer a formal proposal to the Council or recommend that it take action (Article 155 of the EEC Treaty). The Council may request the Commission to conduct a study on whether it is advisable to take certain measures or submit a proposal (Article 152 of the EEC Treaty).

⁽²⁾ Although Article 235 is broadly applicable, it cannot cover each sector of activity in which the Member States wish to take joint action. In this case, other bases must be found. See the interviews with Fernand Van Hoeck, 4 April 2011, and Konstantinos Maniatopoulos, 16 July 2010. Although Denmark participated in a whole series of directives based on this article in the social and environmental fields, it found the way in which Article 235 was applied to be excessive (HAEC, BAC 408/1991/226, SEC(80) 403/2), Note from the Legal Service, 14 March 1980.

⁽³⁾ In the 1980s, the European Council started to include 'policy requests' for the Commission in its conclusions. This practice, which was never formalised by the treaties, was developed over time. For details of the excesses of this system, see the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean-Claude Séché, 14 June 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 49/1987/855, Note from the Deputy Secretary-General Christopher Audland to the directors-general, SEC(78) 4685, 24 November 1978.

⁽⁵⁾ See Chapter 12, 'Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy'.

⁽⁶⁾ See the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean-Claude Séché, 14 June 2011.

⁽⁷⁾ These committees were introduced in 1962. The management committees developed spontaneously with the implementation of the common agricultural policy, whereas the regulatory committees became the predominant procedure, in particular for the internal market. HAEC, BAC 408/1991/226, 'Questions institutionnelles — Rôle des comités', Note from the Legal Service, 30 May 1985.

Changes in (the number of) committees, 1980–86⁽¹⁾

DGs/services	Year	
	1980	1986
Services other than the DGs (Secretariat-General, Eurostat, Customs Union Service (CUS), Joint Research Centre (JRC), Euratom Supply Agency)	14 including 1 advisory committee on programme management (ACPM) in the JRC	21 including 2 ACPMs in the JRC
DG I External Relations	10	25
DG II Economic and Financial Affairs	3	8
DG III Internal Market and Industrial Affairs	33 including 2 concerted action committees (COMACs)	45 including 1 COMAC, which became Community–COST concertation committees (CCCCs)
DG IV Competition	2	2
DG V Employment, Social Affairs and Education	18	31
DG VI Agriculture	49	64
DG VII Transport	9	14
DG VIII Development	1	8
DG XI Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety	13	32
DG XII Science, Research and Development	18 (including 12 COMACs)	26 (including 12 COMACs and 8 COMACs which became CCCCs)
DG XIII Information Market and Innovation	1	2
DG XIV Fisheries	4	5
DG XV Financial Institutions and Taxation	3	3
DG XVI Regional Policy	2	3
DG XVII Energy	8	9
DG XIX Budgets	2	2
ACPMs (not included in DG XII and/or the JRC)	24	16 of which 12 became management and coordination consultative committees (CGCs)
TOTAL	214	316

Source: Filippa Chatzistavrou.

⁽¹⁾ Based on a comparison of various documents on the committees: 'Répertoire des comités I', IX/C/3 (internal document), Terminology Office, EC Commission, Brussels, 1980; Compendium of Committees, Terminology and Computer Applications (TAI), EC Commission, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986; HAEC, BAC 516/2004/8, 'List of Council and Commission committees', *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 2, 1980; HAEU, BAC 82/1989/246, 'Note à l'attention des directeurs généraux et chefs des services sur les comités et groupes d'experts', 18 November 1985; HAEU, BAC 408/1991/260, 'Essai de classification des groupes et comités', Michel Aural, Administrator at the Commission of the European Communities, *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 187, 1975, pp. 330–342. The table contains all the committees which contribute to both the development and implementation of legal acts and adopts the same presentation as the two compendiums in which the committees are listed by directorate-general or service, with the exception of the ACPMs not included in DG XII and/or the JRC. For a detailed overview of the committees established in the Commission, see the annex 'Committees'.

ed that the ‘double safety net’ had never been used. In reality, the Commission almost always found a sufficient qualified majority in the committees. The Council only rarely received appeals to amend the draft measure of the Commission (fewer than 1 % of cases) ⁽¹⁾. Furthermore, the European Parliament also underlined that the existence of the committees made the representatives of the Member States more aware of their responsibilities, while allowing the Commission to keep its executive role ⁽²⁾.

The Commission realised that a more radical improvement in quality would be necessary in terms of reform. It expressed reservations regarding both the Genscher–Colombo initiative (November 1981) ⁽³⁾ and the Spinelli draft treaty (February 1984) ⁽⁴⁾. Gaston Thorn considered it a failure that the Commission had not been able to have added to the text of the Genscher–Colombo plan the idea that voting should become normal practice. Following the Athens European Council in December 1983, the Commission proposed updating the treaties in fields such as research and development, energy, regional policy and environment, adopting of a new institutional framework which would broaden the scope of qualified majority voting in the Council *de jure* and *de facto* (by limiting the practice of consensus), and strengthening of the role of the Euro-

pean Parliament (in line with the procedures of the Spinelli draft). After the Milan European Council in June 1985 ⁽⁵⁾, the Delors Commission, following the line taken by the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984, opted for the more ‘functionalist’ approach of the Single European Act (SEA) ⁽⁶⁾, in comparison with the more ‘constitutional’ approach of the Spinelli draft. The full application of the Single European Act would involve the dismantling of internal borders by 1992 and the extension of both majority voting and Community competences. Despite the scope of the exceptions agreed upon, qualified majority voting covered two thirds of the measures in the White Paper. Furthermore, it proposed rationalising the arrangements for exercising its competences ⁽⁷⁾. Article 202 SEA constitutionalised the exercise of the Commission’s executive powers, but left the question of fields of competence unresolved. On this basis, the Council adopted a ‘comitology’ framework decision on 13 July 1987 in which it set the types and number of committees (three types, with two variants for the regulatory and management committees). In 1987, when the comitology decision entered into force, President Delors described the aerosols statement as null and void.

FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU

⁽¹⁾ Ponzano, P., Andreone, F. and Neframi, E., ‘Chronique de l’administration européenne’, *Revue française de l’administration publique*, Vol. 4, No 140, 2011, p. 295.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/69, ‘Draft European Act, Answer to the questions to the president on the European Union at the meeting of the Institutional Committee of the Parliament on 29 April 1982’.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/67, JUR(82) D/00240, Memo from A. Marchini-Camia of the Legal Service to J. Durieux dated 18 January 1982 containing an analysis of this topic; BAC 391/2003/70, Memo from A. Marchini-Camia to C.-D. Ehlermann dated 4 November 1982 concerning the remarks of Commissioner Karl-Heinz Narjes on the Genscher–Colombo plan.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/76, JUR(82) D/00784, Memo from A. Marchini-Camia of the Legal Service to J. Durieux dated 10 February 1984 including the revised speech by President Thorn on the Treaty on European Union.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/78, SI(85) 501, 5 July 1985, Press conference by Jacques Delors after the Milan European Council, 3 July 1985.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/80, Statement by Jacques Delors on the conclusions of the intergovernmental conference (internal market), SEC(85) 2008, 23 December 1985.

⁽⁷⁾ As of 1984, the Commission established an annual procedure to approve the number of committees and expert groups authorised to meet in the following year. It did the same in relation to the elimination, merger or suspension of the activities of certain committees whose work no longer corresponded to institutional needs (52 in 1983). In 1984, the Commission entrusted DG IX with creating a database of fundamental information concerning the organisation of committee meetings and expert groups. On this basis, it sent two successive reports to the European Parliament in 1983 and 1984 concerning the rationalisation measures it had taken (COM(1984)0093/F, 21 February 1984; COM(85)0497/F, 12 September 1985).

4.3. Interest groups: a necessary evil ⁽¹⁾?

Pressure groups are as different from one another as the areas in which they operate. The category includes trade associations and chambers of commerce, business and industrial groupings, think tanks, international organisations, regional associations and even law firms.

Although the activity of many interest groups tended to level out or change nature as of the mid-1970s, their numbers continued to grow, from an estimated 300 in 1970, thanks among other things to the emergence of action groups focused on one product or sector in particular. According to a directory from 1980, 515 professional organisations were active at the Community level at that time, of which 431 were interest groups and the remainder specialist bodies or international groups ⁽²⁾.

The increasing influence of the 'Brussels lobbies' did not go unnoticed. An article at the beginning of the 1980s highlighted the fact that 'the Brussels telephone directory is full of acronyms, which all contain at least one letter E. E as in Europe, of course. In most cases, these are the initials of pressure groups which have opened offices in the Belgian capital, close to the European institutions' ⁽³⁾.

The question of how interests should be represented arose right from the start of the European integration process. Community interest or pressure groups — depending on the term you choose to use — set up permanent transnational structures

in Brussels to respond to the implementation of common policies. The access of such groups to the European institutions and to the Commission in particular could take one of two forms: formal or institutional access through advisory or consultative committees, or informal access through regular meetings and contacts, whether on the Commission's initiative or otherwise.

A consultative body — the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) ⁽⁴⁾ — was set up in 1958 to express to the Council and the Commission the views and opinions of the occupational groups representative of economic and social interests (employers, trade unions and other groupings) on draft European legislation. However, the real significance of the ESC's formal opinions rapidly became a topic of debate and subject of criticism, to the extent that interest groups would choose other ways of influencing the Community decision-making process.

In view of the increasing number and size of such groups, they became key partners of the Commission, enabling it to benefit from their technical expertise, while having its attention drawn to sensitive issues in certain subject areas ⁽⁵⁾. These interest groups were acknowledged by the Commission as active and valid contributors to the legislative process, provided they were backed by legitimate representation in each Member State and were sufficiently independent. Depending on the case, they came to represent essential support for or, on the contrary, a serious obstacle to specific measures at the European level, as well as playing a more general role in the integration process by rallying their members on matters of public interest, such as consumer affairs or the environment ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ The title of a special report on the subject published in *30 jours d'Europe*, No 188, Brussels, March 1974.

⁽²⁾ EC Commission, *Directory of the professional organisations set up at Community level*, Delta, Brussels, 1980.

⁽³⁾ *30 jours d'Europe*, Brussels, January 1982. Cited in Basso, J., 'Les groupes d'intérêt, les groupes de pression et le fonctionnement de la démocratie en société civile européenne', *L'Europe en formation*, No 303, 1996–97, p. 48.

⁽⁴⁾ See box 'The Economic and Social Committee' in Chapter 18, p. 353.

⁽⁵⁾ Kirchner, E. J., 'Interest group behaviour at community level', in Hurtwitz, L. (ed.), *Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1980, pp. 192–239.

⁽⁶⁾ Sidjanski, D., 'Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté', *L'Europe en formation*, No 207, June 1977, p. 7.

The Commission's sectoral approach to interest groups

At the time, the Commission had not adopted any official, consistent rules on pressure groups ⁽¹⁾. Until the mid-1980s, and the launch of the Single European Act, its attitude can be described as 'sectoral', focusing on relations with those professional groupings most solidly entrenched in the Brussels microcosm. This was notably the case with the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA) concerning implementation of the common agricultural policy and the European Confederation of the Iron and Steel Industries (Eurofer) for steel policy, which were viewed as key partners in their respective fields. This sometimes gave rise to problems in the case of Eurofer owing to the crisis in the steel industry in the early 1980s ⁽²⁾.

The European Bureau of Consumers' Unions (BEUC), which was set up in 1962 to act as the consumer's voice in the European institutions, was one of the most influential interest groups. From 1973 to 1989, it played an important role in the Community decision-making process through the Consumers' Consultative Committee. This committee was part of an extensive network of consultative committees engaged in a regular dialogue with the Commission. At the same time, the adoption in the 1970s of a number of regulations and directives on the free movement of various categories of professional people gave rise to an occasional single interest group, such as the European Association of Osteopaths. In the professionals category alone, the number of organisations at the Community level rose from 28 in 1970 to 54 in 1980.

At the beginning of the 1970s, there was growing debate about the conduct of Community interest groups, as illustrated by the beginning of a controversy sparked by a press article ⁽³⁾ and taken up by a member of the European Parliament, Henk Vredeling. Underlying it were what were viewed as abnormal relations between the Commission and certain multinationals, such as Unilever, St-Gobain and Plasmon, during the consultations preceding the drafting of Community legislation ⁽⁴⁾. In its reply of 7 June 1972 to a question tabled on the issue by Vredeling, the Commission merely stated that it was not accustomed to commenting on press reports.

This case is an illustration of the influential role henceforth played by pressure groups in relation to the Community institutions as a whole, not just the Commission. To take another example, in the mid-1970s a Commission proposal for a directive on producer liability for damage caused by defective products had the support of consumer organisations and insurance companies. The draft, however, was met by concerted criticism from various employers' organisations, which lobbied against it before the Council. It was some years before the directive was finally adopted ⁽⁵⁾.

In practice, with the steady expansion of Community policies between 1973 and 1986, most directorates-general were, in different ways and to varying degrees, exposed to an ever increasing number of interest groups. The business, manufacturing and agricultural worlds, through the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA) and the

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, 'Commission communication on an open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups', SEC(92) 2272 final, 2 December 1992. It should, however, be noted that regular relations were maintained as of the 1960s with certain interest groups in specific sectors with reference to agricultural and industrial policy. A division for relations with professional organisations was set up in DG VI for that purpose.

⁽²⁾ See box 'Eurofer' in Chapter 12, pp. 269–270.

⁽³⁾ 'Les groupes de pression qui hantent les couloirs de la CEE', *Vision*, March 1972.

⁽⁴⁾ European Parliament, Minutes of the sitting of 25 April 1972. Written Question No 65/72 from Henk Vredeling to the Commission of the European Communities on pressure groups and the European Communities.

⁽⁵⁾ Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29.



Keeping a watchful eye on the CAP: a meeting of the European farmers' lobby organisation COPA in Brussels, 18 March 1986.

General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation (Cogeca), which represented cooperatives, had a long-standing practice of formal and informal contacts with the Commission. At the same time, Irish and British farmers' associations and unions set up national representation offices in Brussels after their countries joined in 1973. From that point on, public interest movements saw the light of day, like the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), created in 1974.

Towards a pluralistic approach

Starting in the 1980s, a new tendency appeared as the Commission moved to a process of consulta-

tions and hearings of economic and social decision-makers, in particular company executives ⁽¹⁾. This went hand in hand with a sharp increase in occupational and specialist groups in Brussels, in turn linked to the extension of the Community's powers.

With respect to company executives, the real or supposed influence of proposals by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) raised many eyebrows. Created in 1982 on the initiative of the then managing director of Volvo, Pehr G. Gyllenhammar, it is said to have played a major

⁽¹⁾ Sidjanski, D., 'Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne', *Il Politico*, No 3, 1982, p. 540.

role in the Single European Act signed in February 1986 through what was viewed as close co-operation between Europe's business circles and the Commission. Aware of this, the Commission showed a degree of prudence in its dealings with the Gyllenhammar group so as not to reflect adversely on the legitimacy or representativeness of other European business leaders' organisations ⁽¹⁾. In any event, the negotiations on the Single European Act gave rise to renewed comment on and analysis of the influence of interest groups on the shape European integration was taking and on specifically European methods of political representation ⁽²⁾. The Commission also made effective use of the representativeness of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), established in 1973 by employee organisations, to build up vital cooperation in the implementation of Community social legislation. Consultative and advisory bodies in which employers' representatives also took part helped maintain a regular dialogue, even if the results did not always meet expectations. After the Council adopted a social action programme in January 1974, a number of consultative committees were set up on the initiative of Commissioner Patrick Hillery on health and safety at work, social security for migrant workers and the free movement of workers. On a more general level, contacts between unions and the Commission as a whole were put in place with the arrival of Roy Jenkins as president in January 1977. In the 1980s, these meetings became more institutionalised and were held twice a year. However, trade unions also managed to exert pressure to defend their interests through informal contacts with commissioners and directorates-general.

The establishment of the European Environmental Bureau signalled the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the Community level, with the setting-up of transnational consultation and negotiation structures. In 1980, animal welfare groups began to open offices in Brussels in response to the new powers acquired by the Commission under the common agricultural policy. As for the European Women's Committee, set up in 1984 by a group of women working at the European Commission, it was a logical development in view of the progress made on equal opportunities following the Defrenne case in 1976 ⁽³⁾. There was also a long tradition of dialogue between the Commission and organisations active in development policies for the South by way of the joint funding of projects, particularly in Africa and Latin America, by DG VIII and, to a lesser extent, by other Commission departments.

Regional offices also sprang up in line with the development of regional policy. Two representation offices for local public authorities, the City of Birmingham and Strathclyde Regional Council, both British, were opened in Brussels in 1984. They were followed by a German office in 1985, and Spanish and French ones in 1986.

At the beginning of the integration process, the Member States had been well able to handle the conflicting interests and claims of pressure groups involved in European public policy. As the 1970s advanced, however, there was a growing trend for interests to come together at a European level, striking up direct relations with the European institutions and bypassing the national authorities.

From the mid-1980s, faced with a proliferation of interest groups in Brussels prompted by the expansion of the Community's powers, the Commission

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 78/1989/52, Memo to Karl-Heinz Narjes, Vice-President of the Commission, from Fernand Braun on the Gyllenhammar 'Round Table', 13 June 1985.

⁽²⁾ As shown convincingly in the work of Cowles, M. G., including: 'L'euro-péanisation de l'action politique des multinationales', *Politique étrangère*, No 2, 1997, pp. 309–324.

⁽³⁾ See Chapter 18, 'Free movement of workers, social rights and social affairs'.

abandoned its sectoral approach for a pluralistic one. Subsequently, one of the biggest challenges lay in the Commission's ability to devote its attention in equal measure to the diversity of views expressed by the major groups representative of

economic and social interests. This change of approach and outlook was to be hammered home by the Single European Act.

PIERRE TILLY

Roy Jenkins: momentum regained but interrupted

The recruitment of Roy Jenkins as the first British President of the European Commission was a remarkable coup. Twice British home secretary, a highly successful chancellor of the exchequer, and a man tipped as the next foreign secretary and heir apparent as Labour leader had Harold Wilson not unexpectedly lost the 1970 British general election, Jenkins arrived in Brussels in 1977 with a substantial domestic and international reputation. He was also, with Edward Heath, the most high-profile pro-European in British politics: he had been a supporter of British EEC membership since the early 1960s, had famously led the Labour rebellion which saved the 1971 European Communities Bill in the House of Commons, and had been the leader of the 'Yes' campaign in the British 1975 referendum. His ministerial track record spoke for itself. Moreover, as a renowned speaker and writer he seemed better qualified than his predecessors to demystify and explain the role of Commission president. Better still, his appointment had been championed by the two most powerful political leaders in the Community, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. Here at last, it seemed, was a British statesman who could begin to fulfil those far-reaching hopes that so

many on the continent had attached to the United Kingdom's participation in the integration process, while at the same time demonstrating the value of the United Kingdom's EEC membership to the British public.

The European context of his appointment was discouraging, however. The mid-1970s had been a phase during which the integration process had seemingly moved backwards, not forwards. Ambitious new targets, like the dream of economic and monetary union by 1980, had disappeared from view; existing achievements, such as a functioning customs union, were under threat from protectionist currents both within Europe and beyond. The misgivings about Community membership felt by the British continued, despite the apparently decisive outcome of the 1975 referendum. And even developments that ought to have been seen as positive, like the determination of the Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese to consolidate their democracies by entering the EEC as soon as possible, were discussed amongst the Nine in terms that emphasised the disadvantages of enlargement rather than its potential merits.



François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) hands over to Roy Jenkins (on the left), 6 January 1977.

Moreover, Jenkins lacked any real inside knowledge of how the Community system worked. Although a passionate advocate of the United Kingdom's role in Europe, his own career had seldom taken him to Brussels: of his ministerial appointments, all but his second stint as home secretary predated British membership, and in the 1970s home secretaries had no call to travel to Brussels since none of what would subsequently become the justice and home affairs dimension of the integration process yet featured on the Community's agenda. As Jenkins himself confessed, 'My [European] conviction was complete, but my experience was negligible' ⁽¹⁾.

So how, then, did this passionate pro-European, unversed in the operation of the European system, fare once in charge of the European Commission? And did Jenkins's high profile and evident gifts overcome the gloom of the situation he inherited? The best way of answering these questions is to identify the successes and disappointments of his 4-year Presidency.

The first achievement of his Presidency was to win the right for the Commission president to attend meetings of the G7, the regular summits held amongst the leaders of the seven most industrialised countries. There had been calls for Commission participation in this forum ever since the start of regular economic summits in 1975. After all, a substantial proportion of the subject matter discussed overlapped with Community powers. But Jenkins and his supporters had to battle long and hard to gain

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 2.



An effective communicator: Roy Jenkins at a press conference in 1977.

permission to attend, and then to be treated on a par with his fellow participants. At the London Summit of May 1977, Jenkins was not given a microphone at the concluding press conference; 2 years later in Tokyo he was not invited to the pre-summit coordinating dinner for the European participants. But gradually such petty discriminations ebbed away, thanks largely to the fact that Jenkins was manifestly of a stature and calibre to belong at such occasions. The value of his contributions progressively eroded the case against his participation. The place of the Commission president at G7, G8 and, more recently, G20 meetings has never since been challenged ⁽¹⁾.

The second of Jenkins's major achievements was his role in the launch of the European Monetary System ⁽²⁾. For it was the revitalisation of monetary integration that the incoming president fastened upon as the issue with which to reinvigorate the Community and it was with Jenkins's Florence speech of October 1977 that the process that would eventually lead to the EMS began. It is true, of course, that the system launched in early 1979 bore little resemblance to Jenkins's initial ideas. And it is still more true that nothing would have come of the proposal had the Commission president's suggestion not been picked up by Schmidt and Giscard

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010; see also Garavini, G., 'The battle for the participation of the Community in the G7 (1975–77)', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 12, No 1, 2006, pp. 141–158.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010; Ludlow, P., *The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community*, Butterworths, London, 1982; Mouton-Druol, E., *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2012.



'The Parliament is not really a rewarding body to which to speak': Roy Jenkins spoke openly enough about the strange and disagreeable feeling that speaking in front of the European Parliament initially gave him.

d'Estaing. The Commission could help air ideas on such matters, but the power to move from ideas to actual decisions belonged to the Member States alone. The mere fact that a major policy proposal by Jenkins had helped trigger an ultimately successful policy venture, however, underlined the powers of initiative that the Commission Presidency still retained. In a period of low Commission morale, this was an important reminder.

His third success was the redirection of the Commission's role in the enlargement negotiations under way with Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the initial stages of the Greek talks, the Ortolí Commission had become the mouthpiece for the many doubts about enlargement harboured, unvoiced, by the Member States themselves. This trend had

reached its apogee with the Commission opinion of January 1976 which had been disowned by the Member States and resented by the Greeks for stating publicly a number of misgivings about the consequences of rapid Greek membership widely shared in national capitals, and which had continued to surface intermittently in the Commission's handling of the Greek membership talks in 1976 and 1977 ⁽¹⁾. Under Jenkins's leadership, however, the Commission approach shifted to one where hesitation was replaced with a determination to bring the enlargement discussions to a rapid and positive outcome. To this end the Commission rediscovered its expertise as a source of practical

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.



Roy Jenkins arrives at the G7 summit in Venice in June 1980: gaining the right to attend such summits was one of the triumphs of his Presidency.

solutions to the technical problems thrown up by enlargement, as a mediator in delicate intra-Community diplomacy and as an adviser to would-be member state governments. The two meetings between Jenkins and Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek prime minister, in January and September 1978 were crucial milestones in this transformation ⁽¹⁾.

Alongside these important successes there were a number of disappointments. Of these, the first was the failure to have the intended impact on the way in which the Commission worked. It is clear that the incoming president had high hopes of using his

tenure to carry out a radical shake-up of the way in which the Commission functioned ⁽²⁾. And such transformative intent persisted well into Jenkins's second year in Brussels, with Commission reform being the principal theme of the awayday held by the president's cabinet in the summer of 1978 ⁽³⁾. Actual success in altering the manner in which the Commission functioned was slow to arrive, however. Some useful changes were made: a central advisory group was formed that would ultimately become the Forward Studies Unit and the patterns of briefing within the upper reaches of the Commission do

⁽¹⁾ Karamouzi, E., *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).

⁽²⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, box 1, folder 'Reform of the Commission'.

⁽³⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 17, Record of East Hendred Meeting, 31 July 1978.



On the quest for monetary integration: Roy Jenkins arriving at the Brussels European Council meeting of December 1977.

seem to have been transformed by the arrival of the high-calibre team that Jenkins brought with him from London. The Jenkins Presidency also commissioned the Spierenburg report. But the root and branch transformation originally envisaged was never attempted, let alone carried out.

Also disappointing was the way in which Jenkins's tenure in Brussels did not have the hoped-for positive effect on the debate about the United Kingdom's place in Europe. Indeed, the United Kingdom's European difficulties only seemed to worsen, with the Callaghan government opting out of the EMS, and the Thatcher government rapidly embroiling the country in a bitter row about its budgetary contribution. Jenkins played a useful role

in helping to find a temporary solution to the latter. But the awkwardness of a British Commission president having to deal with a major stand-off between the United Kingdom and its partners cast a shadow over his final year in Brussels ⁽¹⁾.

The final disappointment of Jenkins's tenure was his decision not to seek a second term. To have a truly significant impact on the integration process, a Commission president needs more than a single term in Brussels ⁽²⁾. Jenkins's case, however, showed the dan-

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, in particular pp. 545–547.

⁽²⁾ Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the standard term of a Commission Presidency was 4 years, not 5.



Roy Jenkins in Strasbourg.

gers of appointing a major political figure who still harbours domestic political ambitions. For once Labour lost the 1979 general election, Jenkins's mind turned inexorably back to British politics, plotting what ultimately became the launch of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981 ⁽¹⁾. Inevitably this distracted him somewhat from his European duties. More seriously it also largely explains his decision not to seek reappointment.

In the history of Europe, therefore, Jenkins will remain an important Commission president who

began the process of much-needed institutional revitalisation. His stature and intellectual contribution highlighted how important the post could be. And the impact of both the EMS success and the G7 victory would endure long beyond 1980. But the petering out of his reform aspirations and the decision not to seek reappointment meant that his impact on the Community was not as fundamentally transformative as it might have been.

PIERS LUDLOW

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.

Chapter 5

The impact of the first enlargement

The year 1973 marked the European Community's first encounter with the actual impact of enlargement. The debate about enlargement had been one of the main controversies of the preceding decade, repeatedly causing deep divisions between the six founding members ⁽¹⁾. The long-delayed and highly complex membership negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom had moreover been one of the key challenges facing the Community in the course of 1970 and 1971 ⁽²⁾. The successful conclusion of the membership negotiations in late 1971 brought the Community face to face for the first time with a phenomenon that would loom large in its subsequent develop-

ment: the hazards of referendums. Not for the last time, the outcomes of these consultations had been mixed: while the voters of Denmark and Ireland approved their countries' accession to the EEC and those of France indicated, albeit by a smaller margin than hoped, their readiness to see the Community expand, the Norwegians refused to become the 10th Community member. This meant that the Community of six expanded to nine rather than 10 Member States on 1 January 1973. While virtually everyone in Brussels was familiar, if not weary, with the issue of enlargement, the practical implications of accommodating three new Member States were, however, unfamiliar and posed a number of problems for the EEC as the period covered by this volume began.

This chapter will review these difficulties and the manner in which they were overcome at three levels: first, the political difficulties posed by Irish membership, and still more by Danish and British membership; second, the impact on Community policies

⁽¹⁾ Ludlow, N. P., *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge*, Routledge, London, 2006, esp. p. 133 et seq.

⁽²⁾ Geary, M., *An Inconvenient Wait: Ireland's Quest for Membership of the EEC, 1961–73*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 2009; Rasmussen, M., 'Joining the European Communities: Denmark's road to EC membership, 1961–73', PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2004; Furby, D. E., 'The revival and success of Britain's second application for membership of the European Community, 1968–71', PhD thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2009.

of the three new Member States; and third, and in greater detail, the administrative implications of Community enlargement. While some of the more ambitious aspirations of the British, in particular the idea of profoundly transforming the Community from within, would soon fall by the wayside, the move from six to nine Member States undoubtedly encouraged major changes in the politics, policies and administrative arrangements of the European Community in general and the Commission in particular.

The political challenge of enlargement

The Irish posed the fewest problems as far as their commitment to European integration was concerned. Community membership had been approved in the 1972 referendum with an overwhelming 83.1 % in favour and 16.9 % against. Both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, the two main political parties, solidly supported EEC membership. The fact that Jack Lynch's Fianna Fáil government which had negotiated membership was replaced in March 1973 by a Fine Gael government led by Liam Cosgrave thus in no way called into question Ireland's place within the EEC. And there was little or no organised Euroscepticism beyond the fringe Sinn Féin movement.

The political difficulties posed by Irish membership instead sprang from the country's economic underdevelopment. At the time it joined, the differential between Irish per capita GNP and the Community average was significantly greater than the income gaps between the six founding members. As a result, both Ireland's immediate implementation of the existing *acquis communautaire* and its capacity to enact some of the bold moves towards greater integration being contemplated in the early 1970s were open to question. An illustration of the type of difficulties this could pose would be

the 1975–76 dispute between the Irish government and the European Commission over the implementation of the 1974 directive on equal pay for men and women. By a strange twist of fate, this piece of legislation had been steered through the Council of Ministers by Ireland's own commissioner, Patrick Hillery, but the Irish government had deemed it too costly to implement. Hillery and the Commission stood their ground on this, and the Irish were not granted the exemption they sought. The episode was widely seen as all but ruling out Hillery's prospects of reappointment ⁽¹⁾. Irish membership thus afforded the Commission an early taste of the problems that could arise when extending the integration process to a country that still fell some way short of the level of economic development attained elsewhere in the EEC. The southern European applicants, Greece, Spain and Portugal, discussed elsewhere in this volume, would later pose similar problems ⁽²⁾.

As far as Danish and British membership was concerned, by contrast, the main political difficulties sprang from the persistence of a strong level of domestic opposition to the EEC. Euroscepticism was not a totally new phenomenon, of course. The sizeable Communist parties in both France and Italy opposed the integration process (although in Italy, in particular, this opposition soon faded), as had the German Social Democrats prior to 1959. But the 1973 enlargement did bring the problem of internal party political and public opposition to the EEC to a new level. In both Denmark and the United Kingdom, substantial factions within political parties that were likely to hold governmental office were either ambivalent about or hostile to their country's membership. Furthermore, in both countries, the presence of a sizeable pool of voters sceptical about the merits of integration posed an enduring temptation to politicians to adopt a populist anti-European stance. In both Denmark and the

⁽¹⁾ Walsh, J., *Patrick Hillery: The Official Biography*, New Island, Dublin, 2008.

⁽²⁾ See Chapter 24, 'The Mediterranean challenge'.

United Kingdom there were votes to be gained by ‘Euro-bashing’ in a way that did not apply to any of the founding Member States. The entire European approach of the two new members would be profoundly affected by these realities.

Despite their underlying similarities, however, the paths of Denmark and the United Kingdom soon diverged. In Denmark, the potential political divisiveness of the European issue was curbed, almost paradoxically, by the establishment of the most advanced system of parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation in the Community ⁽¹⁾. Almost uniquely, a great deal of Community legislation was discussed by the Danish parliament before it had been decided upon in Brussels, thus ensuring that Danish ministers had guaranteed parliamentary backing for the stance they adopted in Council debates and minimising the risk of anti-European rebellions once the Council decision had been taken. Also of importance were the effectiveness of Danish interministerial coordination and the strong alliance of interest that quickly developed between Copenhagen and the Commission. This alliance was grounded in the belief that an effective Commission could act as the protector of small countries’ interests against the excesses of the strong, but also owed much to the shared commitment of Brussels and Copenhagen to the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the effectiveness of Denmark’s first European commissioner, Finn Olav Gundelach. The overall consequence, however, was that Denmark’s early track record within the EEC showed little of the disruptiveness that might have been expected given the Eurosceptic tone of much of its domestic debate.

The British, by contrast, were much less successful in preventing their own misgivings about integra-

tion from spilling over into their day-to-day engagement with the EEC. The defeat of Edward Heath in the February 1974 general election rapidly removed from power the prime minister who had negotiated the United Kingdom’s entry into the EEC. Heath’s replacement, the Labour leader Harold Wilson, headed a party that had instructed its members to oppose the 1971 European Communities Bill in the House of Commons, and had fought the 1974 election on a pledge to renegotiate the United Kingdom’s terms of entry and to seek their reapproval by the British population by means of a referendum. Fourteen months after accession, the United Kingdom seemed to be raising a serious question mark about its continued EEC membership ⁽²⁾.

In the event, Labour was able to honour both of its pledges while confirming the United Kingdom’s European membership — the outcome Harold Wilson had almost certainly desired all along. The British government quickly scaled back the extent of change it sought to the terms of entry and ultimately settled for, and recommended to its public, a series of modifications that altered little of substance. The United Kingdom’s European partners and the Commission also handled the whole affair with a degree of tact. The Commission appears to have taken heed of a note on the issue prepared by David Hannay, the head of cabinet of Christopher Soames, one of the two British commissioners, which was entitled ‘Renegotiation without tears’ ⁽³⁾. In this he advised against any strong public condemnation of the British move or any questioning of the legality of an attempt to reopen the substance of a membership negotiation so recently concluded. Instead, the Commission should await the details of the United Kingdom’s exact requests, and then see what scope there was to accommodate them without the accession treaties being formally modified. Similar care

⁽¹⁾ Auken, S., Buksti, J. and Sørensen, C. L., ‘Denmark joins Europe: Patterns of adaptation in the Danish political and administrative processes as a result of membership of the European Communities’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 14, No 1, 1975, pp. 1–36.

⁽²⁾ Wall, S., *The Official History of Britain and the European Community — Volume II: From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–75*, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 511–590.

⁽³⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

to take the heat out of the matter was shown on one of the key issues that the British raised, namely their budget contribution. Commission Secretary-General Émile Noël, who chaired an internal committee designed to search for ways to respond to the United Kingdom's demands, skilfully incorporated a former British Treasury official in his team, knowing full well that this would allow an unofficial but vital exchange of information between London and Brussels about what was and was not negotiable ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission also kept a low profile during the 1975 referendum campaign in the United Kingdom. The two British commissioners, Christopher Soames and George Thomson, threw themselves wholeheartedly into the campaign, giving speeches up and down the United Kingdom. Members of their staff provided help to the 'Yes' campaign, in particular by compiling factual information about Community policies designed to rebut some of the claims made by those campaigning against the EEC ⁽²⁾. A Welsh member of the Commission staff was also dispatched to Cardiff, ostensibly to investigate the possibility of setting up a representative office there, but in reality to contribute to the hard-fought campaign in Wales ⁽³⁾. But widespread European Commission involvement was avoided on the grounds that it might prove counterproductive. No non-British commissioners intervened in the debate, President François-Xavier Ortoli, for instance, restricting himself to a positive public reaction to the result only once the voting was over and it had become clear that the British public had voted by a sizeable margin to remain within the EEC ⁽⁴⁾.

Despite its seemingly clear outcome, however, the 1975 referendum failed to resolve the issue once and for all. Instead, British misgivings about im-



The three new members added substantially to the Community's population.

portant aspects of the Community continued: the Callaghan government would opt out of the European Monetary System, while from 1979 onwards, the new Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher would lead a vociferous campaign to secure a budget rebate ⁽⁵⁾. The United Kingdom's lengthy career as a somewhat turbulent member of the Community had begun.

Providing some compensation for these political challenges, however, the 1973 enlargement process also brought a number of unquestionable political benefits. First, and most simply, it significantly increased the size of the Community, and hence its political and commercial weight in the world. The enlarged Community had a population of 256 million, making it significantly bigger than the United States, which had 212 million inhabitants

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with David Hannay, 14 July 2011, and Richard Hay, 10 August 2010. See also Chapter 11, 'The politics of the Community budget'.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Robert Jackson, 27 September 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ British referendum: statement by François-Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 6 June 1975.

⁽⁵⁾ See Chapter 11, 'The politics of the Community budget'.

in 1973 ⁽¹⁾. The Community's gross domestic product (GDP), while still lower, drew closer to that of the United States: EUR 989 billion compared to EUR 1 123 billion for the United States ⁽²⁾. And its share of global trade was even more impressive: 36.6 % of total world exports in terms of value in 1973, and 35.7 % of total world imports, compared to US figures of 11.9 % and 12.1 % respectively ⁽³⁾. Second, it added credence to the EEC's long-standing claim to speak for Europe — or its western half at least. When the Community had been composed of only six countries and constituted a minority even of the non-Communist half of the continent, this had always been a somewhat difficult claim to swallow. With three additional states now included, and the remaining members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) closely linked through the free trade area accords that accompanied the 1973 expansion, this now looked a more legitimate, if still slightly inaccurate, self-image. And third, and perhaps most importantly, the expansion of 1 January 1973 brought to an end the long battle over Community membership that had so scarred the previous decade. If enlargement had its political costs, so too had 'non-enlargement' in the course of the 1960s. With eastern Europe still firmly under Communist domination and no immediate end in sight for the non-democratic regimes of southern Europe, the thorny question of which country to include in an integrating Europe seemed (wrongly) to have been definitively answered. The Commission's enlargement task force, established to handle the 1970–72 negotiations, was disbanded, with no expectation that this decision would have to be reversed in the short term ⁽⁴⁾.

Impact of the enlargement on Community policies

Disentangling the exact contribution of any individual Member State to a particular policy decision in a multilateral system like the European Community is an almost impossible task. Furthermore, to the extent that national influences can be discerned, despite the Commission's commitment to promote European as opposed to national interests and its pattern of collective decision-making, it makes more sense in a volume like this one to discuss them within each of the separate sections examining particular policy fields, rather than tackling the impact of Denmark, Ireland or the United Kingdom in a section on enlargement. This section will hence confine itself to a number of broader points.

The first would be to highlight the key change that did not happen — namely a root and branch transformation of the CAP. Radical alteration of the Community's approach to agricultural support had long been something that many British governments had hoped to be able to do once inside the European Community. The possibility of effecting such change had indeed been an important incentive behind both the 1961 application submitted by Harold Macmillan and that submitted in 1967 by Harold Wilson's Labour government ⁽⁵⁾. By 1970–72, admittedly, Heath's negotiators had become well aware that to seek to attack the CAP *before* becoming a member of the EEC would be harmful, possibly even fatal, to their chances of accession. After two painful and humiliating rebuffs the British had learnt the hard way that if they were to get into the Community they would have to, in the words of Con O'Neill, the chief negotiator at official level, 'swallow whole' the *acquis communau-*

⁽¹⁾ Eurostat, *EU integration seen through statistics*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 10.

⁽²⁾ Eurostat, *EU integration seen through statistics*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 11.

⁽³⁾ 'The competitiveness of European Community industry', Document of the Commission's services, 5 March 1982, p. 4.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Ludlow, N. P., *Dealing with Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 103; Parr, H., *Britain's Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's World Role, 1964–67*, Routledge, London, 2006.

taire including, therefore, the CAP as it stood ⁽¹⁾. But such short-term pragmatism in no sense indicated the disappearance of the long-term desire to alter the system. On the contrary, the expectation that future British governments would use their greater leverage from within to carry out the type of change that had been impossible from without remained intact throughout the early 1970s.

Nor was this expectation just a British delusion of grandeur. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that one of the main arguments against British membership deployed by the French in the 1960s was precisely the threat which the United Kingdom might pose to the CAP, once inside the EEC ⁽²⁾. And these same fears help explain why President Georges Pompidou had been so careful to make his agreement at The Hague in December 1969 on the enlargement of the Community conditional on the ‘completion’ of the existing *acquis* — i.e. first and foremost the finalisation of the CAP ⁽³⁾. France was determined to ensure that the CAP was already a *fait accompli* even before the United Kingdom joined.

As should become clear from the chapters devoted to Community policies, 1973–86 was not a period when either British hopes were fulfilled or French fears realised. A number of significant changes were made to the Community’s agricultural policy during the years in question — the introduction of milk quotas in particular. But none of them amounted to the type of fundamental transformation to which the British had aspired. Large-scale CAP reform would not occur before the early 1990s, and again during the opening years of the 21st century. A full explanation of why profound change took so long to

materialise lies beyond the scope of this section ⁽⁴⁾. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that while the British were intent on CAP reform, they were not the only country to join the Community in 1973. Denmark and Ireland, both of which had large farming populations, stood to do extremely well out of the agricultural policy. They hence had little incentive to alter its basic features. British pressure for change, whether within the Commission or in the course of Council debates, was thus counter-balanced by Danish and Irish determination to defend the CAP. Paradoxically, enlargement may actually have cemented the pro-CAP status quo rather than weakening it.

One policy area that was boosted by enlargement was regional policy. To a large extent this reflects the fact, noted above, that with the inclusion of Ireland, the Community had significantly widened the gap between its richest regions and its poorest. The arguments in favour of a Community-level response to such disparity were strengthened as a result. Admittedly, the full implications of this change would only really become clear in the latter half of the 1980s, by which time Ireland had been joined by three new Member States (Greece, Spain and Portugal), all of which had per capita GNPs well below the Community norm. But even before these two enlargements, the full impact of which would only be felt after 1986, the arrival of Ireland bolstered the case for regional policy.

Somewhat more counter-intuitively, so too did the arrival of the United Kingdom, initially at least. Unlike the case of Ireland, this was not a reflection of the overall wealth of the country. Instead, British enthusiasm for regional policy sprang from their realisation that one way of supplementing the low levels of Community financial support that the

⁽¹⁾ O'Neill, C., *Britain's Entry into the European Community: Report by Sir Con O'Neill on the Negotiations of 1970–72*, Frank Cass, London, 2000.

⁽²⁾ Parr, H., ‘Saving the Community: the French response to Britain’s second EEC application in 1967’, *Cold War History*, Vol. 6, No 4, 2006.

⁽³⁾ Ludlow, N. P., *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge*, Chapter 7, Routledge, London, 2006.

⁽⁴⁾ Ludlow, N. P., ‘The green heart of Europe: the rise and fall of the CAP as the Community’s central policy, 1958–85’, in Patel, K. (ed.), *Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy since 1945*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009.

United Kingdom was likely to receive by means of the CAP was to find new forms of Community expenditure out of which the British might expect to do better. Regional policy was seen as the most promising avenue, since there were a number of British regions that would be worthy candidates for substantial funding. It was hence no coincidence that the portfolio successfully secured by one of the first British commissioners, George Thomson, was regional policy. Thomson's aims were very much in line with the wider aspirations of the Heath ⁽¹⁾ government. Unfortunately for Thomson, however, the Heath government's enthusiasm for this expenditure-related way out of the British budget quandary was not renewed under his successors. The governments led by Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher all decided that the best way of addressing the size of the United Kingdom's net contribution to the EEC budget was to limit the amount of money paid into Community coffers rather than to boost the sums likely to be received by the United Kingdom.

Two further effects of enlargement are observable in trade policy and in foreign policy more generally. In relation to trade policy, the Danes and the British helped bolster, both inside the Commission and more generally within the Community system, the camp of those favouring liberal, free-trading solutions rather than policies of a more protectionist variety. During a period of acute economic crisis, this was of some political importance, since it was precisely at such times that the siren voices of a more protectionist approach to trade were at their most alluring. The 'class of '73', in other words, helped the EEC resist any large-scale retreat during the 1970s and early 1980s from the liberalising approach to industrial trade that it had followed ever since 1958. As for foreign policy generally, the incoming British were very enthusiastic about the

idea of building a Community that mattered in foreign policy terms. Needless to say, much of this policy thrust was played out within the context of European political cooperation — and is as such beyond the scope of this volume. But it also had a direct impact on the European Commission, where Christopher Soames would prove an energetic exponent of a Commission able to play a significant role on the world stage. The single most dramatic example of this ambition was Soames's May 1975 visit to Beijing and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the EEC, a coup largely planned by the British commissioner and his immediate entourage with minimal consultation of either the rest of the Commission or the Member States ⁽²⁾.

The administrative impact of enlargement

Any enlargement poses a series of administrative challenges to a body like the European Commission. The arrival of the Danish, Irish and British was potentially particularly disruptive, in part because it was the very first such change, thereby obliging the Commission to devise from scratch the mechanisms needed to cope, but also because of the presence amongst the new Member States of a country such as the United Kingdom whose administrative tradition was as well-established and as fiercely prized as were those, very different, primarily German and French traditions out of which the initial Commission structures had been formed. That the Irish also owed their administrative habits and structures primarily to the British model made the likely impact of this administrative culture clash that much greater. This section will first discuss the new wave of recruits to arrive as a result of enlargement, before

⁽¹⁾ Wall, S., *The Official History of Britain and the European Community — Volume II: From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–75*, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 511–590.

⁽²⁾ Chenard, M. J., 'The European Community's opening to the People's Republic of China, 1969–79: Internal decision-making on external relations', PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2012, in particular Chapter 3.

moving on to review their impact on the manner in which the European Commission operated.

The first challenge to be overcome was that of making openings for personnel from the new Member States. This was made less straightforward than it might have been by the agreement between the Member State governments that the recruitment of new Danish, Irish and British officials should come about without a very significant increase in the overall size of the Commission. The implication of this was that vacancies would have to be created, rather than the incomers simply being added to the existing staff. In order to accomplish this, a ‘golden handshake’ scheme was put in place so as to encourage long-standing members of the staff to depart. The task of administering this was entrusted to Jean-Claude Paye, previously Raymond Barre’s head of cabinet, who was asked to remain at the Commission for an additional 6 months so as to oversee, with Noël, the process of encouraging staff to apply for golden handshakes and of selecting whose applications to accept ⁽¹⁾. In general this seems to have been done very efficiently. It also meant, as one German official recalled, that enlargement led to a drop in the average age of those working at the Commission, since many of those who were encouraged to leave were significantly older than the incoming staff from the new Member States ⁽²⁾.

Some outstanding individuals, but too few Brits

The Irish government blazed a trail that numerous future new Member States would follow by appointing as their first commissioner a figure who had played a central role in their membership negotiations. Patrick Hillery had been foreign minister and as such had been the country’s chief negotiator. In the process he had inevitably acquired both a

sound knowledge of the nuts and bolts of the Community and a good range of contacts. He also had enough inside knowledge to choose carefully the portfolio to which he aspired, disregarding pressure from his government to bid for regional policy, and instead setting his sights on social policy. This was indeed the job he was given. And as a further feather in his cap, Hillery was made one of the five Commission vice-presidents — something which was by no means automatic for an incoming commissioner from a small, new Member State ⁽³⁾.

Despite this promising start, however, Hillery’s first few months in Brussels proved difficult. At the heart of his difficulties was his choice as head of cabinet, Robin Fogarty, a diplomat and another former member of the team that had negotiated Irish membership. Fogarty proved an unfortunate choice: first of all he had no French and no aptitude to learn it, which was a hazardous predicament, to put it mildly, within what was still a predominantly French-speaking institution. Second, he showed little patience with the way in which the Commission operated, telling a journalist that he felt surrounded by ‘fools’, and urging his commissioner to press for Noël’s removal as secretary-general! And third, his relationship with Hillery himself and with the rest of his cabinet broke down. The last straw was an incident in February 1973 when Hillery travelled, on Fogarty’s instructions, to a meeting with a Luxembourgish minister, but to the wrong place and at the wrong time. When Hillery took his head of cabinet to task over this mistake, Fogarty threatened to resign — and immediately saw his resignation accepted. Edwin Fitzgibbon, previously the deputy head of cabinet, was promoted in his stead ⁽⁴⁾.

The Irish commissioner bounced back well, though, from these early difficulties. Social policy had traditionally been a field in which the Com-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Walsh, J., *Patrick Hillery: The Official Biography*, New Island, Dublin, 2008.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid.

mission's ability to make a difference had been limited. This, however, looked set to change, since the Paris Summit of October 1972 had called for 'vigorous action in the social field' and invited the Commission to devise an action programme. Hillery thus had a mandate for action and would respond to it energetically, despite the worsening economic climate from late 1973 onwards. Particular priorities included promoting employment, improving working conditions and pushing for equal pay and conditions for men and women. One positive development from an Irish point of view was the location in Dublin of one of the two new social policy agencies decided upon during this period: the Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, which would be established in 1976 ⁽¹⁾. In the Jenkins Commission, Hillery — who would subsequently become president of Ireland — would be replaced by Richard Burke, who, apart from a brief interlude at the start of the Thorn Commission, occupied the post until the appointment of the outstanding Peter Sutherland to the Delors Commission in 1985.

Elsewhere in the Commission the Irish appear to have established themselves rapidly and fairly effectively. Not all of the senior appointees proved total successes: the only Irishman, for instance, to be appointed a director-general, Seán Ronan in DG X (Information), left after only 4 years. But, by contrast, the next Irish director-general, Eamonn Gallagher, had a very marked impact upon the newly established DG XIV, responsible for fisheries. The Irish government's policy of pressing for senior posts in DG VI (Agriculture) also bore fruit, with two Irish directors appointed. And rising through the ranks were a number of very able younger Irish officials, like David O'Sullivan and Catherine Day, both of whom would go on to hold very senior positions within the institution.

The Danish approach to the appointment of a commissioner was to look for a candidate with clout within the Commission rather than someone with strong ties to domestic politics. It is telling that Finn Olav Gundelach's name was brought up by Commission president Francois-Xavier Ortoli. This was well in accordance with the intentions of the government and the Foreign Ministry to seek a centrally placed and influential commissioner. As the then Danish ambassador to the EC said: '... we knew the importance of the inner circle in the Commission' ⁽²⁾. Gundelach had been trained in the Foreign Ministry's European division and had served in the GATT as well as having been Danish ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels. He was strongly in favour of European cooperation, but was a moderate with regard to the supranational dimension of the integration process. Once nominated, Gundelach composed his cabinet independently with a mind to establishing himself as a force in his own right within the Commission. He did include people with sound agricultural expertise, but less as a reflection of Danish interests than as a way of influencing a key policy area in the Commission. His cabinet was generally designed to enhance the commissioner's overall influence on general Commission policies and to exert influence over other Commission portfolios also. As expected, he conducted his duties as commissioner independently of Danish politics and quickly developed into one of the strong commissioners with an influence that stretched well beyond his own briefs. As testament to this, Soames insisted that Gundelach deputise for him in the external relations field for the 6 months or so in 1976 when the British commissioner was suffering from serious health problems ⁽³⁾. And Gundelach's influence was further enhanced when he assumed responsibility for agriculture in the Jenkins Commission ⁽⁴⁾. Revealingly, Gundelach was chosen as one of the 'Four Horsemen', the inner group (also

⁽¹⁾ See box 'The Commission and the agencies: a difficult start' in Chapter 18, p. 354.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Niels Ersbøll, 3 October 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Arne Larsen, 19 September 2011.

comprising Étienne Davignon and François-Xavier Ortoli) that the Commission president used as an informal sounding board ⁽¹⁾.

After Gundelach's sudden death in 1981, the Danish government selected a politician as the second Danish commissioner. Poul Dalsager, a social democratic MP and former minister of agriculture, contrasted with Gundelach's approach by adopting a closer focus on agricultural issues. Former Finance Minister Henning Christophersen, who succeeded Dalsager in the Delors Commission, was also a politician, but in many other respects Christophersen's appointment marked a return to a commissioner who was a force in his own right and — like Gundelach — together with his cabinet, a key ally for the Commission president. Christophersen worked closely with Delors on the preparation of the Commission's new work programme — parts of which were drafted in Copenhagen — and was to become an important pillar of the Delors Presidency. This held true also for the close relationship between Christophersen's cabinet, that of Delors and the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers from 1980, Niels Ersbøll, which heralded closer cooperation between the Council and the Commission.

The level of education of the Danish Commission officials was, with a few exceptions, confined to degrees in law, economics and political science from the universities of Aarhus and Copenhagen. A good number of them had been trained at the Danish Foreign Ministry or Finance Ministry, and many had experience of the Danish diplomatic delegation to the EEC. Practically all of them had occupied posts in the central administration in Copenhagen, and most cabinet staff would return to their national careers after several years at the Commission. The Danish officials were fluent in English and were also, as a rule, familiar with both French and German. There were very few cases of political appointees. Decisions on who to send to Brussels were taken by the director of the Foreign Ministry based on

advice from the delegation to the European Communities in Brussels — most likely guided by the Commission's Secretariat-General. The number of appointments, cabinet posts apart, was approximately 15. The key Commission policy areas to which the Danes contributed special expertise and interest were agriculture, fisheries and shipping. Agriculture in particular was a field where the Danish government — somewhat in competition with the Irish and British — was eager to claim leading administrative positions. It did manage to have a Dane placed in a director's post in the DG for Agriculture ⁽²⁾.

The British also applied themselves with some energy to the task of filling their share of posts within the Commission. Needless to say, the first priority was filling the two places around the Commission table reserved for the United Kingdom. Here British internal decision-making gave an encouraging indication of the positive frame of mind with which the Heath government approached EEC membership. In the course of discussions in London, at least one member of the government suggested that the United Kingdom should select lightweight figures for the Commission posts, reserving its outstanding candidates instead for the British permanent representation and thereby strengthening the intergovernmental aspects of the Community over the supranational dimension ⁽³⁾. This course of action was rejected. Instead the United Kingdom selected two strong commissioners, Christopher Soames, a former cabinet minister and ambassador to Paris, and George Thomson, another former minister and a prominent Labour pro-European, and even announced its choices early, in the hope, it was claimed, that this might encourage other countries to nominate outstanding individuals to the Commission ⁽⁴⁾. Both commissioners moreover secured important portfolios — external relations

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 435.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Bjarne Bladbjerg, 5 May 2011, and Ejner Stendevad, 19 December 2011.

⁽³⁾ The National Archives (UKNA), PREM 15 2077, Robert Armstrong to Edward Heath, 29 July 1971.

⁽⁴⁾ UKNA, PREM 15 2077, Robert Armstrong to Edward Heath, 29 July 1971; Geoffrey Rippon to Edward Heath, 'British Members of the European Commission', 7 February 1972.

and regional policy — and threw themselves into their new tasks with some enthusiasm, aided and abetted by high-calibre cabinets. Soames in particular gained a strong reputation, and was even spoken of seriously as a potential Commission president since it had been informally agreed that Ortoli would be succeeded by a Briton ⁽¹⁾. The emergence of Jenkins's candidacy for the job, however, would prove fatal for his prospects. His 4-year term should, nonetheless, be considered a success, comprising not only policy coups like the opening to China referred to above, but also the remarkable feat of maintaining a good rapport with both the French government and the US authorities during the 1973–74 period when relations between Paris and Washington were highly strained ⁽²⁾.

The British were also entitled to fill a number of senior jobs elsewhere in the Commission hierarchy. The choice of commissioners was thus followed swiftly by the selection of their cabinets and a handful of other very senior British officials, notably Christopher Audland, who became deputy secretary-general. Filling such posts involved a detailed dialogue between the Commission, especially Émile Noël, and the British government. This advance party then played a major role, in conjunction with the ever-present Noël, in the identification of slightly less senior British officials, choosing normally from a list of potential recruits which had been drawn up by the British civil service. David Hannay, Soames's head of cabinet, recalls delegating most of his normal functions to his deputy, Adrian Fortescue, for a 6-month period so that he could concentrate on the huge task of filling all the posts that had been set aside for the British ⁽³⁾. In each case, great care had to be taken to match the particular skills of the best British candidates with the specific vacancies that had been created. This was made all the more tricky by the fact that most British recruits were 'generalists', who had studied the classics, history or English

at university, rather than lawyers and economists like most of the officials of other nationalities ⁽⁴⁾. Other more junior posts were then meant to be filled through competitions in the more normal way.

Some of the individuals who emerged from this process would go on to enjoy lengthy and distinguished careers in the European Commission. Others performed well in Brussels before moving on to success elsewhere. But the numerous positive stories should not be allowed to mask an underlying problem with British recruitment. Put simply, too few qualified Britons applied for posts (especially for the medium and junior A grade posts) in the course of the United Kingdom's first few years as a Member State. As a result, the British struggled to fill the A grade posts allotted to them and built up a structural problem of under-representation in the European Commission that was to persist at least into the early 1980s ⁽⁵⁾. This difficulty, although less acute than that suffered by the Netherlands, was sufficiently serious to provoke a debate in the European Parliament in 1978 and an exchange of letters between the Jenkins Commission and the British foreign secretary ⁽⁶⁾. Neither Denmark nor Ireland, by contrast, struggled in the same way to attain the expected level of staff representation.

There are many explanations as to why this problem occurred. One persistent factor appears to have been the difficulty of identifying appropriate British candidates who had sufficient knowledge of French or of another Community language ⁽⁷⁾. Another more short-term element may have been the inaccurate guide to the equivalent grading between the British civil service and the Commission initially drawn up

⁽¹⁾ UKNA, PREM 16 859, Armstrong minutes on Harold Wilson–Christopher Soames meeting on 28 October 1974.

⁽²⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ See, for instance, Richard Hay's recollections; interview with Richard Hay, 10 August 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Willis, V., *Britons in Brussels: Officials in the European Commission and Council Secretariat*, European Centre for Political Studies and Royal Institute of Public Administration, London, 1983.

⁽⁶⁾ 'Debates of the European Parliament', 14 June 1977, pp. 80–88; UKNA, FCO 30/4155, David Owen to Roy Jenkins, 6 April 1978; Roy Jenkins to David Owen, 25 May 1978; David Owen to Roy Jenkins, 31 August 1978.

⁽⁷⁾ This was the factor highlighted by Christopher Tugendhat in the European Parliament debate mentioned above, 'Debates of the European Parliament', 14 June 1977, pp. 80–88.

by the British civil service, which had the effect of making it appear that Brussels jobs were much less well paid than they actually were ⁽¹⁾. And yet another may have been the ongoing uncertainty that hung over the United Kingdom's place in the EEC for much of the early period — something that is likely to have deterred would-be applicants attracted to a long and stable career ⁽²⁾. This last factor is likely to have been at its most acute during 1974–75 — i.e. the period of the renegotiation and the referendum — but did not disappear entirely thereafter. The Labour Party after all fought the 1983 general election on a manifesto pledge to negotiate British withdrawal. For whatever reason, however, the impact of the British in Brussels is likely to have been mitigated by the fact that for virtually the whole of the period covered by this volume, there were fewer British employees in the Commission than there ought to have been.

Gradual change, but no revolution

The influx of Danish, Irish and British officials undoubtedly had an effect on the way in which the Commission worked. In the following pages, we will discuss the most significant changes that came about. But, as was the case above when trying to identify the impact of enlargement on the policy of the Communities, it is no easy matter to distinguish between the effects wrought by the newcomers and pre-existing patterns of change or external pressures for reform, neither of which had anything to do with the move from six to nine Member States. Some of the changes described might, therefore, have come about anyway even without enlargement, but the pace of change would probably have been slower. Furthermore, virtually all the effects described fall into the category of gradual rather than revolutionary change.

The first and perhaps most obvious effect of enlargement was the way in which the simultaneous arrival of so many new staff largely unfamiliar with the Commission's way of working encouraged the institution to write down its method of operation. Christopher Audland was thus asked to head the team which drafted the first manual of procedures, a reference work that has been constantly updated and reissued ever since ⁽³⁾. This exercise also highlighted — and probably contributed to the reduction of — some of the administrative anomalies which had resulted from the merger, in the late 1960s, of the ECSC High Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions. This process had, at times, led to the coexistence within the new single Commission of different practices which had evolved independently in each of the three executives.

Another change, of particular importance to historians, was the way in which the newcomers altered both the circulation and the preservation of written information within the Commission. Hannay, for instance, recalls the astounded, but delighted, reaction of a senior DG I (External Relations) official when he was given detailed records of Soames's conversations with visitors ⁽⁴⁾. The British administrative tradition of taking extensive notes at most meetings, of disseminating such records quite widely and of making certain that at least one if not several copies of these records were preserved for posterity spread through the Commission rapidly if unevenly. It is no coincidence that the initiative later in the 1970s to establish what would become the Historical Archives of the European Union, housed in Florence, was very much the work of Audland ⁽⁵⁾. The British also succeeded in importing significant elements of their administrative culture of detailed preparatory briefing notes. This, however, appears

⁽¹⁾ Willis, V., *Britons in Brussels: Officials in the European Commission and Council Secretariat*, European Centre for Political Studies and Royal Institute of Public Administration, London, 1983, pp. 27–28.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 August 2010. See also Audland, C., *Right place — Right time*, Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2004.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Audland, C., 'The historical archives of the European Union: Their opening to the public, management and accessibility', *Journal of the Society of Archivists*, Vol. 28, No 2, 2007, pp. 177–192.

to have been a change where 1977 and the arrival of Jenkins was an even more important milestone than 1973. By the late 1970s, not only was the Commission president arriving at international meetings equipped with the range of speaking notes, background briefs, steering briefs and the like that any British minister would expect, but the same expectations had spread and were being copied by commissioners from different administrative traditions. Ortoli's paperwork for European Council meetings which he attended as vice-president in the Jenkins era was often noticeably better and more digestible than the preparatory materials he had taken to the Council meetings in his capacity as Commission president earlier in the decade ⁽¹⁾.

A further change partly attributable to the process of enlargement was the fact that Commission procedures became less formal. Some movement in this direction was likely to have occurred anyway, given broader societal changes across Europe as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s and 1980s. But it was certainly the case that all three of the new administrative cultures being introduced into the Commission mix tended to be less formal than those of the original six members. The Danes, Irish and British therefore strongly reinforced the trend towards more relaxed forms of address and slightly less stiff interaction between different levels of the Commission hierarchy ⁽²⁾. Some British officials also introduced the custom of inviting their colleagues to dinner at home — a practice little seen prior to 1973 ⁽³⁾.

The final point to make is that the single most predictable administrative change, that in the language balance of the Commission, was not as important as expected. The arrival of the Irish and British obviously did mean that English became an official Community language. In the medium term this would pose a serious challenge to the predominance

of French as the main working language in the EEC. But for a number of reasons there was no Copernican shift from a predominantly French-speaking to a mainly English-speaking working environment in the immediate aftermath of enlargement ⁽⁴⁾. For a start, the British were highly conscious of French sensitivities about this issue — it had been one of the subjects discussed between Georges Pompidou and Edward Heath in their celebrated May 1971 summit ⁽⁵⁾ — and not only honoured their promise to select senior staff who were fluent French speakers, but also issued strict instructions to all the new Commission employees to be tactful and to eschew linguistic assertiveness from the outset ⁽⁶⁾. Second, the position of French was so deeply entrenched, especially in crucial bastions like the Secretariat-General, that no rapid shift was ever likely. Third, the Brussels of the 1970s was a much more French-speaking city than it would later become, lacking much of that international milieu which would allow subsequent generations of Eurocrats and their families to function almost exclusively in English. The incoming Danes, Irish and British thus had every reason to become accustomed to living and working in a French-speaking environment. All of this meant that the short-term linguistic impact of 1973 was the marginalisation of the other languages of the Community rather than a decisive shift from French to English. With that many more linguistic cultures jostling for space, the odds of any meeting adopting German or Italian as a *lingua franca* lengthened significantly. French, though, would remain the leading language, with English established as the normal second choice ⁽⁷⁾. Interestingly, a more significant date for the longer-term linguistic balance would arguably be 1977 rather than 1973, because neither Roy Jenkins himself

⁽¹⁾ Compare the dossiers HAEC, BAC 81/1984/7 and BAC 36/1984/100.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Richard Hay, 17 August 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interviews with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010, Klaus Meyer, 20 October 2010, and Nikolaus Vaulont, 20 August 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ 'Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic in the Elysée Palace, Paris at 15.30 on Thursday 20 May 1971'.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Nikolaus Vaulont, 20 August 2010.

The translation services

The enlargement of the Community on 1 January 1973 increased the number of its official languages to six, with Danish and English being added to Dutch, French, German and Italian. The structures of the directorate for ‘Translation, documentation, reproduction, library’, which was part of DG IX (Personnel and Administration) and headed by the Italian Antonio Ciancio from 1970 to 1984, were adapted accordingly: an English-language section and a Danish-language section were set up alongside the four existing divisions, as the Commission’s translation services had already been organised by official language for several years ⁽¹⁾.

These divisions, which were devoted to translation activity per se, were coordinated by a horizontal division entitled ‘General Affairs’, including a planning office (which brought together all translation requests and sent them to the language divisions by order of priority), a terminology office (which helped translators in their everyday work and constantly entered terms in the Eurodicautom computerised terminology database) and a typing pool ⁽²⁾. In addition to these structures in Brussels, the Commission had had a Medium- and Long-Term Translation Service in Luxembourg since 1967 ⁽³⁾.

Each language division was organised into groups, composed of about 10 translators and revisers

specialised in one or more subject areas (energy, transport, etc.). This system created lasting working relationships between translators/revisers and the authors of the documents received and made it possible to distribute the work appropriately, taking account of each person’s strengths: ‘In the Danish division many people were trained translators, but there were also ... economists, lawyers and engineers; there was even an architect. There was always a colleague who could be consulted if someone had any doubts,’ Tove Blaabjerg Sørensen, head of group from 1975 to 1990, recalls ⁽⁴⁾. In this way, the organisational set-up was characterised by effectiveness and mutual assistance and helped new colleagues to become part of the team quickly.

Although about 10 Danish-language revisers had been working in-house since January 1971 ⁽⁵⁾ — they had been responsible for revising the translations of the treaties produced by that candidate country — and there had been a small unit of English translators since the 1950s ⁽⁶⁾, the Commission had difficulty recruiting enough translators for these two languages in the first months after enlargement. At the end of 1973, it had 355 translators in Brussels, including just 35 Danish translators and 58 English translators, out of the 80 expected for each language by that date ⁽⁷⁾. But this problem was resolved quite quickly and staffing levels rose substantially over the years, with the result that, in

⁽¹⁾ For information on the previous period, see Dumoulin, M., ‘The administration’, in Dumoulin, M., (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 234–236.

⁽²⁾ For more details, see the feature on the Commission’s translation services in *Courrier du personnel*, No 398, 20 December 1978, pp. 48–80.

⁽³⁾ Since the STML ‘was destined to take on most of the work of the High Authority’s translation service’ (EC Commission, *Études sur la traduction et le multilinguisme. La traduction à la Commission: 1958–2010*, Luxembourg, 2009, p. 1), after the merger of the executive bodies of the three Communities it was made part of the Brussels directorate in a large trans-Ardenne service within DG IX in 1985.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Tove Blaabjerg Sørensen, 14 June 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ For further details, see ‘Danish is now an official international language’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 405, 14 September 1979, pp. 40–56.

⁽⁶⁾ For further details, see ‘A visit to the Commission’s English translation division’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 401, 26 April 1979, pp. 34–43.

⁽⁷⁾ EC Commission, *Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1973*, Luxembourg, 1974, p. 517.

1985, when the Dutchman Ivo Dubois was appointed head of the new Translation Directorate that brought together the Brussels and Luxembourg services from then on, it comprised nearly 1 100 linguists ⁽¹⁾.

There was no shortage of work, as demand for translation had been growing incessantly every year, rising from 315 915 pages ⁽²⁾ translated and revised in 1973, to 495 000 ⁽³⁾ in 1980 and 770 000 in 1986 ⁽⁴⁾. Up to the end of the 1970s, the main requesters or 'customers' by far were DG VI (Agriculture) and the Secretariat-General, followed by DG VIII (Development), DG V (Social Affairs) and DG XIX (Budgets) ⁽⁵⁾.

The official arrival of the Greek language in the Community on 1 January 1981 had been carefully prepared by the Commission. The Translation Directorate had given its translators the opportunity to attend Greek language courses, including in Greece, for several years before enlargement, and since 1977 had had a small group of Greek translators and lawyer-linguists to translate into Greek all the Community legislation, namely the treaties and the main secondary legislation, which amounted to 40 000 pages at that time ⁽⁶⁾. It showed the same foresight in the period before Spanish and Portuguese became official languages on 1 January 1986.

Pierre-Olivier Laloux

nor some members of the high-powered team that accompanied him to the Commission Presidency shared the exceptional French-speaking skills of the first cohort of Britons to arrive in Brussels. Much greater linguistic allowances had to be made for this second wave of British recruits. Even this generation, however, could not be faulted in its attempts to revive rusty school French, with struggles of this sort featuring prominently in Jenkins's *European Diaries* and in the recollections of Hayden Phillips and David Marquand ⁽⁷⁾.

Generally speaking, the incorporation of three new nationalities into the European Commission was remarkably smooth. It helped that so many of the first Danish, Irish and British arrivals were very competent. It was also useful that so many came from those portions of the Danish, Irish and British civil service that had become convinced of the merits of EEC membership during the previous decade, and were hence solidly pro-European in their basic beliefs. They did not necessarily share quite the same degree of passionate Europeanism of some of the first generation of Eurocrats, but they were wholly certain that Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom belonged in the EEC and were determined to make a success of membership. As a result, they also recognised that the prospects of dramatically changing the administrative culture in Brussels were very slight. Instead change, if it came at all, would be gradual rather than dramatic, and spread out over the whole of the 1973–86 period and beyond.

PIERS LUDLOW, JÜRGEN ELVERT
AND JOHNNY LAURSEN

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Études sur la traduction et le multilinguisme. La traduction à la Commission: 1958–2010*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2009, p. 132.

⁽²⁾ 'Traduction, documentation, reproduction, bibliothèque — Les grandes lignes de cette direction (IX-D) en 1977', *Courrier du personnel*, No 392, 14 July 1978, p. 59.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1980*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 37.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 46.

⁽⁵⁾ 'Traduction, documentation, reproduction, bibliothèque — Les grandes lignes de cette direction (IX-D) en 1977', *Courrier du personnel*, No 392, 14 July 1978, p. 59.

⁽⁶⁾ 'La langue grecque est déjà entrée à la Commission', *Courrier du personnel*, No 415, 27 June 1980, pp. 31–34. The work of revising the body of EU law in Greek continued until the mid-1980s.

⁽⁷⁾ Interviews with Hayden Phillips, 17 August 2010, and David Marquand, 7 June 2011.

The challenge of the first enlargements for the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service (SCIC)

Alongside the translation service, the interpreting service covered a completely different profession. Indeed, they were two separate directorates in DG IX (Personnel and Administration). This structural separation had existed since the institutions were set up. The task of SCIC was to translate the exchanges at meetings of the Commission, but also those of the Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), the European Investment Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, as well as the summit meetings and subsequently the European Councils, none of which had its own interpreting service, which is why they used the Commission's. In 1979, the Commission accounted for 50.65 % of interpreter days, and the Council 40.25 %. It should be pointed out that the Common Assembly of the ECSC — which later became the European Parliament — and the Court of Justice had their own interpreting and translation services.

Wherever possible, only interpreters with the status of officials were used for meetings of the College of Commissioners, Councils of Ministers or European Councils. In the initial years after the first enlargements, freelancers who passed strict tests were offered contracts as members of the auxiliary staff or ad hoc contracts for the languages for which the Commission did not yet have enough permanent interpreters (Danish, English or Greek). It is worth mentioning that, at that time, even countries that were not members of the EEC called on the services of SCIC, which started training interpreters in Chinese as early as 1979 ⁽¹⁾.

SCIC's policy was to offer a high-quality and effective service that met real needs. The use of languages in the meetings of the institutions varied widely, ranging from the possibility of using all languages to very restricted asymmetrical language arrangements. There was full language coverage at meetings of the Council of Ministers, but reduced language arrangements

applied at meetings of Coreper and the College of Commissioners ⁽²⁾. The College of Commissioners did not use all the official languages at its meetings. Commissioners mostly spoke French and German, plus English from 1973 onwards. However, all the languages were always used at meetings of the Council of Ministers, summit meetings or European Councils ⁽³⁾. There were cases in which experts refused to take part in technical meetings at which a vote was taken or in meetings of working parties at the Commission if interpretation was not provided into and out of their language.

Given the increase in the number of meetings and languages, with the resulting rise in the number of interpreters after the first two enlargements, the Commission decided, on 15 April 1981, to formally set up a Joint Interpreting and Conference Service on the basis of the service that had existed in this form since the Commission's beginnings in 1958. The head of the former Directorate E for Interpreting and Conferences of DG IX, Renée Van Hoof — who had worked for the ECSC in Luxembourg until the Val Duchesse negotiations — managed to ensure that, from 1981 onwards, SCIC became independent from DG IX and was mentioned separately on the Commission's organisation chart, under the direct authority of the president. She was later to become the first director-general, the first woman to rise to that rank. These arrangements came into force on 1 May 1981. Two directorates were set up in SCIC — Directorate A (General Affairs and Interpretation) and Directorate B (Conferences), plus the Training Division. The various interpreting units came under Directorate A.

At that time 431 interpreters — not including the 1 117 selected and approved freelance interpreters on the service's register — covered 15 languages, seven of which had become official languages by then. Not all of them were EEC citizens ⁽⁴⁾. There were more women than men (55 %/45 %). Freelance interpreters covered 29 % of the service's needs, a figure which later rose to 50 %. The number of meetings increased from 2 801 in 1959 to 8 423 in 1980 and 9 894 in 1990. The number of interpreter days rose from 4 438 in 1959 to 75 472

⁽¹⁾ See also *Joint Interpreting and Conference Service*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995, p. 17.

⁽²⁾ E-mail from Noël Muylle to Vincent Dujardin, 19 June 2013.

⁽³⁾ Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013.

⁽⁴⁾ See Dumoulin, M., 'The administration', in Dumoulin, M., (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 244–245.

in 1980. In order to fix the number of meetings organised at the Commission and their language coverage, keep costs under control and take account of the rooms available, SCIC introduced a system of arbitration between DGs organising meetings and the Secretariat-General. The Council of Ministers became the largest 'user' of SCIC, which had become the largest interpreting service in the world. By way of comparison, 1 766 meetings were organised at the United Nations in New York in 1980, with 119 interpreters ⁽¹⁾.

After the second enlargement, the complexity of allocating interpreters led to the establishment of an ad hoc computerised system for this purpose (Safir, which was superseded by Pearl), which was the first time that this had been done in an international organisation. This was accompanied by an electronic calling system (Crystal), which staff interpreters could use to obtain information on their assignment schedule directly by telephone.

Although the organisational structure of SCIC was initially located in the Cortenbergh building, and later in the Berlaymont building, the meeting rooms were spread across other buildings in Brussels: Arlon, Brocqueville, Marais, Tour d'Ursel and Manhattan. The Commission decided to centralise its activity and built the first Centre de conférences Albert Borschette in 1981. SCIC was closely involved in this and had 20 meeting rooms installed that met the standards of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).

In the 1970s, in order to keep costs under control, SCIC, like the UN, concluded an initial 5-year agreement with the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC), laying down the working conditions of freelance interpreters and their remuneration at preferential rates. By way of example, a meeting requiring interpretation from seven languages into seven languages cost ECU 11 550, whereas a meeting requiring interpretation from five languages into three languages cost ECU 3 300. Furthermore, SCIC became a member of the Inter-Agency Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and Publications (IAMLADP), the advisory body of the language services of the United

Nations, and took part in the world's first experiment in teleinterpreting, which was organised by the National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA) between New York and Buenos Aires ⁽²⁾.

Permanent or freelance interpreters were allocated on the basis of their language combinations and the areas in which they had the greatest interest, or of their training. Quite a few of them had previously obtained a degree in law or economics. In order to prepare interpreters as well as possible for their future duties, SCIC set up a documentation unit and took part in the work of the Interinstitutional Working Party on Terminology and Documentation (GIIT). In addition, it went on to organise refresher courses for languages which had recently become official or to prepare for future enlargements.

In the 1960s, there were few university degree courses in interpreting in Europe and the rest of the world, and not enough graduates of such courses reached the standard required by the Commission. As a result of this lack of interpreters, SCIC introduced a 6-month training course in 1964. Participants were accorded the status of paid trainee. If they passed the training, they were offered short-term contracts as members of the auxiliary staff, which could be renewed after a further assessment. This training course, which was run by in-house professionals, was open to any applicant who had a university degree in any subject and who passed the aptitude test. As a result, by the time of the 1973 and 1981 enlargements, about 35 % of SCIC staff had been trained in house, and SCIC cooperated with universities by offering them educational and financial assistance. The training courses were sometimes organised in other cities (Athens, Copenhagen, Florence, Hamburg, Lisbon, Madrid, etc.). The same approach was subsequently used for the accession of Spain and Portugal, in cooperation with the ministries of foreign affairs and education of those two countries ⁽³⁾.

Vincent Dujardin

⁽¹⁾ 'Création du service commun "Interprétation-conférences"', *Courrier du personnel*, No 425, 12 August 1981, p. 33.

⁽²⁾ Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013. See also *Joint Interpreting and Conference Service*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995, p. 17.

⁽³⁾ Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013.

Chapter 6

An administrative culture in transition

The move from an administration with a mission (dear to Jean Monnet) to an administration that manages — along the lines of the national administrations — took place only gradually and was fraught with difficulty in the Commission because the Commission was subject to particular constraints which did not exist at national level, such as the obligation to submit legislative proposals required by the treaties (for example, annual agricultural prices or the achievement of the four freedoms).

Whether or not there was an administrative turning point is one of the major questions of the period between the arrival of the British and the appointment of Jacques Delors. Is it possible to pinpoint any changes in the Commission's administrative culture in those years? It is not easy to answer that question since, if certain changes were merely superficial or were limited to the names used, others were initiated but did not really come to fruition until after Jacques Delors' departure or even after Jacques Santer's term of office. Lastly, as is

often the case, some reforms that were attempted but that came to nothing are hard to interpret without referring to the period that followed. In any event, the main watershed had already been achieved with the merger and the establishment of the single Commission in 1967–68. If the 1973 enlargement did usher in many major changes to organisation charts and staff, with the departure of 13 directors-general, 40 directors, 80 heads of division and 100 administrators, in terms of administrative culture those years were a period of slow transition or, from one perspective, a period of maturing. They were marked by a few adjustments, but no revolutionary changes, resulting from the arrival of the British and a more general lack of political will to reform the institution. It should be pointed out that the administration was subject to many structural constraints: the framework and obligations set by the staff regulations, the need for the agreement of the Member States for the granting of posts and for any reform, and the need to comply with strict geographical balances.

While it is true that Roy Jenkins commissioned the Spierenburg report in 1978 ⁽¹⁾, its effects were very limited beyond its diagnosis that there was insufficient management. The only difference in this case was that, unlike the very many other reports that had been written from 1961 onwards, this report was published and therefore did not remain a purely internal document. In reality the legacy of Émile Noël continued to have a significant impact on the administration until the 1980s.

The question arose of what kinds of change and reform to promote in a Community administration that had gradually consolidated its practices since the 1960s. Thus, since 1967, the single Commission had been in a phase that was described by David Coombes ⁽²⁾ in 1970 as one of ‘bureaucratisation’, in other words one in which a common culture of bureaucracy was emerging in the Commission, with a move away from Jean Monnet’s model of an administration pursuing a mission and/or Walter Hallstein’s model of a charismatic administration. That movement was accompanied by an attempt to introduce management, in other words techniques and practices that appeared to have been brought in from the business sector. But this was not without its problems, given the tension between this new approach and the bureaucratic model. That movement was not peculiar to the Commission, since national administrations were subject to exactly the same tension during that period, albeit to quite differing degrees, as a result of the introduction of the theories of ‘new public management’. The Commission must be seen in the context of the changes that the Member States’ administrations were undergoing at much the same time.

Commissioners for personnel and administration, 1973–88

Albert Borschette (1973 until his death on 8 December 1976) — also responsible for competition.

‘I did not agree to take responsibility for policy on personnel and administration in order to engage in management, but rather to pursue a policy’ ⁽³⁾.

François-Xavier Ortoli (9 December 1976 to January 1977) — at the same time as being president.

Christopher Tugendat (1977–80) — also responsible for the budget and financial control.

Michael O’Kennedy (1981–82), who resigned and was replaced by Richard Burke (1982–85) — also responsible for the Statistical Office, the Publications Office and the Interpreting and Conference Service.

Henning Christophersen (1985–88) — also responsible for the budget and financial control.

DG IX as the driving force

In those years, the two directors-general of DG IX (known then as Personnel and Administration) were both French, and their tenure was characterised by a high degree of continuity. The Ortoli Presidency stated its intention to ‘take control’ of that directorate-general, no doubt so as to counter the supposed (or potential) British influence over administrative issues. Pierre Baichère was appointed director-general in 1973. In 1981, when directors-general were changed again, DG IX remained the preserve of the French following the appointment of Jean-Claude Morel. But the situation was no longer what it had been in 1973: alongside the new French director-general there was a new deputy director-general — a post that had been created on that occasion — the Briton Richard Hay who,

⁽¹⁾ See box ‘Proposals of the Spierenburg report’, p. 177.

⁽²⁾ Coombes, D., *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC*, Political and Economic Planning, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970.

⁽³⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 241a, 9 February 1973, p. 3.

logically enough, took over from Morel when he left in 1986. In fact, this DG had begun to be shared between the French and the British as early as 1973, when Jeremy Baxter was appointed director for personnel after holding the same position in the British Post Office.

In 1973, Baichère replaced the Italian Lamberto Lambert, who had been in office since 1969 and who fell victim to the changes of staff that followed the first enlargement in 1973 ⁽¹⁾. Pierre Baichère, who had a background as a senior French civil servant, spent some time working at the High Authority in Luxembourg, as a member of the cabinet of the Frenchman Pierre-Olivier Lapie, and later as director for the budget, before entering the single Commission as director for the research budgets in DG XIX (Budgets), under the authority of Lambert, who was the director-general of that DG until 1969.

Jean-Claude Morel, who also hailed from the French civil service, having graduated as an engineer from the *École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique* (ENSAE, the Paris-based graduate school of economics, statistics and finance), worked in DG II (Economic and Financial Affairs) from 1963, moving up through the ranks to be appointed deputy director-general. However, when he went to work in DG IX in 1981, that DG had not been his first choice, as his assistant, Philippe Petit-Laurent ⁽²⁾, recalled.

Consequently, between 1973 and 1986, the two directors-general for personnel and administration had quite similar profiles, as they had both graduated from the French *grandes écoles* — the *École nationale d'administration* (ENA) in the case of

Baichère and ENSAE in the case of Morel — and they were appointed director-general at almost the same age — Baichère at 48 and Morel at 49.

And yet there were many differences between the two directors-general and their actual role in the system. They differed in their leadership style, with Baichère being more traditional and Morel more enterprising and imaginative. They also differed in their relations with the Secretariat-General, which, particularly since the creation of the single Commission, had become the main administrative player. Under Baichère, DG IX was not in charge of the most sensitive issues. According to Morel's assistant: 'Émile Noël had accepted that Morel would gradually take on all these sensitive matters, which had not been the case before, provided that one of his right-hand men, Eduard Brackeniers ⁽³⁾, was involved as well ...'. However, the appointing authority was put back in the hands of the director-general in 1981. As a result, the nature of relations with the Secretariat-General changed gradually: DG IX was no longer a mere underling but had to wait until Noël's departure before it could take full charge of the administration. Lastly, the two men differed in their attitude to the introduction of change. While Baichère may not have been a promoter of change, Morel advocated broader, more reformist thinking, based on the reports produced by Spierenburg and then Ortoli in 1980 ⁽⁴⁾, some of whose more radical proposals (such as the separation of grade and function) had the potential to produce major changes in the Community civil service in 1982.

It should be noted that DG IX was the subject of criticism within the Commission itself. The direct-

⁽¹⁾ Pierre Bockstaël, who had been his assistant since 1969, recalled his departure: 'He left at the time of enlargement, when a number of directors-general left the Commission. That was a shame because he was one of the major figures in the Commission's administration' (interview with Pierre Bockstaël, 7 July 2010).

⁽²⁾ See interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Appointed head of division responsible for coordination. See interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ 'Report of the group of members of the Commission set up to study the implementation of Part Three of the Spierenburg report', 28 February 1980. See EC Commission, *Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1980*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 30, and HAEC, COM (80) Minutes No 550, meeting of 5 March 1980, which elaborated considerably on the objectives of the Ortoli report and its implementation.

or-general of the Legal Service relayed this criticism in a note of February 1979 entitled ‘Problèmes administratifs’ ⁽¹⁾: ‘DG IX poses several problems: 1. The functions are not well defined. It is the embodiment of excessive centralisation and bureaucratisation, while at the same time seeming to be over-influenced by the heads of cabinet. 2. It is too large and should be divided. 3. It is quite hard to find highly qualified officials to fill the most senior posts. 4. For a long time it was used as a place for sidelining officials who were thought to be “accident-prone”. The effects of this policy can still be felt.’

Pierre Baichère fought hard to prevent any separation between administration and personnel and managed to preserve the unity of DG IX. He drew attention to this topic in a note dated 11 January 1977 at the time of the arrival of Roy Jenkins, stating that a separation of this kind carried with it the risk of a ‘fragmentation of personnel policy’ ⁽²⁾.

Opening up to new methods of management

The departure of Walter Hallstein, the charismatic head of the EEC Commission, together with the end of the High Authority and its model of an administration pursuing a mission, led to what has been described as the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the Commission ⁽³⁾. What counted under Hallstein was loyalty. With an expanded organisation and presidents in

office for shorter periods, the bureaucratic culture was a shared reference point for Commission officials, who had a tendency to protect themselves, not against users but against interference by the Member States. Jenkins referred to this in his speech to staff on 12 November 1980: ‘We cannot expect our officials to be contented indefinitely with European ideals and the principles of a worthy cause: the people who work for the Commission also deserve to have the prospect of a career and a really satisfying job’ ⁽⁴⁾. In that same year Michel Crozier, a French sociologist, was invited by DG IX to a major conference on ‘future developments in bureaucracy!’ ⁽⁵⁾.

The incorporation of officials from the High Authority also led to substantial adjustments: that was the view of Baichère, who used the following quite revealing expression when interviewed in the *Courrier du personnel*: ‘The officials of the ECSC and Euratom felt a bit as if it was the children who were eating the parents!’ ⁽⁶⁾.

The introduction of management must be seen against the background of this process of bureaucratisation. This period of transition or maturing was characterised by gradual organisational adjustments that were carried out in three stages. First, there was an old ‘Staff’ division in Directorate A (Personnel). Its name had been changed regularly, but in 1975 it became ‘Establishment, organisation and evaluation’, Division No 3 (after those devoted to the Staff Regulations and Recruiting) and then, in 1978, for reasons of ‘linguistic precision’, the ‘Management and organisation, and establishment’ division, with the term ‘management’ having the unusual and convenient characteristic of being identical in all six Community languages.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, Note from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to Nick Stuart, 26 February 1979.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/364, ‘Administration and personnel unit should be kept in DG IX’, 11 January 1977. The decisive argument seems to have been that ‘this would be all the more serious since the administration staff are the section of our staff which makes the most demands and has the highest rate of trade-union membership ... it is clear that the trade unions will seek to take advantage of this new division of DG IX’.

⁽³⁾ According to Coombes, D., *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC*, Political and Economic Planning, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970. He goes too far when he claims that the Hallstein Commission ‘was clearly not a bureaucracy’ (p. 299), since the first EEC Commission was able to be both governmental (political) and bureaucratic (and hierarchical).

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 75/1984/37, pp. 3–4.

⁽⁵⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 416, 29 July 1980, pp. 13–20.

⁽⁶⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 319, 10 April 1974, p. 12.

Second, in June 1980, the set-up was adapted with the establishment of the ‘Careers’ division (in Directorate A) and the creation of an independent ‘Management and organisation’ sector, which was hived off from the Personnel Directorate and placed under the responsibility of the director-general in order to stress its special nature, in line with the Spierenburg and Ortoli reports. For one of the members of this division, Maria Pia Filippone, this was ‘a signal to Parliament of the importance that the Commission attaches to this type of activity’. As a matter of fact, it was a response to a growing concern of the Parliament: ‘The budgetary problems related to staffing had already started — staffing had to be limited and staff had to be used more effectively. In order to use staff more effectively, management had to be bolstered: that was how this whole process began; it was an issue that we had not been aware of beforehand’ ⁽¹⁾.

The third stage came about in 1986: a new ‘Coordination and Resources’ directorate was set up when Richard Hay became director-general ⁽²⁾, and Eduard Brackeniers was put in charge of it. So it was not until that year that a directorate was devoted to management, on an equal footing with the original Personnel Directorate.

But during that period of nearly 15 years, management had yet to be translated from words into actions. It was necessary to go through the motions. As Brackeniers put it, management was a ‘nice’ idea ⁽³⁾. Some went even further, referring to it as ‘mystification’, like Petit-Laurent: “Management and organisation” was somewhat based on intellectual mystification, with the usual unscrupulous acts

being disguised behind pseudo-managerial babble’ ⁽⁴⁾. To be more specific, it could be thought, as suggested by Anne Stevens, that human resources management was seen merely as a way of designing, applying or even circumventing binding rules ⁽⁵⁾.

This focus on management was strengthened by the accession of the United Kingdom but was not caused by it. Training in management techniques had already existed for several years at l’Institut européen d’administration des affaires (Insead, the European institute of business administration) in Fontainebleau or the Comité national de l’organisation française (CNOF) in Paris. The Commission had contacted Louvain university on this question as early as 1969, as we shall see later on. The only development was that the Commission used a greater variety of management training institutes: for example, it started using the Institute for the Development of Human Resources in Brussels from 1974 onwards. In those early years there was also a certain amount of interest in fact-finding missions to London: accordingly, in 1974 two officials from the ‘Recruitment’ division paid a visit to the civil service to study the ‘development of new recruitment and selection techniques’ ⁽⁶⁾. But this interest soon waned when it was realised that the techniques that had been seen there were not transferable, with the two officials concerned drawing the following conclusion: ‘overall, we are quite disappointed by our visit to Britain’.

Management was still considered to be distinct from substantive issues. However, in words if not in actions there were the first signs of a new link between management and substantive issues, in

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Maria Pia Filippone, 8 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ When Jean-Claude Morel became director-general of budgets, Philippe Petit-Laurent, one of his assistants, followed him to that DG but returned in 1989 as director of personnel in the ‘old’ Directorate A.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Eduard Brackeniers, 26 April 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ ‘Une simple amélioration ou une modernisation radicale? La réforme de l’administration de la Commission européenne’, *Revue française d’administration publique*, Nos 105 to 106, 2003, pp. 81–94. Anne Stevens is a professor at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/371, Note from Van Den Eede to Yves Desbois, 10 March 1975.

other words policy. The subject of management was first put on the agenda of the meeting of directors-general following an initiative from a British director-general in 1976. In a note written in English in February 1976 by Raymond Le Goy, who worked in the area of transport, to Émile Noël, he asked for a meeting on the subject of management because ‘past a certain point in size and complexity, it becomes a crucial parameter for policy’ ⁽¹⁾. The initial attitude of Noël, who chaired these meetings, was to refer the issue to the director-general for personnel and administration ⁽²⁾. Management was not (yet) considered to be an issue that a secretary-general of the institution should be dealing with. The Commission was still coloured by a traditional view of the senior civil service as a ‘public authority’, and this was reflected in the way (staff) management was confined to a single DG, thereby demonstrating its strictly sectoral nature. The idea that management formed an integral part of the Commission’s policy work had yet to gain traction, but the directors-general did start to discuss the subject at that time. They did not take on board their new managerial role until much later, and heads of unit did not come to this realisation until even later still.

The scant impact of studies and reports

Initially the reports on the reform of the administration remained internal Commission documents only. In a second phase launched by Roy Jenkins, they were made public, for example the Spierenburg report in 1979.

The Pouillet report of November 1972 was commissioned from the Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), specifically its Association universitaire de recherche en administration (AURA), with Professor Edouard Pouillet, assisted by Gérard Deprez ⁽³⁾. Since 1969, AURA had been responsible for gradually installing the PPBS (planning, programming, budgeting system) at the Commission ⁽⁴⁾. Gérard Deprez recalled the state of mind in this task force when it started its investigation in 1970: ‘At the time we were convinced that the introduction of modern management methods in the Commission could radically improve its position in the Community’s institutional system’ ⁽⁵⁾.

When the team from UCL carried out their investigation, they lost their illusions. Deprez put it this way: ‘And yet, while the programme was being implemented, we realised that the vast majority of the members of the organisation were far from sharing our optimism and accepting that our analysis was sound. When we criticised the fragmentation of the activities carried out and the lack of any real priority in either the objectives or the allocation of resources, the response was either that the treaties imposed constraints or that the political situation had to be taken into account. When we stressed the need to set precise objectives before embarking on specific measures, we were told that clear objectives could hamper rather than facilitate progress in certain policies. When we highlighted the need to make a better choice of the instruments to be used to achieve certain objectives, we were told in no un-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, Note from R. Le Goy to E. Noël, 10 February 1976.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, Note from Émile Noël to Pierre Baichère, 17 February, P.144/76: ‘It would be preferable if you took the initiative of organising a special meeting of this kind yourself and if you prepared and chaired the meeting. That would be far more in keeping with your responsibilities.’

⁽³⁾ He was a doctoral candidate in sociology at UCL, who was awarded a doctorate for his thesis entitled ‘La Commission des Communautés européennes. Essai sociologique sur une organisation captive’, Centre de recherches sociologiques, Institut de sciences politiques et sociales, UCL, 1974. Indeed, Gérard Deprez points out in the introduction to his thesis that ‘[their] concerns were not primarily scientific, but rather managerial, in nature: the aim of the AURA task force was not to conduct a sociological analysis of the Commission’s problems, but rather to provide a programme of assistance, while sticking to the terms of the contract’, p. I.

⁽⁴⁾ PPBS is the budget drafting procedure launched in the United States in 1963. PPBS was introduced to DG IX in 1969 and was later extended to all DGs following a decision taken on 14 October 1970.

⁽⁵⁾ Deprez, G., ‘La Commission des Communautés européennes. Essai sociologique sur une organisation captive’, PhD thesis, UCL, 1974, p. II.

certain terms that it was necessary to take account of governments' demands and that the Commission had very little margin for manoeuvre' ⁽¹⁾.

The result was a rather sterile dialogue between members of the Commission who were convinced that their institution had to operate under specific constraints and external consultants who took the view that some of the objections raised were due to 'people's resistance to changes that might affect them directly in their work and status' ⁽²⁾.

Consequently, very little can be attributed to the Pouillet report. Perhaps the main change of note was the development of posts of deputy director-general responsible for the internal management of their directorate-general, with the director-general concentrating his or her activity on key internal coordination issues. But this process was quite slow, and the tendency remained for deputy directors-general to be given responsibility primarily for specific subjects or sectors. There were six of them in 1970, 13 in 1973 and 19 in 1981 and 1986.

Another 'internal' procedure implemented from 1974 onwards was screening. A screening group was set up that year, chaired by Jeremy Baxter, director for personnel: it comprised six officials, plus the chairman. About 10 experts were consulted, including the Canadian researcher Hans J. Michelmann ⁽³⁾. Once again there was a certain mismatch between the ambitious methodology of the process (including questionnaires, statistics on the work of services and interviews), the conclusions that there were 'quite a few negative factors' and the results, which were limited to a reduction in the number of specialised services and a few early

retirements ⁽⁴⁾. Nevertheless, the report threw light on the comparatively low importance attached to management by heads of division and specialised services, with only 27 % of them considering it to be a priority and just 13 % of them stating that they would like to attend a management seminar. The final assessment was as follows: 'The group feels that, as long as the institution's departmental heads continue to be concerned essentially with structures rather than behaviour, the management function in the modern sense of the word cannot be effectively carried out' ⁽⁵⁾.

However, screening was essentially a process, a regular exercise which was continued, in various forms, throughout these years, in each DG. Responsibility for screening was given to the 'Establishment, organisation and evaluation' division, which was set up to this end in 1975 and was renamed 'Management and organisation, and establishment' in 1978. With screening in mind, the head of this division, Pierre Bockstael, attended management training courses, in particular at the General Commission on the Scientific Organisation of Labour (CEGOS), and led missions to London (Manpower Planning Model), Canada (Public Service Commission in Ottawa), the firm Volvo and the Swedish employers' confederation. In 1976, the Lambert report ⁽⁶⁾ on officials' careers was written. It advocated long-term planning and a single career for all grades in each category (apart from A3, A2 and A1) ⁽⁷⁾.

The objective of the Spierenburg report was quite different. The Commission, after a weekend sem-

⁽¹⁾ Deprez, G., 'La Commission des Communautés européennes. Essai sociologique sur une organisation captive', PhD thesis, UCL, 1974, page III.

⁽²⁾ Ibid., page IV.

⁽³⁾ In 1978, he wrote the first book entirely devoted to the Commission's administration: *Organisational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy: The case of the Commission of the European Communities*, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1978.

⁽⁴⁾ As a matter of fact this was the primary objective assigned to the exercise by Commissioner Borschette in his instructions to the director-general (note to Pierre Baichère, 30 August 1974). 'The objective of the screening, for the moment, is to reduce the number of A posts by at least 30, but if possible by between 40 and 50' (HAEC, BAC 18/1986/30, p. 1).

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 84/1986/553, 'Report on the organisation and operation of the departments of the Commission submitted by the Screening Group', 30 June 1974, p. 18.

⁽⁶⁾ Lamberto Lambert was Director-General of DG IX (Personnel and Administration).

⁽⁷⁾ At that time administrators' careers began in the starting grade, A7; the 'upper' grades were reserved for heads of division (A3), directors (A2) and directors-general and deputy directors-general (A1).



At the end of 1978, the Commission set up an investigative committee to look into its structures, operating methods and staff policy. The reflection group, consisting of Karl Buschmann, Paul Delouvrier, Giuseppe Petrilli and Dick Taverne, was formed in January 1979 with the Dutch ambassador and former vice-president of the ECSC High Authority, Dirk Spierenburg, in the chair. Presented to Roy Jenkins on 24 September 1979, the Spierenburg report, entitled 'Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services', was intended to improve efficiency and coordination in the work of members of the Commission and advocated the appointment of a single vice-president, a reduction in the number of commissioners to one per Member State and fewer, but larger, units under directors-general with more authority. (Cartoon, *Courrier du personnel*, No 412, 28 March 1980, p. 13.)

inar at Comblain-la-Tour in September 1978, had commissioned a 'group of renowned, independent people from outside the Commission' to produce a report in order to examine the issues of organisation and staffing.

The report was intended for publication from the moment it was commissioned. That at least was an innovation. The composition of the group was announced on 23 January 1979: it was to be chaired by Ambassador Dirk Spierenburg and include the trade unionist Karl Buschmann, the senior French civil servant and former director for finances of the High Authority Paul Delouvrier, the former member of the Commission Giuseppe Petrilli and the director of the United Kingdom's Institute for Fiscal Studies, Dick Taverne.

Once the report was published, on 24 September 1979, responsibility for its implementation was given to Vice-President Ortoli, as if the president who had commissioned it was no longer interested in it. In the view of Petit-Laurent: 'When the Spierenburg report came out in 1979, the then president, Roy Jenkins, a little perniciously, could think of nothing better ... than to make sure that his predecessor Ortoli was left holding the baby, because Jenkins had no interest whatsoever in mundane administrative matters' ⁽¹⁾. In 1980, the Ortoli


⁽¹⁾ It should nevertheless be pointed out that Ortoli had been commissioned by Hallstein back in 1961 to write a first report on the Commission's staff. That report was highly critical of the recruitment of the first staff at the Commission and advocated a far more flexible system of employment rather than careers.

report ⁽¹⁾ was devoted to the implementation of the Spierenburg report.

Very few of the bold proposals in the Spierenburg report went on to be implemented at the end of the Jenkins Commission. Actually, for him this was a question of tactics, above all: he wanted to show the Council that the Commission was intent on reform, and in this way ease the approval of budget headings, as shown by his speech to Commission staff a year after the report was submitted: 'Now that we have taken the initiative to reform ourselves, the least that we can expect is to be granted the very modest resources needed to accomplish our task' ⁽²⁾. As far as the implementation of the report was concerned, 'there was little more than follow-up meetings where we examined lists of reforms, only to find that we had made no progress on any of them, with a few exceptions' ⁽³⁾, according to Petit-Laurent. Mention should nevertheless be made of the 15 % reduction in the number of divisions and specialised services, with a total of 50 being cut. In addition, the report had the virtue of reviving the debate on relations with the national civil services.

Proposals of the Spierenburg report

- Strengthening of the screening group
- Creation of a central staff register
- Description of jobs in the light of the tasks of the units
- Better system of staff reporting
- Organisation of joint competitions with other European institutions
- Transfer from category B to category A
- 'Right and duty' mobility
- Continued emphasis on training, especially management training
- Ad hoc selection committee for appointment to A3 posts
- Recruitment of specialised staff from outside as temporary staff



The Spierenburg report stresses the importance of mobility. It is a factor that provides incentives, ensures renewal both in terms of personnel and departments and offers a better overview, while at the same time helping to improve morale by renewing interest in work. Yet there are major obstacles to mobility: the tendency to prefer tradition to change and the lack of transparency in procedures for recruitment or filling posts means that genuine mobility opportunities are few and far between. (*Courrier du personnel*, No 409, 17 December 1979, p. 38.)

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 75/1984/37, Meeting between the President of the Commission and the staff, 12 November 1980, p. 13.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

Exchanges with national administrations

When Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Community, officials from those countries had the chance of a short-term placement in the Commission for the first time. In April 1974 and then in May 1976 the Commission gave its approval in principle to a new exchange scheme for officials. As a result, in the period up to 1979, 33 national officials from eight Member States did a placement in the Commission (lasting on average for 13 months), whereas 11 Commission officials did a placement in the administrations of five Member States, each for an average period of 6 months.

One of the recommendations of the Spierenburg report took over this measure, emphasising the ‘introduction of outside experience to the Commission’. The authors justified this for historical reasons: ‘In the earlier days of the Community, staff were recruited at all levels, and therefore brought with them experience acquired in other walks of life which was very valuable to the Commission. Now that the European civil service is becoming more stable, and staff are making their life’s career in the service of the Commission, this advantage is lost. If the Commission is not to become increasingly divorced from experience of the world outside, it is essential that it should be able to benefit from a current of staff having such experience’ ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, ‘Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services’ (Spierenburg report), 24 September 1979, p. 35. It proposed that, within 4 years, the proportion of temporary staff should be 20 % of the total number of A4/A5 officials (200 temporary staff). It also recommended that the provisions of Article 29(2) of the staff regulations of officials of the European Communities (Regulation No 31 of the EEC Treaty, OJ 45, 14.6.1962), which was intended for grades A1 and A2, should be extended to A3 staff, with a strict upper limit of 2 %, in other words that external recruitment should be permitted at grade A3 (head of division) level. This measure, which was supported by François-Xavier Ortoli at an ad hoc meeting on 16 January 1980, was given a very cool reception by Baichère, who exclaimed: ‘20 % without rigged competitions? How can you choose?’ Noël summarised the proposal in the following way: ‘External (lateral entry) recruitment without a competition.’ ‘Rigged competitions’ are competitions organised solely to establish previously identified temporary staff as officials.

Certain guarantees were proposed in exchange: internal competitions would be open to established officials only, and temporary staff could not be established.

The Spierenburg report proposed a change in the approach to relations with the national civil services, which were no longer willing to send the Commission ‘experts who continue to be paid by their home governments but receive a daily subsistence allowance’ ⁽²⁾. And yet this latter approach prevailed because the 1980 system led to the introduction of seconded national experts (SNEs), who started to be given this title in 1988 under Delors. Unlike 1974, this new system removed the reciprocity of exchanges, since Commission officials were no longer seconded to the administrations of the Member States.

The 1982 ‘turning point’ and the failure of the planned sweeping reform of the European civil service

In the wake of the Spierenburg and Ortoli reports, in 1981–82 the new director-general, Jean-Claude Morel, wishing to make his mark, tried unsuccessfully to conduct a more comprehensive reform of careers in the European civil service. This provoked quite a strong reaction in the Commission, and there were signs of opposition to this proposal at the meeting of directors-general on 10 May 1982. The subject of the meeting was the separation between grade and job. After an introduction by Christopher Audland, each director-general spoke on the subject: only two directors-general were in favour, seven were against and six were sceptical.

⁽²⁾ Ibid., p. 39.

But there was a really heated exchange at a meeting held on 13 July 1982, when the ‘Commission staff policy’ guidance document was discussed. On that occasion Noël opened the discussion and went on the offensive. He began by attacking the controversial nature of the document and its unjustified criticism of the Commission: ‘It is ridiculous to call on the Commission to spend more time discussing matters of principle when it has been waiting for 18 months for a document from DG IX on staff policy.’ The secretary-general refused to condone the ‘unacceptable criticism of the insufficiently “consistent and transparent” management of the directorates-general’, and went on to say: ‘DG IX should not believe that its word is gospel.’ He was totally opposed: ‘The new career system that is advocated is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ because ‘the problem of a separation between grade and job arises only for A1, A2 and A3 staff’. Accordingly, he proposed limiting the use of the Article 50 procedure by taking advantage of the possibility offered by Article 51 of putting certain A1 or A2 officials in a lower-level job (as had been done when the executives were merged in 1967–68) and introducing a single career with advancement from A5 to A3 (principal administrator, head of division and adviser): ‘These few limited arrangements would achieve the desired aim without completely changing a career system which works satisfactorily for 95 % of staff’ ⁽¹⁾.

Most of the directors-general who spoke after Émile Noël agreed with him. For example, Fernand Braun took the view that the French system of grade/job separation could not be applied in the Commission. Manfred Caspari was ‘totally opposed to an uninterrupted mandarin-style career, which would make the system wide open to constant pressure from the trade unions for transfers from one category to the next’. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann consid-

ered ‘that a comprehensive reform of the staff regulations is pointless and that a radical reform would also be very risky’ ⁽²⁾. The director-general of the Legal Service thought that there was a risk that the Council would take this opportunity to call into question the fundamental principles of the European civil service, not to mention the discretionary powers that the trade unions would exercise in the new system. Carlo Facini took the view that ‘it is totally unrealistic to think that careers can be managed by the Commission using the criterion of effectiveness alone’. The Danish director-general Ole Bus Henriksen was more positive about the single career: he wanted to see a ‘cost–benefit analysis’ of the measures that were advocated.

Only three directors-general spoke out in support of the single career: John Roderic Steele, Daniel Strasser and Athanase Andreopoulos, who considered that ‘only a revolutionary reform can remotivate staff’. Thus, support for the reform came from the new Member States in addition to the Danish director-general, but there were also opposing views among the French, with Émile Noël on one side, as the guardian of the temple, and Jean-Claude Morel and Daniel Strasser, on the other, wanting to see the system transformed. Strasser’s arguments were the exact opposite of Noël’s: the director-general of budgets took the view that ‘separating grades and jobs was the only way of introducing some flexibility into a profoundly reactionary system’ ⁽³⁾ and he wanted to see an end to the categories and the distinctions between administrative, linguistic, scientific and technical staff.

This reform did not come to fruition. In retrospect, it appears, in a way, to have been ahead of its time and, and in any event, ahead of the thinking within the Commission. Philippe Petit-Laurent summed up this episode in the following way: ‘In the 1980s, there were not enough people outside fighting for

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, DG IX document on the meeting of directors-general held on 13 July 1982 to discuss the guidance document on Commission staff policy.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

these ideas ... the people on the inside did not have strong enough convictions and, above all, ... the institution felt vigorous, the trade unions felt sufficiently strong and ... there were not enough Member States pushing in that direction' ⁽¹⁾. This takes us back to the many constraints that the Commission worked under in the area of administration and personnel. Its reform remained a highly limited process. Following the consultation procedures with the trade unions and staff associations, the reform of the staff regulations had to be negotiated with the Member States, and with the Parliament as far as staffing levels were concerned. The status quo was preserved at that time because of the potential danger of the Council and the Parliament interfering with the Commission's internal organisation.

Within the Commission, Noël was also apparently quite opposed. The only legacy of administrative reforms in those years was a few organisational ad-

justments and gradual acceptance of management. All in all, with the accession of Spain and Portugal, it was apparently not anticipated that there would be any urgent need to reform the administration: indeed, it is strange that there were no more reports on this subject until the end of Delors' term of office. The arrival of Richard Hay as head of DG IX and of Commissioner Christophersen in 1986, together with the departure of Émile Noël, resulted in the application of more professional methods to administration and personnel, with the Commission gradually ceasing to manage human resources like a family. The first signs of this tendency could be seen in September 1985 when objectives were set for each service under the Commission's annual work programme. The whole process was designed to make sure that officials were better informed of these objectives and supported them more fully ⁽²⁾.

MICHEL MANGENOT

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Philippe Petit-Laurent, 19 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 45.

Chapter 7

‘It was European Brussels, not Belgian Brussels’⁽¹⁾: life for European officials outside the institutions

Living conditions for European officials did not change significantly compared with the 1960s ⁽²⁾. With some exceptions, most officials and their families lived in or around Brussels. In about 1980, 60 % lived in the 19 municipalities of greater Brussels and 40 % outside Brussels (some in the immediate outskirts of the city, some much further afield). At the beginning of 1981 a total of 8 694 officials worked in Brussels, of whom 2 337 (26.8 %) were Belgian. On the basis of the average family coeffi-

cient of 2.75 calculated in 1980 by DG IX (Personnel and Administration), the number of working officials and their family members totalled some 17 500 persons ⁽³⁾.

To this figure must be added the number — a statistic that is poorly documented — of officials already entitled to a full pension, provided they had worked for 35 years ⁽⁴⁾. This system, which appeared

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ Dumoulin, M. in collaboration with Conrad, Y., ‘Like strangers in the city? European officials in Brussels’, in Dumoulin, M., (ed), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 241–272.

⁽³⁾ *L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à Bruxelles*, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Brussels, 1982, p. 29.

⁽⁴⁾ The number of officials drawing a pension as of 1 September 1979 was 816. Commission’s reply to written question No 396/79 by Lord O’Hagan, OJ C 282, 12.11.1979, p. 18.

to favour women but was in fact discriminatory, was amended in the 1980s. The point is worth making if only because the number of officials reaching pensionable age increased as time went by and a substantial proportion of them decided to establish their main residence in Brussels or its outskirts.

Whether unmarried — and a relatively high proportion of temporary staff and officials of the Commission were not married ⁽¹⁾ — or married, with or without children, officials had to find somewhere to live. The prevailing impression given is that ‘southern Europeans lived in the city centre, northern Europeans in the suburbs’ ⁽²⁾. In fact, during this period French, Italian and British officials preferred the suburbs that had grown during the city’s second expansionary phase (Auderghem/Oudergem, Uccle/Ukkel, Watermael-Boitsfort/Watermaal-Bosvoorde, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe, Woluwe-Saint-Pierre/Sint-Pieters-Woluwe) ⁽³⁾. Did they settle there temporarily or permanently? A valuable indicator gives some guidance in answering this question. Since 1972, officials had been able to obtain housing loans at reduced rates ⁽⁴⁾. It was a highly successful measure; as of 1 June 1974, there were 494 outstanding loan applications ⁽⁵⁾. In 1979, information provided by the Beamtenheimstättenwerk, one of the financial institutions to which the officials repaid their debt, showed that since the measure had been introduced the Belgians were the national group to benefit most from it, accounting for 23.6 % of the total loans

granted. They were followed by the Italians, French and Germans, who together represented around 65 %. Thus, practically none of the other nationalities, apart from a small number of Dutch, availed themselves of the measure ⁽⁶⁾.

Places of residence of European officials ⁽⁷⁾

Of the 250 municipalities outside Brussels chosen by Eurocrats as a place of residence, the most popular were Overijse, Tervuren/Tervueren, Kraainem and Wezembeek-Oppem, but Hoeilaert, Rhode-Saint-Genèse/Sint-Genesius-Rode and Waterloo were also high on the list. These were mainly the choice of the higher-level officials or of those who chose their place of residence on the basis of their children’s school. Within greater Brussels, European staff settled chiefly in the east and south-east of the city in areas where they could find new housing, green spaces, attractive surroundings and good communications. The Schuman area, including Etterbeek and part of Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, attracted a large proportion of unmarried officials, new arrivals and many trainees. Officials of all grades and nationalities and their families gravitated towards the municipalities of Woluwe-Saint-Pierre/Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe and, to a lesser degree, Ixelles/Elsene, Auderghem/Oudergem and Watermael-Boitsfort/Watermaal-Bosvoorde. The municipality of Uccle/Ukkel particularly attracted grade A officials, including many French and Italians who were no doubt influenced in their choice of residence by the proximity of the Lycée français. In the other municipalities there were a few European Community officials, mainly Belgians.

⁽¹⁾ *L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à Bruxelles*, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Brussels, 1982, p. 29.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. L. Lederer, a British official, in a letter published in the Brussels daily newspaper *Le Soir* on 7 June 1978 made the same observation. See also Willaert, D. and Koelet, S., ‘De Europese aanwezigheid in de Vlaamse Rand’, in Degadt, J. et al., *De internationalisering van de Vlaamse Rand rond Brussel*, Academic and Scientific Publishers, Brussels, 2012, pp. 44–70, and more specifically pp. 46–49 (‘Europeanen in de Vlaamse Rand tijdens de periode 1961–2008’).

⁽³⁾ Caillez, J., *Schuman-City. Des fonctionnaires britanniques à Bruxelles*, Academia Bruylant, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2004, pp. 30–31.

⁽⁴⁾ This benefit would subsequently be abolished.

⁽⁵⁾ Commission’s reply to Written Question No 89/74 by Mr Della Briotta, in OJ C 90, 29.7.1974, p. 18.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the utilisation of sums available for granting building loans to officials of the European Communities over the period 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1979’, COM(80) 404 final, 16 July 1980.

⁽⁷⁾ *L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à Bruxelles*, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Bruxelles, 1982, p. 44.

This finding is at variance, if only partially, with the notion that European officials lived in Belgium but did not put down roots because the provisional nature of their work location discouraged them from settling permanently, and it indirectly poses the question of integration in the country.

'Eurocrats: a privileged and dissatisfied group' ⁽¹⁾

In 1976 the Commission considered that 'complaints that officials in Brussels are not well integrated into their surroundings are out of date' ⁽²⁾. The facts show that the issue of integration was still open. Admittedly, each official was different in this respect and, furthermore, many of the difficulties observed below were in line with the experience of other international bureaucracies, whether in Geneva or elsewhere. However, despite this obvious fact, Belgian public opinion turned against European officials. The public took little interest in European issues in a context of economic crisis and the political and institutional crisis affecting relations between the language communities in Belgium ⁽³⁾. Mistrust was often combined with envy, partly owing to the rapid establishment of European and international institutions in Brussels, including the Secretariat-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This jealousy arose from exaggerated ideas of privileges and immunities. Quite apart from the numerous press articles about officials' salaries and tax exemptions, a good illustration of this are the myths surrounding the 'EUR' number plate, commonly supposed to give its holders exorbitant privileges 'that we thought had been abolished

in 1789' ⁽⁴⁾. To cite one official: 'The real *Bruxellois* viewed us with distrust ... They didn't like us because they thought we would push up rents and land prices, as well as cleaners' wages' ⁽⁵⁾. Objects of mistrust and often of envy, European officials, or Eurocrats — a word that entered the French language in 1965 ⁽⁶⁾ and rapidly took on a pejorative connotation — illustrate the principle that every society 'divides its immigrants and labels them, establishing with each (artificial) group a precise social distance' ⁽⁷⁾.

The distorted view of the social status of European officials also led the public authorities to take discriminatory measures against them. An example was the 'grave rights' case in 1979. As the Belgian minister of the interior explained in a circular to the provincial governors calling for an end to this state of affairs, 'in some municipalities the authorities charge European Community officials a much higher fee for grave rights than the charge levied on other inhabitants' ⁽⁸⁾. Then there was a case that arose in 1983. Five Brussels municipalities imposed a tax on 'persons who are not registered in the population registers ... and who are owners or tenants of accommodation used as a secondary residence or who use it without payment'. On the basis of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 and the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, officials were exempted from registering in the population registers. The Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice, which in March 1986 ruled that the Kingdom of Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations and ordered it to pay the costs ⁽⁹⁾. Certainly, public opinion and that of some public authorities

⁽¹⁾ Scotto, M., 'Les eurocrates: des privilégiés mécontents', *Le Monde*, 8 October 1983.

⁽²⁾ Commission's reply to Written Question No 514/76 by Mr Seefeld, OJ C 294, 13.12.1976, p. 52.

⁽³⁾ Favell, A., 'Bruxelles: capitale européenne au cœur d'un état-nation éclaté', *Europe: régions et communautés contre les nations*, *Panoramiques*, No 49, 2000, pp. 110–115.

⁽⁴⁾ 'Ce que nous coûtent les "Européens"', *Belgique No 1*, No 328, 18 January 1973.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Rey, A., *Le dictionnaire historique de la langue française*, Le Robert, Paris, 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Gatti, E., 'Defining the expat: the case of high-skilled migrants in Brussels', *Brussels Studies*, No 28, 31 August 2009, p. 10.

⁽⁸⁾ Minister of the Interior circular of 28 March 1979 in *Moniteur Belge*, 28 September 1979.

⁽⁹⁾ Judgment of 18 March 1986 in Case 85/85 *Commission v Belgium* [1986] ECR 1149.

gives food for thought. To quote the *Courrier du personnel*: ‘We are not liked because we’re not understood. We are not understood because people don’t know us’ ⁽¹⁾. The issue prompted numerous statements to press bodies and agencies, for example by the director-general of DG IX (Personnel and Administration) ⁽²⁾, exercising the right to reply; the flood of recriminations about the ‘status’ of officials and the supposed consequences of this status in terms of living conditions prompted individual and collective reactions from the Commission. ‘The population of the host country ... has an atavistic tendency to criticise and malign others,’ wrote one official ⁽³⁾. Was he an isolated case or was he saying aloud what many of his colleagues thought privately? In the autumn of 1981, a trade union representing staff members of the European institutions, the Syndicat des fonctionnaires des institutions européennes (SFIE), conducted a survey among Commission staff employed in Brussels. Altogether 2 300 staff members responded, of whom 60 % said that they would like to leave Brussels ⁽⁴⁾. Although caution must always be exercised in using surveys, this result confirms the malaise that had already been pointed out both by the Union Syndicale and by the European Civil Service Federation (FFPE) ⁽⁵⁾.

This malaise was not only due to hostile public opinion, whether openly expressed or not, or to MEPs’ complaints about ‘Berlaymargot’ or jargon, i.e. ‘euro-babble’, the ‘obscure, hollow and pseudo-technical language often [hiding] deficient or superficial thought’ ⁽⁶⁾. Setting aside the strikes expressing the discontent of officials who felt that the monetary

turbulence of the time was reducing their purchasing power, at least three other reasons for dissatisfaction can be singled out. The first has already been mentioned, namely the uncertainty of officials as to whether they were to stay in Brussels temporarily or permanently. The other two were more work-related. First, most officials were fully committed to their work and complained that the Commission and, consequently, its officials were regularly made into scapegoats by national governments and the media. Second, they complained that the agenda was too often dictated by budgetary constraints, meaning that short-termism often prevailed over longer-term reflection.

However, it would be wrong to limit the review of the life of officials to what might have been thought and said about the gloomy climate that prevailed for much of the period. At the same time, this mood, and the general distrust with which they were received, raises the as yet unexamined question of their social integration ⁽⁷⁾.

Needless to say, such negative experiences were far from universal. For many, the Belgian capital was appreciated for its scale, its accessibility and its quality of life. As one official put it: ‘I found Brussels a very pleasant and easy place to live in; perhaps less exciting than London but easier because London is so big’ ⁽⁸⁾. Or to quote a second: ‘As a place to live, [Brussels was] not exciting but very, very pleasant, with lots of interesting things going on’ ⁽⁹⁾. Another spoke for many in highlighting the quality of the food: ‘Living in Brussels was agreeable and eating in Brussels was agreeable!’ ⁽¹⁰⁾. The fact that the traffic problems were much less acute than they have since become also added to the appeal, as did property prices that were substantially lower than in

⁽¹⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 401, 26 April 1979.

⁽²⁾ These rights of reply were addressed in particular to the weekly magazines *Pourquoi Pas?* (September 1981) and *The Bulletin* (April 1982) and the newspaper *Le Monde* (October 1983), etc.

⁽³⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 415, 26 April 1979. The text is signed by E. Perrone.

⁽⁴⁾ ‘Six fonctionnaires européens sur dix souhaitent quitter Bruxelles’, *La Libre Belgique*, 18 January 1982.

⁽⁵⁾ ‘Une caste de privilégiés’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 414, 23 May 1980, pp. 33–37; ‘La FFPE répond au Pourquoi Pas?’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 422, 23 March 1981, pp. 54–56.

⁽⁶⁾ Written Question No 524/79 by Lord O’Hagan to the Commission of the European Communities, OJ C 275, 31.10.1979, p. 18.

⁽⁷⁾ Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., ‘La Commission européenne: du compromis culturel à la culture politique du compromis’, *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, p. 435.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Robert Jarrett, 14 October 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Richard Hay, 10 August 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.

most major European cities. A significant proportion of those interviewed in the making of this volume referred highly positively to the quality of their accommodation, whether rented or purchased. And less anecdotal, and perhaps still more revealing, is the fairly sizeable percentage of non-Belgian Commission staff who chose to remain in Belgium and often within Brussels after they had ceased to work for the Commission.

Breaking down prejudices

'One of the wonderful things about the Commission is that working there gets rid of all your prejudices. You come across lazy Germans, unassuming French people, enormously hard-working and precise Italians, unassuming Brits. You work with all kinds of people, and you all work together. You don't give a second thought to the nationality of the person working next to you' ⁽¹⁾.

A 'European ghetto'?

Although behaviour differed from one individual to another, at least two categories of officials can be distinguished. The first category was that of officials who had to take on very heavy workloads and felt that the little free time they had left had to be devoted first and foremost to their families ⁽²⁾. For these officials, socialising took second place. As one of them explained eloquently: 'Integration in the life of the city wasn't very complete. The fact of having a pretty demanding job at the Commission, and being with colleagues of other nationalities, not only from Monday to Friday since we often went in to work on Saturday as well ... meant that on the only remaining day (Sunday) we didn't really feel

like seeking friends among the other inhabitants of the city or the neighbours, whatever their nationality. For this reason we often preferred to remain with people of our own nationality, simply because we had spoken in other languages the other 6 days of the week and wanted a rest on our one free day.'

But the difficulty of integration might also have been due to the feeling of being an immigrant. In the words of one Italian official: 'In the 1970s Brussels was physically, geographically, far from my native country. There was no motorway, telephone connections weren't easy. Phone conversations were expensive. Flights were not frequent and, above all, you couldn't find products we now take for granted and can find in the supermarkets, from pasta to mozzarella. They didn't exist. We felt as if we really were living in a foreign country, immigrants' ⁽³⁾.

Some nice negotiations and discussions at home

'Some Danes preferred to only have contact with other Danes. But I had, as part of my work, close contacts with colleagues from other Member States. And I invited them home, and we had some nice negotiations and discussions at home. It was always very great fun to meet them outside the meetings. And I had many friends among them. So that was one part of my work. Then I had contacts with third countries, in particular the English-speaking countries: the Australians, the New Zealanders and so on. Well I also had close contacts with these people, when it could be done without political consequences' ⁽⁴⁾.

The second category of officials were those who forged links in one way or another. The form and nature of these links varied considerably, but they generally had one point in common. Friendships were generally made with other European offi-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Margaret Brusasco-Mackenzie, 8 August 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010: 'All the posts I held were demanding: I didn't have time for a social life. Any remaining time had to be dedicated to the family and immediate colleagues.' Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010: 'I had a young family so, basically, it was go to work, have a sandwich for lunch and then go home, the countryside, the garden.'

⁽³⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Hans Jørgen Bendixen, 5 December 2011.

cials⁽¹⁾, since ‘we really felt like foreigners in contacts with Belgians’⁽²⁾. Even if officials appeared to have numerous and highly amicable relations with Belgians⁽³⁾, “‘Community’ social life’⁽⁴⁾ can be generally illustrated by the ‘garden’ metaphor suggested by one interviewee: ‘From the point of the general sociability of Belgian society compared with American society, I’m tempted to compare it with a walled garden. This certainly has the advantage ... that you always feel that you’re at home, except that there is no ceiling. But in the same context in the US there are no walls, the gardens communicate with each other, the dogs, the children, everything communicates. So there is a kind of sociability catalyst present that is more evident’⁽⁵⁾.

‘We were mostly “communautaires”’

‘We weren’t in Belgian society very much, unless you call going to the opera being in society. We did do operas, concerts, theatres and things. Our friends however were mostly “communautaires”, whether of the permanent representations, or of the Commission, or of the Parliament. There were any amount of social occasions with them, some quite serious, some not serious at all’⁽⁶⁾.

In addition to these initial considerations, it should be pointed out that social integration began at work. The cafeteria was for a long time particularly highly prized as an internal venue for socialising⁽⁷⁾. The small restaurants near the Berlaymont provided an opportunity to verify that lunchtime was ‘a serious matter at that time’⁽⁸⁾.

Still more important was the increasing involvement of Commission staff in clubs and associations. In 1973, there were 42 leisure and sports clubs. Four years later there were 45, with a total of 2 000 members. Over half of them were sports clubs, confirming the words of one interviewee who said that sport played an important role in social life⁽⁹⁾. One of the oldest associations was the horse-riding club, set up in September 1961 at the Royal Étrier Club in Uccle/Ukkel. It had 500 members in 1986. Anglers were catered for at Court-Saint-Étienne where their club, which was founded in 1974, hired a 1.5 ha pond. Also in 1974, the Community bought an extensive property in Overijse which became a multi-purpose sports centre open to officials of the Council, the Commission and the ESC.

While some sporting activities, such as the participation by a team from the European Communities Flying Club in the Paris–New York–Paris race in June 1981 or the Sail for Europe adventure⁽¹⁰⁾, were well publicised as a way of promoting the European ideal, others, such as tennis or swimming, were practised informally with colleagues or took the form of competitions organised by Belgian amateur sports federations. Eurobowling, Euro-volley and the European Communities Squash Club, which was created in 1975 doubtless as a collateral effect of the United Kingdom’s accession, are just a few examples of the opportunities available to play sports with representatives of other social and professional circles and forge friendships with them. Playing one or more sports in the company of colleagues or people

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010, Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010, and Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010 concerning Franz Frochmaier, for example. See also interview with John Pearson, 19 February 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Guy Van Haeverbeke, 7 April 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 September 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interviews with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010, and Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010: ‘When we had time, we would talk to colleagues and go and have a coffee together’ (translated from German).

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010; Johnson, S., *Stanley I presume?*, Fourth Estate, London, 2010, p. 158.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ In the context of the information campaign surrounding the first European elections in June 1979, a small group of people aspired to bring European integration to the attention of a wider public through sport, in this case sailing. Former director in the European Parliament’s information office and co-founder in 1976 of the Sail for Europe association Guy Vanhaeverbeke recalled: ‘What did a group of eccentrics say to itself? We must find some way of associating the Union’s image with something less bureaucratic, technocratic, diplomatic ... we shall design a boat, we shall put in it a crew of nine (there were nine countries in the Union), boys and girls, and we shall launch them into a very big international sporting event ...’ (interview with Guy Vanhaeverbeke, 7 April 2011). And so it was that the yacht *Treaty of Rome* took part in the famous Whitbread Round the World Race in 1977–78 and carried the European colours to a highly creditable third place.

who belonged to the 'European village' in Brussels also offered the opportunity to mix business with pleasure, i.e. to 'make many useful contacts' in the words of Horst Krenzler, who often played tennis with Martin Schulze, the ARD correspondent in Brussels ⁽¹⁾. In the European microcosm that was Brussels, the place and role of journalists has to be taken into account. As reported by Marcell von Donat, 'My wife was an editor at the ARD TV studio in Brussels. This meant that our circle of acquaintances expanded to include people from the world of journalism' ⁽²⁾. Some of the associations set up by European officials were cultural and artistic in nature. From November 1975, they often met at the Europa Club, which had just been established at Avenue de Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan 66. However, this was not the only meeting place. The 'International Club Château Sainte-Anne' was also frequented by Commission officials willing to pay the very high membership subscription ⁽³⁾. And finally, in addition to institutionalised clubs and associations there were informal leisure activities. In the words of one Welsh official, 'I had lots of Irish friends, with whom I used to go for a drink after work. The pubs — the Drum and the Corkscrew — were close to the European Commission ... We had a very good group of friends; some of us would sing together. I was involved a lot in that social side.'

The Brussels Hash House Harriers

'Well they're either described as drinkers with a running problem, or runners with a drinking problem. You meet once a week and you go running for about 10, 12 kilometres, and then you go and drink beer or whatever. The Hash House Harriers was very good from a social point of view because it was mixed and very international, not just Commission people, local Belgians, and we'd go out running in little villages, which often had their own breweries' ⁽⁴⁾.

The role of schools

The number of children of officials registered at the European schools in Brussels, while significant (2 700 on average at Uccle/Ukkel between 1973 and 1984), was regarded as well below expectations ⁽⁵⁾. One reason was doubtless that officials could choose between the education offered at official Belgian schools, which were non-fee-paying, the European schools and 'national' schools such as the Lycée français, the British School or the Deutsche Schule. Parents opting for one of the latter often did so for practical reasons rather than adherence to their national culture. 'We had a house built in Tervuren because it was very near the Deutsche Schule,' says one official, adding: 'It was a homogeneous environment' ⁽⁶⁾. Education in the European schools was not without problems, the main one being 'the quality of the teachers, which was a matter of concern to us,' according to one person interviewed ⁽⁷⁾. The choice of teachers was not decided on by the school or its head. The teachers were sent by the Member States. This led one father, who was dissatisfied with the choice in question, to call it 'one more example of the failure of the inter-governmental method' ⁽⁸⁾.

Apart from this question of the selection of teachers, the prevailing impression is that the European school was an unusually valuable experience, for parents as well as pupils. Many of them, whether they were acting as a parent representative or a volunteer helping to organise a sports or cultural activity, found that the school offered a unique opportunity for socialising ⁽⁹⁾. It was an opportunity, too, to experience at first hand the enthusiasm or reluctance of different cultures at the school when it came to cooperating in such activities. 'The difference be-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Created in 1969 as a business club offering restaurants, sports facilities and meeting rooms, the club had a swimming pool, inaugurated in 1970, and a multi-purpose sports facility which opened in 1974.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ *Courrier du personnel*, No 458, p. 46.

⁽⁶⁾ Interviews with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010, and Klaus Meyer, 20 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Almut da Fonseca Wollheim, 22 September 2011.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Antonio Marchini-Camia, 6 December 2011.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.



Given the number of officials and the high percentage of female staff within their ranks, the Commission has a large number of social obligations, particularly towards families. This is why it set up a day nursery and after-school care facilities in the 1960s. The other institutions quickly expressed their desire to group together the various social facilities in a single building, which would be open to all the institutions. From September 1974, a complex in Boulevard Clovis/Clovislaan would house the social infrastructure (including the day nursery, after-school care and other social amenities) available to staff of the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Economic and Social Committee (SEC(74) 2858).

tween the national cultures [was very interesting]. The Brits all thought it was far too nose-to-the-grindstone academic with not enough out-of-school activities of the sort that you'd expect. That the broader formation was neglected. The French all thought that there were far too many out-of-school activities which were frivolous nonsense and there should be more nose to the grind' ⁽¹⁾.

Surprises at the European schools ⁽²⁾

'There were amusing situations. The children had to learn several subjects in another language. This gave rise to some odd situations. In one class, for example, the children had to learn the *Marseillaise* in English. When they went home they talked about towns and rivers with names their parents had never heard of.'

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Almut da Fonseca Wollheim, 22 September 2011.

Nine new European schools in 1978

The first European school, which opened in 1953 in Luxembourg, did not acquire official status until 12 April 1957. The regulations for the European Baccalaureate followed on 15 July of the same year. What was to become, in 1959, the Uccle/Ukkel European School opened in 1958 at Rue du Trône/Troonlaan 2 in Brussels, in a building no longer standing. It was followed, at the instigation of Étienne Hirsch, the President of the Euratom Commission between 1959 and 1962, by European schools associated with the setting-up of the Euratom research centres (Mol and Varese

in 1960, Karlsruhe in 1962 and Bergen the following year). The annex to the Uccle/Ukkel school, which opened in 1974 in Woluwe-Saint-Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe, became independent in 1976. The school in Munich, for children of staff of the European Patent Organisation, which was created by a protocol of 15 December 1975, opened its doors in 1977. In 1978 a school was set up in Culham in the United Kingdom to meet the schooling needs of the children of staff associated with the implementation of the JET programme.



Jacques Delors meets the pupils of the primary section of the European School in Woluwe Saint-Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe.

'The head of primary, Mr Mittler, was ... a German, very strict, very serious, but with a common sense attitude. And a committed European ... One day, ... the parents proposed putting flags outside the school to represent all the nationalities there.

Mr Mittler hesitated before replying: "I've had enough of flags in my lifetime." (Interview with Almut Da Fonseca-Wollheim, 22 September 2011.)

A plethora of activities

While the role of the school was important, so too was frequently that played by social activities — including activities outside the ‘European village’ — by spouses, particularly officials’ wives. Some improved their French, or broadened their horizons even further by learning Dutch ⁽¹⁾. Others got involved in charity work in order to build bridges with Belgian society ⁽²⁾, or joined Femmes d’Europe, the association of officials’ wives ⁽³⁾. In the words of one of them, ‘I met other women who, like me, had young children and preferred to talk about the arts. The conversation wasn’t about our husbands, cooking, the common market ... We weren’t just officials’ wives. So I was in a different environment’ ⁽⁴⁾.

The social life of the ‘colourful mix’ ⁽⁵⁾ that characterised European officials also took the form of other activities shared with ‘soulmates’ ⁽⁶⁾. While they were not in a majority by any means, some officials were very active in numerous small groups committed to certain issues. Some of these were national political groups. This was the case with the ‘small group of people who belonged to the SPD, or were close to the SPD ... [Eberhard] Rhein, [Hans] Beck, [Franz] Froschmaier ... This small group even had organisational status,’ according to one of its members ⁽⁷⁾. Others opted for activities more directly relating to European integration. At the end of the 1960s, a group of young journalists and officials set up the Agenor group, which was ‘more than a study or discussion group, since we launched a publica-

tion that had a viewpoint on European issues, a left-wing viewpoint ... There was a real need to encourage people to think at European level about what should and should not be done rather than uncritically accepting everything the Commission proposed’ ⁽⁸⁾. Another very active group was the ‘Europe group’, which was something like the section of officials of the European federalist movement ⁽⁹⁾. Other pro-European militants, while they wrote for publications such as *Europa in Beweging* or *Europe en marche*, were also involved in religious activities such as the Foyer catholique européen (European catholic centre) ⁽¹⁰⁾, the Secretariat of the European Protestant Churches ⁽¹¹⁾ or the European ecumenical group, which would gradually give rise to the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society ⁽¹²⁾.

This plethora of activities sometimes included initiatives that led to unexpected developments. In March 1968, at a time when DG VIII (Development) was based in Rue du Marais/Broekstraat, the Europe–Third World Association was created, chaired first by Charles Van der Vaeren and then by Eduard Weimar. The aim was to ‘finance, with a contribution from officials, micro-projects in developing countries. The Europe–Third World Association then grew throughout the Commission ... There were around 1 000 members. We had a very reasonable budget that enabled us to finance between 10 and 20 small projects a year. And we had good support from the Commission ... In some cases, we used our contacts in delegations for information and monitoring’ ⁽¹³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.

⁽³⁾ Audland, C., *Right place — Right time*, The Memoir Club, Weardale, 2004, p. 260.

⁽⁴⁾ Comment by Mrs Carpentier during the interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Martin Vasey, 20 October 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

⁽¹¹⁾ Interview with Elias Verploeg, 26 September 2011.

⁽¹²⁾ Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.

⁽¹³⁾ Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

The school and local church, meeting points

'The European school was a meeting point for parents ... There was also a parents' association and pupil exchanges at weekends ... between families. Then there were our Belgian neighbours and the local church, in which we were actively involved. There was an association called "Groupe de familles chrétiennes du Fond'Roy", of which we were among the founder members. It consisted of a Catholic couple, a Protestant couple and three couples of mixed faiths. In the winter months we organised monthly conferences attended by 200 to 300 people. We would listen to talks by well-known personalities of different faiths, followed by a meditation in accordance with the religion in question. We even managed to get the Chief Rabbi of Belgium to give a talk to a Christian audience for the first time in his life' ⁽¹⁾.

European sociability: an experimental construction

While it is not feasible to list all the types of social activities engaged in by officials, some more comments should be made on their lives outside the institutions, however closely linked the two appear to be. In 1980, Jean Jakus, who conducted the European Community choirs, explained that these choirs built bridges between the Community and

the general public, providing a permanent contact between choir members who were Community officials and non-'European' members ⁽²⁾. This observation highlights the fact that the quality of cultural life in Brussels, of which these choirs formed a part, greatly increased during these years. Many officials welcomed this and regularly attended concerts or performances at La Monnaie/De Munt, including those of Maurice Béjart's *Ballet of the 20th Century*. Art lovers increasingly had a wealth of exhibitions to choose from thanks to the knock-on effect of the Europalia festival, which started in 1969 and provided a showcase throughout Belgium for all aspects of the culture of a particular country of the European Community ⁽³⁾.

Jakus's words illustrate above all the fact that European or Community sociability was an experimental construction. In their daily work, European officials were torn between the building of a common culture, resulting in real compromises, and the realisation that cultural differences still had value. This meant 'recognising the other and accepting that their ways conditioned the existence of the whole' ⁽⁴⁾. But the challenge was also for officials and their families to be able to leave their 'European village' and for the inhabitants of Brussels to realise that the presence of 'invaders may have kept Brussels from a certain degree of provincialism, leading to stagnation and apathy' ⁽⁵⁾.

MICHEL DUMOULIN


⁽¹⁾ Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010 (translated from German).

⁽²⁾ 'Paulo majora cantamus', *Courrier du personnel*, No 415, 27 June 1980, pp. 55–56.

⁽³⁾ The countries represented in these years were Italy (1969), the Netherlands (1971), the United Kingdom (1973), France (1975), Germany (1977), Belgium (1980), Greece (1982) and Spain (1985).

⁽⁴⁾ Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., 'La Commission européenne: du compromis culturel à la culture politique du compromis', *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, pp. 454–455.

⁽⁵⁾ 'Nid de lobbies, d'eurodéputés ... et de journalistes', *Le Soir*, 28 March 1986, p. 20.



Part Three

The Commission and the changing Community system



Europe on the march: keeping the institutional wheels turning was often hard work. Cartoon by Plantu from 1986 on the Community institutions, reproduced in Plantu, *Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l'Europe*, Le Monde Éditions, Paris, 1992, p. 1.

Introduction

So much of the Commission's effectiveness, morale and reputation is tied up with its interaction with the rest of the European Community system that a detailed look at how these vital interinstitutional relationships developed is an absolute necessity in any history of the Commission. This third part of the volume will therefore examine closely the evolution of the relations between the Commission and the Council pyramid, including both the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the newly launched European Council, those between the Commission and the European Parliament and the manner in which the budgetary process changed in the course of the period between 1973 and 1986. A character sketch of Gaston Thorn is also included, as is a brief look at the interaction between the Commission and some of the lesser-known European institutions.

Each of the main institutional chapters will seek to combine a sketch of how interaction between the Commission and the other main Community structures functioned on a day-to-day basis, an appreciation of the importance of this relationship and an analysis of how it evolved during the years between 1973 and 1986. For the period covered by this volume was one in which the idea of institutional reform was a near constant topic of debate,

with several major alterations in the Community system actually occurring and still others contemplated. Such changes took diverse legal forms. Formal treaty change was much talked about but slow to appear. The 1975 Brussels Treaty did introduce a series of relatively small changes to the budgetary process and brought into being the Court of Auditors. But a wider-scale revision of the Community decision-making process would only arrive, in treaty form, with the Single European Act of 1986. A background rumble of discussion about the necessity of treaty change would thus be a feature of almost all of the years covered by this volume, with a crescendo of interest occurring in the early 1980s as the institutional system struggled to cope with the ongoing economic crisis afflicting western Europe. This debate about treaty change would arguably reach a climax with the European Parliament's publication of the Draft Treaty on European Union of 14 February 1984 — a document closely associated with that tireless campaigner for radical European reform, Altiero Spinelli ⁽¹⁾. This foreshadowed important aspects of both the Single European Act itself and subsequent European treaties.

⁽¹⁾ Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, OJ C 77, 14.2.1984, p. 33.

Diagnoses but few cures: the Tindemans, Committee of Three and Spierenburg reports

One distinctive feature of the debate about institutional reform during this period was the proliferation in the course of the 1970s of reports on how the Community functioned and how this operation might be improved. Three in particular deserve to be looked at more closely: the Tindemans report, the study of the Committee of Three and the Spierenburg report.

The earliest and most ambitious was the report on 'European union' that the December 1974 European Council commissioned from one of its members, Leo Tindemans, the Belgian prime minister. This was submitted to the European Council in December 1975. Quite deliberately Tindemans sought to avoid utopianism. The covering letter to his fellow leaders stated clearly: 'My proposals do not directly concern the final phase of European development. They state the objectives and the methods whereby Europe can be invested with a new vitality and current obstacles can be overcome' ⁽¹⁾. He thus side-stepped the rather more radical views, including the establishment of a European government which would supersede the Commission, outlined in the Commission's report of June 1975. The suggested

changes the Belgian prime minister proceeded to outline, however, were far-reaching. They included a big push towards the effective coordination of European foreign policy, the revitalisation of internal targets such as economic and monetary union and a common energy policy, measures designed to revive popular enthusiasm for European integration, including the abolition of internal border controls, and a range of institutional changes conferring additional powers on the Parliament and Commission and speeding up decision-making within the Council of Ministers ⁽²⁾.

The response of Europe's political leaders was unenthusiastic, however. Tindemans' ideas were discussed, notably at the The Hague Council of November 1976. The foreign ministers and the Commission were asked to report quarterly about progress towards European union. But no concrete forward steps were taken. Harold Wilson's retrospective conclusion that the European Council's discussions had 'led nowhere' was not far off the mark ⁽³⁾.

The non-implementation of the Tindemans report helped shape the approach taken by both subsequent review teams. The Committee of Three, inevitably

⁽¹⁾ 'European Union, Report by Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council', *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 1, 1976, p. 6.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ Duff, A. N., 'The report of the Three Wise Men', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 19, No 3, 1981, p. 238.

dubbed the Three Wise Men, asked by the Brussels European Council of December 1978 to prepare a report on possible political reform, deliberately ruled out anything that might entail institutional change, seeking instead 'specific proposals ... which may be implemented swiftly' ⁽¹⁾. Among the improvements advocated by Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin were the clearer setting of priorities by the European Council, a greater role for the Council Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat, in coordinating and expediting the work done by the various Council formations, and more effective reporting by each Presidency to the European Parliament ⁽²⁾. Specifically ruled out, by contrast, was one provision that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the main initiator of the review, was widely believed to have hoped for, namely the appointment of a European Council president who would hold the post for several years ⁽³⁾.

The Spierenburg review also sought to avoid any radical change. The idea of an external report specifically focused on the European Commission emerged out of the dissatisfaction of Roy Jenkins and his entourage with multiple aspects of the Commission's operation ⁽⁴⁾.

The task of preparing it was entrusted to a team led by Dirk Spierenburg, a Dutch diplomat and former member of the High Authority. Their recommendations included a reduction in the number of commissioners and their portfolios, the rationalisation of many of the Commission's sub-units, including a reorganisation of directorates-general, the appointment of a powerful vice-president, responsible for internal coordination, a limiting of the role of cabinets and an overhaul of the Commission's approach to staffing designed to facilitate mobility between different posts and to make the pattern of promotions fairer and more predictable ⁽⁵⁾. Some of these last measures were carried out. But the bolder moves suffered the same fate as those outlined in the other two reports, namely non-implementation due to a combination of hostility and inertia. As Tindemans reflected wistfully in a 1980 European Parliament debate on the subject of Community reform, 'Are we perhaps in the process of building up a library of forgotten reports? If I was of the mandarin class, I would propose writing a book entitled "Remembrance of past reports" or perhaps publishing a dictionary of wasted European ideas' ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, Council of the European Communities, 'Report on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three [Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin] to the European Council, October 1979', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1980, p. 3.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ Edmund Dell attributes the cool French reaction to the final report to its rejection of Giscard d'Estaing's idea. Dell, E., 'The report of the Three Wise Men', *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 2, No 1, 1993, p. 56.

⁽⁴⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 17, 'Meeting at East Hendred', 31 July 1978.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/122, Spierenburg, D., 'Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services', report drawn up at the request of the Commission by five independent individuals under the chairmanship of Dirk Spierenburg, 24 September 1979.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Leo Tindemans to the European Parliament, 18 June 1980.

Well before the negotiation of the Single European Act, however, a series of major changes had occurred, without formal modification of the treaties. Some, like the move to directly elect the European Parliament (EP) — a change agreed at the very end of 1974 but only implemented in 1979 — constituted the belated realisation of possibilities left open by the Treaty of Rome. Article 138 had recognised that a move from an indirectly to a directly elected parliament could occur but had not specified when; the 1974 decision did not therefore require a new treaty base. Others, like the second key institutional change agreed in December 1974, namely the establishment of a European Council, had no formal treaty grounding at all. Retrospective treaty acknowledgement of the European Council's very existence would only come in 1986 with the Single European Act. And yet, despite this lag between actual change and the formal recognition of such change, the European Council, as Chapter 8 will demonstrate, would quickly emerge as a major new interlocutor of the Commission, with the ability of successive Commission presidents to act effectively at European Council level becoming an ever more important determinant of their impact and influence. In the 1973–86 period, as in the Community's formative years, formal treaty change was only one, highly imperfect, measure of the actual evolution of relationships between the different parts of the developing Community system.

At the root of this process of change was a blend of idealism, the need to accommodate the new demands of the Community's expanding policy agenda and, especially towards the end of the period under review, the hope of fixing an institutional system that was perceived as being under intolerable strain. Idealism was perhaps most visible in the move to direct elections. This had long been a priority for some, with successive Italian governments having shown particular enthusiasm for the idea. But the impetus behind the reform was increased by the growing importance of Community rhetoric about 'democracy' in the 1970s. This had become

an important part of the Nine's collective stance at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe between 1973 and 1975, and it became still more crucial to European discourse and self-identity when dealing with the wave of change and instability that swept southern Europe in the middle portion of the decade. If the Community collectively, and the EC Member States individually, were to stand firm in their determination to press Greece, Spain and Portugal to consolidate their fledgling democratic regimes, it was important that the EC itself was seen to practise what it preached. Crucial too were the hopes that the direct involvement of the European public in the selection of their EP representatives would begin to bridge the gap between European structures and European citizens. Furthermore, most Member States regarded the direct elections to the European Parliament as an essential counterweight to the creation of the European Council.

Also important in explaining institutional change — and perhaps still more the debate about institutional change — was the expansion of the Community's policy agenda. Several of the new policy areas were not regarded, by all Member States, as suitable to be handled in the same way as the customs union or the common agricultural policy (CAP). As a result, institutional arrangements were devised, for foreign policy cooperation, for instance, or for monetary affairs, that departed from the standard pattern of institutional cooperation set out in the Treaty of Rome. This in turn created an incentive to establish a wider institutional framework which would incorporate these different policy areas and different institutional arrangements and guarantee a degree of coherence — hence the debate, most famously associated with the Tindemans report of 1975, about 'European union'. Major steps in this direction were, it is true, very limited during the years covered by this volume: many of the ideas advanced by the Tindemans report were left unimplemented. But constant discussions continued, reinforcing the sense that the existing institutional

framework would have to change, even if neither the timing nor the extent of this alteration could be predicted with any certainty.

A final spur to change came from the context of crisis. For by the early 1980s, many had drawn the conclusion that the Community system as it existed was not ideally suited to respond to Europe's pressing economic and political needs. Gaston Thorn, as Commission president, spoke for instance very frankly and openly about Europe's crisis and the extent to which interinstitutional paralysis contributed to this malaise ⁽¹⁾. The perceived need for reform, including treaty reform, thus formed the backdrop to the EP's deliberations on the Spinelli draft treaty, to the Member States' discussions in the Dooge Committee and then finally to the vital decision taken at the Milan European Council in 1985 to convene the intergovernmental conference that would draft the Single European Act. Mounting pressure for large-scale institutional change was thus a leitmotiv of the 1973–86 period, even if much of the realisation of this change would occur only after 1986.

Throughout all of this debate about change the Commission had an important and distinctive voice. As will be explained below, it adopted consistent positions in favour of both a greater use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers and an increase in the European Parliament's powers. Likewise, it made clear its views on the desirability of a move towards a much fuller European Union,

submitting a substantial document on this topic in 1975, which envisaged, among several possible outcomes, the establishment of a European government to entirely replace the Commission ⁽²⁾. And it took within its stride the emergence of the European Council, an institutional change which could have been construed as a major threat to the Commission's position. In the early 1980s, furthermore, Thorn would adopt a persistent rhetorical line about the necessity of treaty revision, would welcome the EP draft treaty and would ensure that the Commission was represented first by Frans Andriessen and later by Carlo Ripa di Meana on the Dooge Committee, where once more the need for substantial treaty change was underlined. Needless to say, however, this Commission desire for reform, while clearly articulated throughout the period covered by this volume, could only reach fruition in a context where the Member States too were of the opinion that the institutions and treaties of the Community needed substantial reform. It was thus only at the very end of this period, at the intergovernmental conference convened to produce what would become the Single European Act, that the Commission was finally able to see many of its long incubated ideas begin to be implemented. Most observers agree, however, that the role of Jacques Delors and of Émile Noël, the Commission's representative on the key drafting committee, was crucial in shaping a great deal of the final treaty ⁽³⁾.

PIERS LUDLOW

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech of Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 12 January 1981.

⁽²⁾ 'Report on European Union', COM(75) 400 final, 25 June 1975, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1975.

⁽³⁾ Jean de Ruyt, for instance, talks about the 'determining role' of Jacques Delors in De Ruyt, J., *L'Acte unique européen*, Éditions de l'université de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1989, p. 70.

The Commission's role in negotiating the Single European Act: an account by Paolo Ponzano

The arrival of Jacques Delors at the head of the Commission coincided with the Commission playing an unprecedented role as the driving force in institutional matters during what was to be a unique episode in the history of European integration.

In the face of the United Kingdom's misgivings about treaty change and the Franco–German attempt to propose a new Fouchet plan, Jacques Delors played a decisive role both in the decision, taken by a simple majority, to convene an intergovernmental conference (according to Delors' memoirs, an idea of François Lamoureux) and in the solutions reached at the Milan European Council, which were included in the Single European Act:

- (a) the objective of abolition of internal frontiers, which was included in the second paragraph of Article 8a of the Single European Act;
- (b) extension of majority rule;
- (c) application of the 'differentiation' principle as the quid pro quo for the introduction of the majority vote to allow adoption of the 300 legislative acts in the White Paper; this principle, which was included in paragraph 4 of Article 100A of the Single European Act, allowed the minority Member States in the Council to maintain stricter national rules where justified by legitimate reasons of protection of public health and of the environment (recalling the imperative requirements of the *Cassis de Dijon* judgment) if confirmed by the Commission following a Community procedure;
- (d) the introduction of the principle of economic and social cohesion in respect of the economically weaker countries, enabling them

to adapt more easily to Community competition resulting from the completion of the internal market.

While it is an exaggeration to claim that 90 % of the provisions of the Single European Act were drafted by the Commission services that assisted President Delors in negotiating it, there is no doubt that the Commission, under Delors' leadership, played a decisive role in this negotiation, enabling it to achieve almost all its objectives both on the institutional front (extension of majority voting, increased involvement by the European Parliament in the legislative process) and in terms of policy content (introduction in the treaty of the White Paper principles on the abolition of internal frontiers; achievement of the fundamental freedoms and implementation of accompanying policies; extension of Community powers to the policy areas of research, environmental protection and economic and social cohesion; extension of social policy powers to protection of workers at the workplace; etc.).

With regard to the extension of majority voting, it should be pointed out that from 1985 there was a significant increase in the number of majority decisions at the Council and that reaching unanimous decisions became easier and faster thanks to the restored 'deterrent' of majority voting. Consequently, President Delors' ingenious idea of introducing in the treaty the substantial objective of completing the internal market — an objective that all the Member States subscribed to — enabled real progress to be made on the institutional front while rendering the practice of consensus arising from the Luxembourg compromise virtually obsolete.

Paolo Ponzano, 1 July 2013

Gaston Thorn: an embattled visionary

Few Commission presidents have arrived in Brussels with as much experience and inside knowledge of how the European Community system worked as Gaston Thorn. As prime minister of Luxembourg in the mid-1970s he had participated in, and even chaired, meetings of the European Council. A former foreign minister, he had also acquired extensive expertise about how the Council of Ministers functioned. And as a member of the European Parliament since 1959 he was well acquainted with the operation of the Strasbourg Assembly. His well-established role as one of the most active members of the international liberal movement also gave him contacts and allies in many of the European governments with which he would have to deal. Nor did he lack the linguistic skills necessary for the job, since he had excellent English, French and German.

Counterbalancing such advantages, however, were the difficult circumstances in which he inherited the job of European Commission president in January 1981. His own appointment had been a difficult one, secured only in the face of determined opposition from French President Valéry Giscard



Thorn's inheritance was not an easy one ... (Published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 421, 12 February 1981, pp. 8–9).

d'Estaing ⁽¹⁾. Within his Commission he would have to come to terms not merely with a former president, François-Xavier Ortoli, but also with one of his chief rivals for the Commission Presidency, Étienne Davignon. The Belgian commissioner had only been denied the top job because of internal party political manoeuvring within the Belgian

⁽¹⁾ *The Financial Times*, 16 June 1980.



Gaston Thorn speaks to the press in 1982. The Commission president was often very candid about the crises facing the Community.

government, and would continue to be regarded as the strong man of the Commission throughout the 1981–85 period. Furthermore, the allocation of portfolios among the members of Thorn's Commission had been settled only after one of the longest and hardest fought 'nights of the long knives' ⁽¹⁾.

Even more fundamentally, the general economic and political context of the early 1980s was profoundly discouraging. Western Europe showed little sign of escaping from the economic downturn of the 1970s. East–West relations, meanwhile, were in the grip of what some were calling a second Cold War. The Community itself was still struggling to establish a *modus vivendi* between the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the still relatively

new European Council and the now directly elected European Parliament. Thorn's own opening speech in Strasbourg had candidly acknowledged the ongoing institutional malaise ⁽²⁾. In such circumstances, restoring the Commission's driving role, which was clearly Thorn's aspiration — and which lay at the heart of his view of how the Community system ought to work — would be no easy task ⁽³⁾.

Matters were made still worse by an extraordinary run of misfortune that seemed to afflict the new Commission. Adrien Ries, Thorn's initial choice as head of cabinet, the vital right-hand man of any European commissioner, and in particular the president, resigned within days because of health difficulties; his replacement, Fernand Spaak, was then murdered after a mere 6 months in the job ⁽⁴⁾. Finn Olav Gundelach, one of the heavyweights amongst the commissioners, and the man charged with the vital task of keeping control over agricultural expenditure, collapsed with a heart attack and died in January 1981 ⁽⁵⁾. Then, in May, the new French president, François Mitterrand, recalled another of the more prominent commissioners, Claude Cheysson, to become his foreign minister ⁽⁶⁾. The man nominated in Cheysson's stead, Edgard Pisani, was a first-rate figure in his own right. The disruption caused by the change of personnel remained very real nonetheless.

Beset by these difficulties, Thorn struggled to stay in control of events. Part of the problem lay within the Commission itself, where too many of Thorn's colleagues seemed intent on testing the limits of presidential authority and collective responsibility ⁽⁷⁾.

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter 11, 'The politics of the Community budget'. Concerning the 'night of the long knives', see section 2.1, 'The commissioners'.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 12 January 1981.

⁽³⁾ Thorn's view of how the Community should work was set out very clearly in his talk 'Union européenne ou déclin: être ou ne pas être?', HAEC, Archive of speeches, Jean Monnet Lecture to the European University Institute, 24 May 1984.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010; *The Financial Times*, 20 July 1981.

⁽⁵⁾ *The Financial Times*, 14 January 1981.

⁽⁶⁾ *The Financial Times*, 26 May 1981.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.



Gaston Thorn in Brussels in February 1983.

The phenomenon of individual commissioners acting as quasi-independent ‘barons’, answerable to no one but themselves, was not entirely new. Indeed, in a Community system where individual commissioners owed their appointment to backing from their national government rather than selection by the Commission president, any president was likely to have some difficulties in maintaining full control. But the problem was to reach its apogee in the early 1980s, with several of Thorn’s colleagues clearly feeling neither loyalty nor deference to their president ⁽¹⁾. Also troublesome was the ever-growing assertiveness of a European Parliament frustrated that the introduction of direct elections in 1979 had not resulted in a rapid increase of its powers. By February 1983, MEPs were threatening to dismiss the entire European Commission unless

the ongoing impasse over the Community budget was rapidly resolved ⁽²⁾. A strong speech by Thorn helped avert an immediate crisis, but not before the potential pitfalls of managing day-to-day relations with a power-hungry European assembly had been publicly revealed ⁽³⁾.

The biggest difficulty, however, sprang from the deterioration in Thorn’s standing among his fellow European leaders. In the summer of 1981, the Commission president had staked a great deal of his authority on a proposal designed to settle the festering budgetary row. In this he had suggested accompanying measures to address the problem of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the budget with measures designed to limit the runaway expenditure on agriculture, and with a mod-

⁽¹⁾ *The Financial Times*, 21 April 1981.

⁽²⁾ *The Financial Times*, 8 February 1983.

⁽³⁾ *The Financial Times*, 9 and 10 February 1983.



The Commission president together with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

est increase in the overall size of the Community budget ⁽¹⁾. The compromise package, however, had been roundly rejected by the European Council. Instead, the Member States, with Germany and France to the fore, would turn to ever more intergovernmental methods of bilateral consultation in their efforts to settle the issue, a trend that Thorn deplored and denounced but could do little to reverse ⁽²⁾. Neither these bilateral efforts nor

those led by the Presidency immediately broke the deadlock. On the contrary, the shambolic Athens Council in December 1983 only underlined how hard it was to find a solution. But the fact that it was ultimately the French Presidency that devised the compromise agreement reached at Fontainebleau in June 1984 did underline the extent to which the Commission in general, and Thorn in particular, had been sidelined from the most pressing issue of the day. Admittedly, the final package deal agreed at Fontainebleau bore more than a passing resemblance to Thorn's ill-fated proposals submitted 3 years earlier. Mitterrand too had ultimately been pushed to the conclusion that the British budgetary problem could only be solved within the

⁽¹⁾ Schwabe, K., 'Gaston Thorn' in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), *The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso*, John Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).

⁽²⁾ Gaston Thorn's strongest denunciation of this method came in his speech to the European Parliament on 15 December 1983 (HAEC, Archive of speeches).

context of a wider-ranging combination of budgetary reforms and alterations to the way in which the CAP functioned. However, the worrying fact remained that the Commission president had become a marginal figure in the discussions that led up to the final deal.

Needless to say, the Thorn years were not without their achievements. Prominent among these was the gradual advance of the enlargement negotiations with Spain and Portugal. Progress in these talks was slow and halting, with Spain in particular posing huge problems for both the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy. The final breakthrough, furthermore, would occur in June 1985 under the Delors Presidency, rather than Thorn's. But the Luxembourgier deserves credit for maintaining the pressure to move forward, despite the difficulties encountered.

Another important advance was the negotiation of the Lomé III settlement with the Community's partners in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Commission also responded sensibly to the worrying situation in 1983 when expenditure threatened to outstrip income by making the necessary savings on non-compulsory expenditure and averting an overall budgetary shortfall. The tightening up of the milk quota system was an important step towards regaining some control over the CAP budget. The Thorn years were also characterised by a high level of Commission activity designed to tackle the serious crisis confronting the European steel industry, and by equally energetic Commission efforts to forge an effective partnership with the European electronic and computer industry. These last have been credited by some analysts with creating a partnership between the Commission and industry that would help launch the single market project in the mid- to late 1980s ⁽¹⁾. The fact, however, that both steel policy and contacts with Europe's



Work to do: Gaston Thorn confronts the mounting paperwork in front of him.

high-technology sector were mainly attributable to Davignon and not to Thorn personally rather underlines the questions about the Commission president's personal authority discussed above.

Gaston Thorn presided over the European Commission during an extremely difficult period for the European Community. His limited success in establishing himself as a strong leader is therefore partially attributable to the almost insurmountable nature of the problems he was confronted with. He also inherited the job in unpropitious circumstances and was to suffer an early run of misfortune. He deserves credit, furthermore, for helping to ensure that the next president would inherit a Commission full of ideas about how to push Europe forward, even if uncertain how to guarantee that such ideas would be carried out. The successes of the Delors period were partly built on the foun-

⁽¹⁾ Sandholz, W. and Zysman, J., '1992: Recasting the European bargain', *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No 1, 1989, pp. 95–128.

dations laid during the preceding half decade. At the time, however, there was little sense of forward movement in the integration process. This helps explain the mounting frustration both in Brussels and elsewhere — and in particular Thorn’s forceful but ultimately futile condemnation of what he per-

ceived as intergovernmentalism. As Delors would demonstrate, working with this trend rather than against it would prove a much more effective route to renewed success.

PIERS LUDLOW

Chapter 8

Relations with the European Council

One of the major institutional innovations to occur during the 1973–86 period was the institutionalisation of European summitry and the birth of the European Council ⁽¹⁾. This replaced the previous pattern of occasional and infrequent gatherings of the heads of state or government of the Member States — three such gatherings between 1958 and 1969 — with a schedule based on three meetings each year. The exact legal status of the European Council, it was true, remained ambiguous until the 1986 Single European Act. But long before this date, the pattern of frequent meetings between the most senior politicians in each of the Member States had become regularised and had begun to have a decisive effect on the manner in which the Community was governed. It is hence important to establish how the Commission interacted with this new entity.

The Commission's initial reaction to French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's suggestion for a European Council was surprisingly conciliatory. Given some of the Commission's earlier misgivings about one-off European summits and its fear that such assemblies could take over the leadership role to which it aspired, the notion of replacing ad hoc summits with regular European Council meetings could easily have been construed as a threat ⁽²⁾. Exactly this point was made by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the Benelux states) with the discreet support of the Commission during the negotiations that followed Giscard d'Estaing's proposal ⁽³⁾. The Commission itself was less open about its fears. It did express the hope that the new entity would be a Council, and not a new body

⁽¹⁾ Mourlon-Druol, E., 'Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The creation of the European Council in 1974', *Cold War History*, Vol. 10, No 3, August 2010, pp. 315–339.

⁽²⁾ Ludlow, N. P., 'An opportunity or a threat? The European Commission and The Hague Council of December 1969', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 9, No 2, 2003, pp. 11–25.

⁽³⁾ According to an oral account by Émile Noël related to Paolo Ponzano behind the scenes, the Ortolí Commission encouraged the Benelux states to adopt this stance.



‘that might overshadow the existing institutions’. It also opposed the institution of a separate secretariat to serve the new body ⁽¹⁾. But the suggestion by Altiero Spinelli that the Commission respond with an institutional counter-proposal of its own was rejected by the majority — as François-Xavier Ortoli put it in a speech to the European Parliament, it would be foolish to try to save the Commission to the detriment of the Council ⁽²⁾. Furthermore the Benelux states enjoyed some success in the subsequent negotiations in rendering Giscard d’Estaing’s ideas more Community-oriented (*communautaire*). Émile Noël,

who represented the Commission on the committee planning the European Council, was hence able to adopt a conciliatory position, especially once it became clear that the French president’s original intention of marginalising the role of the Commission president in European Council meetings enjoyed little support amongst the Member States ⁽³⁾. If the new body was able to inject some much-needed vitality and sense of purpose into a Community struggling to come to terms with the global economic downturn, the Commission was

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(74), Minutes No 314, second part, meeting of 28 October 1974.

⁽²⁾ Badel, L. and Bussière, É., *François-Xavier Ortoli: L’Europe, quel numéro de téléphone?*, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011, p. 153.

⁽³⁾ Noël’s views would later be expressed publicly. He did acknowledge the potential danger of ‘intergovernmentalism’. But he concluded: ‘Despite a few disappointments, the European Council’s 4-year track record is clearly positive.’ Noël, É., *Les rouages de l’Europe: comment fonctionnent les institutions de la Communauté européenne*, 2nd edn, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1976, pp. 45–63.



Present at the creation: the Élysée dinner in September 1974, at which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing canvassed his fellow leaders about the idea of regular summits.

very ready to welcome its creation and participate in its work. This was all the more the case given the parallel progress made towards direct elections to the European Parliament ⁽¹⁾.

Learning how to make use of the European Council, however, was something that would take the Commission some time. To some extent this was a matter of procedure. The Commission thus gradually discovered the importance of setting out its views in writing to the members of the European Council prior to their meetings, often in the form of a brief memorandum. Close consultation with the Member State holding the Council Presidency

also proved its value. And on those occasions when the European Council debated issues that had direct implications for existing Community policies, it would normally fall to the Commission to follow up the guidance provided by the heads of state or government with detailed legal proposals ⁽²⁾. As Delors was to emphasise to MEPs: 'The Commission has a right of initiative. But a distinction needs to be made according to whether we exercise it within a specific institutional framework or in a more general political context. Within a specific institutional framework, our duties are to give effect to what has formally been decided by the Euro-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(74), Minutes No 320, meeting of 11 December 1974.

⁽²⁾ Noël, É., *Les rouages de l'Europe: comment fonctionnent les institutions de la Communauté européenne*, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1976, pp. 51–52.

pean Council or by amendment to the treaty' ⁽¹⁾. But given the nature of European Council meetings and the emphasis on personal conversation between the key figures, the Commission's impact was significantly affected by the personality and standing of its main representative, the Commission president. And here the track record over the 1975–86 period was somewhat mixed.

Ortoli was not particularly well suited for the task. In part this reflected the inevitable difficulty for a French Commission president in making his mark in a forum where Giscard d'Estaing was a dominant figure and also the leader most sceptical about a prominent Commission role. Ortoli had been close to Georges Pompidou but was much less well connected to his successor ⁽²⁾. But Ortoli's standing was also a factor: his recent biographers characterise him as a strong president of a weak Commission ⁽³⁾. Amongst the heads of state or government he seems to have carried much less authority than he did within his own institution. So while the first Commission president to attend European Council meetings was able to make periodic contributions to discussions, he did not become a prominent figure within the new forum.

Roy Jenkins was rather different. For a start, it quickly became clear that establishing an influential position within the European Council was one of his priorities. Second, he was appointed with strong backing from both of the key figures in the European Council of the time, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and while relations with the former were variable, Roy Jenkins's rapport with Schmidt remained close throughout his Presidency. Third, he had a personal stake in one of the key items on the agenda of many of the European Councils of the late 1970s, having

played his part in relaunching the idea of European monetary integration with his Florence speech in October 1977. He was therefore very much engaged in all of the European Council negotiations that would lead to the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS). Fourth, the success of his efforts to win a place at G7 summits meant that he was also deeply involved in all European Council discussions designed to coordinate the stance of European representatives prior to the annual global summits. Finally, and most fundamentally, he was someone whose stature and expertise were so clear that it was inevitable that he became an important figure in top-level meetings ⁽⁴⁾. A man often described as 'the best prime minister the United Kingdom never had' was very much at home amongst national leaders ⁽⁵⁾. But despite fitting in so well, and despite his undoubted impact, Jenkins was ultimately hamstrung by serving only a single term, and by the way that so many of his later European Councils were dominated by bickering about the British budget contribution. This limited the scope to discuss anything else and proved particularly awkward and embarrassing for a British Commission president ⁽⁶⁾.

Gaston Thorn ought to have been immediately comfortable in Europe's most senior decision-making forum. As Luxembourgish prime minister he had been present at the creation of the European Council and had attended many of the subsequent summits. But the advantages that this familiarity might have given him were outweighed by his ideological conviction that the European Council ought not to be as central to the Community's operation as it had become. His very first speech to the European Parliament as Commission president was some indication of this, identifying the direct elections to

⁽¹⁾ Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 2, 1989, p. 60.

⁽²⁾ Badel, L. and Bussière, É., *François-Xavier Ortoli: L'Europe, quel numéro de téléphone?*, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011, p. 150.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*, 2011, pp. 128–141.

⁽⁴⁾ Interviews with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010, and Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ See Lewis, P., 'Roy Jenkins, 82, dies; Helped start centrist British party', *The New York Times*, 6 January 2003.

⁽⁶⁾ A reality that Jenkins acknowledged: Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 546.

the European Parliament as the only major institutional advance of the 1970s, and passing over the European Council's creation in silence ⁽¹⁾. His subsequent behaviour only confirmed this attitude. He did admittedly try to get the heads of state or government's approval for his June 1981 plan to solve the budgetary impasse through a major increase in the Community's budget. But once this was rejected out of hand, he lapsed into a pattern of deploring the European Council's power and lamenting the stifling effect that he believed it was having on the integration process ⁽²⁾. He continued to attend European summits of course. But as recalled by David Williamson, who was present at several European Council meetings in the early 1980s as a member of the British delegation, Thorn contributed little even when the agenda turned to issues like the budget or the CAP where a Commission president ought to have been a major player ⁽³⁾. The Luxembourgish president could hence claim little of the credit when the impasse over the British budgetary question was finally broken at the Fontainebleau Council of 1984.

This last breakthrough did mean that Jacques Delors arrived at a highly propitious moment for progress at European Council level. But it was not just good fortune that made the new French president of the Commission the most effective European Council operator of any Commission president to date. Equally important were his assiduous preparation for each top-level meeting, his technical mastery of most of the Council's subject matter, a good rapport with the other main players and a flair for identifying both the content and the timing of compromise proposals designed to break deadlock. Delors' work rate before each Council was formidable: not only did he endlessly rehearse possible scenarios and outcomes with members of his cabinet, but



Unhappy birthday: the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Treaty of Rome were overshadowed by serious disagreements amongst the Ten.

he also developed a highly effective dialogue with Niels Ersbøll, the secretary-general of the Council of Ministers ⁽⁴⁾. This dialogue gave him insight into all of the likely national positions before the Council began, and allowed him to discuss his priorities and expectations with the individual responsible for writing up the draft conclusions in advance of each meeting. Hard work was also central to the technical expertise that Delors accumulated on all of the key subjects debated, a reservoir of knowledge that meant that it was to the Commission president that the heads of state or government would invariably turn whenever they needed a solution to a problem they had not anticipated or were unsure as to the likely outcome of any given decision. This central role was reinforced by the excellent relations that Delors was able to form with Chancellor Kohl, the single most powerful member of the Council during the latter half of the 1980s, the more distant, but still fruitful, relationship with François Mitterrand, a good rapport with Felipe González of Spain and a succession of Italian prime ministers, and a relationship with Margaret Thatcher that only broke

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 12 January 1981.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 15 December 1983.

⁽³⁾ Interview with David Williamson, 14 July 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.

down completely at the very end of the decade. Such personal links, when combined with Delors' expertise, level of preparation and political nous, enabled the Commission president to spot the clever compromises that could bridge seemingly incompatible national positions. Mastery of the Council was not

the sole factor that made Delors such an effective president of the European Commission, but it was undoubtedly one of the most significant assets he was able to play upon.

PIERS LUDLOW

Chapter 9

Relations with the Council

9.1. The Council of Ministers

Relations with the Council in the period 1973–86 were multifaceted and affected the Commission directly, with quite significant Council involvement in each of the Commission's activities and even in its composition. We shall concentrate here on the institutional dimension of the relationship between the Commission and the Council, seen as a single institution. While a single institution is what the Council was in legal terms, in functional terms it consisted of several configurations and bodies, including Coreper ⁽¹⁾, which we shall discuss later. After describing how the Commission was represented at the Council, we shall focus on two aspects in which significant and, in fact, interdependent changes occurred at this time: relations with the

Council Presidency and relations with the Council's General Secretariat.

Efforts to maintain single representation of the Commission at the Council

The Commission was represented at the Council in a quite straightforward way: commissioners took part in meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Commission was represented in Coreper by the Secretariat-General. Between 1973 and 1986 there were two divisions in the Secretariat-General — 'Relations with the Council I' and 'Relations with the Council II', which monitored the work of Coreper I and Coreper II respectively. However, since the deputy secretary-general traditionally represented the Commission in Coreper II, it was the person responsible for 'Relations with the Council I', with the rank of director since 1981 (Henri Étienne), who represented the Commission in Coreper I.

In Council working parties, the Commission was represented by members of the directorates-general. The directors-general often attended Coreper

⁽¹⁾ The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) is responsible for preparing the work of the Council. Coreper has two configurations: Coreper I, consisting of the deputy permanent representatives, covering most legislative matters, and Coreper II, consisting of ambassadors and dealing with political, economic and institutional matters.

meetings, at which two representatives could be present, as they did meetings of ministers, depending on the agenda. In addition, cabinet members accompanied commissioners to Council of Ministers' meetings, but could not take the floor. On the other hand, Commissioners were advised not to attend Coreper meetings, and cabinet members were actually barred from attending (save in exceptional circumstances).

Failure to comply with these rules inevitably caused tension. In an incident on 9 December 1983, Commissioner Christopher Tugendhat arrived in person to represent the Commission in Coreper I, thus obliging Henri Étienne, also attending on behalf of the Commission, to leave the room because the Commission representation had reached the maximum permitted size with the presence of both the head of cabinet and the director-general. Henri Étienne, representing the Secretariat-General, thus had to give up his seat to the head of cabinet of a resourceful commissioner. This incident provoked a sharp response from Émile Noël, who criticised the head of cabinet of the commissioner concerned for a compromise reached at the expense of the Secretariat-General⁽¹⁾. In his memo to Noël, Henri Étienne drew a bitter conclusion, describing the incident as a humiliation: 'The fact is that some cabinets and directorates-general do not want the secretariat involved at all and think that it should give up its seat.'

However, the Secretariat-General was determined to point out that it was the indispensable intermediary in relations with the Council. In 1975, for instance, it was stated at a Commission meeting that 'the Commission confirmed the arrangements which had hitherto applied and gave instructions that all official communication or contact with the presidents of the Council and the Permanent Representa-

tives Committee regarding the organisation of work should go through the Secretariat-General, which could then carry out the necessary coordination'⁽²⁾.

The Presidency: a new source of political impetus

In the period from 1973 to 1986 there were two salient moments in the Commission's relations with the Presidency: first, 1979–80, in the wake of the report of the Three Wise Men⁽³⁾ on the reform of the European institutions⁽⁴⁾, and, second, the 1984 French Presidency, which changed the procedures in force from the Fontainebleau Council meeting onwards.


Shortly before the publication of the Three Wise Men's report, Noël drafted a general memo on relations with the Council, focusing on the Commission's concerns about developments. From January 1979, he had noticed 'a constant expansion of the role of the Council Presidency (at every level) and ... the insistence by Member States on tight control over the tasks entrusted to the Commission'. He went on to say that 'within the Council set-up, the Presidency's role is now complementary to that of the Commission. For instance, it is the Presidency which presents the compromises that the Commission is unable to put forward itself either because they are too far removed from its initial views or (unfortunately in some cases) because they are questionable from the point of view of Community rules.' He cited as an example: 'the French Presidency's management since the beginning of January in the monetary compensatory amounts case', which was 'a good example of potential abuse', adding,

⁽²⁾ HAEC, COM(75) Minutes No 360 of the meeting held on 19 November 1975, p. 38.

⁽³⁾ See the introduction to Part Three.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, Biesheuvel, E., Dell, E. and Marjolin, R., 'Report on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1980, in line with the task entrusted by the European Council of considering 'adjustments to the machinery and procedures of the institutions'.

⁽¹⁾ HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN) 605, Personal memo from Émile Noël to Mr Lever, P.1105/83, 20 December 1983, concerning the incident in Coreper.



Making the institutional system function smoothly was a challenge throughout the 1973–86 period.
(Illustration published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 402, 14 June 1979, p. 25.)

‘however, the very tough response by small and medium-sized countries to such abuse is a reasonable guarantee that it will not spread’ ⁽¹⁾.

This was a fairly explicit reference to the alliance between the Commission and the small (and medium-sized) Member States on the question of compliance with Community practices. For the Commission secretary-general viewed the role of the Council Presidency as a kind of adulterating force.

His recommendation to President Jenkins was less trenchant: this risk only really existed if the ‘big Member States wanted to take advantage of the increased possibilities open to the Presidency’, which would ‘result in a shift in the Community’s internal political balance and in its institutional balance’ ⁽²⁾.

The Commission was haunted by the risk of a return to the *Directoire*, in the form of a big Member State’s Presidency. The advent of the first British

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël dated 26 January 1979 on Commission/Council relations.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

Presidency in the first half of 1977, just as the Jenkins Commission was taking office, fuelled certain fears in this respect within the Commission. According to Pierre Bockstael, the Foreign Office had issued an instruction ‘not to work on Commission documents’. Bockstael says: ‘It was awful when the British had the Presidency because they were very well prepared. It was often very irritating for me because, when I had to go and defend issues at the Council, I would go to the permanent representation to prepare the meeting with the group chair. The documents which the Commission submitted to the Council were of course always the basic documents, because they had been proposed by the Commission. The officials in the British permanent representation spent their entire time redrafting these documents to suit them and trying to get our agreement. They rewrote everything and turned it into Presidency documents. It was not until after the Presidency was over that a British official who chaired the group told me: “We had instructions to work, not on the Commission documents, but on the Presidency proposals.” And hence to weaken the Commission and, of course, the voting process. These were no longer Commission proposals. And this instruction came from the Foreign Office’ ⁽¹⁾.

The 1979 report played a part in the reorganisation of relations between the Council Presidency and the European Parliament, henceforth to be elected by direct universal suffrage. The President of the European Council could from then on address the European Parliament and, by a strange twist of fate, the first to do so was Margaret Thatcher in Strasbourg at the end of 1981. The political coupling of the Commission and the Parliament (the Commission had been accountable to the Parliament since 1952) was disrupted to some extent by the arrival of a third partner which seemed to want nothing to do with Strasbourg.

The institutional triangle became official and was enshrined at the start of the 1980s, to the advan-

tage of the Council Presidency. The first triologue on budgetary matters took place on 30 June 1982 between the three presidents — of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. From 1983, whenever conflicts arose, the Presidency embarked on mediation and political arbitration between the Commission and certain national delegations, such as Denmark in relation to the common fisheries policy that same year.

The year 1984 marked the second change of direction in relations between the Commission and the Presidency. Traditionally it was the government of the Member State holding the Presidency that came to Brussels to visit the Commission, with the latter then informing it of its priorities. From the 1984 French Presidency onwards, it was the Commission members who had to visit the capital city in question to hear the Presidency’s priorities. In 1989, these negotiation priorities became the Presidency’s programme. The fact that the Commission had to do the travelling was a good example of the symbolic transfer of leadership and the shift in the balance of power.

This was underlined by the two new institutional ideas put forward by President François Mitterrand at the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau in June 1984. He started by proposing discussions on the best way of ensuring more continuity for the Community Presidency. The expression he used — Community Presidency (rather than Council Presidency) — is misleading and seems to have been inspired by the spirit of the French Fifth Republic and its institutions. The Commission wondered about the meaning of this reference: ‘It may be that this statement was made as a result of the declarations by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the opposition. In any case, the Commission has no problem with troika-style formulas. Other suggestions (such as an elected president of the European Council) belong to the future ...’ ⁽²⁾. It was in 1984 that former

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 81/1984/17, Steering brief for the Fontainebleau European Council of 25 and 26 June 1984, Brussels, 21 June 1984, containing proposals by President Mitterrand concerning the institutions and the European Union.

French President Giscard d'Estaing in fact proposed electing the European Council president by direct universal suffrage for 5 years.

The second institutional proposal tabled in Fontainebleau was to set up a 'permanent secretariat for political cooperation', which the Commission feared might be located within the Council General Secretariat. Sceptical, it made the following suggestion to President Thorn in a steering brief: 'Despite our reservations on this point, if the Commission intervenes it should adopt a positive, albeit cautious, approach.' This idea is in fact nearly as old as European political cooperation itself. However, the establishment of such a secretariat had been blocked since 1972 because of a dispute over its location. Another internal document, this time a speaking brief, was more critical, expressing fears that 'this secretariat, under the authority of the president of the European Council, could soon become the hub through which all important decisions would have to pass, which might well disrupt the institutional structure of the Community and upset the precarious balance between intergovernmental and Community structures in the overall European integration process' ⁽¹⁾.

However, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the European political system was being reorganised on an intergovernmental footing. Thus, while the Presidency was wresting more power from the Commission, it was at the same time beginning to become 'communitarised', in other words it was moving away from its initial profile of a simple intergovernmental counterweight. This trend was made possible by the existence of the Council's General Secretariat, which, the Commission was pleased to note in 1979, had 'contributed usefully to bestowing a European dimension on the Presidency's work' ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 81/1984/17, Speaking brief for the Fontainebleau European Council of 25 and 26 June 1984, Brussels, 21 June 1984, containing proposals by President Mitterrand to give the European Council a permanent secretariat for political cooperation (see note No 3).

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël on Commission/Council relations, 26 January 1979.

Voting practice ⁽³⁾

Voting in the Council was used pragmatically, avoiding sensitive issues for which a Member State might request a unanimous decision when a majority vote would be sufficient from a legal point of view.

Some 30 cases of abstention were recorded between the 1966 Luxembourg compromise and 1981. Moreover, in 13 cases the compromise was directly invoked or very important national interests were invoked to block a vote. During this time, there was a record period of 3½ years without any decisions adopted on a majority vote.

The recurring tension in the run-up to each prospective vote led to an increasingly systematic invoking of the Luxembourg compromise. This was reflected in a broader interpretation and wider use of the Luxembourg compromise, the acceptance of the practice of 'protest voting' ⁽⁴⁾ and the gradual, *de facto* relinquishing of the *tour de table* at the Council. This happened, for instance, in the case of British opposition to the use of a vote in relation to fisheries in July 1977, and also when Denmark expressed the same kind of opposition in 1981 (see table 'Cases in which the Luxembourg compromise was invoked', page 219).

Between 1975 and 1981, there were around 10 ⁽⁵⁾ cases of Member States invoking very important national interests to block the voting process (fisheries, external relations, etc.) (see table 'Cases in which the Luxembourg compromise was invoked', page 219). In three of these cases, the disputed decision was adopted a little later by a qualified majority, either at the level of the Council or by means of the written procedure.

Filippa Chatzistavrou

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 391/2003/68, Memo by reflection group attached to the Commission Secretariat-General, UE (82) 19 rev., Brussels, 22 March 1982, on qualified-majority voting in the Council. Research carried out by Filippa Chatzistavrou.

⁽⁴⁾ The term 'protest vote' appears as such in the Secretariat-General memo referred to above (see previous note). Increasing recourse to the Luxembourg compromise was making the voting process more and more difficult. Thus when a vote was held, it became an act of 'protest'.

⁽⁵⁾ A Secretariat-General document (note by Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi to François Lamoureux dated 30 October 1986) refers to nine cases. Another memo by the Commission Secretariat-General on qualified-majority voting at the Council (HAEC, BAC 391/2003/68, Memo by reflection group attached to the Commission Secretariat-General, UE (82) 19 rev., Brussels, 22 March 1982) states that the Luxembourg compromise was invoked in 15 cases during that period. The difference in number is due to a difference in identification of the acts.



Jacques Delors chairs a meeting of the Economic and Financial Council in his capacity as French minister of finance in 1984. To his left is Neils Ersbøll, the secretary-general of the Council. Their collaboration would prove even more central once Delors became president of the Commission a few months later.

The Council's General Secretariat: between complementarity and misgivings

Relations with the Council's General Secretariat could be described as complementary but marked by misgivings about the emergence of a parallel and potential rival administration. Noël summarised the options in the abovementioned 1979 memo: 'In order to cope with these increased responsibilities, the Presidency could have recourse to its national administration or to a European administration: the Council Secretariat' ⁽¹⁾. The preferred option was soon made clear: 'We at the [Commission] Secretariat-General consider that the second formula is by far the better.'

He goes on to draw a quite precise comparison between the resources of the Council Secretariat and

those of the Commission, without discounting the risk of real competition: 'The Council Secretariat has a large staff (1 700 officials), but this must be compared with the 8 500 officials of the Commission ... Only a small number of staff members are involved in policymaking. If I remember correctly, the Council's Directorate D (Science, Technology, Energy) comprises only about 15 A grade officials, hence the equivalent of a very average-sized directorate in the Commission. Turning the Council into a structure capable of competing with or replacing the Commission in terms of expertise would require a veritable institutional revolution' ⁽²⁾.

The Council Secretariat was, therefore, in the Commission's view, the lesser evil and a way of Europeanising the Council and its Presidency. So, when it came to discussing changes in the role of the Council secretary-general, the Commission was not opposed to raising his or her profile. In line with the Three Wise Men's report, talks were held to prepare the ground for the European Council meeting in Venice in June 1980 on the basis of a proposal by German Secretary of State Klaus von Dohnanyi, who wanted to give the Council secretary-general a more political profile along the lines of a German secretary of state, making him or her a kind of alter ego in Brussels of the Council president, and someone who might be induced to chair Coreper.

Several of the ministers who examined this proposal in Varese on 8 February 1980 expressed reservations: the French minister saw in it a 'source of political conflict', while his British counterpart feared a 'new centre of power'. The reaction of Commission Vice-President Finn Olav Gundelach was more positive, however: thus according to the minutes of the meeting, 'he highlighted the fundamental need for the Community and the Commission to have a strong Council. He stressed the fact that

⁽¹⁾ It is significant that Noël speaks of 'Council Secretariat' rather than 'Council General Secretariat'. The Secretariat of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Council was given the status of General Secretariat as far back as 1954, whereas the EEC Commission Executive Secretariat only became the Secretariat-General in 1967 with the merger, the High Authority having adopted this title in 1960.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël dated 26 January 1979 on Commission/Council relations.

Cases in which the Luxembourg compromise was invoked ⁽¹⁾

Member State	Council	Date	Subject
Ireland	Agriculture	23.6.1975 following mention in Coreper on 14.6.1975	Veterinary matters
Ireland	General Affairs	13.12.1976	Conservation and management of fisheries resources
United Kingdom	Fisheries	18.7.1977	Ban on fishing Norway pout
France	General Affairs	2-4.4.1978	Euratom/USA relations
United Kingdom	Fisheries	25.9.1978	Framework agreement with Norway
United Kingdom	General Affairs	16-17.10.1978	Fisheries agreement with third countries
France	Budget	20.11.1978	1979 budget
United Kingdom	Fisheries	19.2.1979	Fisheries agreements between EEC and Canada, Sweden and Norway
Denmark	Fisheries	27.10.1981	Conservation measures for fisheries resources
Greece	External relations	4.5.1982	Export credit scheme
United Kingdom	Agriculture	10-11.5.1982	1982 agricultural prices
Denmark	Fisheries	21.12.1982	Common market organisation
Greece	External relations	24.6.1983	Export credit scheme
Denmark	Fisheries	30.6.1983	Provisional quotas for Member States and Norway
Denmark	Fisheries	11-12.7.1983	Fishing in the North Sea in 1983
Greece	Agriculture	26-27.9.1983	Dry grapes and figs scheme
Germany	Agriculture	13-16.5.1985	Prices for cereals and colza in 1985/86
Germany	Agriculture	11-12.6.1985	Prices for cereals and colza in 1985/86

this need was being increasingly felt now that the Community had to cope with new policy areas that were much broader and more dynamic than those entrusted to it initially by the treaties. He felt that it should be possible to implement the German sug-

gestion concerning the Council secretary-general without causing rivalry between the institutions set up by the treaty' ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Note from Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi to François Lamoureux, 30 October 1986.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Commission note for the file, Brussels, 14 February 1980.

At a second meeting on 17 March 1980, the ministers again discussed the proposal by von Dohnanyi, whose memo on the new role of the secretary-general had been modified in a bid to veil the political nature of the new duties proposed. While the ministers were becoming less sceptical provided the secretary-general was no longer asked to chair Coreper, Gundelach continued to pledge the Commission's support for the plan: 'Reiterating the views put forward in Varese, he urged the ministers to recognise the significance of the suggestion by von Dohnanyi. After underlining the need to relieve the secretary-general of administrative tasks, he expressed the fear that the kind of rapporteur role suggested by Pierre Bernard-Reymond (the French Secretary of State for European Affairs) would mean a watering-down of the German proposal' ⁽¹⁾.

On 26 September 1980, a compromise was reached on the role of the Council secretary-general, who was given the official task of assisting the Council in general and the Presidency in particular, during a 5-year term of office. On 8 October 1980, Nicolas Hommel, the discreet Luxembourgish diplomat who had served as secretary-general since 1973, was replaced by the Dane, Niels Ersbøll, a former secretary of state and, before that, the first Danish permanent representative. He consolidated the role of the General Secretariat, which began to assert itself in the decision-making process, in particular in the context of preparing European Council meetings, starting with the one in London in Novem-

ber 1981 which marked the end of Coreper's role in this respect.

Relations between Ersbøll and Delors

'... I had an excellent relationship with Mr Ersbøll, who was a first-rate civil servant ... I submitted ideas to him, since we had the right of initiative, and then I made sure that the General Affairs Council met in good time to prepare the European Council debates properly. I used to give Mr Ersbøll 3- and 4-page documents on each issue. When he had finished touring the capitals, Mr Ersbøll used to come and see me and describe the reactions of the rotating Presidency and the other Member States. It was my job to make sure that the machinery was well-oiled — the Commission, which could not go beyond its remit, the General Affairs Council, the rotating Presidency, the preparation of European Council meetings — not to mention trying to limit the European Council to the broad lines, except in the case of financial horse-trading' ⁽²⁾.

From 1982, in close cooperation with each president of the European Council and the Commission president, Ersbøll drew up the draft conclusions. It was with Jacques Delors that relations became very close, to the point that the two formed a veritable tandem before each European Council meeting.

MICHEL MANGENOT

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 93/1999/148, Memo from the Secretariat-General to the Commission members, SI(80) 215, 19 March 1980.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.

9.2. The Commission and Coreper: between cooperation and rivalry

In the Communities with nine Member States, the responsibilities of both the Council and the Commission increased. A series of new tendencies thus emerged: the proliferation of specialised Councils and informal ministerial meetings, a significant rise in the number of issues to be dealt with in Coreper, the need to resort ever more frequently to restricted sessions in the Council and in Coreper, and the need to better define the agenda on the basis of current priorities. In this quest for efficiency, how the Commission and Coreper cooperated was of paramount importance.

As early as the Paris Summit of 19 to 21 October 1972, it was decided that the Council would take practical steps to improve its decision-making procedures (see table 'Proposals to improve working methods at Council level, 1972–73', page 222). The Council wanted to give Coreper more freedom in the decision-making process within the Council and better involve the Commission in its work ⁽¹⁾.

Among other proposals, it was suggested that the General Affairs Council (foreign ministers) should become the core around which the work of other Council configurations was organised. Through its two weekly meetings (Coreper I on Wednesdays and Coreper II on Thursdays), Coreper was an interface between national and Community interests ⁽²⁾. It was responsible for preparing Council meetings, with the exception of the Agriculture Councils. These were prepared by the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), with Coreper only giving an opinion on the SCA's work ⁽³⁾. Coreper also gradually acquired more autonomy in its preparatory role at working group level. At ministerial level, it lightened the work of the Councils ⁽⁴⁾. The 'A' item procedure, which had become part of Community practice in 1962, expanded considerably as the Community's powers increased. The governments responded to the working groups submitting an increasing number of 'A' items to Coreper ⁽⁵⁾ by giving more flexible instructions to their permanent representatives. By giving them a stronger negotiating hand, the chances of agreement being reached at this level were improved ⁽⁶⁾. In other words, the permanent representatives were given greater latitude so that only items that involved positions of

⁽¹⁾ See the notes of the Secretariat-General to the members of the Commission concerning: the 682nd Coreper meeting on 12 April 1973, HAEC, SEC(73) 1522, 17 April 1973; the 685th Coreper meeting on 10 May 1973, HAEC, SEC(73) 1852, 14 May 1973; and the 691st Coreper meeting on 20 June 1973, HAEC, SEC(73) 2419, 21 June 1973 (HAUE, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 444, 'Relations with the Council', 1973). During these discussions, two possibilities emerged: the organisation of policy discussions on general issues before the presentation of specific proposals by the Commission, or policy discussions on the most important proposals before they were sent to Coreper and the working groups. This idea was presented by the Belgian Ambassador Joseph Van der Meulen on 20 March 1973 (HAEC, SEC(73) 1279, 30 March 1973, p. 7, point F). The second part of the idea was also proposed by Émile Noël to Coreper on 12 April 1973.

⁽²⁾ The case of the directive on free movement of doctors is a good example of the key role played by Coreper. Faced with a Belgian delegation that was maintaining a general reservation, the Belgian permanent representative, in liaison with the Commission, invited the Secretary-General of the Belgian Health Ministry to Coreper to confront him with the position of the other eight Member States. The safeguard clause proposed by the Commission in the event of a massive influx of doctors from other Member States was accepted and the directive was adopted, with Belgium abstaining (HAEC, SEC(74) 5205 of 20 December covering the 753rd Coreper meeting of 18 December 1974).

⁽³⁾ Veterinary matters remained supervised by Coreper.

⁽⁴⁾ At the time, Coreper I had to monitor the work of 20 or so working groups.

⁽⁵⁾ The 'A' item practice de facto reduced the Commission's ability to appeal to the Council against a unanimous Coreper decision.

⁽⁶⁾ 276th meeting of the Council on 4 and 5 February and 288th meeting of the Council on 4 and 5 June 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 2556, 'Relations with the Council', 1975.

Proposals to improve working methods at Council level, 1972–73

The role of Coreper vis-à-vis the Commission	<p>At the beginning of its term of office, the Commission presents to the Council and the European Parliament a general programme covering common, existing and new policies. The programme specifies the cases where the Commission has recourse either to specific provisions of the treaty or to Articles 235 or 236 of the EEC Treaty. The programme makes it possible to highlight the interdependence between the various common policies and enables the Parliament and the Council to commit themselves in principle to implementing it.</p> <p>Coreper can decide to speed up work on long-outstanding Commission proposals.</p> <p>Debates are organised in Coreper (or in the Council) on important Commission initiatives with a view to identifying the views of the governments before the competent working groups start examining the proposals in detail.</p> <p>Standing rapporteurs are appointed for proposals that are very technical (Émile Noël supported this proposal).</p>
The role of Coreper vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers	<p>Coreper prepares all the Councils.</p> <p>The Council's agenda must focus on key political issues that are mature enough for a decision to be taken (also a Commission proposal). The permanent representatives take part in all specialised Councils.</p> <p>Council meetings take place more frequently and more regularly given the higher number and larger volume of dossiers to be dealt with. As with the regular meetings of agriculture and finance ministers, the Council should set a minimum frequency for meetings involving specialised ministers, in particular for common policies that are under development (Commission proposal).</p> <p>Informal ministerial meetings should be revived.</p>
The role of Coreper vis-à-vis the working groups	<p>Coreper scrutinises progress made in the working groups every 2 months so that it can pass on any guidelines.</p> <p>A first reading takes place in Coreper before the working groups start examining a dossier.</p> <p>The working groups are given a deadline for examining a dossier, and the dossier is raised in Coreper when that deadline expires (proposal by Émile Noël).</p>

a political nature and that were ripe for a decision were discussed in the Council ⁽¹⁾.

This idea was sanctioned at the Paris Summit of December 1974 ⁽²⁾, with a view to strengthening the political role of the Council. The Member States proposed that each General Affairs Council should start with a restricted discussion involving the min-

⁽¹⁾ Until that time, the permanent representatives depended largely on their attachés, who were members of the working groups, and it was difficult for them to intervene usefully back in their Member States until a first discussion had taken place at their level. If the competent ministers were reluctant to come to Brussels, their interventions carried less weight and they could count on the understanding of their colleagues to postpone the discussion.

⁽²⁾ In the final communiqué of the Paris Summit, point 7 states, among other things, that '... each Member State will take the measures it considers necessary to strengthen the role of the permanent representatives ...', HAEC, BAC 23/1979/223, SEC(74) 5026, 12 December 1974.



Festive end-of-year meeting of Coreper I, 18 December 1981.

isters and the presidents of the Council and of the Commission. In the week preceding each Council meeting, Coreper had to hold a meeting with the president of the Commission in order to draw up the agenda and identify the main questions on which the Council would focus.

For the Commission, the increase in Coreper's decision-making powers was not seen as a measure likely to simplify procedures. Via its deputy secretary-general, Klaus Meyer, the Commission emphasised repeatedly that Coreper was not a political body and that it was not accountable to any parliament. Coreper was the ultimate instrument for coordination, but only the Commission could ensure the coherence of the system. The Council acknowledged this position and in a memorandum

by the Irish foreign minister Garret FitzGerald it proposed better coordination between the Commission and the Council, and Coreper in particular.

Despite highlighting the spirit of cooperation, it was clear that on some subjects the views of the Commission and of the Council could not be reconciled. The Commission rapidly found itself having to deal with cases where the working groups would neglect some of its proposals owing to expert reservations or where the chair of Coreper would use its prerogatives to push matters of interest or curb others. There was also broad agreement that the proper functioning of Coreper was hampered by the pursuit of consensus arising from the Luxembourg compromise, which was a practice



Christopher Audland (second from the left) meeting with Coreper II as deputy secretary-general representing the Commission, a position which he held from 1973 to 1981.

that had a bearing on all levels of the Council ⁽¹⁾. Indeed, Presidency compromises were emerging as an alternative to the Commission's proposals, and majority decisions remained exceptional until 1985 ⁽²⁾. Compromises were the product of a subtle game between the Council Presidency and the Commission. They were drawn up by the Presi-

dency itself or by the competent departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, often in direct cooperation with Commission departments.

The pursuit of consensus forced the Commission Secretariat-General to make more use of its coordination function within Coreper I ⁽³⁾. This strengthened the Commission's legislative role in areas of Community competence in relation to Coreper II since majority decision-making was more prevalent

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, 'Report on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1980, p. 24: '... Majority votes as such are not possible in Coreper and subordinate groups. These forums must find some more informal consensus method of reaching their due share of solutions ...'.

⁽²⁾ In early March 1986, Jacques Delors reiterated a proposal to the president of the Council with a view to amending the Council's rules of procedure. Under the proposal, the Council would be able to proceed to voting at the request of the Commission. The proposal was discussed at ambassador level (Coreper II) on 9 April 1986 but was rejected by some of the delegations (see the Council Presidency's note of 1986 on amending the Council's rules of procedure with regard to decision-making). The rules of procedure of 24 July 1979 were finally amended on 20 July 1987. They allow for the possibility afforded by the above proposal on the condition that 'the majority of the members making up the Council agree to it' (see Articles 2(2)(b) and 5(1) of the rules of procedure adopted by the Council on 20 July 1987 on the basis of Article 5 of the treaty of 8 April 1965 (87/508/Euratom, ECSC, EEC)).

⁽³⁾ In the special meetings with Coreper I or II, the Commission would try first of all to identify, for each Council, which decisions could be voted on or unblocked through abstention (in the spirit of paragraph 6 of the Paris Communiqué).

in technical committees ⁽¹⁾. The Commission was perfectly aware that Coreper played a key role in the examination of its proposals. Coreper was the body with the power to decide whether to initiate or speed up work so that the working groups could examine specific Commission proposals. The Commission invested heavily in its relationship with Coreper in order to gain support from the permanent representatives in favour of its proposals.

The Commission was represented in Coreper by the Secretariat-General and the competent directorates-general. The deputy secretary-general — first Klaus Meyer, then Christopher Audland — represented the Commission in Coreper II.

The secretary-general took part in certain meetings and working lunches concerning the most important dossiers. The Secretariat-General therefore played a prominent part in the coordination of Commission positions within Coreper but not necessarily for negotiating in the place of the directorates-general. The Secretariat-General ensured consistency and continuity in relations with Coreper. The director responsible for relations with the Council represented the Commission in Coreper I. The two competent units 'Relations with the Council I' and 'Relations with the Council II' (Henri Étienne and Umberto Stefani) prepared the meetings between the Commission and Coreper and drafted the minutes of the weekly meetings (called SI notes). Only the notes that were included on the Commission's agenda and were therefore discussed in the weekly meetings of heads of cabinet were overseen by Émile Noël himself. It was also notice-

able, during these years, that the directors-general themselves participated more frequently in the meetings, especially those of Coreper II.

The Antici Group

The Antici Group, which was made up of one official from each permanent representation, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Secretariat-General of the Commission ⁽²⁾, played an extremely useful role in the functioning of Coreper. It also turned out to be an effective tool for contact between the Commission and Coreper.

Émile Noël used the group to send information or messages relating to the Commission's position to the permanent representatives and to keep abreast of the position of the Member States on the most sensitive issues.

Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi

The directorates-general took part in Coreper I or II depending on the dossiers entered on the agenda. The two divisions 'Relations with the Council I' and 'Relations with the Council II' processed the information they received from the various cabinets and the information relating to dossiers that were already before the Council. They had to check with the departments involved that the Commission's views had been solidly set out and that the various departments had coordinated their respective positions. They handled any friction between the directorates-general and the Secretariat-General. During the period concerned, directors-general clearly participated more in meetings, especially in Coreper II meetings.

In addition to the official meeting, there were also other types of meeting between Coreper and the Commission, namely meetings that were held in restricted session and were devoid of procedural

⁽¹⁾ At the time, Coreper I was in charge of agriculture and fisheries policy, customs union and the internal market, trade matters and so-called 'flanking policies' (transport, competition, taxation, social policy). In 1975, research and atomic matters also came within the remit of Coreper I. Coreper II dealt with political and institutional dossiers such as political cooperation, external relations and economic policy, where the Commission played only a very limited role. Paolo Ponzano notes that, in the 1970s, the General Secretariat, in its capacity as overall coordinator, ended up intervening in more than half of the dossiers discussed in Coreper I (Dossier note '30 years of Coreper in brief', SG-PA1- PP/frw (09) D/2703, 3 April 2009, provided by Paolo Ponzano).

⁽²⁾ See section 3.1, 'The Secretariat-General'.

concerns ⁽¹⁾ (see table ‘A topography of the Commission’s relations with Coreper’, page 227). The work of Coreper ended 10 days before the Council meeting to allow for extensive coordination within the governments. The Commission therefore took part in Coreper restricted meetings where participants discussed problems linked to the functioning of the decision-making process within the Council, in particular at the level of working groups, ad hoc groups and Coreper.

It was indeed important to develop practical mechanisms to ensure discretion but also to raise governments’ awareness of the Community dimension of problems and of the role to be played by the European institutions. The idea was for the president of the Commission to be a kind of ‘key auxiliary’ for the success of the work carried out in Coreper. François-Xavier Ortoli introduced the custom of inviting the ambassadors to a working lunch to discuss the most important issues. In July 1974, he suggested that Coreper as a whole, i.e. both its components, take part in what he called *conférences d’État-major* (top-management sessions) to evaluate pending cases and rank them by order of priority. He also suggested similar meetings between himself, or Émile Noël, and the deputy permanent representatives. In the same spirit, Émile Noël sowed within the Council the seeds of the idea that the General Secretariat and the Commission departments could, at the beginning of each Council Presidency, take stock of the action to be under-

taken ⁽²⁾. Following François-Xavier Ortoli’s impetus, preparatory meetings between the president of the Commission and Coreper II were introduced. The president of the Commission was accompanied in these meetings by the secretary-general and sometimes by one or more other members of the Commission. In exceptional cases, the meetings could be held with only the heads of delegation, the president of the Commission, the secretary-general of the Commission and the general secretary of the Council attending. The Secretariat-General considered that commissioners and members of their cabinets should only exceptionally take part in Coreper meetings or in its working lunches. In the 1970s, Étienne Davignon was one of the first to depart from this rule, often negotiating with Coreper I on external trade policy and the steel crisis plan. The trend then intensified, thereby indirectly confirming the growing weight of Coreper ⁽³⁾.

These informal meetings were designed to involve the Commission in the Council’s preparatory work, signalling intensified relations. Their purpose was to take stock of progress made, explore any difficulties and enable a frank and open political discussion to take place before the issues arrived in the Council. The Secretariat-General prepared these discussions between the president of the Commission and Coreper with the help of the commissioners’ cabinets. Émile Noël himself centralised preparations for these meetings. By means of ‘Meyer notes’ ⁽⁴⁾, the president of the Commission could automatically include important items on the Commission’s agenda. These meetings were aimed at preparing the preliminary meeting of the

⁽¹⁾ At the discussions on improving decision-making procedures, it was decided that meetings between Coreper and a commissioner could become a periodic occurrence as some specialised Councils would in future meet at regular intervals (Memo to President Ortoli of 15 July 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 143 ‘Coreper’, 1974). The need to maintain the confidential nature of all Council meetings, and especially of this type of meeting, was recognised fairly swiftly (summary of the guidelines of the meeting of 20 June 1974 between the president of the Commission and Coreper, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 474 ‘Coreper’, 1974). At a lunch, the Commission could confidentially submit a non-paper and the Council could then deliver an oral communication on the same subject.

⁽²⁾ Note on the lunch of the deputy permanent representatives with President Ortoli on 19 June 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 474, ‘Coreper’, 1974. Only permanent representative Émile Cazimajou came out against the procedures suggested by President Ortoli. Since deputy permanent representatives were great suppliers of ‘A’ items compared with ambassadors, Cazimajou considered that their affairs needed to be depoliticised and dealt with at their level so that they could remain autonomous and not be dependent on the ambassadors.

⁽³⁾ Ponzano, P., ‘Relations between Coreper and the European Commission’, *Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea*, 5th year, No 1, 2000, pp. 30 and 35.

⁽⁴⁾ Drafted by Deputy Secretary-General Klaus Meyer.

A topography of the Commission's relations with Coreper

Type of meeting	Frequency	Other persons attending the meetings on behalf of the Commission	Objectives
Restricted Council or preliminary session of the foreign affairs ministers with the participation of the president of the Commission and the commissioners concerned	Before the meeting of the General Affairs Council	Secretary-general (for the Council: ministers/state secretaries, permanent representatives, an official) President of the Commission, permanent representatives, secretary-general or deputy secretary-general	Scrutiny of the agenda — discussion of thorny political issues which are not on the Council agenda or are of explicitly political aspects This type of preliminary meeting is prepared 5 days beforehand at a brief meeting
Preparatory meeting between the president of the Commission and Coreper II	On a date in advance of the Council	Secretary-general	Preparation of the preliminary meeting of the foreign affairs ministers and of the Council: discussion on the work programme of the current Presidency and of the next semester, on the preparation of the European Council
Meeting of the president of the Commission and the commissioner concerned with Coreper I or II. Meeting of the president of the Commission and the Coreper chair. Special Coreper meeting (very restricted) with the president of the Commission	On a case-by-case basis	The commissioner concerned	Specific dossier: to explain the intentions of the Commission, focusing on the issues likely to be discussed at ministerial level
Restricted meeting of ministers, preparatory meeting of ministers with the participation of the president of the Commission	If needed, on an ad hoc basis	Deputy secretary-general	Any subject that needs to be discussed within a limited circle, or unofficial meeting to discover the lay of the land
Working lunches of Coreper I or II with the president of the Commission	One week before the Council	Secretary-general, director responsible for the 'Relations with the Council I' division	Preparation of the Council
Coreper working lunch Exchange of views of ambassadors or Coreper II meeting on a specific issue Informal meeting with the chair of Coreper I or II	Twice a month	Secretary-general, deputy secretary-general, director responsible for the 'Relations with the Council II' division Director responsible for the 'Relations with the Council I or II' division	Preparation of the next ministerial meeting, examination of the dossiers likely to be included on the Council agenda Preparation of the Coreper meeting and testing of Presidency compromises



Émile Noël (right), together with the ambassadors and deputy permanent representatives, played a key role under the Ortolí Presidency by establishing contacts at the highest level between Coreper and the Commission.

foreign affairs ministers and conducting an initial ‘political’ review of the agenda of the formal meeting of the General Affairs Council. The discussions at Commission level thereby acted as a filter. The items reviewed and earmarked for discussion were then brought up in the preliminary ministers’ meeting and related to the work of future Council meetings. During these unofficial encounters, the president of the Commission could personally examine stalled dossiers and work out, together with the permanent representatives, how to give them some momentum. He could request a General Affairs Council or a specialised Council, or ask for work to be speeded up at expert level so that a decision could be reached more quickly. He could also: request that an item be placed on the agenda of the upcoming Council to enable the commissioner concerned to present his position; choose to bring

it up in a restricted ministerial meeting; or even reserve the right to bring an action against the Council for failure to act if the political dialogue came to nothing ⁽¹⁾. Exceptionally, he could also make it possible to identify the elements of a political compromise, which would be formalised later.

The way in which the Commission took part in the contacts organised in the margins of the Council depended not only on the nature of the agenda but also on the style of the president. Owing to his car-

⁽¹⁾ The Commission could request that an item be placed on the provisional agenda of the Council, even against the unanimous opinion of the Committee (Article 2 of the EEC Council’s provisional rules of procedure of 25 January 1958). The Council adopted the agenda by a simple majority. This practice would be formalised a little later (see note ⁽²⁾, p. 224, and note ⁽²⁾, p. 230).



Roy Jenkins (centre) at a working lunch with the members of Coreper, which he considered a platform for diplomatic debate rather than a decision-making forum.

eer as a senior civil servant and as a politician ⁽¹⁾, François-Xavier Ortoli cultivated the relationship between the Commission and Coreper. In contrast to President Ortoli's tendency towards diplomatic activism, Roy Jenkins, who was more political, considered that Coreper was not the legitimate partner of the Presidency of the Commission. He saw Coreper lunches as 'tennis matches' between diplomats in search of illusory leadership ⁽²⁾. For his part, Gaston Thorn, who had a strong political background, also felt ill at ease in these diplomatic circles. Jacques Delors, in turn, engaged fully in relations with Coreper, considering that prepara-

tory work was crucial for advancing the Community interest.

The new round of discussions on how to improve the functioning of the Council revived the idea that Coreper's role had taken on excessive proportions ⁽³⁾. In 1979, the report of the Three Wise Men proposed clearly delimiting Coreper's 'pivotal role between the Community apparatus on the one hand and the Member Governments on

⁽¹⁾ Badel, L. and Bussière, É., *François-Xavier Ortoli: l'Europe, quel numéro de téléphone*, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011.

⁽²⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, pp. 187, 212, 219, 321, 519, 563–4 and 583.

⁽³⁾ See the conclusions of the European Council of December 1980 (Conclusions on the report of the Three Wise Men, point B on the 'Report on European institutions'), HAEC, BAC 40/1986/28, SI(80) 892, 5 December 1980.

the other' ⁽¹⁾. The Commission, for its part, was mindful that, in order to function properly, the Council undoubtedly needed a Coreper that was effective, both in preparing Council meetings and in monitoring the work of the groups. Under the Jenkins Presidency, and as early as March 1978, a list of proposals that were pending in the Council was drawn up twice a year and circulated within the Commission. This was the early stages of the idea of a legislative programme, which would be formalised a little later in 1981. In 1979, the formal adoption of the Council's rules of procedure confirmed the influence of Coreper in the decision-making process ⁽²⁾. But in the 1980s, fears about the relative imbalance of Coreper's weight compared with other institutions were exacer-

bated ⁽³⁾. Going with this trend, the Commission pushed for a greater spirit of cooperation. Under the Thorn Presidency it developed a dual strategy. On the one hand, it supported Coreper's commitment to monitoring more closely the work of the Council groups in order to prevent its proposals from getting stuck at this level. On the other hand, in the event of political disagreement in Coreper meetings, it invoked its declaration of 1979, which stated that the appropriate forum for discussing political issues was the Council ⁽⁴⁾. Its goal was to try to reserve any substantive discussions for the informal ministerial meeting and then, if necessary, for the General Affairs Council.

FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU

⁽¹⁾ The report proposed that the permanent representatives should enjoy 'a status, and a freedom in negotiation within suitably framed instructions' (p. 49). According to the Three Wise Men, Coreper, which was considered as a 'check-point', was destined to occupy even more of a central position than the General Affairs Council. The report emphasised that some of its control had been lost to new 'high-level' bodies, but that it should still be capable of regaining 'an overview function in the technical phases of work, rather like that which the European Council occupies at the political level' (p. 57). HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, 'Report on European institutions' or 'Report of the Three Wise Men', October 1979.

⁽²⁾ From then on, the 'A' items procedure appeared in the Council's rules of procedure. The rules stipulated that there had to be unanimity in the Council and that the Commission had to give its approval in order for an item on the agenda to be addressed under the 'A' item procedure (Article 2(6) and (7) of the rules of procedure adopted by the Council on 24 July 1979 on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the EC (79/868/ECSC, EEC, Euratom)). The right of the Commission to appeal to the Council against a unanimous decision of the Member States at Coreper level and, therefore, to oppose its inclusion as an 'A' item, would now be formally provided for. However, cases where the Commission requested a decision at Council level on a dossier where the Member States had been in unanimous agreement in Coreper were very rare in practice (see File Note, Secretariat-General — Directorate D, Relations with the Council, PP/cv/2001-168, 30 April 2001, Annex 1, BAC).

⁽³⁾ This kind of thinking was found, for example, in the draft European Act (the Genscher-Colombo plan). See the reply to the questions posed to the president (of the Commission) on European union at the meeting of the Institutional Committee of the Parliament on 29 April 1982 (HAEC, BAC 391/2003/69).

⁽⁴⁾ The declaration stated that, where serious political objections were raised by one or more delegations in the Committee, the Commission would favour an extension of the deliberations to enable the Council to be consulted. HAEC, BAC 386/1991/142, Note from H. Étienne addressed to the members of the Commission, SI(81) 332, 15 April 1981, on the 1026th meeting of Coreper I on 14 April 1981.

Chapter 10

Relations with the European Parliament

The Commission has long felt there to be a basic alliance of interest between itself and the European Parliament. Virtually all the Commission presidents, and many other commissioners as well, have assured the Strasbourg Assembly of the goodwill that they bore towards the Parliament, of the importance they attached to seeing its powers grow and of the importance which they would attribute to the Parliament's views. Thus in January 1973 François-Xavier Ortoli declared: 'We are convinced that we will be all the more able to act effectively ... since the Commission ... will have the advantage of a more detailed and richer dialogue with your House' ⁽¹⁾.

Four years later, Roy Jenkins adopted a similar tone, pledging that his Commission would 'work most closely with the Parliament. No doubt we shall have disputes, but we are on the same side.' He

also undertook personally to give the lead in establishing closer links with the assembly ⁽²⁾. Gaston Thorn struck a more emotional note, placing great emphasis on his own past relations with the Parliament. He opened his first speech as Commission president by saying: 'Everyone here will understand that I find it difficult to hide what I feel as I stand in this chamber today. I was elected with you in June 1979 and, with 10 years as a member of this House and four terms as president of the Council behind me, I see so many familiar faces as I look around' ⁽³⁾.

His underlying promise to do everything in his power to improve relations between the Commission and the European Parliament was all but identical to those delivered by his predecessors, however.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by François-Xavier Ortoli to the European Parliament, 16 January 1973.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Roy Jenkins to the European Parliament, 11 January 1977.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 12 January 1981.

Nor did Jacques Delors, another former MEP, break with this tradition. His opening speech hoped for ‘frank dialogue’ between the Commission and the Parliament and underlined the importance which he attached to the presentation of the new Commission to the Strasbourg Assembly: ‘This act before the representatives of the citizen’s Europe goes hand in hand with the individual act of loyalty performed by each commissioner before the Court of Justice as symbolising the Community as an entity in law.’ His Commission would, he promised, be ‘a driving force and a generator of proposals’. But in the process ‘[i]t will respond to the appeals and hopes of those of you in this Parliament who keep the European flame alive. It will do so by giving serious consideration to your resolutions, opinions and pronouncements and helping to make the essential leap forward which will widen our horizons and reinforce our action’ ⁽¹⁾.

This enthusiasm for good relations between the Commission and the Parliament, and for the latter to gain in power, made logical sense. In an era when the European Community as a whole was placing ever greater emphasis on the importance of democracy — as a fundamental value of the Community, as a norm to be expected of all would-be members and as a cause to be promoted — it became vital for the Commission to be able to highlight the extent to which it too was subject to democratic control. It is no coincidence that the phrase ‘democratic deficit’ was first coined in the late 1970s by David Marquand, a British academic who had briefly served in the Jenkins Commission as a special adviser responsible for relations between the Commission and the European Parliament ⁽²⁾. As someone who had worked at the interface between Brussels and Strasbourg, Marquand would have been well aware of both Commission sensitivity on this issue

and its hope that a more effective, directly elected parliament would address this vulnerability. But many within the Commission also believed that if the institution could generate strong Parliamentary backing behind some of its proposals, these would be much less likely to be blocked or watered down in the Council of Ministers. This idea had been present in Brussels since at least the mid-1960s — Walter Hallstein was looking to precisely this phenomenon when he chose to tell Strasbourg about the controversial proposals that helped trigger the empty chair crisis before he informed the Council of Ministers — but it became particularly attractive from a Commission point of view in a period like the 1970s and early 1980s when decision-making at Council level was notoriously slow. A clear democratic mandate behind a Commission proposal might serve to cut through the impasse amongst Member State representatives.

Actually translating this noble aspiration for better Commission–Parliament relations into practice, however, proved more awkward than might appear from the lofty prose of Commission presidents’ speeches. Ortoli’s 1975 assessment of the state of Commission–Parliament relations was brutally frank. ‘At present the Commission’s commitment to the European Parliament is not always sufficient, and its action within this organisation does not always provoke the desired impact. Too often, consultation with the European Parliament is considered as an indispensable formality at a legal level and often the Commission’s position vis-à-vis the European Parliament is inspired by a state of mind which is too bureaucratic. To date the Commission has rather insufficiently exploited the latent political powers of the European Parliament and has not really endeavoured to put all their energy at the Community’s disposal’ ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament, 14 January 1985.

⁽²⁾ Marquand, D., *Parliament for Europe*, Jonathan Cape, London 1979, p. 64 et seq.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, ‘Tentative de collaboration plus dynamique avec le Parlement européen’, Communication by President Ortoli to the members of the Commission, 27 February 1975.



President Ortoli talking to the French MEP Georges Spénale in June 1976.

Frequent attendance at the Parliament was an unwelcome additional duty in the already busy timetables of most commissioners, made more onerous still by the poor transport links between Brussels and the Alsatian capital. As noted by one of the briefing notes prepared for Jenkins in advance of a Commission meeting due to discuss how frequently Commissioners could be expected to be in Strasbourg, ‘many of them [your colleagues] find Parliament a bore ...’⁽¹⁾. Partly as a result, the attendance record of Commissioners at plenary sessions was far from total, a nadir being reached in May 1978 when MEPs formally complained about the absence of several of the commissioners whose expertise was needed to answer many of the points raised

at Parliamentary question time. In response, the Commission had to give an undertaking that a greater number of its members would be present in Strasbourg, that absences from the Parliament would be kept to the strict minimum and that either Jenkins himself or Ortoli, his predecessor and vice-president, would always be there for question time⁽²⁾. Commission representation at Parliamentary committees was also irregular, despite these being held in Brussels rather than Strasbourg. Nor were all commissioners entirely comfortable even when they were present. Ortoli had little background as a Parliamentary operator, having spent most of his career prior to his arrival at the Commission as an official rather than a politician.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, Hayden Phillips brief for Jenkins, undated (but clearly circa June 1977).

⁽²⁾ HAEC, COM(78) Minutes No 473, second part, meeting of 10 May 1978.

Jenkins, who had been a highly effective Parliamentary speaker and debater within a British context, was quite open about how alien and uncomfortable he initially felt the European Parliament to be. ‘The Parliament is not really a rewarding body to which to speak. There is of course the linguistic difficulty and the fact that the Chamber is often pretty empty ... and these difficulties are compounded by the extraordinary proliferation of the photographic industry in Strasbourg, so that not only are you liable to have moving television cameras producing film that is hardly ever used, but you also have flashlight photographers who come and photograph you the whole time you are on your feet — and even when you are not’ ⁽¹⁾. The unpublished draft of the Commission president’s diary also included the additional concluding line: ‘God knows what is done with them [all these photographs] unless there is an acute demand in Greenland for photographs of the Danish commissioner’ ⁽²⁾. David Marquand has confirmed Jenkins’s ongoing frustrations with dealing with the Parliament and disappointment at its failure to live up to his initial, unrealistic expectations ⁽³⁾.

There was also a long-running dispute between the Commission and the European Parliament about the flow of information between Brussels and Strasbourg. At issue was the level of information that the Commission could be expected to provide to the assembly about its response to Parliamentary votes and resolutions. The Commission was ready to accede to Parliament’s initial request and supply this information in writing rather than merely briefing orally. But it drew the line at translating a detailed monthly account of what had happened in response to each Parliamentary resolution into all six working languages of the EP. The affair hence rumbled on from 1977 right up until 1980, involv-

ing extensive correspondence between Jenkins and EP presidents Emilio Colombo and then Simone Veil ⁽⁴⁾. By 1979, moreover, it had been flanked by another, rather more embarrassing, argument involving the Jenkins Commission and the European Parliament, this time centred on commissioners’ expenses. Triggered by British press revelations about the extravagance of External Affairs Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp’s trip to China in October 1978, the expenses scandal ultimately had few lasting effects ⁽⁵⁾. But the way in which it was allowed to trouble Commission–Parliament relations, despite the apparent determination of the Jenkins Commission to maintain a cooperative relationship, underlined that there was nothing automatic about harmonious Brussels–Strasbourg relations.

This underlying reality was to become even more apparent from 1979 onwards when the new, directly elected Parliament decided to resort to the budgetary weapon in its efforts to win additional powers ⁽⁶⁾. Strasbourg’s main target in this dispute was not of course the European Commission itself, but rather the Council of Ministers, which had the final say in all budgetary matters, and still more the Member States themselves. It was only through a collective decision by the latter, after all, that the elected but still comparatively powerless Parliament could be granted the new powers that it believed it deserved. But the principal victim of this trial of strength between the parliamentarians and the national governments was the Commission, whose programmes and administration were directly affected by delays, both threatened and real, to institutional agreement on the budget. Both Jenkins and Thorn tried hard to make clear

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R. *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 63.

⁽²⁾ Manuscript copy of the *European Diary*, Jenkins papers, East Hendred (accessed by kind permission of Lady Jenkins), p. 78.

⁽³⁾ Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 9/1986/102, Multiple documents.

⁽⁵⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, pp. 373–374, 396–397, 399–400, 411 and 427–428.

⁽⁶⁾ See Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’.



Gaston Thorn and Piet Dankert, President of the European Parliament, are all smiles in 1982. But relations between the two institutions were not always easy during the early 1980s.

their sympathies for Parliament's basic position ⁽¹⁾. It was, however, undeniably the case that the recurrent budgetary squabbles helped aggravate the climate of interinstitutional disagreement that the former Luxembourgish prime minister denounced upon becoming Commission president but proved unable fully to resolve: 'I am struck by the fact that in recent years, and more particularly since

your election by direct universal suffrage, recurring quarrels of form and substance have strained relations between our two institutions. The same point was made at the recent European Council in Luxembourg, which deplored the permanent state of interinstitutional strife. The new Commission's first concern, therefore, was to get to grips with this problem. We did so at an informal meeting held before we actually took up office' ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 537. For Gaston Thorn's position, see for example his first speech to the European Parliament as President of the European Commission, 12 January 1981.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Parliament, 12 January 1981.



Leo Tindemans, the Council president, Piet Dankert and Gaston Thorn toast the June 1982 agreement on the budget. Their relief indicates how problematic the issue had become.

This interinstitutional tension would be thrown most sharply into relief in 1979 and again in 1984 when the Parliament refused to approve the Community's draft budget and threatened the Commission with a vote of censure. It would hence only be at the very end of the period covered by this volume, when the Parliament did acquire substantial new powers through the Single European Act, that a fully harmonious relationship between Strasbourg and Brussels would, temporarily, be regained.

To dwell exclusively on the difficulties of the relationship would be unfair, however, especially as the single biggest source of mutual frustration was an overall institutional balance within the European Community that both the Parliament and Com-

mission were eager to change but were prevented from doing by the lack of consensus amongst the Member States. It would ignore, moreover, the wide variety of efforts that the Ortoli, Jenkins, Thorn and Delors Commissions would make to improve links with the Parliament. These began in 1973 with the decision to create a specific Commission portfolio for relations with the European Parliament, a responsibility initially given to the Italian commissioner and vice-president, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza. This post, not intended to absolve other members of the Commission from their responsibilities vis-à-vis Strasbourg, was instead designed to ensure that there was one person who had an oversight of the Commission's interaction with the Parliament and had the duty to highlight any changes that needed to be made. Once



A major step towards direct elections: Parliament adopts the Patijn report in January 1975.

created, this position would endure for the whole of the 1973–86 period, being held successively by Richard Burke, Lorenzo Natali, Frans Andriessen and Grigoris Varfis. Also important in facilitating dialogue between the institutions was the continuation, throughout the period covered by this volume, of the tradition of holding Commission meetings in Strasbourg rather than in Brussels whenever the Parliament was in plenary session. This did not entirely eliminate the problems connected with commissioners' attendance at Parliament debates — hence the difficulties noted above — but it did make it substantially easier for commissioners to be present at the major EP events and to build strong links with the key parliamentarians.

The Commission also made clear its backing for Parliament's long-running campaign to acquire new powers. Ortoli's Commission thus welcomed

the 1975 reforms that brought into existence the Court of Auditors and increased the oversight capacities of the Parliament in budgetary affairs. It also undertook to make maximum use of the new concertation procedure introduced as part of these reforms ⁽¹⁾. Roy Jenkins threw his weight behind the Parliament's efforts to hold both the Council of Ministers and the European Council to account, telling an informal meeting of the EC foreign ministers of his belief that both the Council president and the head of state or government presiding over each European Council meeting should be ready to report regularly to the Parliament. When the French foreign minister objected, noting that there was nothing about this in the Treaty of Rome, Jenkins retorted by pointing out that

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, SI(76) 133/3, 20 February 1976.



A 1977 demonstration in front of the Berlaymont calling both for direct elections and a single currency.

there was nothing about the European Council in the Treaty of Rome either ⁽¹⁾. Both Gaston Thorn and Jacques Delors were complimentary about the draft treaty on European Union drawn up by the European Parliament in February 1984. Delors, reviewing all of the various efforts made to

break the institutional impasse afflicting the Community, praised the Parliament for its 'more daring ... approach' ⁽²⁾. And it would be Delors, of course, who would ultimately have an important hand in taking the first substantial step towards the granting of new powers to Strasbourg with his efforts to ensure that the 1985 relaunch included

⁽¹⁾ Roy Jenkins's cabinet papers, All Souls College, Oxford (accessed by kind permission of Crispin Tickell), record of informal meeting of foreign ministers, Echternach, 25 October 1980.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Speech archives, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament, 14 January 1985.

institutional reform as well as the setting of the single market target. Neither he nor Parliament itself was entirely happy with the resulting Single European Act, fearing that it might not go far enough in altering the Community's institutional balance ⁽¹⁾. But such was the subsequent impact of the 1986 treaty change that Delors, with hindsight, would identify it as his favourite European treaty ⁽²⁾.

Perhaps the single most revealing strand of shared Commission and Parliamentary enthusiasm, though, was their joint efforts to push for and then implement direct elections to the Strasbourg Assembly. Commission support for this idea stretched back beyond the period covered by this volume. The writings of Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission, for instance, make quite clear that this was a step that he strongly supported, and Jean Rey, the second president, would also distinguish himself as an enthusiastic backer of this advance ⁽³⁾. But faced with total deadlock on the issue among the Member States, there was little that the Commission could actually do to further this cause. It would thus only be with the favourable decision on the principle of direct elections taken by the Nine at the Paris Summit of December 1974 that Commission enthusiasm could begin to have a concrete effect. A document dating from the following summer underlined the Commission's determination to see the timetable towards direct elections adhered to and set out clearly why the Commission had so favourable a view of this development: 'The Commission believes that the commitment made by the heads of government in Paris last December concerning elections to the European Parliament by



An end to European conflict? The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* cartoonist takes a positive view of the first direct elections.

universal suffrage has twofold significance: it is the first step towards European union and it represents a decisive choice in favour of a new institutional balance based on democratisation. Direct elections to Parliament will naturally lead to questions about the strengthening of its powers, especially its legislative and budgetary powers. These questions will be answered in the context of European Union' ⁽⁴⁾.

As a result, both the Ortoli and Jenkins Commissions mounted an energetic campaign in support of the rapid implementation of the Paris decision. Ortoli told the Strasbourg Assembly of his view that, with the commitment to hold direct elections, 'Europe had made a decisive choice on the road to democracy ... To set to work on the Europe of tomorrow by introducing democratic machinery is beyond doubt the most effective way of tackling the construction of Europe. The thrusting dynamism thus engendered is bound to play — and I believe

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Speech archives, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 11 December 1985, during the debates which took place between 9 and 13 December 1985.

⁽²⁾ CVCE, Interview with Jacques Delors, Paris, 16 December 2009.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Third General Report on the Activities of the Communities 1969*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1970, Annex, p. 520.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 36/1984, Memo on 'Élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct' for the press conference of President Ortoli, 11 July 1975.



Election night: Finn Olav Gundelach is one of those following the results of the first direct elections with interest.

will continue to play — an extremely positive role in ensuring subsequent progress in the building of Europe by reinforcing European legitimacy, and at the same time giving added weight to the measures implemented in Europe's name ... ' (¹). Jenkins meanwhile not only pledged from the very outset of his Presidency to treat the Parliament as if it were already directly elected, but oversaw the start of practical preparations for the elections. The records of his cabinet thus contain not merely a succession of papers commissioned to reflect on the changes to the Community's institutional balance that direct elections would bring, but also the minutes of a joint Commission–European Parliament liaison body that met from mid-1977 onwards to discuss how best to organise the multinational election campaign and how to allocate the funds that

had been set aside in the Community budget for this purpose (²). These were employed largely for a non-partisan information campaign designed to familiarise the European public with the prospect of direct elections and to provide them with factual information that would help them make their party political choice.

The June 1979 direct elections did therefore constitute a major milestone for the Commission as well as for the Parliament itself. Internal discussions had made it quite clear that the Commission recognised that it would have to play greater heed to the new Parliament than it had done in the past, that it would have to make greater efforts to consult Strasbourg and that it would have to improve its procedures so as to be more responsive to Parliamentary

(¹) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by François-Xavier Ortoli to the European Parliament, 14 January 1975.

(²) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/728 and BAC 39/1986/750.

pressure and better able to respond quickly to the greater demands that were likely to be posed by an elected assembly. As Jenkins noted, the Commission approached the new Parliament ‘with a mixture of respect and apprehension’ ⁽¹⁾. A series of administrative reforms followed, including the establishment of a Parliamentary Affairs Group within the Commission made up of senior officials appointed by each commissioner ⁽²⁾. It would take time, of course, for the Commission to adapt fully to the new realities. One factor, for instance, behind the Parliament’s rejection of the 1979 draft budget may have been the fact that some of the directorates-general involved were still more used to heeding the views of the Council of Ministers than those of Strasbourg. In the years that followed there would also be periodic frustration within the Commission at the manner in

which the Parliament was conducting its campaign for new powers. Fundamentally, however, the Commission was well aware that the positive implications of greater Parliamentary legitimacy outweighed any short-term inconvenience. The Commission thus hoped that the new Parliament would increase the legitimacy of the Community, ‘broaden the basis of popular support for the Community’s institutions and create a greater sense of involvement in [their] policies’ ⁽³⁾. The new Parliament might well prove a more awkward partner to work with and would exercise greater pressure on the Commission to play its full role, but its arrival constituted a real opportunity to regain forward momentum in the integration process.

PIERS LUDLOW

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, p. 375.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/759, SEC(79) 1163/2, 16 July 1979. See also memo from Émile Noël to the directors-general, SEC(79) D/11941, 23 October 1979, in the same file.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Roy Jenkins welcoming Simone Veil as President of the European Parliament, 18 July 1979.

Chapter 11

The politics of the Community budget

On one level, the Commission's responsibility for drawing up and winning approval for the Community's budget was a very unglamorous and humdrum task. DG XIX, the directorate-general primarily responsible for this task, was never regarded as a particularly exciting or high-profile part of the Commission. The budget portfolio, meanwhile, was not considered an especially desirable responsibility by members of the Commission. Christopher Tugendhat, who held this responsibility throughout his 8 years as commissioner, recalls that when he first arrived in Brussels in 1976 the job he was given was widely regarded as 'boring and unimportant and small beer' ⁽¹⁾. Indeed, the very fact that he was allowed to take this portfolio as the more junior British commissioner at a time when the senior one, Roy Jenkins, held the Commission Presidency, was

a strong indication that neither his colleagues nor the onlooking Member States regarded the budget job as being of immense significance.

On the other hand, the overall size of the Community budget, and its distribution, both between policy areas and between Member States, has always been a highly political and deeply sensitive issue, with major knock-on effects on the Commission's capacity to pursue its multiple policy objectives. The budget has also been an issue regarded as being of great importance by all the Member States, both those likely to pay more into Community coffers than they would receive by way of European funding (net contributors) and those liable to receive more than they paid in (net beneficiaries). It was no accident that the single most serious crisis of the Community in the 1960s, the empty chair crisis of 1965–66, had been triggered following a disagreement between France and its partners about budg-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.

etary questions and, in particular, the procedure for financing the common agricultural policy ⁽¹⁾. To add further to the significance of the issue, decision-making over the Community budget was also perceived as a testing ground — if not a battle-ground — for the evolving balance of powers between the different Community institutions. The Commission thus regarded some degree of autonomy in terms of income as a major step towards the acquisition of greater political independence, the Council of Ministers saw its control over Community income and Community expenditure as an important means of control over the Commission and the European Parliament believed that gaining some degree of ‘power of the purse’ constituted the most likely route to end its comparative powerlessness within the Community institutional system. Yet despite their somewhat divergent interests, the nature of the budgetary approval process meant that without agreement between the three institutions, the Community budget could not be agreed.

The main focus of the chapter that follows will be this more political dimension of the budget. The exact division of the budget between different sectors, and the way in which this division evolved in the course of the 1973–86 period, is the subject of the figures below. Brief mention will be made of the successive commissioners holding the budgetary portfolio. But the real interest of the subject lies in the way in which the budget became entangled with the wider political fortunes of the Community at multiple moments in the 1970s and 1980s. It is on these moments — occasions, moreover, when the Commission’s position was more determined by the views of its president or the College as a whole than by the commissioner nominally responsible for the budget — that this overview will concentrate.

As the 1970s began, the Commission seemed to have taken a major step forward in terms of budgetary independence. Part of the package deal concluded at the The Hague Summit in December 1969 was an agreement to press ahead with a system of Community financing that would introduce a substantial range of ‘own resources’ — in other words, revenue that would automatically accrue to the Community. Such own resources had long been a major objective of the Commission since they would significantly lessen the institution’s dependence on money allocated to the Community by the Member States and could be seen as a significant step in the direction of a more federal system. The way in which the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970 put in place three different types of own resources deriving from customs receipts, agricultural levies and a cut of each Member State’s value added tax (VAT) was therefore seen as an important advance. No longer would every penny that the Commission spent come from national budgets and hence depend wholly on the willingness of the Member States to allocate money to European goals. However, as would become clear over the subsequent decade and a half, this beneficial change was accompanied by four other developments, each one of which would make the Commission’s budgetary position distinctly harder to manage.

The first factor that had the potential to complicate the Community’s budgetary position was the likely evolution of the common agricultural policy. Details of how the CAP developed over the 1973–86 period are covered in Chapter 16 of this volume. What mattered from the budgetary point of view, however, was the fact that the greater part of agricultural spending was compulsory — in other words the amount spent on agricultural support would automatically rise or fall according to market conditions, without either the Commission or the Member States being able to control the exact amount that it cost — and that it was likely to rise substantially, with no upper limit to the sums that might be involved. Both the precious level of independence

⁽¹⁾ Subsequently, the confrontation would turn into what is undoubtedly a more widely known disagreement about voting rules. But the origin of the conflict concerned the Community budget and the balance of the Community’s priorities in terms of agriculture and other sectors. See Ludlow, N. P., *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 49–70.



Budget Commissioner Christopher Tugendhat addresses MEPs in 1980. The ongoing row over the British budgetary contribution made his role very testing.

that the Commission felt that it had attained by means of the own resources system and the hard-won degree of influence over budgetary affairs which, as will be discussed below, the European Parliament had acquired, were hence highly vulnerable within a budget where the single largest item was liable to expand in a fashion that was possible neither accurately to predict nor to control.

A second underlying problem was the issue of the United Kingdom's budgetary contribution. Even before the British entered the Community in 1973, it had been recognised that the planned system was not to their advantage. The United Kingdom imported much more than most Member States from outside the Community — and for a variety of reasons wanted to continue to do so — thereby paying a disproportionately large

amount into Community coffers by way of customs receipts and agricultural levies. Furthermore, as it had a relatively small agricultural sector, it was likely to receive much less in the form of CAP subsidies than other Member States. The entirely predictable result was that it would quickly become one of the largest net contributors, if not the largest, to the EC budget. For a country whose per capita GNP was below the Community average by some margin for most of the period covered by this volume, that was not a very acceptable state of affairs. And yet recognising the difficulty was much easier than solving it. To compensate the British would not only mean revisiting an arrangement to which the United Kingdom had signed up when joining the EC, thereby setting an awkward precedent for future enlargements, but might also seemingly sanction the principle of *juste retour* — the

idea that each country should obtain monetary support from the Community in proportion to the amount that it had put into the EC budget. This was an idea strongly opposed by most Member States and by the European Commission. An impasse had hence been created that would prove extremely hard to break.

A third potential complication facing the Commission as it sought to use its powers to shape the Community budget was the new power in budgetary matters acquired by the European Parliament — another result of the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970. At the level of general principle, the Commission was in favour of this development; greater EP scrutiny was seen as an appropriate corollary to the Commission's greater financial independence. But in practice, working with a new and more assertive Parliament would not always be easy, especially as the MEPs were clearly intent on using their limited budgetary authority as leverage in their quest to obtain further powers and influence in other areas of Community activity. Furthermore, the 1970 agreement had also given the Parliament the right to flank Commission expenditure proposals with their own suggestions for non-compulsory expenditure. Such parliamentary spending priorities would not necessarily fit easily with those of the Commission. As a result, both the Jenkins and Thorn Commissions would have distinctly more choppy relations with the European Parliament over budgetary issues than previous Commissions.

The final factor which would make the Community budget much harder to agree during the 1973–86 period than had been the case previously was the general economic downturn that was to afflict Europe from 1973 onwards. Budgetary negotiations have always been hard fought and sensitive affairs, regardless of the economic climate. But for most of the Community's formative period, the clashes between different national interests and different visions of how the Commu-

nity should evolve had been softened, in their budgetary dimension at least, by the realisation that the Community budget was relatively small and that the fiscal position of most Member States was comparatively strong. From 1973 onwards, the onset of recession dramatically altered this position. With government budgets under pressure across Europe, a rising Community budget — pushed upwards by the growing cost of the CAP if nothing else — was always likely to attract significant criticism. For most of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the Commission would hence find itself confronted in every budgetary discussion with an array of Member States eager to contain EC expenditure and each acutely aware of the consternation back home which would greet a substantial increase in the Community budget. In such a context, winning support for any new forms of European expenditure would not be easy.

During the Ortoli Commission the budget portfolio was held by Claude Cheysson, the junior French commissioner. Given, however, that Cheysson also held the development brief, and for that reason gained a reputation of seldom being in Brussels but instead travelling extensively through the developing world, the relatively low status of the budget job was confirmed (¹). This did not mean, however, that the Ortoli years were uneventful from a budgetary point of view. Rather the reverse, indeed, since the period not only saw a first round of argument over the British budgetary contribution, but also involved a further treaty change. Such high political matters, however, were likely to be handled by the Commission as a whole, or by the president and his advisers, rather than falling primarily to whoever held official responsibility for budgetary matters.

(¹) The intensity of Cheysson's travel schedule was confirmed by a contemporary joke: 'What's the difference between God and Cheysson? God is everywhere, Cheysson is everywhere except Brussels.' Interview with Hayden Phillips, 2 February 2011.

The context in which the tricky issue of the British budgetary contribution first arose was the renegotiation of the United Kingdom's terms of accession demanded by Harold Wilson's Labour government in 1974. Often viewed as a somewhat farcical exercise that produced little real change, the renegotiation did permit a first serious attempt by the Commission to discuss the problem of the United Kingdom's contribution. Asked by the Council to investigate the issue, the Commission established a high-level working group, somewhat coyly entitled *Groupe d'études économiques et financières dans la Communauté élargie* (GEEF), in June 1974 ⁽¹⁾. The sensitivity of the issue was underlined by the committee's membership: chaired by Ortolí's head of cabinet, Philippe de Margerie, and with a further member of the same cabinet, Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, nominated as rapporteur, the group also included Émile Noël, Ugo Mosca, the director-general of DG II, Franz Froschmaier, the head of cabinet to Wilhelm Haferkamp, and, crucially, Richard Hay, a member of Christopher Soames's cabinet and a former Treasury official. As he acknowledged in an interview, his function was in part at least to ensure a channel of communication both with the British commissioners, who were otherwise kept at arm's length from proceedings, and with his erstwhile colleagues back in London ⁽²⁾. The work of this group then fed through into the production of a paper that the Commission submitted to the Council in early 1975 ⁽³⁾. The paper largely confirmed that the issue was real, albeit one the exact extent of which was impossible accurately to predict, and outlined a first attempt at a solution. Unfortunately, from a British point of view, the corrective mechanism proposed by the Commission and agreed upon at the Dublin European Council meeting in 1975 was made subject to

a number of conditions that would ensure that it never proved effective. So eager, however, was Harold Wilson to wrap up the renegotiation, so as to be able to proclaim it a success in the run-up to the 1975 United Kingdom referendum on EEC membership, that the ineffectiveness was overlooked. The issue dropped off the radar for a few years — helped by the transitional arrangements that meant that the United Kingdom was still not paying in as much as would otherwise have been the case, and by a temporary slowing of the rise in CAP expenditure — but as would become clear under the next two Commission Presidencies, the underlying difficulties had not been resolved.

Another development of importance during the Ortolí period was a further revision of the treaty rules on budgetary matters. The 1975 Brussels Treaty was a logical follow-up to the Luxembourg Treaty signed 5 years earlier. Had the Commission's original proposals been accepted, they would have introduced new provisions for raising the ceiling on Community expenditure, permitted the Community as a whole to raise loans and increased the scrutiny powers of the European Parliament. In the event, however, only this last aspect of the Commission's draft won sufficient approval from the Member States. The treaty also increased the level of budgetary control by creating an independent Court of Auditors. Both of these developments would create difficulties for the Commission in the years ahead.


The Jenkins years saw the coming together of all four of the underlying problems affecting the budgetary process. The ructions over the question of the British budgetary contribution, which would so disrupt both the latter half of the Jenkins Presidency and almost all of the time that Thorn was Commission president, are of course closely associated with the new and abrasive approach to the United Kingdom's European policy shown by Margaret Thatcher once she became prime minister in 1979. The new British leader certainly affect-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 36/1984/107, Cabinet files of President Ortolí, 'Compte-rendu par Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac de la première réunion du Groupe d'études économiques et financières dans la Communauté élargie' (GEEF), 5 June 1974.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Richard Hay, 17 August 2010.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(75) 40, 30 January 1975.

Figure 1 — CAP expenditure and total expressed in MUA (1973–77), MEUA (1978–80) and MECU (1981–86) ⁽¹⁾



Source: Strasser, D., *The Finances of Europe*, 3rd English edn, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992.

ed the style and the manner of the confrontation. But the fundamental question of how to rectify a problem that the British had been complaining about ever since they joined would have had to have been confronted by whoever was prime minister as the 1970s came to an end, since 1979 saw the termination of the various transitional arrangements which had lessened the amount that the new Member State had to contribute. James Callaghan had raised the issue with Jenkins before he lost the general election and would have been compelled to pursue it had he been re-elected ⁽²⁾. Also aggravating matters was the sharp rise in CAP expenditure. Spending on the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund had been 5 587.1 million units

of account in 1976, the final year of the Orto- li Presidency, but by 1980, Jenkins's final year in Brussels, it had more than doubled to 11 291.9 million ⁽³⁾. This seriously worsened the British budgetary predicament. The general backdrop of recession and budgetary retrenchment ruled out any hope of resolving the question of the British budget contribution by means of increasing total Community expenditure and flanking the CAP, out of which the British did not do well, with other types of expenditure from which the United Kingdom might benefit more. This possibility had been extensively discussed in the early stages of British membership and was at least one reason for the government of Edward Heath's enthusiasm for a Community regional policy. But by the end of the decade, it was no longer politically feasible to resolve the British problem in this fashion. Some form of redistri-

⁽¹⁾ In the book by Daniel Strasser, the different units of account (MUA = million units of account; MEUA = million European units of account; MECU = million European currency units) are used without being updated, in order to ensure consistency with the financial documents prepared every year by the Community institutions.

⁽²⁾ Jenkins, R., *A Life at the Centre*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 492.

⁽³⁾ See Figure 1.

bution within the existing budgetary parameters would have to be found instead.

Commission expertise and mediation would be fundamental to any solution of this sort. But providing such advice would not be easy. For a start, handling such a delicate affair would be particularly problematic for a Commission led by a Briton. Jenkins himself acknowledged this difficulty: 'at the end of 1979 and in 1980 ... I could be accused of playing a British hand and putting my full force and attention behind it. I believed that this was in the general European interest, but I doubt if this view of my motives was taken in Paris, and perhaps not in some of the other capitals either. I noticed a strain in my relations even with the Belgian government, and with some Commission colleagues too' ⁽¹⁾. The fact that the budgetary portfolio was held by the other British commissioner made matters more awkward still. In the event, however, the Commission was able to play a major role in finding a temporary solution to the issue of the British budget contribution. First it submitted a paper to the Council in September 1979 confirming that there was indeed a problem ⁽²⁾. A month later, and again on the eve of the Dublin Summit in late November, it outlined a number of possible solutions ⁽³⁾. Then, in the light of the bitter exchanges about the subject at the European Council meeting, it submitted two further communications on the issue in the first months of 1980 ⁽⁴⁾. And finally, both Jenkins himself and Émile Noël played important roles in the marathon General Affairs Council meeting on 29 and 30 May where a deal was finally struck, although credit for the breakthrough should also be shared with Emilio Colombo, the Italian foreign minister, who ably chaired the discussions, the German state secretary, Klaus von Dohnanyi, whose compromise solution finally

carried the day, and the British foreign secretary, Peter Carrington, who accepted the arrangement and was able to sell it, not without difficulty, to his reluctant prime minister. In essence what had been agreed was a mechanism to cap the British contributions for 1980 and 1981 at a level substantially lower than they would otherwise have been, and to provide a formula by which these costs would instead be borne by the other Member States. In the meantime the Commission was given a 'mandate' to search for a more durable solution to the problem. In other words, the May 1980 deal was not a solution that altered the fundamentals of the dispute. Crispin Tickell, Jenkins's head of cabinet, described the arrangement as 'a 2-year truce' ⁽⁵⁾. Responsibility for finding a longer-lasting settlement would now fall to the Thorn Commission.

The Jenkins years were also marked by a new level of interinstitutional tension over the budget. The first, and less important, manifestation of this was the row that broke out between the Commission and the EP over the Commission's 'extravagant' expenses. Also involved was the recently created Court of Auditors, which produced a critical report in July 1979. The latter provoked another round of embarrassing press stories and obliged Jenkins himself to defend the Commission's behaviour before the Parliament ⁽⁶⁾. Ultimately, the furore died down with few lasting consequences. But a warning shot had been fired about the EP's readiness to use its oversight powers. It was thus not a total surprise when later that year a much more serious dispute broke out between the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission over the EC budget — a row that would culminate in the Parliament's rejection of the draft budget on 13 December 1979 ⁽⁷⁾. This was to prove the first of a succession of bruising encounters

⁽¹⁾ Jenkins, R., *A Life at the Centre*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 492.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, COM(79) 462 final, 12 September 1979.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(79) 620 final, 14 November 1979, and COM(79) 680 final, 21 November 1979.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM(80) 50 final and COM(80) 147 final, 20 March 1980.

⁽⁵⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 20, 'Settlement of the British budgetary issue reached at the General Affairs Council of 29 and 30 May 1980', Tickell note, 29 July 1980.

⁽⁶⁾ Jenkins, R., *European Diary, 1977–81*, Collins, London, 1989, pp. 373–374, 508.

⁽⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 537–540.



In December 1979, President Jenkins became the first Commission president to see the draft of the budget rejected by the newly directly elected European Parliament.

between the new, directly elected Parliament and the other Community institutions over the budgetary process.

The ongoing sensitivity of the budgetary issue was apparent from the very start of the Thorn Presidency, with the question of who should hold the relevant portfolio becoming the most fraught issue of a famously difficult and lengthy ‘night of the long knives’. According to press reports, Thatcher herself personally intervened with the Commission president to thwart his attempt to divide the job and place special responsibility for overseeing a restructuring of the budget with Michael O’Kennedy — the Irish commissioner — rather than with Christopher Tugendhat⁽¹⁾. This battle would set the tone for a 4-year period in the course of which the dispute over how the EC should be financed would become the single most divisive issue on the Community’s agenda.

⁽¹⁾ *The Financial Times*, 9 January 1981.

Thorn’s strategy for dealing with the budgetary problem was a bold one — arguably too bold. Conscious not only that a permanent solution to the British budgetary question still needed to be found, but also that the ceaseless rise of CAP expenditure threatened to overwhelm the whole Community budget structure, he decided to use the ‘mandate’ that the Commission had been given to propose a complete overhaul of Community revenue and expenditure. As he told the European Parliament when presenting his Commission’s work programme for his first year in office, ‘I cannot accept it as an article of faith that the current ceiling on budgetary resources is sacrosanct’⁽²⁾. On 24 June 1981, he thus presented the European Council with a comprehensive package of measures, designed to break the impasse. These included plans to stimulate the European market and promote the free movement of labour, ideas to contain the growth in CAP spending, an increase in expenditure in both social and regional policy, and an additional budgetary transfer to the United Kingdom designed to address the British budgetary anomaly. All of this would have implied the end to the Community’s self-imposed ceiling for the EC budget of 1 % of total GNP⁽³⁾.

Unfortunately, few of the Member States reacted favourably to the Commission president’s proposals. The success of a package deal within a European context depends upon each of the Member States deciding that the positive aspects of the plan outweigh the negative ones. In this instance, however, the reverse appears to have occurred, with almost all of the Ten able to fasten on to some facet of the proposal that they disliked. Rather than breaking the deadlock, Thorn’s gambit had deepened it.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Presentation of the General Report for 1980 and programme of the Commission for 1981’, Address by Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission of the European Communities, to the European Parliament, Luxembourg, 11 February 1981.

⁽³⁾ Schwabe, K., ‘Gaston Thorn’ in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), *The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso*, John Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).



An increase in the percentage of VAT receipts going to the EEC was seen as part of the solution to the budgetary problems. Reaching agreement on this was not easy.

True, the plan had not been rejected out of hand, with the European Council deciding to set up a committee to suggest ways in which the scheme could be modified. But when even a much-modified version of the Commission's plan was unable to win the backing of the London European Council in November 1981, Thorn's prospects of settling the budgetary dispute seemed to have failed. Furthermore, the new president's credibility as a source of a viable solution had been seriously damaged in the process ⁽¹⁾.

The budgetary deadlock had a debilitating effect on the rest of the Thorn Presidency. This was perhaps most evident at European Council level, where successive meetings were dominated by the increasingly ill-tempered dispute. The Athens Council of December 1983 represented a nadir, with widespread talk of a Community crisis ⁽²⁾. But relations between Thorn and his fellow European Council members were also strained to near breaking point.

⁽¹⁾ Schwabe, K., 'Gaston Thorn', in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), *The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso*, John Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).

⁽²⁾ 'Athens European Council, 4–6 December: no communiqué or decision', HAEC, BAC 81/1984/13, note BIO (83) 510, EC press release, 6 December 1983. 'Despite intense preparations during the 6 months between the Stuttgart and Athens European Councils, the 10 heads of state or government, meeting in Athens on 4 December, broke up 2 days later without achieving any progress on any of the Community's vital problems. They failed to reconcile their differences over the reform of the common agricultural policy, thus stalemating any possibility of decision on revitalising the Community and the accession of Spain and Portugal.'



Presidential accord: Leo Tindemans, Piet Dankert and Gaston Thorn sign the June 1982 agreement on the Community budget.

In the aftermath of the Athens failure, the Commission president denounced the intergovernmental methods that the national leaders were resorting to in their quest for a solution and deplored a situation in which the proposed solution advanced by the Commission was flanked by multiple alternative suggestions made by individual Member States ⁽¹⁾. At a less elevated level, the rapport between the Commission and the European Parliament was also adversely affected by the battle over the budget. Tugendhat recalls the way in which his dialogue with parliamentarians was hurt by Thatcher's unpopularity amongst MEPs and their consequent sense that the best way they could hit back at the British prime minister and punish her for her perceived obstinacy was by attacking the

British commissioner ⁽²⁾. Equally seriously, the annual budgetary discussions between the institutions became so acrimonious that in June 1982 the three presidents — Gaston Thorn, Piet Dankert and Leo Tindemans — had to sign a 'treaty' stipulating exactly which categories of expenditure the Parliament was entitled to modify, and which by contrast remained untouchable ⁽³⁾.

Even after this apparent breakthrough, however, difficulties continued. In early 1983, for instance, MEPs objected strongly to the Commission's proposed supplementary budget, designed to transfer back to the United Kingdom some of its budgetary contributions ⁽⁴⁾. And in 1984 there was another

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn, President of the European Commission, following a meeting of the Athens European Council, Strasbourg, 15 December 1983.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.

⁽³⁾ *The Financial Times*, 1 July 1982.

⁽⁴⁾ *The Financial Times*, 17 January, 25 January, 27 January, 8 February and 10 February 1983.

confrontation between the Parliament and the Commission, with the draft budget once again voted down by MEPs ⁽¹⁾. The question of the British budget contribution thus blended with the continuing interinstitutional wrestling match for power between the EP and the Council of Ministers and the ongoing struggle to contain agricultural expenditure to make the passage of each annual budget a decidedly hazardous affair.

The final solution of the British budget contribution at the Fontainebleau Summit of June 1984 came too late for Thorn's Commission. It would be his successor Jacques Delors, and not the former Luxembourgish prime minister, who would benefit from the end of this long-running dispute. Furthermore, the main architect of the eventual compromise would be the French Presidency, rather than the Commission, despite the usefulness of a succession of Commission background papers. The intergovernmental methods denounced by Thorn produced the breakthrough: a formula for a British budgetary rebate that has lasted until the present day. They also slightly increased the percentage of VAT receipts that were transferred to the Community, temporarily lessening the shortage of overall funds affecting the EC. What really mattered, however, was the general lesson conveyed by this long-running affair about the need for far-reaching budgetary reform. EC progress would be all too hard to come by with so much time being lost each year in battles between the institutions over the budget. The need for what would eventually become the two key components of the Delors I package of 1988 — namely the move towards multi-annual financial perspectives and an overall raising of the ceiling for Community expenditure — had become obvious in the course of the period between 1979 and 1986.

The European Court of Auditors

The European Court of Auditors has officially been the independent body responsible for auditing all of the Community's finances since 25 October 1977, when it began to operate. The Court of Auditors was established by the treaty of 22 July 1975 and replaced the Audit Board, which had been responsible since 1957 for the external audit of EEC and EAEC finances, and the auditor of the ECSC. The usual practice is that the Court, based in Luxembourg, is composed of one member from each Member State, appointed by the Council after consultation with Parliament. Its members, who are generally drawn from national external audit institutions and appointed for a renewable term of 6 years, elect one of their number as president; the first president was Michael N. Murphy from Ireland.


After every financial year the Court prepares an annual report on the general budget of the Communities. The annual report, which also contains the reactions by the Community institutions to the Court's comments, has been published in the Official Journal since 1977.

Revenue

Although at the outset the budget of the Communities was exclusively funded by financial contributions from the Member States using a distribution key, since the 1971 financial year it has been partly funded by own resources, pursuant to a Council decision of 21 April 1970. These amounts, which are collected by the Member States and then paid to the Communities, accounted for half of revenue as early as 1973 and have been increasing annually; they consist of agricultural levies in the form of customs duties on imports of agricultural products from non-member countries, levies on sugar and isoglucose arising also from the operation of the CAP and customs duties resulting from the application of the common customs tariff to the customs value of goods imported from non-member countries. VAT (calculated on a harmonised base and levied at a maximum rate of 1 %) has been added to the revenue from these three sources since

⁽¹⁾ *The Financial Times*, 14 December 1984.

Figure 2 — Expenditure trend expressed in MUA (1973–77), MEUA (1978–80) and MECU (1981–86)



NB: For the trend in EAGGF guarantee expenditure, see Figure 1, p. 248.

Source: Strasser, D., *The Finances of Europe*, 3rd English edition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, appendices.

1979, marking an end to the contributions from the Member States.

Although the own resources system was intended to grant the Communities greater financial independence, it nonetheless led to much more restricted room for manoeuvre than before. The balanced budget, which was enshrined in Article 199 of the EEC Treaty, could now only be achieved by varying

the rate of VAT, whereas under the system of contributions from the Member States the total amount of the contributions could simply be adjusted to match the budgeted expenditure.


At the beginning of the 1980s, uncontrolled agricultural expenditure, the impasse caused by the 'British problem' (see above for details), a fall in the income from own resources and the expansion of

certain policies, while necessary, put an unavoidable strain on the Community budget, which was in deficit for the 1984 and 1985 financial years. The agreement reached at the Fontainebleau European Council meeting on 24 June 1985 raised the maximum rate of VAT to be mobilised to 1.4 %, which provided a temporary solution to the problem. However, it was thanks to the Brussels agreements of 11, 12 and 13 February 1988 that a lasting solution was found, i.e. a system combining financial contributions (based on GNP) and own resources.

Expenditure


With the exception of expenditure linked to the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Development Fund (EDF), for which it laid down a specific *modus operandi*, the EEC Treaty did not include any specific provision relating to the management of the financial interventions that the Community institutions were called on to make. However, the institutions' room for manoeuvre was far from absolute. That was the case, for example,

Figure 3 — Allocation of the budget by sector, 1973



Source: Strasser, D., *The Finances of Europe*, 3rd English edition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, appendices.

Figure 4 — Allocation of the budget by sector, 1986



Source: Strasser, D., *The Finances of Europe*, 3rd English edition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, appendices.

Implementation of the general budget of the European Communities: expenditure														
	Millions of units of account (MUA)					Millions of European units of account (MEUA)			Millions of ECU (MECU)					
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Commission operations	188.7	231.0	271.5	323.3	369.6	495.5	551.9	569.9	637.1	703.8	737.8	805.3	876.3	1 003.2
Other institutions' operations	56.6	75.2	92.5	107.4	132.0	191.1	223.7	260.0	304.7	344.4	370.4	407.6	431.5	530.7
EAGGF 'Guarantee' section	3 614.4	3 459.8	4 327.7	5 636.7	6 587.1	8 679.3	10 387.1	11 291.9	11 063.7	12 259.8	15 785.8	18 330.4	19 727.8	22 118.1
Structural Funds	259.1	281.8	375.3	623.8	685.5	1 388.7	1 515.5	1 808.5	3 566.8	4 570.1	4 081.3	3 220.0	3 702.9	5 664.7
Energy/industry/research/transport policy	68.8	83.0	95.7	110.7	150.6	208.0	205.1	274.3	256.5	365.8	426.3	494.5	520.7	627.2
Cooperation policy	63.3	358.5	250.9	202.8	194.1	313.2	443.7	603.9	738.4	891.2	901.3	996.5	963.8	1 057.3
Other policies	1.3	27.3	20.2	16.5	30.2	58.9	62.5	89.9	55.1	71.5	91.92	1 165.5	157.2	148.2
Repayments to Member States	249.7	306.8	374.1	523.7	568.9	667.9	766.5	847.9	966.6	1 066.4	1 050.0	1 082.5	1 071.5	3 095.5
Other	3.3	3.0	9.0	17.9	17.9	39.2	64.7	111.0	137.1	196.6	233.9	579.1	418.6	430.5
Total	4 505.2	4 826.4	5 816.9	7 562.8	8 735.9	12 041.8	14 220.7	15 746.3	17 726.0	20 469.6	24 506.0	27 081.4	27 870.3	34 675.4

Implementation of the general budget of the European Communities: revenue																
	Millions of units of account (MUA)					Millions of European units of account (MEUA)			Millions of ECU (MECU)							
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986		
Agricultural levies	411.3	255.0	510.4	1 035.2	1 576.1	1 872.7	1 678.6	1 535.4	1 264.9	1 522.0	1 475.4	1 946.7	1 121.7	1 175.5		
Sugar levies	99.0	75.1	79.7	128.5	202.4	406.2	464.9	466.9	482.5	705.8	958.5	1 003.3	1 057.4	1 043.2		
Customs duties	1 986.3	2 737.6	3 151.0	4 064.5	3 927.2	4 390.9	5 189.1	5 905.7	6 392.4	6 815.3	7 234.6	7 623.5	8 310.1	8 173.0		
Value added tax							4 737.7	7 258.5	9 187.8	12 000.5	13 691.0	14 565.9	15 218.9	22 223.4		
Financial contributions	2 267.9	1 914.0	2 164.6	2 490.9	2 503.2	5 340.3	2 312.9	12.8	165.8	208.9	231.5	176	1 927.1	224.5		
Other revenue	47.5	55.1	307.9	274.1	275.8	167.2	219.3	886.2	955.7	174.9	1 470.1	204.5	449.9	827.6		
Total	4 812.0	5 036.8	6 213.6	7 993.2	8 484.7	12 177.3	14 602.5	16 065.5	18 449.1	21 427.4	25 061.1	25 361.5	28 085.1	33 667.2		

with expenditure linked to administrative operations (staff costs, infrastructure costs, etc.). ‘Calculated in great detail and with a high degree of accuracy’ ⁽¹⁾, it accounted for a minuscule share of total Community expenditure (approximately 5 %), with on average two thirds being associated with the Commission.

The same applied to EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ section expenditure and repayment to the Member States of 10 % of the amounts paid as own resources. Since the amounts were the result of a payment obligation, they were set almost automatically. In the case of the agricultural market guarantee policy, this binding mechanism finally resulted in the major budgetary difficulties referred to above.

The figures given above are taken from the book by Daniel Strasser, *The Finances of Europe* ⁽²⁾. They show

clearly that the period from 1973 to 1986 was characterised by a steady, widespread increase in expenditure. The agriculture sector is worthy of attention because the amount of expenditure associated with the EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ section accounted for some two thirds of all spending. It was therefore by far the largest budget heading. The other large budget ‘blocks’ concerned the social and regional sectors (included under the heading ‘Structural Funds’; the ERDF was added from 1975), the energy/research/industry/transport sector and cooperation.

It should be noted that the expenditure figures until 1980 relate to implementation (utilisation of payment appropriations). From 1981, they relate to adopted commitment appropriations.

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⁽¹⁾ Strasser, D., *The Finances of Europe*, 3rd English edn, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, p. 155.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.



Part Four

The Commission at work: policies and actions

Introduction

The years 1973–86 lay between two phases of strong progress: the 1960s, which saw the rapid implementation of the Treaty of Rome, and the second half of the 1980s, which followed on from the Single European Act and led to the Treaty of Maastricht. Consequently, the perception we have of the period in question suffers from the comparison with these two phases and it is often seen as a time of inaction or stalemate. The following chapters show that this is a short-sighted and largely unjustified view of things.

The period was definitely not without its difficulties. The crisis in the international monetary system and the energy crisis, followed by a collapse in economic growth and a series of sectoral crises, prompted both societies and countries to adopt a defensive attitude, making initiatives at Community level more difficult to undertake: this was unavoidably reflected in the Commission's activity. At the international level there was also mounting tension, in trade and in relations with developing countries, as well as in the situation in the Middle East and in East–West relations. However, the Commission did much more than simply monitor and analyse these new trends: fresh common policies were launched, older ones were revamped or reworked and a greater

consistency of its overall action gave rise to a global vision of an increasingly political nature.

The Ortoli years were marked by a twofold trend: the lead given by the Member States at the Paris Summit in October 1972 called for new initiatives, which were made more difficult to implement by the crisis. A number of policies were nevertheless relaunched or redeployed, such as social policy, transport policy and development aid. Others, such as regional policy and environment policy, were created.

The second half of the 1970s saw moves to bring greater consistency to this range of policies. This was prompted by a worsening of the world economic crisis, which was by then viewed as a long-term phenomenon, prompting a change to an economic model essentially imported from the English-speaking world. However, the Commission also had to take account of input from the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC). The Jenkins and Thorn years were thus characterised by more dynamic and consistent action by the Commission. Its 1978 action plan ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter 12, 'Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy'.

expressly linked completion of the single market to the renewal of economic and industrial structures, research and development policy and social policy. In the following years, this global vision was further consolidated and, at an internal level, the transport, energy, environment and regional policies can be considered a part of this. The same can be said of the development of the Commission's action in the international sphere: the relaunch of the internal market was closely linked to the reopening of multilateral trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and cooperation policy to general political considerations.

In all these areas, the Commission took full advantage of its power of initiative. Where it had seemed for a time to be at a disadvantage in relation to the Member States, it took action to increase its expertise and resources in order to play a greater role: this was the case with monetary issues and political cooperation. Consequently, practically all of the actions taken which were central to the renewed impetus of the second half of the 1980s can be traced back to the preceding years. The inherently political turning point of 1985 can only be properly understood against this backdrop.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE

Chapter 12

Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy

Very early on in the work of the Commission, a debate arose on the respective roles of the market and industrial policy intervention. Should market forces be left to operate freely? Or should fundamental economic trends be accompanied by flanking policies, if possible at Community level? If so, should this mean that, under certain conditions, certain types of aid could be exempt from competition policy rules ⁽¹⁾? Over the years, the Commission's interventions had extended into new areas, not always with a clear sense of direction, which sometimes gave the impression 'that there was no

policy' ⁽²⁾. For instance, it tended to make frequent use — too frequent, in the eyes of the business community — of the infringement procedure in competition matters. A period of crisis marked by an economic downturn and the challenging of existing structures and methods forced a complete restart. This resulted in the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, which streamlined a wide range of policies under one overarching vision. It confirmed the market logic while pursuing interconnected and targeted policies of intervention. The aim was to bring about a structural shift in the European economy, which had become urgent because of external competitive pressure from the United States and Japan.

⁽¹⁾ Bussière, É, 'An improbable industrial policy', in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 457–470.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

Towards a new dynamic

Some elements of this new vision had their roots in earlier years. The 1970 Colonna memorandum had already tried to link the completion of the internal market to the pursuit of industrial policy objectives as a prerequisite for the emergence of global-scale European companies. It already listed the granting of aid to certain sectors and the use of national procurement programmes as instruments to stimulate industrial restructuring. This comprehensive approach was endorsed by the Paris Summit in October 1972, but the action programme proposed by Commissioner Altiero Spinelli, adopted in December 1973, did not yield any concrete results. Plans

to integrate major national industrial programmes under a Community umbrella, for example in the fields of aerospace and uranium enrichment ⁽¹⁾, came to nothing. The failure of the Unidata project in the IT field epitomised this impasse, which revealed differences of opinion within the Commission itself and diverging interests between Member States ⁽²⁾. The overall outcome of the mid-1970s was disappointing. Neo-protectionism within the common market itself was rife, the prevailing mood was in favour of renationalising economic policies and the global position of the European advanced-technology industries slipped. The Commission, subject to pressures from Member States and public opinion, was not able to counteract these trends, particularly in crisis-hit sectors ‘where a number of discriminatory national policies were accepted on social grounds’ ⁽³⁾.

When Roy Jenkins took office as Commission president, European citizens were much more aware of the depth of the crisis than in 1973. As the old Keynesian recovery methods failed wherever they were tried, priority was now given to renovating industrial structures at European level and no longer at national level alone. This gave the Commission an opportunity to make a fresh start in a favourable intellectual climate. The vision that emerged after the first few years of crisis was a comprehensive one. The Commission’s action programme for 1978 brought together the relaunch of economic and monetary union (EMU), the completion of the single market and a series of structural and social policies under one comprehensive vision, thus striking a balance between market dynamics and targeted intervention ⁽⁴⁾. This new synthesis was typified



The impressive range of powers of Vice-President Étienne Davignon. (Published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 431, 18 March 1982, p. 5.)

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Ernesto Previdi, 12 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Griset, P., ‘Nous ne vieillirons pas ensemble. Unidata et la coopération industrielle franco-allemande au début des années 1970’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La crise des années 1970: De la conférence de La Haye à la veille de la relance des années 1980*, ‘Euroclio’ collection, Vol. 35, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006, pp. 287–314.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM(78) 52, 14 February 1978, p. 26 and annex, p. 4.

by the concept of positive adjustment — granting aid for restructuring then a return to the market — which was applied in rescuing crisis-hit sectors ⁽¹⁾. Even the hardest defenders of market liberalism accepted certain types of intervention, especially those aimed at Europeanising technology, through an active approach to standards ⁽²⁾. Nonetheless, Étienne Davignon, commissioner for the internal market, customs union and industry from 1977 onwards, thought this whole policy dovetailed with the treaty's fundamental pragmatism: 'We had to go back to a goal that we had aimed for but had failed to achieve' ⁽³⁾.

The organisation chart adopted by the Commission in 1977 allowed the internal market and industrial policy to be considered under one overarching vision, in contrast to what had existed since 1973. The merger of the relevant directorates-general (DGs) meant a return to a situation previously known to Fernand Braun, the new director-general, under Commissioner Guido Colonna di Paliano ⁽⁴⁾. It enabled the two DGs to consolidate their unity of vision in the handling of complex matters in sustained dialogue with the DGs responsible for external relations (on GATT-related issues), for economic and financial affairs, under Ortolí's authority, and for competition. This concern for coherence continued when the Thorn Commission took office in 1981. The internal market portfolio changed hands from Étienne Davignon to Karl-Heinz Narjes, who was also entrusted with industrial innovation and the customs union, while Davignon was put in charge of industrial affairs, energy and scientific research. Importantly, industrial affairs and the internal market continued to be covered by the same DG (DG III), still



Cover page of the magazine *30 jours de l'Europe* on the third industrial revolution in Europe (March 1980).

led by Braun and now under the joint authority of Davignon and Narjes ⁽⁵⁾. This structural continuity was matched by the continuity of objectives that characterised this whole period: the completion of the internal market was the precondition for and key to Europe's industrial revival, which had to be supported by targeted interventions.

In the same vein as the 1978 action programme, the 'Report on some structural aspects of growth', published in June of the same year, stated that 'secure, unhampered access to a continental-size market ... remains one of the main sources of impetus for industrial change' ⁽⁶⁾. In October 1981, a new communication from the Commission, entitled 'A

⁽¹⁾ Van Laer, A., 'Quelle politique industrielle pour l'Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)', in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, p. 14.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, COM(78) 255, 22 June 1978, quoted by Van Laer, A., 'Quelle politique industrielle pour l'Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)', in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, p. 14.

Community strategy to develop Europe's industry', elaborated on the same comprehensive idea ⁽¹⁾. The aim was to create a genuine European industrial space by developing a single set of standards and opening up public tenders. This framework would be used to boost investment in new technologies by grouping procurement orders as part of an industrial policy pursued at Community level. This strategy was again set forth by the Commission at a special Council meeting held in September 1983 to discuss strengthening the international competitiveness of European business, and was eventually incorporated in the economic union programme adopted at Fontainebleau in June 1984 ⁽²⁾. The Delors Commission programme, endorsed by the Council meetings in Brussels on 29 and 30 March 1985, largely followed in the latter's footsteps.

The internal market and industrial strategy

The completion of the internal market was the first prong of this comprehensive programme. It was vast in scope, dealing with the free movement of persons — in their professional capacity — services and goods, but also with the legal environment in which businesses operated. In many respects the Commission's progress had been stalling for several years, especially in lifting technical barriers to the free movement of goods. The method of harmonising national technical regulations, which had been applied from the very beginning, ran up against difficulties due to the growing complexity of products and the Member States using regulations to neo-protectionist ends ⁽³⁾. Member States

had not been able to use customs duties since 1968 and had replaced them with a host of non-tariff barriers (technical barriers to trade) in order to limit imports to their domestic markets. This made the Commission's task difficult. The draft directives resulting from harmonisation procedures run by dozens of working groups of national officials and experts were very detailed because 'every comma had its history and its reason, such as protecting a local industry or stopping others from entering a certain market'. Since the final Council decision was taken by unanimity, 'everybody had to be either satisfied or dissatisfied for there to be an agreement' ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission dealt with neo-protectionist measures not only by appealing to reason and issuing repeated warnings, but above all by launching litigation procedures against several Member States at the same time, referred to as high-impact operations, and by pursuing non-contentious solutions through meetings with national government departments, known as package meetings. These actions, undertaken with the support of the European Parliament, were occasionally successful but failed to reverse the trend.

The well-known *Cassis de Dijon* judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 20 February 1979 gave the Commission the lever to bring about a real paradigm shift. The Court considered that restrictions to the free movement of goods could be authorised only in exceptional cases justified by the protection of public health, the protection of consumers or reasons of general interest. It introduced the principle of the mutual recognition of regulations (technical rules, procedures, certificates, etc.) between Member States in the absence of binding common rules. Under this principle, goods legally produced and traded in one Member State could be sold without any further checks in any other. Commission departments drew Davignon's attention to the potential impact

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(81) 639, 29 October 1981.

⁽²⁾ Van Laer, A., 'Quelle politique industrielle pour l'Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)', in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirrmann, S. (eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, pp. 21–22.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010.

of this decision, even though some officials were wary of upsetting Member States. Davignon nonetheless decided to make this principle the basis of a new policy following a memorable speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in September 1979 ⁽¹⁾. A year later, the Commission adopted an ‘interpretative communication on the consequences of the *Cassis de Dijon* judgment’, which allowed a return to the border-opening dynamic: ‘Our interpretation of the *Cassis de Dijon* case-law consisted in reversing the burden of proof ... This completely altered the approach taken by the Commission’ ⁽²⁾.

From then on, the Commission worked on the basis of the mutual recognition principle laid down by the Court of Justice. It abandoned the detailed regulations of the 1970s in favour of a new approach to harmonisation, limited by essential health and safety requirements. At the same time, it referred to the European technical standards issued by the European standardisation bodies CEN (European Committee for Standardisation) and Cenelec (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation) or, in the absence of such standards, to national standards (under the reference to standards procedure). In so doing, the Commission abandoned its previous approach aimed at creating uniform ‘euro products’, and favoured the preservation of traditional national products and, thus, national consumer identities. But through the work of the main European standardisation bodies, the Commission also aimed to ‘quickly bolster European standardisation capabilities’, especially vis-à-vis the United States ⁽³⁾.

The Commission’s two main political objectives thus came together: the creation of a single European market and the emergence of major industri-

al players able to spread their standards on a global scale, especially in the fast-moving technology sector. The immediate result of this new approach was a substantial cut in the regulatory workload: ‘a whole series of directives, which had been held up in the Council for several years without any progress being made, disappeared altogether’ as they had become redundant ⁽⁴⁾. In addition, the Commission was able to replace the highly detailed directives on the freedom of establishment of professional people and the mutual recognition of diplomas by a single directive of 1988 on the mutual recognition of higher-education diplomas for studies of at least 3-years’ duration. The Commission also managed to improve its efficiency by securing Council agreement to a directive on the provision of information about technical standards and regulations which allowed potential new barriers to trade to be identified and eliminated before they came into force ⁽⁵⁾. By mid-1984, on the basis of the progress made in less than a year, the Commission was able to claim that ‘the completion of the internal market is again within reach if we pursue our policy with determination’ ⁽⁶⁾. In his memoirs, Jacques Delors stressed that, by replacing harmonisation with the principle of mutual recognition, the *Cassis de Dijon* judgment enabled Objective 1992, namely an internal market without frontiers, to be met ⁽⁷⁾.

The choice to act on structures was also prompted by the experiences of the 1960s. The European level had to assert itself against interventionist policies at national level which led to distortions of competition contrary to the treaty, over-investment and duplication. For any action to be effective, it

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010; Written contribution by Alfonso Mattera Ricigliano, provided on 19 September 2012.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Eighteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1984*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, p. 86.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, *Eighteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1984*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, p. 85 (Directive 83/189/EEC).

⁽⁶⁾ Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, p. 14.

⁽⁷⁾ Ibid.

had to be taken at Community level, and had to be comprehensive: ‘when devising a policy, e.g. in support of the textile sector, it should include an external element, a social element, a competition element and a regional element’ ⁽¹⁾. These areas of intervention were interdependent, involved directorates-general with potentially different cultures and had to converge in dynamic compromises: ‘If an industry was not restructured, there would be no reason whatsoever for external protection. But if an industry was determined to restructure itself with the support of governments, we could protect it for a certain length of time’ ⁽²⁾.

The Commission proceeded by seeking to scale up certain sector-specific interventions to Community level. It targeted sectors affected by the crisis of the 1970s in their very structure and existence. Thus, under the ‘Davignon plan’, the restructuring of the steel industry was gradually taken in hand from 1977 onwards. The first task was to coordinate the application of lower production quotas, minimum prices and restrictions of imports from outside Europe, all of which needed to include a social element. A decisive step was taken when, in October 1980, the

Commission declared that there was a manifest crisis within the meaning of Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty and imposed mandatory quotas. National initiatives in this area were made subject to a code on aid, while Community support was granted for economic conversion. The Davignon plan was supposed to end in 1985 but was extended to 1988, when the companies were returned to the market. This type of action could not be undertaken without the sustained involvement of the industry, which is why the European steel industry association (Association européenne de la sidérurgie, Eurofer) was set up in late 1976 (see box, page 269–270). Similar policies were launched for the textile and shipbuilding industries, but they were less detailed as the Commission’s legal basis in these fields was weak. For the textile industry, the Commission relied on the multifibre agreements negotiated under the GATT. These allowed the sector to be placed under temporary protection while receiving several types of aid ⁽³⁾. In the same way as for the steel industry, the purpose of this aid was to enable companies to face up to international competition. It was not meant to become permanent, but was aimed at ‘achieving a point where it would no longer be necessary’ ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010.

⁽³⁾ Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (Eds), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, p. 16.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

Eurofer

When the impact of the crisis in the steel industry started to be strongly felt, the Commission, in choosing to come to the rescue of the ailing sector, took care to avoid the errors of the past. A decade earlier, in an effort to tackle the first worrying signs of overproduction, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority had resorted to secretly encouraging the establishment of a European cartel modelled on the International Steel Entente (EIA) of the inter-war years, without, however, providing the business associations with the support needed for success. Company heads had been disappointed by this lukewarm attitude and had turned their backs on the Community, seeking refuge with their respective governments. These tried, as best they could, to protect their industries against competitors within the common market through employment protection schemes and other hidden subsidies that flouted the spirit of the treaties. This resulted in a resurgence of national egoisms and nearly led to the Europe of solidarity being rendered powerless.

Aware of this danger, Henri Simonet and his successor Étienne Davignon did not want to repeat these errors. In order to avoid a complete free-for-all between the nine national producer groups, within these groups and between group member companies and outsiders, they set out to involve the corporate world as closely as possible in the restructuring effort ⁽¹⁾. To that end, the steel industry club (Club des sidérurgistes), tainted with the image of a secret society representing big capital, was asked to reform itself in order to act as single spokesman for the main steel producers in the European Economic Community in their contacts with the Commission and its DG for Industry. The revamp was completed on 9 December 1976, when the articles of incorporation were finalised. Like the EIA before it, the not-for-profit association chose to have its headquarters in Luxembourg. However, since the new body dealt with Commission departments on a daily basis, it was not long before it decided to establish its secretariat-general in the Belgian capital.

The governance and oversight of Eurofer's activities was conducted by a board of 19 directors, chaired by one member elected for a standard 2-year term. Day-to-day business was handled by a team of some 20 full-time staff members divided into four directorates, which became six from mid-1979 onwards. In carrying out their tasks, they were assisted and guided by some



Commissioner Étienne Davignon faced with the steel crisis in Europe (March 1979).

15 standing committees, which led lives of their own within Eurofer. These were convened on both a regular and an ad hoc basis to discuss any topic on which the steel industry might act collectively (external relations, general objectives, social issues, transport, scrap, etc.). In addition, working groups of Eurofer and Commission experts prepared files to be discussed at ECSC Consultative Committee meetings or during contacts between national producer groups' chairpersons and Davignon.

The actual anti-crisis policy, notably the setting of sales prices and the establishment of quarterly production programmes, came under the remit of the steering committee, which was composed of the 'sales managers of all participating companies at the most senior level' ⁽²⁾. The committee collected and collated all useful sales and order data sent to it by half a dozen subcommittees working on each of the individual products covered by the Eurofer agreements (long products, wire rods, coils, mining sheet metal, etc.). On

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Giacomo Giacomello, 6 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ Luxembourg steel grouping, crisis management agreement in force from 1 January 1981.

▶ that basis, it established the steel industry's common positions and tactics in its dealings both with customers and with the various task forces of the Commission. It would obviously have been no use to try to stem the collapse of the steel markets without maximum coordination between the policies pursued by the private sector and the public guidelines handed down by the Community authorities ⁽¹⁾.

Overall, cooperation between the senior echelons of the Commission and Eurofer seems to have worked fairly well. This was a point on which almost all agreed,

although the steel industry was not always candid with its interlocutors in Brussels, who in the same way continued to distrust factory bosses during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Maurice Schaeffer, the director responsible for steel in DG III, 'the Commission wanted to uphold its independence from the industry'. This even meant that 'while Davignon was receiving suggestions from Eurofer, which were often well founded', he and his aides 'were also carrying out studies to keep a check on Eurofer' ⁽²⁾.

Charles Barthel



Cover page of *Euroforum* on the rise of new technologies in Europe (1980).

In the early 1980s, Community action expanded strongly into the area of high-technology industries. This move was part of a comprehensive vision which, according to Étienne Davignon, had a substantial political element to it: 'There absolutely needed to be a positive dimension, and therefore I was very much in favour of having a second pillar' ⁽³⁾. The Commission took action in the form of a series of programmes, the first of which, launched from 1976 onwards, were limited in size. They became much more ambitious from 1983–84 onwards with the Esprit programme targeted at the IT industry, with a budget of ECU 750 million, and later with the RACE and BRITE programmes. These programmes combined the common market logic with scientific research, which would contribute notably to establishing common technical standards, essential to the development of a European industry. They brought together academics and industrialists, whereas until 1984 the Commission had tried to win Member States over to the idea of grouping their procurement orders, in particular in the IT and telecommunications sectors, in order to spark the emergence of European industrial groups large enough to meet this demand ⁽⁴⁾.

Whether dealing with aid measures for sectors under threat or support for new technologies, all of these policies were pursued in permanent and close

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Maurice Schaeffer, 11 April 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 13, 'Research: towards a new common policy', on these topics.

consultation with industrialists. In certain sectors, the dialogue often resulted from industrialists challenging the Commission. But it was also initiated by the Commission encouraging industrialists to get together at Community level to back its projects. The setting-up of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) in 1983 was the outcome of a joint initiative by Ortoli and Davignon. It would go on to support the implementation of the internal market for a number of years ⁽¹⁾.

The dynamic of the Single European Act

The completion of the internal market was the cornerstone of the programme presented by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 14 January 1985. In his speech, Delors hinted at a political shift: 'Is it over-optimistic to announce a decision to eliminate all frontiers within Europe and to implement it? ... Those who have nothing to propose are soon forgotten or held in contempt. Those who do not have the means to match their ambitions are rapidly reduced to tagging along behind' ⁽²⁾. However, this shift had little bearing on the objectives. The substance of those pursued by the Commission for many years would be maintained, as evidenced by the Commission's internal market consolidation programme of June 1984 and the targets that it set itself for 1985 ⁽³⁾, both of which documents were drawn up on the initiative of Commissioner Narjes ⁽⁴⁾. They show that the aim was to make a step change similar to that



Étienne Davignon (fifth from left) and François-Xavier Ortoli (third from left) attend the launch of the European Round Table of Industrialists (7 April 1983).

which led to the customs union in the 1960s. This would be achieved by abolishing formalities at internal borders, making technical and tax regulations converge, setting up a single legal framework for businesses and ensuring the free movement of persons and capital.

The main innovation of Objective 1992 lay in its political nature and the effect this had in stimulating and guiding Commission departments to ensure its implementation. This political dimension was strongly conveyed by Arthur Cockfield, the new commissioner in charge, in an internal letter of 21 January 1985 which refers to an 'important window of opportunity' to complete the internal market ⁽⁵⁾. In a more detailed memorandum of 1 February 1985, he pointed out that the Commission bore responsibility to the people of Europe and that it should clearly explain what the objective was. In effect, the narrative was reversed from the past: it was now less about lifting obstacles and more about building a large free-trade market that

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010; Van Apeldoorn, B., *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 224; Cowles, M. G., 'Setting the agenda for a new Europe: the ERT and EC 1992', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 33, No 4, 1995, pp. 521–526.

⁽²⁾ Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 14 January 1985, quoted by Alfonso Mattera Ricigliano in his written contribution of 19 September 2012.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/25, COM(84) 305, 4 June 1984.

⁽⁴⁾ Vignon, J., 'Sept ans pour construire le vrai Marché commun', *Economie prospective internationale*, No 25, 1986, pp. 6–23.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from A. Fortescue to Fernand Braun, Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 21 January 1985.

would bring a new dynamic: ‘We must capture the imagination of our people’ ⁽¹⁾.

The decision taken by the Commission on 27 February 1985 to present the programme for the completion of the internal market in the form of a White Paper confirmed the political nature of the exercise. Its rationale was explained by Cockfield in a short letter to the three main directorates-general concerned: the White Paper was to present the Commission’s views on what needed to be done regardless of the foreseeable objections from Member States. The customs union had been achieved through the political will of the founders in the 1960s; the Community now had to show the same resolve when it came to completing the internal market ⁽²⁾.

The way in which Cockfield spread the new dynamic among his departments shows how much it was at the heart of the new Commission’s political agenda. He acted with speed, put his staff under constant pressure and pursued the internal market operation with ‘a kind of mathematical logic’ ⁽³⁾. As early as 21 January 1985, he invited Fernand Braun, Ole Bus Henriksen (DG XV (Financial Institutions and Taxation)) and Friedrich Klein (Customs Union Service) to a restricted meeting for which he asked each of them to draft an exploratory paper ⁽⁴⁾. On 22 January, Rolf Möhler (DG III) sent his first thoughts to Fernand Braun ⁽⁵⁾. A meeting on 24 January produced a joint short paper by Cockfield and Narjes which was sent to Delors’ private office on 25 January ⁽⁶⁾. On 1 February, Cockfield urgently ordered the

circulation of a 6-page memo in which he mapped out his ideas on the course of action to be taken ⁽⁷⁾. On 28 February, following the Commission meeting of the day before at which the decision to draw up a White Paper was taken, he again brought together Braun, Henriksen and Klein to agree on the document’s main strands. DG III was put in charge of coordinating the drafting. To that end, as early as 19 March, Fernand Braun convened a meeting between the representatives of the 10 directorates-general concerned. They were asked to have their contributions ready by 29 March and an interdepartmental meeting was scheduled for mid-April for a first review. In DG III, Fernand Braun encouraged his staff and, if necessary, even chased them up to meet the deadlines ⁽⁸⁾. The White Paper’s general structure was completed in time and sent for feedback to the DGs concerned on 24 April.

This means that it took just over 3 months to decide on the overall organisational framework of the process of completing the internal market. The speed with which it was done made for a political shift, albeit one which was anticipated and wished for by Commission departments and which could not have been achieved without drawing on the wealth of reflection work conducted over the previous years. In a memo to his colleague Henriksen responding to various draft proposals for directives on alcohol taxation, Braun clearly stated his opposition to harmonisation being referred to as the only means to achieve free movement between Member States. Instead, as already set out in the June 1984 Commission programme for the internal market, he suggested reducing the need for making laws uniform ⁽⁹⁾. As the process got under way, Braun perfectly summed up the spirit that was now guiding

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from Arthur Cockfield, 1 February 1985.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Arthur Cockfield to Fernand Braun, Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 28 February 1985.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Michel Petite, 24 November 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1991/27, Memo from A. Fortescue to Fernand Braun, Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 21 January 1985.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Rolf Möhler to Fernand Braun, 22 January 1985.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Short paper by Arthur Cockfield and Karl-Heinz Narjes, 24 January 1985.

⁽⁷⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from Arthur Cockfield, 1 February 1985.

⁽⁸⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Fernand Braun to his departments, 3 April 1985.

⁽⁹⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/24, Memo from Fernand Braun to Ole Bus Henriksen, DG XV, 19 November 1984.



'For the final time and on general demand, I will talk to you about the Single Act': cartoon by Plantu on the Single European Act (1986).

the Commission in a reminder sent to his staff on 25 March: 'I do not expect from you a mere digest of the measures already included in last year's internal market consolidation programme ... the key element of your contributions should rather take the form of an overview of all the actions to be completed by 1992' ⁽¹⁾.

The comprehensive nature of the new policy initiated in January 1985 was explained by Rolf Möhler in his exploratory paper of 22 January. The objective went 'beyond the mere lifting of border formalities' and had to 'include all other obstacles to the functioning of a single internal market', the free movement of products, services, capital and persons, and the implementation of a European policy on inter-company cooperation. However, when fleshing out the programme, account had to be taken of the action timetable laid down by the Commission

in June 1984 ⁽²⁾. Cockfield spelled out the method more precisely in his memo of 28 February: the idea was not to seek uniformity between national rules, but to pursue pragmatic solutions that enabled the stated objective to be met at lower cost and in less time.

Raising public awareness of the expected benefits from meeting Objective 1992 was a key part of the political information campaign that supported it. The 'cost of non-Europe' had been communicated to the public for several years, in particular through the Albert and Ball report drawn up on the initiative of the European Parliament in 1982, which calculated this cost as 2 % of the Community's gross domestic product (GDP) ⁽³⁾. The approach taken in 1985 was not so much aimed at gauging the overall cost

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Fernand Braun to his departments, 3 April 1985.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Rolf Möhler to Fernand Braun, 22 January 1985. Möhler also pointed out that 'the proposals on the internal market put forward by Mr Dekker (the Philips chairman) at a conference [a bit earlier] organised at the CEPS should be looked at in detail'.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, DG III, Note for the file by T.-L. Margue, DG III, 17 April 1985.



A visit by Commissioner Spinelli and his team to the Airbus factories in Toulouse (1974).

of non-Europe from a macroeconomic perspective, which was deemed too uncertain; instead, it tried to assess case by case the costs companies incurred due to various types of barriers when operating within the Community. In Cockfield's view, the purpose was to demonstrate and educate. To President Delors, this also fitted into the comprehensive vision of a revamped European project encompassing currency, research, goods and persons from the 'ultimate perspective of European union' ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission's White Paper, which was completed in the space of 3 months, was adopted by the Milan European Council of June 1985, 2 weeks after it had been transmitted to the latter. It sought to have three types of frontier removed by 31 December 1992: physical frontiers (customs frontiers, including border controls), technical frontiers (through the application of the principle of mutual recognition) and fiscal frontiers. To achieve this, it

The automobile industry: from the American to the Japanese challenge

The automobile industry has always been at the forefront of European integration. Not only did it participate indirectly in the negotiation of the treaties, but it also played a pioneering role in setting up a European association representing its largest firms, namely the Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors (CCMC), the precursor to the current European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (EAMA). The committee was set up in 1972 at the direct request of Robert Toulemon, the then director-general for industrial affairs, in order to allow the Commission to deal directly with the large European multinationals without including the American firms represented in the Liaison Committee of Automobile Manufacturers (LCMA), established in 1958. Ever since the EEC was founded, European car manufacturers had turned to the Commission to seek agreements that would help them in their unequal battle with the larger and financially more powerful American car industry. This American challenge was the concern of the day when the CCMC was established in Paris on 18 May 1972 on the initiative of Pierre Dreyfus, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Renault, the French publicly owned company. The CCMC's main goal was to develop European safety and environmental standards by setting up a European supranational agency, the Bureau technique des véhicules. The aim was to prevent American standards from being imposed on the European market. This obviously meant deepening the internal market, which the Commission would not achieve until the Single European Act was implemented.

The Commission played a major role in tackling the competitive challenges from the United States and Japan thanks to the initiatives by Altiero Spinelli and François-Xavier Ortoli, who very soon met with Giovanni Agnelli, the CCMC's new chairman. He and his brother Umberto would become the staunchest advocates of the European cause and would go on to plead firmly for a European industrial policy along the lines of the ECSC, with the Commission in a central role. In 1974, Spinelli suggested to Ortoli that the automobile sector be made a showcase for the policy he had presented in May 1973. In December 1974, DG III followed this up by starting to work on an industrial policy centred on the conversion of the sector using social and regional aid and European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, and providing for the establishment of a European automobile institute. This resulted, in late 1976, in a communication conferring a pivotal role on the social partners (the CCMC and the European Metalworkers' Federation) in an effort to complement and streamline, at European level, the Member States' industrial policies, which had been guided until then by the pursuit of national champions.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Note for the file from T.-L. Margue, DG III, to MEP Christopher Jackson, 8 July 1985; Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. and Jacquemin, A., 1992, *Le défi: nouvelles données économiques de l'Europe sans frontières*, preface by Jacques Delors, Flammarion, Paris, 1988, p. 22.



François-Xavier Ortoli faces national resistance to his policy for relaunching the single market. (*30 jours d'Europe*, 2 February 1973.)

The key measure proposed by the Commission was the coordination of national research programmes coupled with the provision of public aid similar to that granted to other sectors. The Belgian commissioner Étienne Davignon laid down the roadmap for this policy in collaboration with industrialists, who stressed the need for technical harmonisation, joint research funding and retail competition through freedom of pricing. In June 1981, this comprehensive vision crystallised in the Commission's position on the European automobile industry, which was prepared by the DG III teams led by Fernand Braun and Paolo Cecchini at the express request of the European Parliament. This position, which was hailed as a masterpiece by industrialists, was the result of a long, hard effort across Commission departments: while DG III led the interdepartmental group for the automobile industry, central planks of this industrial policy were dealt with by several other directorates-general. Europe and the European Community thus showed their determination to respond to the strategy deployed by the United States and Japan to limit their mutual competition at the expense of the EEC industry.

A DG III internal memo penned by Jean-François Marchipont stated that the restructuring of the automobile sector was on the right track thanks to merger agreements aimed at producing national champions and industrial cooperation agreements on major investments, in particular for the automation of production lines. These measures were to solve the crux of the European problem, namely a cost of production that was 30 % higher than in Japan. Employment in the European automobile industry had been growing until 1979, but was now starting to feel the effects of Japanese competition, which, for the first time, led to permanent and

temporary lay-offs in all Member States except Germany. Marchipont concluded that the average common external tariff of 10.9 % was not enough to thwart the Japanese manufacturers' strategy to target the Community market following the voluntary import restriction agreement signed between Japan and the United States on 1 May 1981. External pressure thus became the linchpin for the Commission's preferred exit strategy from the crisis and a political matter of the highest order. Countries with domestic manufacturers such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom were still able to unilaterally limit imports to their markets, but could not stop imports reaching markets of consumer countries within the EEC without breaking internal market rules. There was therefore an urgent need for a Community agreement, which the Council had asked for on several occasions with the support of the Benelux countries and Germany. The Commission decided to monitor car imports and Commissioner Haferkamp asked the Japanese to practise self-constraint to avoid a major trade conflict between the three leading economies of the western world. In 1983, an informal political agreement was concluded which capped Japanese exports to the Community at 1981 levels. The agreement, which ran until the end of 1986, provided for *ex post* monitoring by the Community. This meant that, as far as the Commission was concerned, industrial policies and the survival of the European industrial base in the automobile sector took precedence over consumer interests.

Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez

proposed a legislative programme combining de-regulation, which was now possible under the new approach, and a set of 300 directives making up the new framework for the single market. The Milan European Council followed President Delors' view that implementing this package would also require changes to the treaty to enable the Council to adopt the bulk of the programme by qualified majority.

The Single European Act was concluded in Luxembourg in December 1985. The Commission played an essential role in the drafting of the treaty's economic and institutional sections by setting up a working group under Jacques Delors⁽¹⁾. The Single European Act defined the internal market as 'an area without internal frontiers' ensuring 'the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital'⁽²⁾. It linked this objective to the implementation of a series of parallel flanking policies. In particular, it incorporated research and technological development policy into the treaty in order to 'strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry' and to enable undertakings to exploit the

'internal market potential'⁽³⁾. The roll-out of this vast programme was made possible by Article 100a of the Single European Act, which introduced qualified majority voting for harmonising national legislation.

Thus, in terms of overall set-up, the relaunch of the 1970s and 1980s very much followed on from the founding years, when the internal market and economic structural dynamics came together in a single vision. The area of activity expanded, but the debate on the extent of intervention continued. Some officials who had worked under Guido Colonna di Paliano and went on to occupy leading positions in the 1980s contributed to this continuity. Owing to external pressures in the form of shifts in the international economy and to the difficulties faced by Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, a new approach in terms of the method used and the political nature of the debate became necessary and possible. This resulted in the Single European Act.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE

⁽¹⁾ Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 218.

⁽²⁾ Article 8a, second paragraph.

⁽³⁾ Van Laer, A., 'Quelle politique industrielle pour l'Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)', in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), *Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92)*, CHEFF, Paris, 2007, pp. 42–44.

Chapter 13

Research: towards a new common policy

Research policy is one of the areas where the European venture made the most progress between 1973 and 1986. Almost non-existent to begin with, except in the nuclear sector, it grew to become a fully fledged common policy under the Single European Act. In 15 years, the funds allocated to Community research policy increased substantially, its areas of intervention diversified and it steadily gained legitimacy. And the driving force behind the process was the Commission ⁽¹⁾.

It has to be said that the technological, economic and political context impelled Europe's decision-makers towards cooperation on research. Progress in leading-edge technologies now required investment on a scale that was often beyond the capacity of any individual country. European standards were needed for the new products so as to avoid new barriers to trade. And the economic crisis and the decline of certain traditional industries made the development of new sectors a matter of urgency. There was great concern over the backwardness of Europe's economy compared not only with the United States but also with Japan ⁽²⁾. Moreover, the United States seemed less and less inclined to share technologies with its European allies ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ For details on EEC research policy during this period, see in particular Edler, J., *Institutionalisierung europäischer Politik. Die Genese des Forschungsprogramms BRIT als reflexiver sozialer Prozeß*, Nomos Universitätschriften, Politik, No 109, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000; Guzzetti, G., *A Brief History of European Union Research Policy*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995; Sandholtz, W., *High-Tech Europe — The Politics of International Cooperation*, Studies in International Political Economy, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, 1992; Sharp, M. and Shearman, C., *European Technological Collaboration*, Chatham House papers, No 36, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London/New York/Andover, 1987; Stremmel, J., *Die Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, Aachener Studien Sozialwissenschaften, No 6, Aachen, 1988; Van Laer, A., 'Vers une politique industrielle commune. Les actions de la Commission européenne dans les secteurs de l'informatique et des télécommunications (1965–84)', PhD thesis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010. Besides these works, this chapter is based on the Commission's archives, publications issued at the time and testimony obtained for the purposes of this history from those involved.

⁽²⁾ Although some economists contested the very existence of this technology gap, it featured prominently in mainstream debate, for example, Patel, P. and Pavitt, K., 'Is western Europe losing the technological race?', *Research Policy*, Vol. 16, 1987, pp. 59–85.

⁽³⁾ See Van Laer, A., 'The European Community and the paradoxes of American economic diplomacy: the case of the IT and telecommunications sectors', in Patel, K. K. and Weisbrode, K. (eds), *Europe and America in the 1980s: Old Barriers, New Openings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 105–132.

Community resources allocated to support research, by objective and by type of action, 1974–87 (ECU)

	1974	1980	1987
Total amount allocated to support research (% of Community budget)	77 556 162 (1.53 %)	317 891 000 (2.03 %)	740 149 875 (2.04 %)
By objective			
Horizontal actions	—	5 849 000	31 728 000
Nuclear	53 501 663	248 238 000	325 282 875
Non-nuclear energy, environment, health and safety	19 719 855	35 240 000	125 259 000
Development, transport and food technology	—	209 000	720 000
Information and telecommunications technologies	2 203 413	—	124 500 000
Industrial technology, biotechnology and raw materials	—	9 625 000	125 220 000
Other	2 131 231	18 730 000	20 533 200
By type of action			
Direct action	67 067 306	132 400 000	193 111 000
Indirect/shared-cost action	10 488 856	185 491 000	547 038 875

Source: Community budgets published in the Official Journal (commitment appropriations). The table only shows commitments under the chapter 'Research expenditure', because the budgets as they were published do not allow research commitments under other chapters to be identified. Thus, for example, IT research subsidies were rather to be found in 1980 in the chapter on industry expenditure.

During the period under study, the share of the total Community budget that was devoted to research did not increase spectacularly, but the areas funded became much more diversified. Although nuclear research was still very much the predominant element in Community research policy in the early 1970s, non-nuclear energy, the environment, and health and safety began to receive growing attention. Then, starting in the 1980s, the Community considerably expanded its support for information technology and telecommunications,

industrial technology, biotechnology and raw materials. Cross-cutting measures, such as mobility for researchers, were also boosted. At the outset, support for research was mainly through direct actions, in other words research carried out by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), but in time most research came to take the form of indirect actions. Funded in full or in part by the Communities, the research was actually done by external bodies (it later came to be known as shared-cost actions when part-funding became the rule in the 1980s).

But opting for cooperation within Europe was not always the obvious choice. Alliances with American or Japanese partners could offer access to their technologies and markets. Moreover, in industry, the rise of the multinationals was making it increasingly hard to define a 'European company': could the European

subsidiary of an American enterprise be considered European? And European cooperation did not necessarily involve the Community; if European countries wanted to cooperate, they could also do so through intergovernmental agreements. Nevertheless, the Commission played a major part in setting up Euro-

pean cooperation on research within the Community, even if it was not under its sole responsibility.

As the new Community policy became more firmly established, it also needed direction. Over this period, the areas of intervention diversified considerably. Although nuclear research continued to occupy an important place, the prolonged crisis affecting the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the emergence of new economic and social concerns prompted the Commission to propose new areas of intervention. These were mainly areas where it had launched new Community initiatives, such as energy, industry or the environment. The choice of target areas did not give rise to any fundamental debate. On the other hand, tension persisted between basic and applied research. There were also differences of opinion on what shape co-operation should take: should it involve coordinating national policies or should there be a genuine integrated common policy?

A flimsy foundation: the burden of Euratom's past and declarations of intent

From the mid-1960s, the Commission had tried several times to launch Community research initiatives outside the sectors provided for in the treaties (nuclear, agriculture and steel), in particular to help European industry to close the technological gap with its American competitors. But despite resolutions in favour of the principle, the Council did not actually approve many projects. The main practical outcome of these first initiatives by the Commission was the creation in 1970 of European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (COST), a framework for the conclusion of inter-governmental research agreements, which also involved the participation of non-Community countries. COST was not a Community structure, even though the Commission serviced the secretariat.

While the Commission was trying to extend the scope of the Community's powers in the field of research, the only area where it did have wide-ranging responsibilities — namely that of nuclear energy — had for some years been sliding into a serious crisis. Because of the Member States' widely differing attitudes and interests regarding the nuclear sector, no common policy was possible. One of the main bones of contention was the choice of reactor type. Keen to preserve its military and energy independence, France had opted for natural uranium reactors and wanted Euratom to do the same. The other Member States preferred to build enriched uranium reactors using technology and fuel supplied by the Americans. In 1967, the Council failed to approve the 5-year plan for the Joint Nuclear Research Centre (JNRC) because of a lack of consensus on what it should be doing. So the JNRC had to operate with monthly provisional budgets and under the constant threat of widespread redundancies or even complete abolition. The JNRC's staff came out on strike and some even went on hunger strike.

1973: a new start?

With the accession of the new Member States in January 1973, the Commission was enlarged and portfolios were redefined. Altiero Spinelli and his DG III (Industrial Affairs and Technology) retained responsibility for industry and technology (including indirect nuclear research), but research, science and education now came under the new commissioner, Ralf Dahrendorf, with a new directorate-general, DG XII. Dahrendorf was also in charge of the JNRC and the Directorate-General for Scientific and Technical Information and Information Management. The two men took very different approaches. As a convinced federalist, Spinelli had tried in vain over the years to create strong Community institutions to support research. With his new responsibilities, Spinelli continued to concern himself with applied research, for instance in the computer industry. Dahrendorf,

on the other hand, focused on basic research. He launched the idea of a European scientific area ⁽¹⁾, which would in large part be based on the coordination of national research policies rather than on strictly Community initiatives. The case of the European Science Foundation demonstrates their differing viewpoints. In 1970, Spinelli had proposed creating a European Science Foundation at Community level to stimulate European cooperation in basic research. The Member States felt this was far too federalist. Dahrendorf, by contrast, was in favour of creating the foundation as a European association of national research organisations outside the Community framework, and it was in this form that it eventually came into being in 1974.



Magazine cover on the Ispra Joint Research Centre, February 1981.


Ralf Dahrendorf left the Commission in November 1974, to be replaced by Guido Brunner.

The Commission's scientific and technological policy programme of August 1973, which the Council approved a few months later, was based on a number of principles which the director, Manfredo Maciotti, summed up as follows: 'Do not do everything (priorities); do not centralise everything (use national potentials); develop a policy not as an objective in itself, but rather as a means to achieving the various objectives of the Community (sectoral approach); and achieve a balance between social concern (environment, health, urban development, etc.) and economic objectives (industrial technology)' ⁽²⁾. A new committee of senior national officials, the Scientific and Technological Research Committee (CREST), was set up at the beginning of 1974: it was to serve as the Commission's official intermediary in its contacts with the Member States' research ministries before proposals were submitted to the Council.

The reform of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, agreed at the beginning of 1973, marked the end of a lengthy crisis. It was decided that the JRC's programmes (the 'N' for 'nuclear' was now dropped) should be geared towards public service work (in particular nuclear safety) rather than towards industrial projects. The Essor reactor installed at Ispra was handed over to the Italian government. The centre could now undertake research in other areas outside the nuclear field on the basis of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, and in the following decade its non-nuclear activities mostly concerned the environment and non-nuclear energy. The JRC was also asked to expand its activities in support of Community policies. This approach would subsequently remain at the heart of the JRC's activities, even if 'in the 1980s the Commission's other directorates-general did not have the impression that science and

⁽¹⁾ The idea was taken up again 20 years later by Commissioner Antonio Ruberti, and even later by Philippe Busquin.

⁽²⁾ Maciotti, M., 'Science and technology in the common market: a progress report', *Research Policy*, No 4, 1975, p. 305.



External view of the Joint European Torus (JET), in the Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom). The JET is a 'tokamak', a device for studying nuclear fusion. Construction started on the JET in 1979 and it produced its first plasma in 1983. The JET was then the largest tokamak in the world. It was set up as a joint undertaking, financed by Euratom (80 %), the United Kingdom (10 %) and participating laboratories (10 %).

technology could really help them' ⁽¹⁾. During this period, the JRC focused especially on normative research in support of the internal market: harmonising tests, quality controls, etc.

In 1974, the JRC was completely reorganised. A new director-general and six new directors were appointed and the directorate-general's headquarters were transferred from Ispra to Brussels, 'closer' to the 'bodies with which the JRC had to interact' ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Gianluigi Valsesia, 10 February 2011.

Quite a few scientists at the centre had to adapt to working in non-nuclear sectors, and did so without too much difficulty. However, the freeze on recruitment that had been accepted in return for keeping on all the existing personnel would, in the medium term, result in an ageing staff ⁽¹⁾.

The JRC's management and staff were to experience a number of disappointments over the following years, notably the installation of the Joint European Torus (JET) at a national site (Culham) and the Member States' refusal to back a very large-scale nuclear experiment known as Super-SARA. But with its continued existence no longer under threat, the centre developed new strengths. For example, it became a pioneer in the field of remote sensing from space and was even accepted in the mid-1970s as one of the principal investigators on NASA's first Landsat missions ⁽²⁾.

Outside the nuclear sector, the Commission managed to secure the launch of a number of joint research programmes (on raw materials, energy, medicine, social policy, the environment, urban planning and development aid policy), although the funds allocated were very modest. For its entire research policy (including nuclear research), the Community had a budget of 1 or 2 % of the total sum spent by the Member States ⁽³⁾. Nevertheless, these small-scale programmes appeared to constitute a springboard for more ambitious projects, as Heinrich von Moltke, head of division in the DG for Industrial Affairs and Technology, commented: 'We did what we had to at the time, in other words create new schemes where it was felt that the treaties might apply, especially in the field of research and technology. There were no instruments, we had to create them. This involved the laborious Article 235 procedure ... All these policies were created from

a few existing bits and pieces that we then tried to generalise' ⁽⁴⁾.

Recourse to Article 235 sometimes involved a rather circuitous approach: when Jean-Pierre Contzen, director in DG XII at the time, had to defend the Commission's first medical research programme before the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) in the early 1980s, at a time when health did not come within the Community's remit, he had to argue that the objective was economic, namely to help the Member States reduce the cost of their social security systems ⁽⁵⁾. By contrast, the Commission's efforts to coordinate national programmes, strongly promoted by Commissioner Dahrendorf, produced very little in the way of results. The Commission continued trying to establish this kind of coordination, but with no success, and officials gradually lost faith in this approach.

A change of scale and strategic programming, 1977–84

At the beginning of 1977, a new Commission took office. Guido Brunner retained responsibility for science and research, while Étienne Davignon was put in charge of industrial affairs, the internal market and the customs union. A few months later, the Commission announced a major change in its communication 'Common policy in the field of science and technology': 'By a common research policy for the next 4 years, we do not simply mean the continuation of a traditional, somewhat esoteric science policy, but rather the scientific and technological basis for any European policy. The situation is serious. The signs of an economic crisis become increasingly evident. The boundless faith in continuous linear growth has been shaken; the limits to growth

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with Luigi Massimo, 22 July 2011, and Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, 'The common policy in the field of science and technology', HAEC, COM(79) 281, 23 May 1979.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.

The new DG XII in search of its role

Since the merger of the executives of the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom in 1967, scientific affairs had been in the hands of DG III, which also dealt with industrial affairs and technology. In 1973, a separate Directorate-General for Research, Science and Education, DG XII, was created. To begin with, this did not prevent other departments, such as those responsible for industry or energy, from retaining control of research in their fields. The Directorate-General for Research, Science and Education tried to forge a coordinating role for itself (for instance via the interdepartmental Committee for Research and Development that was set up in 1975), and even to take over responsibility for these activities. Looking back, some former officials in DG XII think this institutional activism went too far: 'We were manoeuvring in an attempt to grab hold of and gather up every crumb we could without any interdepartmental negotiation, in effect trying to be everywhere at once, losing sleep in order to do things that were frankly ridiculous' ⁽¹⁾. Some tensions were probably inevitable between the new cross-cutting directorate-general for research and the sectoral directorates-general. As Hendrik Tent — a former long-serving official in DG XII — pointed out, the weight of a directorate-general in the Commission depended largely on the make-up of its policies, its budget and its human resources. For DG XII, all three grew considerably from the end of the 1970s onwards ⁽²⁾. 'But,' as Tent also noted, 'its

influence depends above all, of course, on the Commission itself and on its commissioner, and whether he has any real influence' ⁽³⁾. And in that respect, too, the fate of DG XII was about to change when, in 1977, it came into the hands of Étienne Davignon, generally considered one of the most powerful members of the Commission.

One notable feature of DG XII was that most of its officials were scientists who were specialists in their field, with highly specific knowledge and networks. Many of them had come from the JRC. Research staff enjoyed a special status under the 1962 staff regulations. The commissioner in charge of DG XII also had wider powers than the others in terms of human resources management, at the expense of his colleague responsible for personnel, a fact that inevitably also prompted some jealousies ⁽⁴⁾. To begin with, the directorate-general was fairly small (in the second half of the 1970s the total staff, taking all grades together, numbered about 110, some of whom also dealt with education and culture) ⁽⁵⁾, but numbers steadily increased thereafter. The directorate-general had two directors-general during this period, both of them scientists originally: Günter Schuster (from 1971 to 1981) and Paolo Fasella (from 1981 to 1995). Thanks to their qualities and longevity, they left a lasting mark on Community research policy.

are gradually emerging.' Community research policy was thus firmly put at the service of economic growth. But the Commission was quite aware of the obstacles it faced: 'The more interesting, practically applicable and important technological projects are for national industry, the more reluctant are the Member States to set aside their national self-interest' ⁽⁶⁾.

Faced with the severe crisis in steel, textiles and shipbuilding, Davignon and his departments began by concentrating mainly on setting up Community schemes to foster the restructuring of these 'old' industries. But in its 'Report on certain structural aspects of growth' in June 1978, the Commission recalled that the Community also had to play an active role in promoting growth, both by completing the common market and by stimulating innovation, the main source of growth. Stimulating innovation meant not only encouraging research but also fostering the development and marketing of research results ⁽⁷⁾. 'It was vital for there to be

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Manfredo Maciotti, 20 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Hendrik Tent, 5 April 2012.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Herbert Allgeier, 4 November 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ EC Commission, 'The common policy in the field of science and technology', HAEC, COM(77) 283, 30 June 1977.

⁽⁷⁾ EC Commission, 'Report on some structural aspects of growth', HAEC, COM(78) 255 final, 22 June 1978.



Children working on a computer in 1984 under the Esprit programme.

a positive dimension to the restructuring that was necessary ... I was very aware that a second pillar was needed. A second pillar — not that the old approach was not geared to the future, but in a different way — that would lead to the creation of new activities,’ explained Étienne Davignon ⁽¹⁾. He listened closely to his staff (before coming to the Commission he had been Director-General of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and his aides soon convinced him that progress was possible, especially in information technology.

And the Commission did indeed draw up a number of programmes in that area. Initially the amount of funding was very small, but gradually it increased. In 1977, the Council rejected an action plan for aeronautical research. The inclusion of research in

industrial strategy was reflected in the creation in 1978 of the new Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development (CORDI), comprising representatives from industry organisations. The Directorates-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and for Research, Science and Education actively sought to boost their expertise through studies carried out by consultants and through a new Community programme, FAST (forecasting and assessment in the field of science and technology), launched in 1978. The ideas developed in the course of the FAST programme, headed for 15 years by Riccardo Petrella, contributed directly to the new research initiatives in information technology and biotechnology.

From 1979, information technology became a priority for Davignon. A pilot phase of the European strategic programme for research and development in information technologies (Esprit) started up in

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

1983. The first Esprit programme, covering the years 1984–88, received Community funding totalling ECU 750 million, the other half of the budget being covered by the businesses and institutions taking part. It financed pre-competitive research projects involving partners from at least two Member States. Esprit took Community research policy to a new level and would serve as a model for other programmes.

Like Spinelli, Davignon approached research from an industrial policy angle and wanted there to be a true common policy rather than just a coordination of national policies. He was able to rely on the precedent of a few small research programmes in information technology and on the experience gained by his departments. He also benefited from the realisation among the Member States that national action alone would not suffice. Despite considerable efforts since the 1960s, their national champions were still rather weak compared with their international rivals. In his speeches, Davignon repeatedly highlighted the threat of industrial domination not only by the Americans but also by the Japanese. But more than anything else, Davignon used the tried and tested approach he had used for the steel industry: to obtain the Council's approval for new Community initiatives, he involved enterprises and administrations from the Member States and national authorities in formulating his proposals. These round-table discussions with IT industrialists and captains of industry offered an opportunity to consult and negotiate, but above all to convince. Once these key players had been won over to a Community scheme, they became valuable allies in the battle for approval from their governments. At last there was a favourable climate for the adoption of a major Community programme. France abandoned its 1981–82 national expansionary policies and the United Kingdom's budget demands were met at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984, so removing two major obstacles to the launch of new common policies. In the wake of the economic crisis of the 1970s, the need for public intervention to stimulate

positive adjustment of the economy was largely accepted. At the time, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) referred to any industrial policy geared towards market-driven developments as positive ⁽¹⁾. This was typically the case with support for research and innovation.

In his second term of office as commissioner from 1981, Davignon was given responsibility for energy and research as well as industrial affairs. He instructed the Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development to gear its research programmes to the needs of industrial and energy policy ⁽²⁾. The Directorate-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs retained responsibility for research actions of immediate relevance for industry, such as Esprit, because 'it is essential for them to remain fully integrated with the coherent whole of an industrial programme' ⁽³⁾. In a communication to the Council on the future of European research policy in the 1980s, this close link with other policies was put forward as an argument in favour of Community action: 'By setting out research actions in the context of an overall strategy, the Community can ensure their continuity from the economic point of view (the market), the industrial point of view (innovation) or the regulatory point of view (financial incentives, standards, competition). This is how the best can be made of R & D [research and development] action at the earliest stage' ⁽⁴⁾. Along the same lines as for Esprit, Davignon and his departments drew up programmes in the fields of telecommunications (RACE), the application of

⁽¹⁾ OECD, 'The case for positive adjustment policies: a compendium of OECD documents, 1978/79', Paris, 1979.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 47/1986/92, Memo from Fernand Braun to Étienne Davignon and Karl-Heinz Narjes, 11 February 1981.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 10/1985/280, Schuster, G., 'Rapport sur les améliorations à apporter en matière de coordination des activités de recherche financées par la Commission', Bonn, October 1981.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, 'Scientific and technical research and the European Community — Proposals for the 1980s', HAEC, COM(81) 574 final, 12 October 1981.

new technologies in traditional sectors (BRITE) and new materials (EURAM), plus a small biotechnology programme. These all started up in 1985–86. ‘Our approach was always the same,’ recalls a senior official at the time, ‘to meet people, to listen, to take note, to analyse and to come back with proposals that would then be acceptable’ ⁽¹⁾. It is interesting to note that standardisation was a major element in all these programmes and was one of the justifications for Community action. In 1983, in parallel with the initiatives in support of industrial research, the Commission also launched the ‘Stimulus’ programme, aimed at boosting basic research, networking between researchers and mobility among researchers, which was the forerunner of the current Marie Curie actions.

Consultation between the commissioners and the Commission departments responsible for research, industry and innovation was usually ad hoc and informal, but Davignon also set up formal groups at various levels. In September 1982, detailed preparation of Esprit was assigned to a small task force of officials from the three Directorates-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, for Science, Research and Development and for Information Market and Innovation. The task force grew rapidly, eventually becoming a separate Directorate-General for Telecommunications, Information Technology and Innovation in 1986. There would always be a certain latent rivalry between it and the DG for Science, Research and Development.

The programmes, budgets and staff of the DG for Science, Research and Development also grew rapidly during these years and a large proportion of its officials were mainly engaged in managing joint programmes rather than devising new ones. New recruits were often highly specialised, with cutting-edge scientific or technical skills, experience in

industry or a wide range of contacts in one sector or another.

But while the number of Community schemes in the field of research was growing, there was still no overarching approach. Since 1980, the Commission had been suggesting the idea of a multi-annual framework programme covering all the research measures based on the three treaties (EEC, Euratom and ECSC). This kind of strategic programming would enable the Community to focus its research actions on the priority sectors, to ensure they were consistent with other Community policies and to plan them over the medium term. Essentially, Council approval of the framework programme was supposed to make decisions on individual programmes easier and to get round the restrictions of annual budget programming. The Commission hoped that this would avoid the usual interminable discussions on each individual programme, with objections of principle becoming mixed up with technical considerations. As Étienne Davignon said, ‘the spirit of the framework programme — though this got distorted later — was that negotiations with the Member States should deal with the overall funding envelope rather than how it was allocated. The Member States clawed this back in the management committees after I left. In a way, the idea of the framework programme was that discussions with the Member States would cover the total amount and the topics. Once the total amount and the various topics were settled, management was to be delegated to the Commission’ ⁽²⁾. Together with the new framework programme, the Commission proposed to rationalise the structures for drawing up, examining and implementing Community research programmes. As different types of measures had developed, with a variety of legal bases, a veritable labyrinth of committees had grown. Ultimately, the Commission saw the framework programme as confirmation of the Member States’ will to develop

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.

The birth of innovation policy

In parallel with the development of research policy, the Commission also established a new policy in a closely related area: innovation. It defined innovation as 'the introduction of new products, services, production methods or marketing and management techniques throughout the economy' ⁽¹⁾. In 1978, this area was assigned to Commissioner Brunner and DG XIII, which was already responsible for the dissemination of technical information — originally one of Euratom's tasks. According to the director-general at the time, Raymond Appleyard, launching a policy for innovation was a welcome challenge for the directorate-general: '[Scientific and technical information and information management] was a true support activity: patents and publications and all the consequences of Commission research. It's pretty practical and wasn't, in my view, a *raison d'être* for a directorate-general. For a directorate or a division, maybe. So there was this directorate-general, on its own, in Luxembourg. Some 100 or 150 officials with very little to do and no reason, at Commission level, to exist at all. It had no policy area of its own, and I tried to create one for those people as best I could' ⁽²⁾. DG XIII set out to draw up a new innovation policy in close collaboration with the other departments, in particular through an interdepartmental working party. In 1981, Karl-Heinz Narjes took over responsibility for innovation. The Commission launched various horizontal measures to foster innovation. Several of those initiatives sought to promote the dissemination of information. Others involved funding for innovation (for example Community support for the creation of the European Venture Capital Association, set up in 1983) and a number of studies and colloquia. There were also proposals for tax measures in favour of investment and a projected European innovation loan scheme. Unlike the Esprit programme, which focused initially on large companies, most of these 'horizontal' projects were targeted at small and medium-sized businesses. Raymond Appleyard himself said that this innovation policy never became a 'really solid policy', but it did make it possible 'to set up clubs': 'Perhaps there was only enough money for meetings and small-scale activities, but the end result was that the people responsible or active in the various countries got to know each other well and came to treat one another more or less as friends' ⁽³⁾.

Community research policy, necessarily implying a substantial increase in the amount of funding allocated. In fact, it hoped for nothing less than the doubling of funding.

It took several years for the Commission to prepare the first framework programme and, above all, to secure its adoption. It was not until July 1983 that the Council approved it. The Commission involved every existing advisory body in drawing up its proposals. It sought to gain the support of scientific experts (in the European Research and Development Committee (CERD)), replaced at the end of 1982 by the Committee for the European Development of Science and Technology (Codest), representatives of industrial organisations (in the context of CORDI, which was succeeded in 1984 by the Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) and, most important of all, the senior national officials who were members of CREST. As for its initiatives in the steel and IT sectors, Davignon sought to 'Europeanise' the vision of those in charge in the national administrations. The support of scientists and leading specialists in research policy would help legitimise the Commission's proposals. A major conference held in Strasbourg in the autumn of 1982, entitled '1980–90: a new development on European scientific policy', broadened the range of interlocutors and at the same time boosted the visibility of the Commission's plans. At ministerial level, the Commission obtained more regular meetings of the Research Council, with meetings being held twice a year from the end of 1981.

The Commission's considerable efforts to disseminate its ideas so as to forge a coalition in support of a framework programme of Community scientific and technological activities eventually bore fruit. In May 1983, the Commission presented its final proposal for the first 4-year framework programme to the Council ⁽⁴⁾. It called for a budget of

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, 'A policy for industrial innovation — strategic lines of a Community approach', HAEC, COM(81) 620 final, 20 October 1981.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Raymond Appleyard, 17 October 2011.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, 'Proposal for a Council decision on the framework programme for Community scientific and technical activities 1984–87', HAEC, COM(83) 260 final, 17 May 1983.



The key to Commissioner Davignon's success was to meet and to convince all the parties concerned. Here he is (fourth from the left) at a seminar in Brussels on the relationships between technology, employment and work. Although the Commission's studies showed that technical innovation created long-term employment, it could not deny that technological progress would cause some jobs to be lost in the short term and would change the nature of work.

ECU 3 750 million over 4 years — a 60 % increase in annual funding compared with 1982. In parallel with the framework programme, the Commission proposed a fundamental reform of the structures and procedures underlying common policy in the field of science and technology ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, 'Communication on structures and procedures for the common policy in the field of science and technology', HAEC, COM(83) 143 final, 16 March 1983.

The principle of the framework programme did not meet with any opposition in the Council, but Community policy at the time was dominated by the budget dispute. Consequently, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom were very reluctant to increase funding for Community research. On 25 July, the Council approved the principle of framework programmes and the scientific and technical objectives of the first framework programme (1984–87), but put off a decision on the financial side of the programme pending the outcome of the

wider discussions on the Community's resources. On 19 December, the Council finally reached agreement on a budget of ECU 1 225 million for the framework programme, including ECU 750 million for Esprit. The structures of the common research policy were amended: two new management and coordination advisory committees were set up under the aegis of the Commission, replacing the specialised CREST committees and most of the advisory committees on programme management. But the Council rejected the fundamental reform proposed by the Commission, as it would have meant losing some of its powers.

Even though Community research was now embedded in the structure of the framework programme, the EEC still had no explicit competence in this area. After the adoption of the framework programme, every Community scheme still required the unanimous approval of the Council under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty or under the Euratom or ECSC treaties.

In quest of foundations for the future, 1985–86

The adoption of the first framework programme in 1984 gave a new impetus to research activities. But only a few months later, in the spring of 1985, France proposed a new framework for European cooperation in this area: the European Research Coordination Agency, better known by the name Eureka. Conceived in response to the United States' strategic defence initiative, Eureka offered an intergovernmental alternative to cooperation under the auspices of the Community. There was a clash between two visions of common research policy: France viewed the Community as one form of cooperation among many, whereas the Commission's ambition was for a Community that would encompass, more or less directly, all public measures on research in Europe.



Poster for Comett, a cooperation programme between universities and enterprises in training relating to technology. During the period 1986–90, grants totalling ECU 52.5 million were paid out under Comett. The projects financed led to the establishment of 125 joint university–business consortia, more than 4 000 student work experience placements in companies in other Member States and 232 exchanges of staff between universities and businesses.

At the Commission, Eureka was seen as a ‘blow beneath the belt’, an ‘anti-Commission explosion’⁽¹⁾. While the single market was making great strides forward, Community research seemed to be struggling against a strong headwind. The JRC faced a new crisis owing to management problems that had led to a delicate financial situation, and also because the United Kingdom, in particular, was no longer willing to fund this ultra-federalist institution. This crisis was resolved by agreeing on a

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.



At a time when the Commission was proposing to set up a European technological community, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl launched an intergovernmental alternative: Eureka (with an allusion to environmental research, liable to interest the German chancellor, whose country was suffering the effects of acid rain), here in a cartoon by Plantu from April 1985 (*Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l'Europe*, Le Monde Éditions, Paris, 1992, p. 87).

certain amount of contract work for external third parties, and setting up a board of governors made up of representatives of the Member States. Officially, Jacques Delors welcomed the idea of Eureka, but he also insisted that it be incorporated in the framework programme. In June, the Commission proposed setting up a European technological community that would embrace the framework programme, Eureka and other forms of European cooperation on technology. The idea turned out to be a '1-day wonder that came to nothing' ⁽¹⁾. So the Community did not become the supreme coordi-

nator of all European action in the field of research, but remained one alongside several others.

Nevertheless, Community competence in the area of research, although not exclusive, was still acknowledged by all the Member States. In February 1986, the EEC Treaty was amended by the Single European Act, with a new Title VI (Article 130f to q) officially establishing Community research policy. This formally sanctioned the existing practices and confirmed the powers gradually acquired over the previous 20 years. Title VI set the Community the objective to 'strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry and encourage it to become more competitive at international level' (Article 130f(1)). Research policy was, then, explicitly aimed at industrial research rather than at basic research. It was also an element of the single market project, since it was intended to support cooperation between undertakings, 'aiming, notably, at enabling [them] to exploit the Community's internal market potential to the full' (Article 130f(2)). Title VI also clearly spelled out the limits of Community competence. Under Article 130g, Community activities were to '[complement] the activities carried out in the Member States', while Article 130h stated that the Member States would coordinate their national research policies 'in liaison with the Commission'. The framework programme still had to be adopted unanimously; adoption by qualified majority was not introduced until the Treaty of Amsterdam ⁽²⁾. Nevertheless, in 15 years the Commission had won recognition for a new common policy and laid down a solid foundation for its future.

ARTHE VAN LAER

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Herbert Allgeier, 4 November 2010.

⁽²⁾ Elizalde, J., 'Legal aspects of Community policy on research and technological development (RTD)', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 29, No 2, 1992, pp. 311–314.

Chapter 14

Competition at the service of the market

Competition policy plays a fundamental role in the process of European integration because it must ensure that neither companies nor countries erect new barriers to trade once customs barriers in the common market have been removed ⁽¹⁾. The EEC Treaty conferred on the Commission the task of monitoring the behaviour of companies so that they did not share markets using a cartel or an agreement (Article 85) and so that a firm did not abuse its dominant position in a given market (Article 86). The treaty also granted the Commission the power to monitor and prohibit certain measures by Member States, such as state aid (Articles 92 to 94) and certain measures in favour of public-sector undertakings (Article 90).

However, the Commission found it difficult to apply these ambitious provisions. Admittedly, competition policy was a new field in western Europe. It was developed in the United States as antitrust policy with the Sherman Act of 1890 and did not cross the Atlantic until after the Second World War. As early as the Hallstein period, the Commission developed an ambitious policy in the form of Regulation No 17 of 1962 that granted it many powers for overseeing agreements. However, the department responsible for implementing competition policy, DG IV (Competition), had not succeeded in applying the policy effectively in the 1960s. Furthermore, the Community's competition policy had to be coordinated with other Community policies with complementary or even contradictory objectives, such as regional or industrial policy. Accordingly, between 1973 and 1986, the main challenge facing the Commission was to gradually implement an effective competition policy.

⁽¹⁾ See Warlouzet, L., 'The Rise of European competition policy, 1950–91: A cross-disciplinary survey of a contested policy sphere', EUI Working Papers RSCAS 80, European University Institute, Florence, 2010, p. 39.

Slow affirmation

The difficult context of the crisis years

The difficult economic situation resulting from the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 made it trickier to develop Community action. The worsening crisis in the sectors that were industrialised first (coal mining, steelmaking, textiles, shipbuilding) resulted in a rush to state aid and to crisis cartel practices (a temporary agreement involving independent companies in the same sector with a view to limiting competition and possibly obtaining or defending monopolistic positions). In the EEC of Six, this type of subsidy to firms already existed in all the Member States, but was particularly evident in certain countries such as France and Italy. The 1973 enlargement, especially combined with the oil crisis, did not resolve the problem, quite the reverse. Jean-Louis Cadieux, who worked in the state aid department in DG IV, noted: ‘When the British joined, I would say that they even outdid the French, because with the Labour government [¹] we had aid appearing everywhere and in all sectors’ — an opinion still shared by Willy Schliedier, the Director-General for Competition, in 1981 (²). The Commission strove to monitor aid to check that it was compatible with the common market under Articles 92 to 94 of the EEC Treaty by requiring Member States to notify their draft decisions before they were adopted. However, the economic crisis made the problem particularly acute because the Member States greatly increased support for companies in difficulty.

The gradual solution to the problem of agreements

Given this delicate situation, for a long time DG IV focused a large part of its energies on agreements. Regulation No 17, which had been adopted as early as 1962, granted the Commission a dual monopoly: information (any company that wanted to be exempt from the prohibition had to notify its agreements to the Commission) and decision-making (the Commission alone decided whether or not an agreement was admissible), including the imposition of sanctions in the form of fines. The link with the Member States was maintained by an advisory committee that gave its opinion on the future decision, while the Court of Justice of the European Communities retained its role of judicial review. The Commission was therefore granted broad decision-making powers of its own.

The problems implementing Regulation No 17 were linked to the gap between the substantial number of notifications — up to 36 000 in 1966 — and the processing capacity in DG IV, which was limited by both the low staffing level and the fact that this field was still very new in Europe. The strategy chosen by DG IV was therefore to focus on block exemptions; instead of taking a decision on all these cases, the Commission contented itself with several landmark decisions to establish case-law, and then proposed an exemption regulation that set out the types of agreement that were authorised (i.e. exempted from the prohibition in Article 85(1)). The Commission obtained this power gradually from 1965, and increased the number of block exemptions, in particular under Frans Andriessen (commissioner for competition from 1981 to 1985). During this period, the regulations on specialisation agreements and on exclusive distribution and purchase agreements were renewed (1982–83), while new regulations were adopted for licences (1984), research and development agreements (1985) and motor-vehicle distribution (1985). The issue of franchise agreements was dealt with in a regulation that had been

(¹) Harold Wilson's Labour government, which returned to power in 1974.

(²) Interview with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19 November 2010; HAEC, BAC 131/1996/135, Memo from DG XVI.A.2.JVG, 20 March 1981.

envisaged since 1985 and was finalised in 1988 ⁽¹⁾. Its architect in DG IV, Jean Dubois, explained the process that led to the regulation being drafted, starting with complaints by firms, moving on to a consultation of all interested parties to define an acceptable model, and culminating in its final adoption ⁽²⁾. The process of regulation by the Commission was therefore based on the working out of rules in complex markets by a constant interplay between the needs of the various economic operators — who were regularly consulted and whose interests were often contradictory — and the definition of the European interest. Gradually, the many pending cases were dealt with by these block exemptions or by case-law, without the Commission having to take a position on every individual case.

Inter-DG cooperation

In laying down and applying competition policy, DG IV had to cooperate with other Commission departments such as the Legal Service, DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs) and DG XVI (Regional Policy). Thus, in the case of the regulations exempting research and development agreements and licensing agreements, the DG for Industrial Affairs, headed by Commissioner Étienne Davignon, intervened frequently when it came to establishing the Commission's position ⁽³⁾. In order to deal with the crisis in the steel industry, a task force comprising DG III, DG IV and the DG managing the ECSC funds was successfully set up between 1981 and 1984. Its purpose was to coord-

inate the monitoring of aid and the reduction of capacity (see Chapter 12, 'Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy', and the 'Eurofer' box, page 269).

There was also close cooperation with DG III in the field of state aid. The situation was particularly problematic in the shipbuilding sector. Faced with increasing structural difficulties (oil crises, competition from Asia), the sector was receiving massive amounts of aid in all European countries. The Community's action, which was rooted in the EEC Treaty itself (Article 92(3)(c)), sought to co-ordinate the national aid schemes in order to prevent major distortions, facilitate rationalisation by reducing capacity and ensure flanking social measures. Many directives were adopted (the third in 1975, the fourth in 1978, the fifth in 1981). Coordination was shared between DG IV and DG III; in 1983–85 the latter wanted to launch a more global sectoral industrial policy, similar to that put into practice for the steel industry ⁽⁴⁾.

The dialogue with DG XVI concerned the assessment criteria for regional aid, which differed between the two DGs ⁽⁵⁾. DG XVI felt that DG IV's approach did not take sufficient account of the wealth of the countries concerned in relation to the Community average. However, regional policy remained modest throughout the 1970s, as did state aid control in general. DG IV remained focused on resolving the difficult issue of agreements, even though the seeds of change had begun to germinate.

⁽¹⁾ Regulations EEC (No) 3604/82 (specialisation) (OJ L 376, 31.12.1982, p. 33), EEC (No) 1983/83 and EEC (No) 1984/83 (exclusive distribution) (OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, pp. 1 and 5), EEC (No) 2349/84 (licences) (OJ L 219, 16.8.1984, p. 15), EEC (No) 123/85 (motor vehicle distribution) (OJ L 15, 18.1.1985, p. 16), EEC (No) 418/85 (research and development) (OJ L 53, 22.2.1985, p. 5) and EEC (No) 4087/88 (franchising) (OJ L 359, 28.12.1988, p. 46).

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.

⁽³⁾ Van Laer, A., 'Vers une politique industrielle commune. Les actions de la Commission européenne dans les secteurs de l'informatique et des télécommunications (1965–84)', PhD thesis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010; HAEC, BAC 91/1994/57, Memo from Fernand Braun (DG III) to Hugo Paemen, Head of Cabinet to Étienne Davignon, 15 November 1983.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 323/1993/209, Memo from Paul Waterschoot (DG III/F3) to Rolf Möhler, 26 October 1983; BAC 323/1993/210, Memo from Daniele Verdiani (DG III/C), 11 January 1984; Memo from A. Van Rhijn (DG III) to Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 1 August 1985.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with George Rencki, 31 May 2011; HAEC, BAC 131/1996/134, Memo from DG XVI (Georges Rencki) to Riccardo Perissich, head of cabinet to Antonio Giolitti, 28 May 1984, and memo from Pierre Mathijsen (DG XVI) to Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 28 April 1983.

Towards new developments

DG IV and the German experience

German competition policy, which came into being in 1957 and had been applied since 1 January 1958, was not the first such policy in Europe, but it had quickly become the most active. To a great extent it inspired Regulation No 17, all the more so since the agreements sector in DG IV was dominated by officials from Germany, in particular the influential Hans von der Groeben, the first European commissioner for competition (1958–67). The continuity with the 1960s remained strong in the period 1973–86 in relation to agreements, first because of the nationality of the two directors-general, who were German, but also because of their experience in DG IV during that decade. Willy Schlieder (director-general until 1981) had participated in the process that resulted in Regulation No 17. His successor, Manfred Caspari, had worked in the private office of Commissioner Hans von der Groeben prior to occupying the post of director-general until 1990. However, the German influence was neither exclusive nor unique. National competition policies had been applied for many years by other Member States, such as the United Kingdom (1948), France (1953) and the Netherlands (1956). Furthermore, it is striking that in DG IV German was only one working language among others; some director-generals had the habit of holding their meetings in French, according to Jean Dubois ⁽¹⁾.

The operation of the DG changed gradually in the 1980s thanks to the arrival of a new commissioner, Frans Andriessen, and a new director-general, Manfred Caspari, who was a trained economist. They reorganised the internal structure, which became sector-based rather than task-based. As part of this process, three directorates disappeared: Direct-

orate A, the inspections directorate, Directorate B, which was responsible for Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (agreements and abuses of dominant positions), and Directorate C, which handled the other types of cases (concentrations, ECSC rules, industrial property rights, energy, transport). To replace them, two directorates were set up that shared the different sectors of activity by amalgamating the former inspection units and the units responsible for decisions (B and C). To avoid divergences in application between these sectoral units, a directorate for coordinating decisions was established that retained segmentation by type of activity. A further development was the creation of a post of deputy director-general in 1984. The post was filled by Jean-Louis Cadieux, who had previously headed an inter-DG task force charged with the sensitive issue of the crisis in the steel industry ⁽²⁾.

The merging of influences

In addition to this German substratum, the increasing influence of British and American practice was changing DG IV. First, the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 brought in a country where business law was much more developed. The style of pleading before the Court of Justice changed. Essentially, procedures paid more heed to the rights of the defence with the creation by Andriessen ⁽³⁾ of the ‘hearing officer’. A further reason for creating this post was the removal of the division between inspection and assessment tasks during the 1984 reorganisation.

Next, the American antitrust experience rapidly became much more widely known, in particular through the evolution in Commission officials’ previous training, as stressed by John Temple Lang, himself an alumnus of the University of Chicago: ‘There was certainly a general influence on Com-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19 November 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010.

mission officials due to the fact that so many of them had studied in the United States and had studied American antitrust law. That became much more common in the 1980s and the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s' ⁽¹⁾. To that extent, the change in DG IV paralleled that taking place in DG II. Finally, the commissioners' style was changing. The Dutchman Frans Andriessen asserted his dynamism in relation to his predecessor Raymond Vouel, who was more unassuming ⁽²⁾. The Irishman Peter Sutherland succeeded him. He combined sound legal training, experience as a lawyer, in particular in the United States, and a political career during which he had served as a very young attorney general (1981–85). As a former rugby player, Sutherland was notable for his fighting spirit during his stint at the Commission ⁽³⁾. He symbolised the association of DG IV's long-established very solid legal expertise and a new willingness to meet head-on economic operators suspected of breaking the rules. This dynamic led the Commission to take multiple initiatives.

Multiple initiatives in the 1980s

In the 1980s, the economic and intellectual context and the single market programme acted as levers for the development of common rules for competition. The Commission took advantage of the more favourable context by launching a number of initiatives on competition, in both old and new areas.



IBM was a highly dominant player on the computer market in the 1970s. The Commission's competition case against it lasted for a decade before finally being settled out of court on 1 August 1984.

Progress on old issues

Ever since the 1960s, the Commission had not limited itself to actions under Article 85 against agreements. At a very early stage it also started work on curbing abuses of dominant positions using Article 86. The first prohibition decision, addressed to GEMA, a German company managing author's rights, was thus taken in 1971. During the 1970s it was followed by a series of important decisions by which the Commission imposed heavy fines in particular on powerful American and Swiss groups that had abused their dominant positions in various markets in the European Community ⁽⁴⁾. These decisions were then upheld by the Court of Justice. It was using this legal basis that proceedings were started against the computer giant IBM (sometimes known as 'big blue'), with the support of the commissioner for industrial, technological and scientific affairs,

⁽¹⁾ Interview with John Temple Lang, 15 February 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19 November 2010, and Gianfranco Rocca, 8 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ *Commercial Solvents-ICI* decision, OJ L 299, 31.12.1972, p. 51 — Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 [1974] ECR 223; *Chiquita bananas* decision, OJ L 95, 9.4.1976, p. 1 — Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207; *Hoffmann-La Roche* decision (vitamins), OJ L 223, 16.8.1976, p. 27 — Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461.

Altiero Spinelli (see box, page 297). The then commissioner for competition, Albert Borschette, had wanted to go even further by attempting to use Article 86 (as interpreted by the Court of Justice in *Continental Can*) to obtain a power of control over concentrations. An initial draft regulation was tabled in 1973 but the discussions were held up in the Council and Coreper in 1974–75, before the Commission put forward new proposals under Andriessen in 1981 and then in 1984 ⁽¹⁾. The impetus from the Single European Act gave new wings to this matter since it stimulated an increase in the number of company mergers. The work done by the Commission during the 1980s did not bear fruit until some years later, specifically with the merger regulation adopted by the Council in 1989. The *Philip Morris* judgment in 1987 helped break the deadlock in the negotiations ⁽²⁾. The case concerned a partial concentration agreement between two tobacco multinationals. It had been the subject of many coordination meetings between DG IV and the Legal Service between 1982 and 1984 because the powers that the treaty granted to the Commission in the field of concentrations were not clear ⁽³⁾. The negotiation process was then accelerated by determined action by Commissioner Peter Sutherland, who threatened to act without the regulation ⁽⁴⁾, and was completed by his successor, Leon Brittan. The Council regulation of 21 December 1989 granted the Commission exclusive power of control over concentrations with a Community dimension.

Work on state aid began very early on because of its prerogatives that the Treaty of Rome granted to the Commission in this area, but tangible results took a long time to emerge ⁽⁵⁾. The first urgent task was to provide a framework for the substantial increase in aid to sectors in difficulty. The Commission took particularly strong action in two sectors where it had specific powers under the treaties: the steel industry under the ECSC Treaty ⁽⁶⁾ and shipbuilding under the EEC Treaty (third directive in 1975, fourth directive in 1978, fifth directive in 1981). The task was to reconcile the demands of intra-Community competition and international competitiveness, and social and regional considerations. Outside these very specific areas, the Commission took other initiatives to affirm these prerogatives, in particular by prohibiting Dutch aid to the American firm Philip Morris in 1979. This prohibition decision was confirmed by the Court of Justice in 1980, in a judgment that underlined the discretionary power available to the Commission when examining the compatibility of state aid with the common market ⁽⁷⁾. At the same time, the Commission adopted Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings. France, Italy and the United Kingdom unsuccessfully challenged the directive before the Court of Justice ⁽⁸⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 104/1993/152, Memo from John Temple Lang to Paul Schmitt, 24 September 1981; Memo to Frans Andriessen, 6 March 1984; Memo from Manfred Caspari to Frans Andriessen, 30 November 1983.

⁽²⁾ Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 *BAT and Reynolds v Commission* [1987] ECR 4487.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 176/1995/808, Memos from John Temple Lang (Legal Service) to DG IV, 13 May 1982, and from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to B. van der Esch, 21 February 1983; Memo from Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 22 December 1983.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Peter Sutherland, 8 September 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interviews with Catherine Day, 9 September 2011, Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010, and Petrus (Pierre) Mathijssen, 14 June 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ See Chapter 12, 'Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial policy', and the box 'Eurofer' in Chapter 12, p. 269.

⁽⁷⁾ Case 730/79 *Philip Morris v Commission* [1980] ECR 2671.

⁽⁸⁾ Joined Cases 188/80 to 190/80 *France, Italy and United Kingdom v Commission* [1982] ECR 2545.

The Commission takes on IBM

Although the Commission only had relatively limited authority in the area of competition policy during the 1970s, it decided to take on the computer giant IBM. At that time, the American multinational dominated the computer market ⁽¹⁾. IBM's competitors had taken many cases against it to the American antitrust authorities, criticising its dominant position. But IBM won all seven cases brought against it in the United States in the 1970s ⁽²⁾. Even the American government abandoned its prosecution in January 1982.

The Commission, on the other hand, persisted in its investigation launched in 1973–74 on the basis of Article 86, with the support of the commissioner for industrial, technological and scientific affairs, Altiero Spinelli. Jean Dubois, who was handling this case at the time in DG IV, recalls the disarray in the Commission's teams because of their lack of knowledge of a sector that was then very new. An in-house training seminar was therefore organised to remedy the lack of technical expertise among Commission officials ⁽³⁾. DG IV took IBM to task for not authorising the connection of peripherals from other companies. For its part, IBM did not hesitate to exert pressure on the European institution and even threatened to close its plant in Montpellier ⁽⁴⁾. Finally, the Commission notified a 1 000-page statement of objections to IBM in December 1980, to which the American firm responded with an 8 000-page file and a request for an oral hearing. The hearing was held in February 1982 and lasted no less than 8 days. Once again, Jean Dubois describes the gap between the power of the American multinational and the Commission's resources. While the European team was struggling to take notes with just one secretary, IBM offered to help: 'Then IBM said: "It's not complicated, we will help you. We have a secretariat, can they come

to take notes to prepare the verbatim record?" The plan was to prepare a verbatim record of every session. We said yes. The sessions lasted until 5 or 6 o'clock every evening and, the next morning, the verbatim record of the previous day was there, printed by IBM. They had resources that we certainly did not possess. They brought with them experts who explained some very interesting points, with video screenings' ⁽⁵⁾. The American multinational even provided character witnesses such as the former American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and the former European Commissioner, Robert Marjolin. IBM enjoyed considerable support from the American administration. In January 1982, the Department of Justice, after dropping its charges against IBM, advised Europeans to do the same. The American delegation to the European Commission even made official overtures. In the words of Frans Andriessen, 'it really was David [against] Goliath' ⁽⁶⁾. In the end, the Commission agreed to negotiate with IBM, even though Andriessen was still threatening to continue the official proceeding and conclude with a formal prohibition decision. Agreement was eventually reached on 1 August 1984. The Commission was tasked with checking that IBM was effectively implementing its commitments to open up to other brands' peripherals' ⁽⁷⁾.

This case illustrates the Commission's ambition — it did not hesitate to take on a very powerful organisation outside Europe, which was supported by its major American ally — but also its independence. It also heralded other spectacular Commission decisions concerning non-European companies, such as the prohibition of the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 or the 2004 finding against Microsoft for abuse of its dominant position in a decision that cited the *IBM* case ⁽⁸⁾.

⁽¹⁾ The historical work of reference on this case is: Van Laer, A., 'Vers une politique industrielle commune. Les actions de la Commission européenne dans les secteurs de l'informatique et des télécommunications (1965–84)', PhD thesis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010.

⁽²⁾ Sobel, R., *IBM — Colossus in Transition*, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1984, pp. 274–275.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁵⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ *Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, paragraphs 94–95.

⁽⁸⁾ Commission decision of 24 May 2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 — *Microsoft*), paragraph 22, OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p. 23.

This gradual affirmation, combined with the experience acquired in examining regional and sectoral aid, facilitated the work of Commissioner Peter Sutherland when he took over this question, which at the time was highlighted in the short section on competition policy in the 1985 White Paper ⁽¹⁾. In a single market, the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade must not be counterbalanced by a large increase in public support for certain firms. A stock-taking of all state aids was therefore launched, which resulted in the publication of the 'First survey on state aids in the European Community' (SEC(88) 1981 final of 13 December 1988) in 1988 ⁽²⁾. Crucial decisions were then prepared during this period, such as the *Bous-sac* decision concerning the leading French textile firm. The size of this company and the scale of the aid it had received rapidly transformed this case into a prime example of the Commission's determination to apply the rules on state aid more strictly ⁽³⁾. The case eventually led to an initial Commission decision at the end of 1986, and to the final decision in 1987 requiring the repayment of more than 300 million French francs in unlawful aid ⁽⁴⁾.

New dossiers: sectoral liberalisation

The air transport sector had traditionally been organised around duopolies. Competition on a given international route was limited because, in general, only two airlines, often flag carriers, could carry passengers. Furthermore, fares were the subject of binding agreements. This situation evolved with the impetus provided by the international regulatory

context — in particular the deregulation undertaken in the United States by the Carter administration in 1978 — and technological progress, with the reduction in the cost per passenger carried. New operators entered the market. At the end of the 1970s, the Danish airline Sterling lodged a complaint with the Commission against the Danish government and the Scandinavian airline SAS about the latter's dominant position, in particular on the Copenhagen–London route. The Commission did not agree with Sterling, but used this case to promote its plans to introduce more flexibility into the sector. The case was picked up by Lord Bethell, a Conservative member of the House of Lords and of the European Parliament. In 1980, he set up the 'Freedom of the skies' campaign ⁽⁵⁾. In 1981, he even threatened to lodge a complaint against the Commission with the Court of Justice if it did not intervene to enforce competition in the setting of air fares. The action against the Commission for failure to act was eventually dismissed by the Court in 1982 ⁽⁶⁾, but it left its mark. The Commission then continued its action, which paved the way for the first liberalisation directive in 1987.

In the field of telecommunications, the same phenomenon of a radical change in the rules (liberalisation of monopolies and oligopolies in the United Kingdom and the United States) and technologies (convergence of communications and electronics by digitisation) affected Europe. Here again, the Commission's action starting in the 1980s consisted in gradually challenging the existing monopolies. This action paved the way for the 1987 Green Paper and the 1988 directive under Peter Sutherland. The directive required liberalisation not only of public procurement (to break the exclusive relationship between national producers of telephone equipment and the public operating monopoly), but also of telephone services.

⁽¹⁾ 'Completing the internal market', White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 June 1985), HAEC, COM(85) 310 final, 14 June 1985, p. 39.

⁽²⁾ Cini, M. and McGowan, L., *Competition Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1998, p. 145.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 327/1994/159, Memo from G. Thies (DG IV) to Robert Sunnen, 11 October 1985; Letter from Frans Andriessen to Bob Cryer, 28 November 1984.

⁽⁴⁾ Commission Decision 87/585/EEC of 15 July 1987, OJ L 352, 15.12.1987, p. 42.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 104/1993/61, Memo from Ian S. Forrester to Jean-Louis Cadieux, 13 May 1981.

⁽⁶⁾ Case 246/81 *Lord Bethell v Commission* [1982] ECR 2277.

Conclusion

During a large part of the period from 1973 to 1986, the Commission's action on competition remained limited by extremely powerful structural and economic factors such as the successive economic crises and the very limited developments in national competition policies. However, at the end of the period, DG IV emerged as a particularly active Commission department by drawing upon a blend of the German tradition inherited from the Hallstein Commission and new dynamics. A field

of multiple justifications and ramifications, competition policy underwent many developments. The Commission took advantage of a more favourable ideological context, the single market programme and the support of the Court of Justice on certain important cases. Initiatives blossomed in many areas with the arrival of Commissioner Frans Andriessen and would result in substantial delegation of powers under Commissioners Peter Sutherland (1985–89) and Leon Brittan (1989–93).

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Chapter 15

Economic and monetary affairs: new challenges and ambitions

New conditions, new challenges

Until the early 1970s, the European economy was still being swept along by the dynamics of the 1960s, marked by Keynesian policies and growth. This climate made it easier to set up the common market and, with the 1971 Werner plan ⁽¹⁾, to make a first attempt at economic and monetary union.

However, the situation deteriorated sharply in the 1970s, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. The new climate of stagflation — low growth accompanied by inflation — also saw a resurgence of national protectionism against a back-

ground of major differences in the economic priorities of Member States, compounded by large inflation differentials and serious monetary instability. These problems culminated, for the Europeans, in the realisation at the start of the 1980s that there was a contrast between their performance — with low growth and high unemployment — and that of the United States. On the one hand ‘Eurosclerosis’, on the other a renewed dynamism, which many observers attributed to the virtues of the supply-side economics of Reagan’s America.

This new situation, so different from that of the 1960s, posed a major challenge for the Commission. The crisis was leading the Member States to renationalise policymaking and was posing a threat to economic union. A new economic strategy was therefore needed to restore dynamism and cohesion within the Community. With this in view, the Commission had to intervene more forcibly in the debate, improving the expertise at its disposal; it had to suggest new strategies and regain the initi-

⁽¹⁾ Bussière, É., ‘Moves towards an economic and monetary policy’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 391–410.



The consequences of the devaluation of the dollar, February 1973.
Cartoon by Plantu.

ative, especially in the area of economic and monetary union (EMU).

Actors and economic strategies

The task of identifying the major policy options fell in the main to the member of the Commission with responsibility for economic and financial affairs and the directorate-general of which the member was in charge (DG II). Because of the importance attached to such matters, the members of the Commission responsible were usually vice-presidents of the Commission, like Wilhelm Haferkamp from 1973 to 1976, and François-Xavier Ortoli from 1977 to 1984, although Alois Pfeiffer, who was responsible for economic and financial affairs in the early years of the Delors Commission from 1985, was not. These were such important matters, however, that the presidents themselves often devoted a great deal of attention to them. Thus, when Roy Jenkins took office in 1977, he took a number of initiatives in this field in spite of reservations on the part of François-Xavier Ortoli. In 1985, Jacques Delors took charge of monetary affairs rather than leaving them in the hands of the commissioner with responsibility for DG II.

The change in the economic climate meant that the period from 1970 to 1980 was marked in Europe by intensive discussions on how to tackle the crisis, and the Commission — itself divided — did not escape these discussions. As Robert Verrue explained, ‘there was a very clear split among my colleagues between those who had studied in the United States or the United Kingdom — particularly the London School of Economics — and those who had followed a more French approach, shall we say, typified by the *Commissariat au Plan* (planning commission), which was really very influential in Europe both politically and economically’ ⁽¹⁾. The French tradition, passed down from Robert Marjolin and Raymond Barre, was carried on by François-Xavier Ortoli, who believed in targeted interventionism and who had become increasingly preoccupied with the convergence of economic and monetary policies by the end of the 1970s. The German view, dominated by the social market economy, was represented at that time by two commissioners from the world of socialism and trade unionism, Haferkamp and Pfeiffer, who wanted to encourage growth without conflict by promoting dialogue between the social partners so as to improve the consensus on the macroeconomic stability framework. In that respect, their ideas were close to those of a certain Jacques Delors, but also to those of François-Xavier Ortoli, who had tried to introduce elements of the German model in France in the 1960s ⁽²⁾.

Robert Verrue describes the synthesis which gradually emerged within the Commission through ‘the need to construct a “concept”, in the German sense of the word, an economic policy concept that would solve the European problem ... which followed up new approaches in economics’ ⁽³⁾. Everyone, however, was influenced in the 1970s by Anglo-Saxon economic thinking, first by Keynesianism and then

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2011.

⁽²⁾ Particularly during his time as commissioner for the plan from 1966 to 1967, with Delors in charge of social affairs.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2011.

by monetarism and supply-side economics, which grew in influence during the 1980s.

Organisational and management changes within DG II reflected these trends. An Italian former diplomat, Ugo Mosca, had been at the reins of DG II since 1973. In 1979, he was succeeded by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, from the Banca d'Italia. An excellent administrator, he was also one of the most brilliant economists of his generation, and a former student of Franco Modigliani at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of his colleagues at the time described him as 'absolutely and implacably demanding in the service ... of a long-term vision of the role of the directorate-general' ⁽¹⁾. Others said that he combined German discipline with Italian flair. As soon as he arrived, said Robert Verrue, 'the work of his departments changed. Because we knew what the boss wanted, the mechanism for giving him what he wanted was put in place, and throughout the whole of that time not even the slightest opinion could be offered ... — in success as in failure — without an eye to the influence of Padoa-Schioppa' ⁽²⁾. In March 1980, he reorganised the DG, primarily in order to improve its analytical capability by creating a new directorate for macro-economic analyses and policies, headed by Michael Emerson, an economist from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a former member of Roy Jenkins's cabinet ⁽³⁾. One of the main objectives of this reform was to bring about a change of scale by considering the European economy as a whole rather than the national economies separately. The introduction of new teams at the start of the 1980s also saw the departure of Frédéric Boyer de La Giroday, who had for a long time been director of monetary affairs and who was the main mouthpiece within the Commission of the economist Robert Triffin; he was replaced by Jean-Paul Mingasson, who was soon to be

a close collaborator of Jacques Delors on monetary questions. In 1983, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was replaced by Massimo Russo, another Italian, who had spent most of his career at the International Monetary Fund.

A new approach

As the Council decision of 22 March 1971 illustrates, at the start of the 1970s the Commission's macroeconomic policy choices were still dominated by Keynesianism. At that time, fiscal policy was considered less a policy in its own right than the main instrument of short-term economic policy ⁽⁴⁾. As the aim was essentially to stabilise the economic cycle, a balance had to be found between acceptable levels of employment and inflation.

The arrival of the former German trade unionist Wilhelm Haferkamp in economic and financial affairs in 1973 did not fundamentally alter this view. However, he did stress the need to introduce social dialogue into a Community-wide economic policy, basing his ideas on the German model with which he was familiar. In June 1976, the tripartite conference on employment and stability in the Community, organised on the Commission's initiative, established a link between the Commission and governments, as well as union and employer representatives ⁽⁵⁾. Haferkamp's aim was to restore full employment and price stability linked to an elevated annual growth rate of approximately 5 %, i.e. a return to the growth rate of the 1960s, by linking salary increases to greater productivity. Gradually, though, a new paradigm emerged for monetary policy. This new paradigm was a consequence of the end of fixed exchange rates, which freed monetary policy from the objective of keeping the exchange rate

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Hervé Carré, 3 July 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2012.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Maes, I., *Economic Thought and the Making of European Monetary Union*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, pp. 90–94.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, *Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1976–77*, OJ L 358, 29.12.1976, p. 13; see also Chapter 18, 'Free movement of workers, social rights and social affairs'.



Young people demonstrate in support of a European currency in front of the Berlaymont, 5 December 1977.

steady. In line with the new approach in the Bundesbank, which embarked on this course in 1975, managing the money supply became the foundation of a policy centred on controlling inflation. However, the Commission's approach was more gradual. As late as 1977, it noted disappointing growth in the Community, which it attributed to unduly restrictive policies on the part of countries with strong currencies, especially Germany where public-sector deficits had been scaled down too quickly ⁽¹⁾. The

Commission accordingly promoted a growth scenario that followed a Keynesian logic designed to boost demand by 1 point of GDP ⁽²⁾.

The annual economic report for 1980 marked a change of course characterised by the abandoning of active demand management policies and a move towards a medium-term supply policy with more structural ambitions. This new trend was clearly set out in the introduction to the 1980 report: 'While,

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1977–78*, OJ L 323, 19.12.1977, p. 3.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

in the past, economic policy was often perceived as a problem of demand management in a world based on the assumption of unlimited supply of energy and raw materials, the importance and critical value of supply constraints and structural adjustment problems are now evident' ⁽¹⁾. The break with the policies of the past was thus very clearly expressed: 'The concerted response to the present general economic situation should be based on the right strategic mix of demand and supply policies and notably the right balance in their application to short- and medium-term problems. Short-term adjustments should be more moderate than at times in the last decade, and a heavier weight has to be given to reducing medium-term inflationary expectations and improving supply conditions in the economy' ⁽²⁾. This major change in direction followed the failure of the experiments in demand-driven recovery, particularly that launched on a Community scale at the Bonn European Council in 1978, which had been followed by major discussions on the effectiveness of this type of policy. Since the effectiveness of these detailed and short-term demand management policies had been called into question, attention turned towards medium-term economic policies aimed largely at improving the operation of the markets within the more general framework of supply-side policies.

The Commission therefore turned its efforts towards the structural dimensions of the crisis: 'The accumulated back-log of adjustments and ... our growing incapacity to respond quickly to the recent changes in the economic environment. The increased structural rigidities in our economies and social behaviour have changed profoundly the long-term dynamics of the business cycle' ⁽³⁾. It stressed the structural nature of unemployment, which was partly connected with the cost of labour and the

burden and structure of taxation. This was in addition to the growing rigidity of the labour market as a result of social legislation introduced in the 1960s. The Commission therefore based its employment policy on the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment, increased competitiveness of the enterprise sector by a deepening of the single market, wage restraint and a systematic reappraisal of labour market regulations ⁽⁴⁾.

The new Delors Commission, with Alois Pfeiffer as member of the Commission with responsibility for DG II, while not wishing to question the substance of the policy outlined since the beginning of the 1980s, nevertheless wanted in 1985 to place greater emphasis on the ties between growth and employment through its cooperative strategy for growth and employment. This initiative, which was designed to create closer links between the actions of the Community, governments and the two sides of industry in order to create growth that would generate more jobs, combined moderate growth in real wages and greater profitability for businesses and demand: 'Only if wage moderation is accompanied by a sufficient level of aggregate demand can one have confidence that the process of improving profitability and restructuring demand (relatively more investment and relatively less consumption) will be rapid enough and not involve drastic deflation that would place social consensus under considerable strain. Only in this way can wage moderation fulfil its employment function' ⁽⁵⁾. This draft, which tied in with the relaunch of the single market and Objective 1992, was produced under the authority of Alois Pfeiffer and Ludwig Schubert, his economic affairs adviser, and therefore also emphasised dialogue between the social partners. As Schubert observed, 'Achieving the internal market was one of the major themes of that time. Our role was to show

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, 'Annual economic report 1980–81', *European Economy*, No 7, November 1980, p. 9.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, 'Annual economic report 1982–83', *European Economy*, No 14, November 1982, p. 11.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, 'Annual economic report 1984–85', *European Economy*, No 22, November 1984, pp. 33–34.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, 'Annual economic report 1985–86', *European Economy*, No 26, 1985, p. 10.

that the growth potential created by the internal market had to be used effectively to enable actual growth — over and above productivity gains — to also create the jobs we so badly needed. This was an essential plank in what Delors used to call the “social dimension” of the internal market’ ⁽¹⁾.

All in all, the DG II of the mid-1980s should be seen as a kind of melting pot of economic cultures in constant search of a combination that would be right for a European Community trying to find a new impetus. An official at the time lists the leading figures in this ongoing debate: ‘There was Mingasson, the Frenchman, for him it was all about the European monetary system, monetary relations, monetary policy is the key element. Then there was Michael Emerson — Operation 1992, the internal markets, structural policies. Lastly there was the Rhenish contingent in the purest sense, Ludwig Schubert, who was an advocate of wage restraint in line with productivity to ensure that unit labour costs did not get out of hand ... All the discussions centred on variants of these three approaches, which merged together’ ⁽²⁾.

The creation of the European Monetary System: the Commission in retreat

The first weeks in office in Brussels of François-Xavier Ortoli coincided with the death throes of the Bretton Woods monetary system: the fixed pegs which were thought to have been preserved at the Washington conference in December 1971 finally gave way to a general floating of currencies from March 1973. The Commission, which had worked non-stop on the introduction of the first attempt at economic and monetary union, tried to maintain stability at Community level by a

joint flotation of the European currencies against the dollar (known as the ‘snake in the tunnel’). To this end, it wanted to ensure that the newly created European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) would have plenty of funds to intervene on the exchange markets to combat speculation ⁽³⁾. However, the Commission was ignored and the growing tensions on the market led to the break-up of the snake, which by 1974 was reduced de facto to a sort of ‘mark area’ that the French franc tried, in vain, to join in 1975. Despite the priority given to reviving the economic and monetary union (EMU) project by Ortoli during his time as president, the Commission continued in fact to be sidelined when the most important monetary decisions were taken, the governments keeping this right for themselves, whether in a European forum such as Ecofin (Economic and Financial Affairs Council) or in the G5, to which the Commission tried to gain admittance in 1975 ⁽⁴⁾. This situation was typified by the way in which the Commission president was invited to meetings of the governors of the central banks of the Community countries in Basel, even at the beginning of the 1980s: ‘The welcome extended to the Commission was not very encouraging — the president had been put in a tiny office ...’ ⁽⁵⁾.

The Marjolin report of March 1975 described this situation as a failure: ‘Europe is no nearer to EMU than in 1969. In fact if there has been any movement it has been backwards. The Europe of the 1960s represented a relatively harmonious economic and monetary entity which was undone in the course of recent years; national economic and monetary pol-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Ludwig Schubert, 8 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM (73), Minutes No 244, second part, meeting of 11 March 1973; François-Xavier Ortoli, ‘L’Europe au carrefour’, lecture in connection with the Paul-Henri Spaak Chair at the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels (ULB), 28 October 1976, pp. 14–15.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM (75), Minutes No 362, second part, meeting of 3 December 1975.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Jean-Paul Mingasson, 11 October 2010.



Commission President Roy Jenkins (on the left) arriving at the European University Institute in Florence on 27 October 1977, the day when he delivered his famous speech advocating European monetary union.

icies have never in 25 years been more discordant, more divergent, than they are today' ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission's departments nevertheless developed a number of initiatives, some of which would have a lasting influence on the process of monetary unification. First, there was the study on the implementation of a parallel currency, which was considered at a very early stage in a study by Robert Mundell, the future winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, produced for the Commission in 1969 and published in 1973 ⁽²⁾. The parallel currency solution was also central to the 1975 All Saints manifesto, drawn up by a group of economists from

Community countries. The basic idea was to create a European currency, the 'Europa', which would compete with national currencies. The Optica reports, produced at the request of the Commission, also returned to this notion of a parallel currency. Neither ministers nor central bank governors were won over by these initiatives, however. The development of the private European currency unit (ecu) in the early 1980s would nonetheless be based on a fairly similar model.

The Commission also took a close interest in the economic side of the EMU project, asking a group of experts, chaired by Donald MacDougall (with Michael Emerson as rapporteur), to study the budgetary implications of EMU. The MacDougall report thus provided a series of analyses and hypotheses on the role of public finance at Community level. It established a link between deepening EMU

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 241/1991/161, EC Commission, 'Report of the study group "Economic and monetary union 1980"', Marjolin report, Brussels, March 1975, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Mundell, R., 'Why Europa?', *European Economic Integration and Monetary Unification*, Study Group on EMU, Brussels, 1973, pp. 110–122.

— completing the single market, introducing common policies, etc. — and the redistributive and stabilising effects of a Community budget that was larger in terms of domestic product. Some of the conclusions of this report would be used by Roy Jenkins in his speech in Florence in 1977 ⁽¹⁾.

For Roy Jenkins, the European economy had to be put back on its feet and the Commission had to take back the initiative in this area, at the risk of upsetting the Member States and the central banks. The speech he gave at the European University Institute in Florence on 27 October 1977 was intended to cause surprise, to create shock waves ⁽²⁾. On the monetary front, he wanted to relaunch the unification process; the loose cooperation offered by the snake was not enough. On the economic front, the Commission needed to stimulate the recovery by mobilising more resources, as recommended by the conclusions of the MacDougall report ⁽³⁾. The Jenkins initiative was drawn up by his cabinet — in which Emerson played an essential role — and discussed in detail with Triffin, but Ortoli had doubts about the merits of the approach ⁽⁴⁾. Although there was no direct follow-up to the October 1977 initiative, it came at just the right time and triggered the process that culminated in the European Monetary System (EMS).

The negotiations that led to the creation of the EMS in December 1978 began outside the Commission, however, and for a while the latter's role became more of a technical one. Although President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt discreetly kept Commission President Roy Jenkins informed, the Commission as such was not involved

in the negotiations until the essentials had been agreed on. The competent Community bodies — the Monetary Committee, the Committee of Governors and the finance ministers — only became involved after the Bremen European Council in July 1978.

Like the snake, the EMS included an exchange-rate and intervention mechanism based on fluctuation margins of 2.25 % either side of bilateral central rates and on a number of lending and support mechanisms. The main innovation was the creation of a new instrument, the ecu — a basket of currencies designed to act as an intervention indicator and a means of settlement for central banks within the system. The December 1978 agreements provided for the creation, after 2 years of operation, of a European Monetary Fund which was to mark the start of the second, institutional, stage of the system ⁽⁵⁾.

The Commission steps up its role

Once the EMS was actually launched on 13 March 1979 — the delay caused by discussions on compensatory amounts for the common agricultural policy ⁽⁶⁾ — the Commission tried its best to consolidate it, so that it did not turn into a second snake, plagued by repeated realignments and member countries withdrawing from the system. However, most economic and monetary decisions fell to the Member States and not to the Community: 'we had no idea what was going on' ⁽⁷⁾. One of the priorities was therefore to strengthen the Commission's role

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1977–78*, OJ L 323, 19.12.1977, p. 2.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, 'Current challenges and future opportunities for Europe', speech given in Florence by Roy Jenkins at the first Jean Monnet conference, 27 October 1977.

⁽³⁾ Ludlow, P., *The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case-Study of the Politics of the European Community*, Butterworth, London, 1982, pp. 39–40 and pp. 48–49.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ One of the themes that was absent from the negotiations on the EMS was the movement of capital; see Bakker, A., *The Liberalisation of Capital Movements in Europe — the Monetary Committee and Financial Integration 1958–94*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996.

⁽⁶⁾ See Chapter 16, 'Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy'.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Hervé Carré, 3 July 2011.

in the management of an EMS which was largely in the hands of the central banks. With this in mind, DG II's Directorate for Monetary Affairs was boosted by the addition of an office in charge of the EMS, and a manual was produced laying down realignment procedures. The procedures for realignments gradually became more collegial. The first realignment was determined primarily by Germany and the second and third — devaluations of the Danish krone and the Italian lira — were unilateral decisions. As the Commission had not even been involved in the consultations between the central banks regarding the Danish krone, Ortoli called for a reform of the procedures at a meeting of the Committee of Governors: 'As regards the procedure applied in the case of the devaluation of the krone, while it is fortunate that consultations took place between the central banks, it is regrettable that the Commission was consulted only at a late stage, since the Commission is responsible for administering the agro-monetary system and realignments are not without consequences for this system (and in particular compensatory amounts). The procedures for realignments should therefore be re-examined' ⁽¹⁾. His argument was accepted. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, director-general of DG II from 1979 to 1983, summarises the resulting changes thus: 'The so-called hegemonic system was therefore abandoned following the first realignment and the unilateral method characteristic of Bretton Woods was abandoned after the third' ⁽²⁾. From then on, realignments became more a Community decision.

In autumn 1979, the Commission drew up new proposals for improving the coordination of policies. Ortoli explained in Basel to the Committee of Governors that 'monetary policy decisions, especially in the case of a large country, are not without their effects on developments within the EMS and

as a result such decisions should be subject to prior high-level consultation' ⁽³⁾. His remarks met with little enthusiasm, however. The Commission's proposals, examined over the next few months by the central banks, had almost no effect.

However, the tensions facing the EMS in the early 1980s made a greater convergence of national policies essential, and realignments played a crucial part in a process that had become more *communautaire*. The example of France is indicative of this trend. When François Mitterrand became president of the republic in May 1981, it was not long before the question arose of the franc's continued membership of the EMS. French Finance Minister Jacques Delors, former Chairman of the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, was at that time working closely with Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and François-Xavier Ortoli. Their actions played a role in the change in economic policy direction adopted in Paris. The Commission was thus able to increase its role in supporting adjustment policies, as it itself explained in 1982: 'The June [1982] realignment is also indicative of a concern to establish greater convergence. In the countries whose currencies were devalued, stabilisation policies are now being applied. The French government has introduced measures intended rapidly to reduce the rate of inflation and to encourage the recovery of investment. The measures include a 4-month prices and incomes freeze, at the end of which the rate of inflation should have declined considerably, the control of public finances, with a budget deficit kept down to 3 % of GDP, and a return to a balanced budget for the social security funds. The countries whose currencies were revalued have recognised that the readjustment could make it easier for them to apply policies which would promote economic recovery. The Commission has, for its part, actively encouraged the process of convergence. It has not confined itself simply to following

⁽¹⁾ BNB archives, Minutes of the 140th meeting of the Committee of Governors, 11 December 1979.

⁽²⁾ 'Lessons from the European Monetary System', in Padoa-Schioppa, T., *The Road to Monetary Union in Europe*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 73.

⁽³⁾ BNB archives, Minutes of the 140th meeting of the Committee of Governors, 11 December 1979.

through as effectively as possible the coordination procedures for economic policies provided for in Community texts. It has tried to spell out what convergence should mean in practice' ⁽¹⁾ in terms of overall balance (budget, balance of payments, etc.) or inflation. In some cases, the recommendations of the Commission and the Monetary Committee came hand in hand with Community loans which made them easier to implement. The realignment of March 1983 and the austerity turn that followed were thus helped along by a Community loan, discreetly negotiated between the French government and François-Xavier Ortoli, the member of the Commission responsible for economic affairs. The principle of convergence was now accepted by Member States' governments. The implementation of the EMS therefore also played an important role in the stabilisation and convergence policies of the 1980s.

The Commission also tried to implement the institutional phase of the EMS. Following on from its proposals of previous years, it submitted a dossier on 'European Monetary Fund: preparatory works' to the Monetary Committee with a number of memos on acceptance and convertibility/negotiability of the ecu, liquidity of the fund, procedures for increasing EMS reserves, consolidation of Community appropriations in the European Monetary Fund, external role of the ecu and the European Monetary Fund: institutional aspects ⁽²⁾. These attempts came to nothing, however, and the Commission's plans were shelved in December 1980. Padoa-Schioppa reacted sharply to this failure: 'There were all sorts of reasons for this: the second oil shock, the new inflationary upsurge that followed, the rise in value of the dollar, centrifugal pressure as a result of these developments. But the main reason was, generally speaking, the distrust of the fund displayed, sometimes openly, by the mon-

etary authorities of the country with the strongest currency. A public opinion that was already less than favourable to the system was encouraged in its anti-EMS sentiments by the very authority responsible for running it' ⁽³⁾.

The Commission then looked for other ways of strengthening the EMS. These efforts culminated in the proposals of March 1982 in favour of the non-institutional development of the EMS. These proposals were aimed first of all at increasing the role of the ecu in the exchange mechanism. The Commission also tried to promote the use of the ecu by the monetary authorities of countries outside the zone and to encourage its use on the financial markets by increasing the Community institutions' issues in ecus and making private use easier. The Commission also put forward proposals that were more political in scope. Thus it attached great importance to all the Community currencies' joining the system, explaining that 'the European Monetary System will not assume its full significance and will not achieve its full potential until it organises, on an equal footing, the exchange rate relationships of all the Community currencies: sterling's, and later the drachma's, participation in the exchange rate mechanism (and the narrowing to 2.25 % of the Italian lira's present margins) would bring the system to full fruition and would act as a signal to the markets and to public opinion of the determination to pursue in common the attempt — accepted and recognised by all — to establish a zone of monetary stability in Europe' ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission likewise suggested issuing an ecu coin to capture the public imagination, and pressed for the creation of an ecu clearing system, a brainchild of Robert Triffin. The development of a market in the ecu as a parallel currency, under the guidance of Padoa-Schioppa, was

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, 'Dossier on the European Monetary System', *European Economy*, No 12, July 1982, p. 36.

⁽²⁾ 'Fonds monétaire européen, travaux préparatoires', 5 November 1981, II/480/81.

⁽³⁾ Archives of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa; Padoa-Schioppa, T., *La direction générale des affaires économiques et financières de 1979 à 1983*, EC Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Director-General, 25 February 1983, p. 30.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, 'Dossier on the European Monetary System', *European Economy*, No 12, July 1982, p. 52.

therefore one of the cornerstones of the Commission's action at that time ⁽¹⁾.

Under the Delors Commission, the process of European integration took off once more with the project for an internal market, designed to set in motion a chain of events leading from the single market to a single currency. In his address to the European Parliament in January 1985, Jacques Delors underlined the merits of the EMS, describing it as 'an area of relative calm in a sea agitated by the wide and sudden fluctuations of currencies' ⁽²⁾. He stressed that 'a real Community currency' was not yet on the agenda: 'I am too well aware of the fundamental problems, notably for the central banks, and the technical complexities of monetary questions to make any hasty promises.' His statement was very much in line with the Commission's traditional recommendations on this matter, namely stepping up monetary cooperation and extending the role of the ecu: 'No hasty promises. However, I do believe that a substantial strengthening of monetary cooperation and a controlled extension of the roles of the official and the private ecu are both possible.'

The Single European Act of 1986 marked an essential stage in the consolidation and the construction of European economic and monetary union. As Jacques Delors noted in his memoirs, 'Lastly, there was the Community's monetary capacity. The ultimate battle in a sense. How could we conceive of total freedom of movement of capital, which was one of the main goals of Objective 1992, without giving thought to the necessary strengthening of monetary cooperation — in the EMS in the first

instance, then within the economic and monetary union? How could we not learn from this experience of cooperation, while at the same time maintaining the status of the European Monetary System which was outside the treaty? I wanted the treaty to acknowledge that the Community could provide itself with a monetary capability' ⁽³⁾. Delors also recounts how he had to fight: 'I counter-attacked by tabling a chapter for inclusion in the Single European Act. A classic example of a compromise that breaks the deadlock. Chapter I was entitled "Cooperation in economic and monetary policy", with the sub-heading "Economic and monetary union". The first article read: "In order to ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policies, Member States shall cooperate in accordance with the objectives of Article 104. In so doing, they shall take account of the experience acquired in the European Monetary System (EMS) and in developing the ecu"' ⁽⁴⁾.

The single market and the creation of a Community-wide capital market based on an end to exchange control would not be possible without the prospect of a future monetary union. The Single European Act provided the Communities with monetary capability and established the EMS and the development of the ecu as part of a dynamic which its supporters were not going to allow to lose momentum. The teams in charge of economic and monetary affairs in the mid-1980s and the 1990s would have the satisfaction of guiding the process to its conclusion.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE AND IVO MAES

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Massimo Russo, 30 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Delors, J., 'Statement on the thrust of Commission policy', Strasbourg, 14 January 1985; *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 1, 1985, p. 12.

⁽³⁾ Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, pp. 223–224.

⁽⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

Chapter 16

Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy

16.1. Adjusting a flagship policy: the common agricultural policy in the 1970s and 1980s

During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the common agricultural policy (CAP) remained one of the Community's flagship policies, but its strengths and weaknesses were coming to the fore. The CAP was one of the first common policies that had been fleshed out in the course of the 1960s. Articles 38 to 47 of the EEC Treaty decreed that the common market to be created should include agricultural products. The Community agricultural policy was to increase the productivity of the agricultural sector whilst taking account of the specific character

of agricultural production, the social fabric of the agricultural population and the structural and natural disparities of production conditions. Ensuring the supply of agricultural goods to consumers at reasonable prices was also one of the policy's aims, as was maintaining a fair standard of living for the agricultural community. Of the several options for the organisation of a common agricultural policy that the treaty provided, the Community opted for a fully integrated common agricultural market with shared price and market mechanisms, guided and managed by the Commission. Since the early 1960s, the core principles of the CAP were market unity, Community preference and financial solidarity.

The CAP became fully operational in July 1968; its completion was generally seen as a major success for European integration. The Member States' agricultural policy was now managed at Community level. This brought with it great challenges and

responsibilities for the Commission. It is important to remember that the CAP was founded in a period when agriculture, forestry and fisheries represented over 20 % of the workforce and contributed around 11 % of GDP. In the post-war period, agriculture was an economic sector in transition and suffering from a number of structural problems, such as the exodus of rural labour, low incomes and low productivity. The Community agricultural policy thus had to address these problems through market measures and structural policy. At the same time (and this was the Commission's main concern), the agricultural markets had to be kept in balance, avoiding shortages and surpluses of foodstuffs, and meeting the needs of both farmers and consumers.

The milk lakes and butter mountains which made the headlines in the 1970s and the early 1980s illustrate how difficult it was to achieve a balanced agricultural market, not least because these surpluses were caused by a whole range of factors, the most important being technical progress in the agricultural sector. This chapter discusses the challenges the Commission faced in agricultural policy by addressing internal developments in market and structural policy. The external dimension — enlargements and international negotiations — together with monetary turbulences formed another set of challenges the Commission had to negotiate. Finally, the imbalance of supply and demand and the resulting increase in costs of the agricultural support mechanisms became untenable and led the Commission to propose adjustments to the CAP.

DG VI: a well-oiled machine

In 1973, Sicco Mansholt, the 'father' of the CAP, left the Commission. Mansholt had dominated agricultural affairs in Europe since the 1950s and his was a difficult act for his successors to follow. His immediate successor, Pierre Lardinois (1973–76), was seen as a good manager of the policy and, due to his experience as agricultural minister in the Neth-

erlands, he had excellent relations with the Council of Ministers. However, he was not perceived as being very imaginative. According to Michael Franklin, deputy director-general in DG VI in the early 1970s, 'the pendulum has swung too far from Mansholt's grand design to Lardinois's daily patchwork' ⁽¹⁾. Pierre Lardinois's successor, the Dane Finn Olav Gundelach (1977–81), was the first commissioner for agriculture who had not previously been agriculture minister in his home country. Gundelach took over the agriculture portfolio in a difficult period of mounting agricultural surpluses. His answer was to press for a more prudent price policy. Following Gundelach's sudden death in January 1981, Danish Agriculture Minister Poul Dalsager (1981–84) took over. Under Dalsager, the Community faced its worst budgetary crisis. As a response, the Commission successfully introduced measures to bring down the costs of agricultural support ⁽²⁾. When Frans Andriessen (1985–89), formerly a minister of finance in the Netherlands, took over the agriculture portfolio in 1985, he had already served a term as the commissioner for competition. Under Andriessen, the Commission started to develop a new outlook on the role of agriculture in society.

The commissioners for agriculture changed frequently, while DG VI had only three directors-general between 1958 and 1986, all of them French. The first, Louis Georges Rabot, who retired in 1978, had served DG VI for 20 years. In the Commission, Rabot was an outstanding figure who had made a major contribution to setting up the CAP. His successor, Claude Villain, was perceived as a strong personality. Although this did not always make for an easy relationship with his staff, he was generally perceived as an able director-general ⁽³⁾. When Villain left the Commission in 1985, Guy Legras took over

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010, reading an entry from his diary of 1976.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Michel Jacquot, 9 September 2010, and Peter Pooley, 10 August 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011, and Peter Pooley, 10 August 2010.



Agricultural Europe — a Community action. A poster from 1978 detailing the principles and achievements of the common agricultural policy.

as director-general. A former French diplomat, he played an important role in defending the CAP in the GATT Uruguay Round, starting in 1986.

During the 1970s and the early 1980s, DG VI continued to be one of the largest DGs in the Commission. The belief that European integration was most tangible and concrete in the CAP was fully accepted in the Commission and it was the credo in DG VI. As David Williamson, deputy director-general of DG VI, pointed out: 'Because agriculture was a fully working European policy, you know, that gave it a special status. Some may occasionally have viewed it as a bad policy, but it was a fully working policy and was, as such, considered as the way we ought to work in Europe' ⁽¹⁾.

Controlling the agricultural markets

'Mr Lardinois, when commissioner, was asked to report on agriculture to the ministers one year and he said: "Europe has been fed this year". That's what we were doing. Some people don't quite understand it, but without this system the whole thing would have broken down' ⁽²⁾.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, market policy and price policy were the main instruments used to achieve a balance between supply and demand, binding most of the Community's financial resources in the guarantee section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). During the 1960s, the Community had devised market organisations for different agricultural products that were managed by the Commission. DG VI officials chaired management committees in which national officials came together at regular intervals, sometimes weekly, to decide on levies and intervention sales and other measures to keep the markets for the different products in balance. This management side was very time consuming and DG VI officials had a great deal of responsibility ⁽³⁾. On top of that, the deputy director-general responsible for markets represented DG VI at the weekly meeting of the Special Agriculture Committee where senior agriculture officials either from national ministries or the permanent representations met to consider Commission proposals and to prepare decisions of the Council of Ministers.

For several agricultural products, mainly milk and dairy products, cereals, sugar and beef, the Council had to decide annually, on a proposal from the Commission, on a range of prices that were to be set for the marketing year ahead and on other market measures. These are key elements of a managed market as opposed to a free market where supply, demand and prices are self-regulatory. As farmers'

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Williamson, 28 July 2010; see also interview with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with David Williamson, 28 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

incomes were perceived as being directly dependent on the price levels of the different products, in some areas, such as milk, the Community had ended up with high prices that had triggered a considerable increase in production and had left the Community with a structural surplus. Nonetheless, the pre-occupation with income levels in farming remained an important guiding factor in CAP policymaking for the Commission as well as for the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The aim of raising farmers' incomes was enshrined in Article 39(1)(b) of the EEC Treaty: 'thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture'. This article followed on from Article 39(1)(a), which outlined the aim of increasing agricultural productivity as a necessary precondition for an increase in farm incomes. However, only raising food commodity prices, and not the rationalisation of production methods, came to be seen as the primary means of improving farmers' standard of living. Consequently, it was in the annual price negotiations in

the Council of Ministers that agriculture ministers sought to improve the situation of their farmers.

'On the key budget side, at that time it was, I would say, an open purse. I mean by this that we didn't actually feel the financial pressure,' Franklin acknowledges retrospectively ⁽¹⁾. In the early and mid-1970s the Commission's price proposals consequently became generous. The Council usually increased prices far beyond the Commission's proposals. High inflation rates hitting the Member States in the aftermath of the oil shock also partly explain price increases in the mid-1970s. Later, under Commissioner Gundelach, the Commission pursued a prudent price policy, leading to less marked price increases.

The Commission's track record in achieving market balance was thus mixed. During the 1973–74 world food crisis, European prices remained lower than world market prices, thus ensuring supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices as required by Article 39(1)(e). On the other hand, technical improvements in farming methods as well as incentives provided by the Community's market and price policy led to surpluses for a number of agricultural products. As the costs for storage and market support increased and, perhaps more importantly, as the image of the Community began to suffer, the Commission worked hard to find solutions to the problem.

Structural policy

The Commission's core idea since the late 1950s was that improving farm structures would increase the productivity of farmers, raise farm incomes and eventually allow for a lower level of agricultural prices, thus ensuring supplies reached consumers at low prices. Market and price policy should thus go hand in hand with structural policy measures,



Farmers collared by agricultural policy. French cartoonist Plantu's image of power relations in the common agricultural policy, September 1974. (Cartoon by Plantu, published in *Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l'Europe*, Le Monde Éditions, Paris, 1992, p. 10.)

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.



A bureaucrat's dream or nightmare? The EAGGF files in the Commission in the 1980s.

financed through the EAGGF 'Guidance' section. However, structural policy had been the last bastion of control of national agriculture ministries and a Community structural policy for agriculture was only born in 1972, with three directives on the modernisation of farms (72/159/EEC), the cessation of farming (72/160/EEC) and the improvement of vocational training and guidance of persons engaged in agriculture (72/161/EEC). These directives launched a Community structural policy and were subsequently extended and updated. Under Gundelach, important new regulations came into being, one on improving processing and marketing structures in agriculture ((EEC) No 355/77) and the other ((EEC) No 1360/78) on setting up producer groups in Belgium, Italy and some regions of

France to improve the performance of producers in the market.

Faced with the problem of population exodus from mountainous areas, the Commission drafted a directive on mountainous and deprived areas that the Council pledged to adopt in its resolution of May 1973 ⁽¹⁾. Georges Rencki, then in charge of the measure in DG VI, relates the rationale of granting direct payments to farmers, as envisaged in the directive, to the interest the Community had in keeping farmers in mountainous areas where the landscape prevented them from ever running efficient

⁽¹⁾ Council resolution of 15 May 1973 on farming in certain less-favoured areas, COM(73) 202 final, OJ C 33, 23.5.1973, p. 1.

and profitable farms ⁽¹⁾. Under Directive 75/268/EEC, which was adopted on 28 April 1975, Member States were authorised to grant aid to farmers in regions corresponding to criteria fixed by the Community (e.g. steepness of slopes, duration of vegetation). These national measures were co-financed by the EAGGF. In fact, the directive for the first time provided for the possibility of granting direct aid to the agricultural sector.

In 1984–85, a new policy on structures in the sector was in the making, starting with a reform of the 1972 directives, due to expire in 1984. This overhaul was increasingly geared towards a qualitative improvement of production and thus demonstrates the slow change in the perception of agricultural policy ⁽²⁾. Over time, the aims of structural policy changed. Initially conceived with the aim of helping small and backward farms to become larger and more efficient, as shown by the three Mansholt directives of 1972, structural policy focused increasingly on the notion of improving rural space, encompassing a broader view of agriculture as part of the rural economy ⁽³⁾.

The CAP in a changing environment: enlargement and international affairs

Both the northern and southern enlargements had a strong impact on the CAP. The United Kingdom, for example, imported a lot of its foodstuffs from Commonwealth countries. This had to be accommodated into the CAP framework ⁽⁴⁾. Import quotas, for example for New Zealand butter and sheepmeat, were fixed but were often seen as insufficient by the British government and the exporting

countries. In 1974–75, the new British Labour government demanded a renegotiation of the British terms of entry, one of the elements being the concern to guarantee the continued access of non-European producers, particularly from the Commonwealth, to the British food market.

Once renegotiation was completed, the British contribution to the budget became the next problem. Due to its small and efficient agricultural sector, the United Kingdom received far less from the Community budget, in particular EAGGF guarantees, than large producer countries such as France. This problem occupied the Community from the late 1970s, when the cap on the Irish and British contributions agreed on upon accession was due to expire, to the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984. The rising cost of the CAP contributed to exacerbating the British budget problem, although an attempt by the British agriculture minister in 1980 to link the budget negotiations and the concurrent annual price fixing negotiations failed.

With the accession of Greece and the prospect of enlarging the Community to Spain and Portugal, the weight shifted from northern products, such as cereals and dairy, to southern products, such as wine, fruit and vegetables, olive oil and tobacco. Moreover, producers of southern products often felt that their markets were less protected than those of northern products. The Commission tried to counterbalance this, and expenditure in agricultural guarantees was redirected towards the support of Mediterranean products, which rose from 8.9 % of agricultural market support in 1978 to 22 % in 1982 ⁽⁵⁾.

Another problem was that, from a structural and natural resources perspective, the agricultural sector of the southern Member States was lagging behind.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Georges Rencki, 31 May 2011.

⁽²⁾ 'A future for Community agriculture — Commission guidelines following the consultations in connection with the Green Paper', COM(85) 750 final, 18 December 1985, p. 16.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Franklin, M., *Joining the CAP — The Agricultural Negotiations for British Accession to the European Economic Community, 1961–73*, Peter Lang, Oxford, 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, 'Mediterranean agriculture: problems and prospects', Speech by Poul Dalsager to a group of Community journalists visiting Greece to study the problems of Mediterranean agriculture, Athens, 22 November 1982.

Farm incomes in Greece, Italy and southern France were on average much lower and holdings were on average much smaller and less productive than in the rest of the Community. This gap between north and south would increase once Spain and Portugal joined the Community.

The Commission had studied the Mediterranean problem since 1975 and produced a communication to the Council in 1977 which included special measures for southern agriculture. However, Gundelach understood that agriculture was only one of the problems of structurally weak regions and that the fundamental difficulty was the general underdevelopment of the periphery of the Community ⁽¹⁾. With the second southern enlargement imminent, this was moving more into the centre of attention of the Commission ⁽²⁾.

These ideas fed into the integrated Mediterranean programmes (IMPs), which put a strong emphasis on modernising agriculture but which were also geared towards the broader aim of improving regional economies. The Council and the Commission worked on the IMPs during the early 1980s with the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984 giving a firm commitment to carry them out ⁽³⁾. The IMP pilot projects were carried out in 1984 and 1985 and the Community financial contribution drew on all three existing Structural Funds ⁽⁴⁾. The IMPs were finally implemented in 1986 and the Community pledged to devote ECU 6.6 billion over 7 years to the modernisation of the economy of Greece and certain Mediterranean regions of France and Italy.

The status the Community acquired in the 1970s as a major exporter of agricultural products led to difficulties with other exporting countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States ⁽⁵⁾. It also affected up-and-coming exporting nations such as Argentina, Brazil and Thailand. Trade concessions were, however, made in the Community's relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP); the Lomé agreements granted export quotas to ACP countries ⁽⁶⁾. With the sugar protocol attached to Lomé I, for example, the Community agreed to purchase and import from the sugar-producing ACP states a guaranteed quantity of sugar that would benefit from the same regime as Community-produced sugar. Lomé III was even more geared towards agricultural cooperation and provided for the free entry of 96 % of products exported by ACP countries.

The international dimension of the CAP gave the Commission the opportunity to negotiate on behalf of the Community. It represented the Community in, for example, the International Wheat Agreement and the International Sugar Agreement. Moreover, the Commission obtained the right to negotiate in the GATT on behalf of the Community; the fact that the Commission, and not individual Member States, negotiated agricultural matters helped to keep the policy intact. On the other hand, the international dimension resulted in a great deal of pressure on the CAP. While in the GATT negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1964–67) the CAP remained unscathed, the climate at the Tokyo Round (1973–79) had become harsher with countries such as Australia and the United States openly attacking the CAP ⁽⁷⁾. Their aim was to treat agriculture not in a separate negotiating group, but as a sector of the economy like any other.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jens Hauge Pedersen, 2 May 2011.

⁽²⁾ 'Mediterranean agricultural problems', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(77) 140 final, 1 April 1977; Ranieri di Carpegna archives, 'Le problème Nord/Sud dans le secteur agricole', SEC(87) 44, 13 January 1987.

⁽³⁾ 'Integrated Mediterranean programmes', Commission communication, 20 February 1985, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 2, 1985, pp. 9–11.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 17, 'Regional policy: a tangible expression of European solidarity'.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Michel Jacquot, 9 September 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ See Chapter 22, 'Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics'.

⁽⁷⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/234, Memo from Leslie Fielding to David Hannay, 'Australia's relations with the Community', Policy statement by the Australian foreign minister, 28 July 1976, pp. 16–18.

The CAP got off lightly in the Tokyo Round; the final Commission communication to the Council of October 1979 reiterates the European Community's victory in separating the negotiations on industrial goods from those on agricultural goods: 'This recognition of the specific nature of agriculture has made it possible not to call into question the common agricultural policy' ⁽¹⁾.

In the subsequent GATT round, launched at Punta del Este in September 1986, this special status of the CAP came under much more serious threat. This time, a group of exporting countries, the so-called Cairns group, put even more pressure on the Europeans to liberalise agricultural trade and to abolish export subsidies. The Commission was thus in the difficult position of having to face the maximalist claims by the Cairns group, as well as Canada and the United States, targeting export subsidies. Eventually, the Uruguay Round (1986–94) would contribute to speeding up the CAP reform in the form of the MacSharry reforms of 1992.

The CAP and 'green money'

The economic and monetary troubles of the 1970s affected the CAP considerably. The unity of the common agricultural market had been expressed in the uniformity of institutional prices, the agricultural unit of account (AUA) ('green money'), initially corresponding in value to the US dollar and the ordinary unit of account. As a consequence of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the late 1960s, this unity was under threat as Member State currencies started fluctuating. In

1969, the French franc was devalued and the German mark was revalued, which affected the value of these countries' agricultural products; in the case of France they became cheaper, and for Germany they became more expensive. To balance these differences, the Community introduced export levies imposed at the French border and subsidies paid on imports to France; in the German case, import levies were raised and an export subsidy imposed on German agricultural products. These original monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) were at first seen as a temporary measure but, as monetary turbulence persisted, they were introduced on a permanent basis in 1971 ⁽²⁾. While they protected the price intervention mechanism and thus upheld the market unity principle of the CAP, the MCAs had problematic side-effects on consumption, production and trade. MCAs were only applied to products for which intervention buying existed, such as cereals, milk and sugar, whereas other product groups immediately felt changes in currency values. Moreover, the system distorted common pricing and led to the existence, in the late 1970s, of seven separate price zones and increased the financial burden of the EAGGF. Throughout the period, the Commission thus argued strongly in favour of dismantling the MCAs ⁽³⁾. However, due to the large gap between strong and weak currencies, this proved difficult. Member States with strong currencies, such as Germany and the Netherlands, came to rely on them as additional income aids for their farmers. The introduction of the European Monetary System was a missed opportunity for dismantling the MCAs, a step which was only agreed at the Fontainebleau Summit in June 1984 in return for additional aid for German farmers.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/238, Memos on the negotiations, pp. 563–573; HAEC, 'GATT multilateral trade negotiations', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(79) 514 final, 8 October 1979.

⁽²⁾ Fennell R., *The Common Agricultural Policy — Continuity and Change*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 89 et seq.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, 'Economic effects of the agri-monetary system', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(78) 20 final, 10 February 1978.

Adjusting the common agricultural policy

Expenditure on agricultural market-support arrangements through the EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ section (EAGGF guarantee) had grown considerably in real terms by the mid-1980s and amounted to around two thirds of Community spending. Three instruments were available to stabilise food prices within the Community: a variable import levy, which raised the price of imported food from producers outside the Community, intervention purchases (and, to a lesser extent, sales), which aimed to maintain price levels within the Community market, and export subsidies to enable Community supplies to be sold on the lower-priced markets of the world. The amounts to be spent on the EAGGF guarantee were not fixed, only forecast — the actual spending on agricultural support would depend both on the prices set for agricultural products and on a range of conditions — dollar exchange rates, world prices, weather conditions, etc. — that were beyond the control of the Community. Expenditure for the EAGGF guarantee was not adequately con-



For *The Economist*, the Tacitus quote ‘he was capable of ruling, if only he hadn’t ruled’ expresses the inability of the EEC members to apply the Treaty of Rome. In this issue, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the CAP is depicted as an achievement adorning the tombstone of the EEC.

Christmas butter

‘For the butter, the only outlet was to outside the Community using export subsidies. The only market was Russia and, at that time, we were in the middle of the Cold War. Feeding Russians who could for 2.8 francs buy a kilo of butter which cost 28 francs in Europe was scandalous. The European Parliament ... was violently opposed to this slashing of the price of European butter. They, the Germans in particular, called for a generalisation or increase of Christmas butter operations. At Christmas, the butter stocks were brought out and put back on the internal market with significant price reductions of around 20, 30 and 40 %. The Germans said that rather than selling to the Russians, we should step up Christmas butter operations. They did not take into account that if people bought the Christmas butter, they would no longer buy normal butter’ ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011.

strained by budgetary procedures and could exceed the amounts forecast in the budget.

As the costs of the support system grew and surpluses began to damage the image of the CAP, the Commission attempted to diversify the instruments of the policy but did not propose a serious overhaul of the CAP mechanisms and aims. And even if it had put forward such an overhaul, the barriers to changing the policy would have been extremely high. Besides resistance from within DG VI, where reform was seen as a ‘dirty word’ ⁽²⁾, and from some commissioners, the Council of Ministers itself was not likely to endorse change easily as the struggle to introduce even minor modifications shows. Therefore, between 1973 and 1986, the Commission’s strategy

⁽²⁾ Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.

was limited to curing the symptoms of agricultural surpluses rather than tackling the root of the problem.

To achieve a balance in the different markets, DG VI devised different schemes, some of them bold and adventurous, others bordering on despair. Butter was sold off at very low prices to countries beyond the Iron Curtain, for example. The butter deals with the Soviet Union in 1973 and 1977 were a politically highly sensitive and contested affair. Other, more conventional, ways of getting rid of the surpluses, were food aid for developing countries (the programme for sending butter oil and skimmed milk powder to India was among the most important ⁽¹⁾), incentives to increase consumption such as subsidised Christmas butter, free school milk and fruit, turning wine into cheap alcohol and butter into butter oil, and many more. These measures offered no long-term solutions, but they were popular with the Member States as they did not cost farmers anything.

Co-responsibility levy and milk quota

Since 1973, the Commission had toyed with the idea of producers sharing the costs of overproduction ⁽²⁾. In the dairy sector this was eventually put into practice with the co-responsibility levy and the milk quota.

The co-responsibility levy can be considered as the first move away from the generous price policy and the Community's guaranteed and unlimited purchase of produce. In July 1976, the Commission decided to propose to the Council a co-responsibility levy in the form of a 3-year action programme to

balance the milk market ⁽³⁾. The Council adopted this action programme on 17 May 1977 and the co-responsibility levy came into effect in September of that year ⁽⁴⁾.

Put simply, the co-responsibility levy was a means to reduce prices indirectly, through a levy on the price of milk delivered to dairies. It had only limited success as initially the Council fixed the levy at the low level of 1.5 % and, if the limit was exceeded, prices would only be reduced in the following year. However, the co-responsibility levy was reinforced in 1980 when a supplementary levy was introduced which applied if deliveries to dairies exceeded those of 1979 by 2 %. Between 1979 and 1982, EAGGF guarantee expenditure grew much more slowly than in the period from 1974 to 1979, notably due to the co-responsibility levy ⁽⁵⁾.

After 1982, EAGGF guarantee expenditure rocketed from ECU 12.4 billion in 1982, to ECU 15.9 in 1983 and ECU 18.4 in 1984 ⁽⁶⁾. The quest of the European Council (notably at the Stuttgart Summit of 1983) and the Commission for further and more radical measures to curb production and thus costs has to be seen in conjunction with three interlinked issues: first, the budgetary rebate requested by the British government; second, the threat which the exploding costs of the CAP posed to the Community budget (in 1983 and again in 1984 the Community's spending commitments exceeded its own resources); and third, the Council's decision to enlarge the Community to Spain and Portugal, two relatively poorer exporters of (southern) agricultural products. This enlargement would

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, 'Improvement of the common agricultural policy', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(73) 1850, 31 October 1973.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 391, second part, sitting of 6 July 1976; BAC 177/1995/3070, 'Document de travail complémentaire sur certaines questions relatives au secteur du lait et des produits laitiers' (distributed on the authority of Pierre Lardinois), SEC(75) 3530/10, 25 November 1975, pp. 4–6.

⁽⁴⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 1078/77 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 1079/77, OJ L 131, 26.5.1977, p. 1 and p. 6.

⁽⁵⁾ 'Guidelines for European Agriculture — Mandate of 30 May 1980', COM(81) 608 final, 23 October 1981.

⁽⁶⁾ Petit, M., *Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987, p. 27.



At a demonstration in Brussels in April 1982, French farmers vent their anger against the proposed reform of the common agricultural policy with the slogans 'Washington governs in Brussels' and 'Europeans enjoy the prices, the French foot the bill'.

thus necessitate further adaptations of the CAP and put a further strain on the budget. These three issues combined meant that pressure on the CAP was higher than ever before.


In its response to the Stuttgart Summit, the Commission proposed the introduction of a quota system for the milk market by means of a supplementary levy on milk produced in excess of the guarantee threshold ⁽¹⁾. In the absence of a quota, the unattractive alternative was to slash the milk price by 12 % in 1984–85 to offset the additional expenditure likely to arise from the guarantee threshold being exceed-

ed in 1983 ⁽²⁾. Given the farm income objective of the CAP, this would have been unacceptable. The Commission, and Director-General Claude Villain in particular, thus chose a practical measure that would not threaten the core principles of the CAP (common prices, Community preference, financial solidarity) but that was in itself a bold solution to the financial problems.

In the Commission, the introduction of quotas had been discussed for a very long time but many were against the system. The argument against quotas was that they were an artificial mechanism that would freeze production patterns, not allowing production to move to the most efficient farmers and

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, 'Common agricultural policy — Commission proposals', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(83) 500, 28 July 1983.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 49/1989/237, 'Economic consequences of the Commission's proposals for adaptation of the market organisation for milk and milk products', Information note from François-Xavier Ortoli and Poul Dalsager, SEC(83) 1508, 23 September 1983.



In 1984, the Council of agricultural ministers adopted the milk quota. Observing the continuing problem of agricultural surpluses, the Dutch cartoonist Fritz Behrendt asks dryly: 'Common market obstacles — no more?' (*Europe*, summer 1984, p. 6.)

thus going against the principles of a free market ⁽¹⁾. In the Member States and among farm interest groups, quotas were equally unpopular. Claude Villain recalled how he fought for a milk quota: 'I defended it against the agricultural leaders of France and in other countries as there was widespread opposition' ⁽²⁾.

Not surprisingly, the endorsement and adoption of milk quotas by the Member States was an arduous process. By 16 September 1983, the Commission had agreed on a set of specific proposals. The quantities of production were set at the 1981 level

plus 1 %, and production beyond these quotas was subjected to a super levy of 7 % of the EEC target price. A special levy hit intensive producers (more than 15 000 kg of milk per forage hectare) at 4 % of the target price ⁽³⁾. The Member State governments appointed a high-level group of officials to prepare the summit meeting in Athens on 6 December 1983. The Athens Summit was a failure and it took another 3 months of Council and high-level group meetings and mediation by the Commission to even out differences on the agriculture package.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Sergio Ventura, 14 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011.

⁽³⁾ Petit, M., *Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987, p. 30.

On 13 March 1984, the Council agreed to impose a milk quota for 5 years. The levy could either be applied at the dairy or at the farm level. The base period was 1981 plus 1 %, as the Commission had suggested in its initial proposal ⁽¹⁾. The final deal, sealed in the Council on 31 March 1984, after the European Council of 19 and 20 March had endorsed it, was very close to the initial Commission proposal. It was an endorsement of the principle of guarantee thresholds and their extension to other products; importantly, the Council also agreed on dismantling positive MCAs.

Costs for EAGGF guarantee measures in the milk market fell from ECU 3 014 million in 1984 to ECU 2 815 million in 1985 ⁽²⁾. The milk quota regulation was an effective and sustainable measure that was here to stay.

New directions and the Green Paper of 1985

Following the introduction of the milk quota in 1984, the Commission continued on the path of revising the CAP to control production and costs. With Commissioner Andriessen in charge, it became more open to the idea of a CAP reform. According to his head of cabinet, Carlo Trojan, 'At that time, genuine reforms of agricultural policy began with Andriessen' ⁽³⁾.

In January 1985, the Commission launched a 'general debate on the perspectives for the common agri-



Following the European Council in Stuttgart in June 1983, the Commission tabled a proposal for quotas on milk production. The Commission's internal magazine *Courrier du personnel* took this view on the measure. (No 443, 28 June 1983).

cultural policy' ⁽⁴⁾. The conclusions were published in a Green Paper in July 1985. The Green Paper did not suggest a revolutionary overhaul of the CAP. Instead, it was an options paper, presenting a range of potential measures such as a restrictive price policy, direct income aid and the extension of the quota system to other product areas. The paper was much criticised in the Commission. For President Jacques Delors and a few others, the Green Paper went too far and they feared that some of its passages would poison the political discussion ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 40/2002/37, 'The Council — main points of the agreement on the control of production in the milk sector' (5802/84), 13 March 1984; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1371/84 of 16 May 1984 laying down detailed rules for the application of the additional levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 (OJ L 132, 18.5.1984); Council Regulation (EEC) No 857/84 of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for the application of the levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 in the milk and milk products sector (OJ L 90, 1.4.1984); and Council Regulation (EEC) No 564/84 of 1 March 1984 on suspension of aids for investments in the field of milk production (OJ L 61, 2.3.1984).

⁽²⁾ Archives Ranieri di Carpegna, Table No 12, undated.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Carlo Trojan, 13 January 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM(85) 333 final, 30 July 1985, p. 1; HAEC, BAC 237/2004/46, 'Note du secrétariat du Steering Group sur les Perspectives de la PAC. Résumé des principales décisions de la réunion préparatoire (14 mars)', 15 March 1985; Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ BAC 49/1989/257, Communication from Jürgen Schüller to Karl-Heinz Narjes, 9 July 1985.

Diversifying the instruments of the common agricultural policy ⁽¹⁾

‘Up to now, the CAP has been characterised by an emphasis on the instrument of price support, an emphasis which is reflected in the share which the Guarantee Section takes of the Community’s Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. This imbalance between price support and other measures is not what the original designers of the CAP intended, and has resulted in the policy using one principal instrument for the achievement of diverse objectives. Since the limits of this approach have now been reached, the question is inevitably posed which complementary instruments should be developed.

Important steps have recently been taken in this sense with the Council’s decisions on the new agricultural structures policy, and integrated Mediterranean programmes. Further reflection is necessary on the means by which the place of agriculture in society can be better assured, taking account particularly of the situation of family farms. This is all the more necessary because of:

- the impact of a restrictive price policy on agricultural incomes;
- the risk of a growing polarisation between the different agricultures in Europe, ranging from those with a good structure in favourable economic conditions, to those with natural handicaps in the context of a poorly developed regional economy;
- the challenge of enlargement.

The Community must ensure that the social and economic conditions of those working in

agriculture are not prejudiced by these developments, and that the social fabric of the rural regions is not destroyed by an accelerated departure of the agricultural workforce. In some regions, agricultural employment and activity, even if maintained by subsidies, is simply indispensable if depopulation of the countryside is to be avoided. The maintenance of a significant number of persons in agriculture is not, however, incompatible with the development — which should be encouraged — whereby a part of their income is derived from non-agricultural sources (part-time farming).

That is why, in this consultative document, the Commission sets out a number of options to be considered in the following fields:

- the role of agriculture as a protector of the environment; in our industrialised society, this role is perceived to be increasingly important, and if agriculture were willing to accept new disciplines in this context, society should recognise it by providing financial resources;
- the better integration of agriculture in regional development; since not all the problems of agriculture can be resolved by agricultural policy alone, it is imperative to consider what contribution other policies can make; in fact, agricultural policy has to be seen in the broader perspective of overall rural policy;
- the question of direct income aids for agriculture; in the context of a restrictive price policy, it is necessary to envisage complementary measures in the form of income aids.’

⁽¹⁾ ‘Perspectives for the common agricultural policy — The Green Paper of the Commission’, July 1985, pp. V–VI.

After the Commission had adopted the Green Paper, a consultation process was put in motion in which the opinions of interest groups, Member States and other Community institutions were collected. Not surprisingly, farmers' lobbies were against price reductions counterbalanced by direct income aids. The opinions of the different Member States diverged. Most Member States were against a restrictive price policy; some were however inclined to accept direct income aids under some circumstances, whereas the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were in favour of reform and a restrictive price policy ⁽¹⁾. The stakes for a further CAP reform thus remained high and the Commission reacted accordingly. The result of the consultation process was published in December 1985 ⁽²⁾. It reflected Andriessen's formula throughout his term in office: instrument diversification — as only a policy mix (restrictive price policy plus additional measures such as the co-responsibility levy) seemed acceptable to ministers and the farming community.

The Green Paper was innovative in that it launched a consultation procedure with Community institutions and other interested parties. More importantly, it accelerated a thought process about the aims and instruments of the CAP and how they needed to be adapted in the future. In the Commission, there was an increasing tendency to see agriculture as part of the larger rural space, the economy and the society of rural areas ⁽³⁾.

Conclusion

While the 1960s can almost be qualified as the golden age of the CAP, in the 1970s and the 1980s the policy confronted the Commission with immense challenges, the most important being the battle against the proverbial butter mountains and milk lakes. However, during the period 1973–86, the CAP evolved and, to a certain extent, demonstrated its flexibility and versatility. The Community successfully negotiated a number of challenges such as monetary turbulence, the southern enlargements and the GATT rounds. While the CAP came under great pressure during the period, the Community was not prepared to embark on far-reaching reforms that would challenge the principles of market unity, financial solidarity and Community preference. Hence, the Commission came up with innovative solutions such as the milk quota. Finally, the economic crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent adoption of neo-liberal economic policy principles meant that protectionist and redistributive policies such as the CAP became more difficult to justify than had been the case in the 1960s. Greater changes awaited the CAP in the early 1990s and it can be argued that the events of the late 1970s and 1980s had opened up the path in the Commission towards adapting the CAP and discussing and initiating change.

KATJA SEIDEL

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 98/1997/1351, Memo from Michel Jacquot (president's cabinet) on the informal meeting of the Agriculture Council on the future of the CAP, 25 September 1985.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, COM(85) 750 final, 18 December 1985.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.; Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.

16.2. Creating a ‘blue Europe’: the common fisheries policy

The legal basis for a common fisheries policy (CFP) can be found in the EEC Treaty articles on agriculture: Article 38 states that the common market shall extend to agricultural products, including products of fisheries. The objectives of the CAP — market unity, financial solidarity and Community preference — were thus equally valid for the fisheries sector. To begin with, fisheries had not been a major economic sector in the Community of Six and the CFP got off to a slow start. It was only in 1966 that the Commission published a first ‘Report on the situation in the fisheries sector of EEC Member States and the basic principles for a common policy’ ⁽¹⁾. Four years later, in June 1970, following further work by the Commission, the Council adopted a resolution on fisheries and agreed on two regulations in October that year. These regulations ((EEC) No 2141/70 and (EEC) No 2142/70) came into effect in early 1971 and created a common market for fisheries products together with a common price policy, provisions on trade with third countries and the possibility for national structural measures to be co-financed by the EAGGF ‘Guidance’ section. Crucially, through these regulations, the principle of equal access of Community vessels to all Member States’ fishing grounds had become part of the *acquis communautaire*.

These measures were clearly prompted by the wish to define the principles of the policy before a major event took place, namely the opening of the first enlargement negotiations with three of the world’s largest fishing nations (Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom), whose waters, like those of Ireland, were important fishing grounds for the


fleet of the Six. As the prospective Member States did not have a say in defining the principles of the CFP, so obviously of vital importance to them, they greatly resented the Community’s decision on fisheries ⁽²⁾. While it was foreseeable that developing the CFP would not be easy, it is doubtful whether anybody guessed just how difficult it would be.

Two periods can be distinguished in the emergence of the CFP; in the first period, from 1973 to 1977, groundbreaking work laying down the basis of the CFP was accomplished in a small ‘Fisheries Products’ division, in DG VI (Agriculture). The Council formally adopted the result of this work in the The Hague resolution of November 1976. The second period began with the formal setting-up of a Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG XIV) in 1977 and concluded with the launching of the CFP in early 1983. DG XIV was created for political rather than organisational reasons — a directorate-general needed to be assigned to an Irish national. Eamonn Gallagher was thus appointed director-general while the commissioner for agriculture maintained responsibility for this policy area until 1981, when the Greek commissioner, Giorgios Contogeorgis, was given the fisheries portfolio in addition to that of transport. Some criticised the creation of an independent DG for fisheries as unnecessary. Some Commission members certainly feared the loss of staff and competences when both DG I and DG VI transferred a division to the new DG XIV ⁽³⁾. The new DG XIV consisted of a small and tight-knit group of fisheries experts. The dominant figures were Eamonn Gallagher, the director-general, and Raymond Simonnet, a director who was known to his staff as ‘the admiral’. Both Gallagher and Simonnet played a key role in the establishment of the CFP. Their dominance of the DG sometimes created frustration and difficulties

⁽¹⁾ COM(66) 250 final.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with David Hannay, 14 July 2011, and Robert Jackson, 27 September 2011.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 416, second part, meeting of 2 February 1977, p. 11.



A fisherman harvesting his 'crops': French cartoonist Plantu's take on the birth of the common fisheries policy in January 1983. (*Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l'Europe*, Le Monde Éditions, Paris, 1992, pp. 68–69.)

for other members of staff, who complained about a lack of transparency ⁽¹⁾.

The first phase: international challenges and Community responses, 1973–77

In the light of the Danish, Irish and British dislike of the principle that all Community fishermen should enjoy equal access to one another's territorial waters, the act of accession of 1972 (Article 100) granted a derogation from free access for an area of 6 nautical miles off Member States' coastlines until 31 December 1982. In some regions that were particularly dependent on fisheries, this zone was extended to 12 miles (Article 101). The historic fishing rights of other Member States in these zones were, however, upheld. For the Commission,

two tasks derived from this act: within 6 years the Council was to determine the conditions for fishing with a view to ensuring the protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of the biological resources of the sea (Article 102) and, with the derogation due to expire in late 1982, a durable solution needed to be found.

It was international developments that precipitated changes in the original CFP framework. In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea opened, with the most likely outcome being that certain states would claim up to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines to form an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including fishing rights. The Commission was acutely aware that this would have severe implications for the Community's fisheries sector. The probable consequences of such a move were twofold. Firstly, Community vessels could lose access to their customary fishing grounds in third-country waters and could be forced to move

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Eugenio Pino, 10 October 2011.

their activities into Community waters. Secondly, fishing vessels of third countries that were fishing in what were potentially Community waters would have to be regulated. The Commission thus had to provide solutions for several problems: firstly, making sure that the new 200-mile zones of the Member States would become a Community zone, respecting the equal access principle; secondly, regulating fishing activity in this zone, for example through conservation measures; thirdly, solving the problem of access for Community vessels to fishing grounds of third countries and of third-country vessels to Community waters; and, lastly, devising measures to assist with the conversion and adaptation of the Community fishing fleet to meet the new challenge.

The Commission expected that the extension of Member States' waters to 200 miles would exacerbate the diverging interests already existing between Member States. Many of the most popular fishing grounds would come under the jurisdiction of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (80 % of Community catches were in the north-east Atlantic, 75 % in Community waters), whereas Belgian, German, French and Dutch vessels needed access to these waters ⁽¹⁾.

Louis Mordrel, a senior official in DG XIV who participated in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, explained the potentially disastrous implications for the CFP: 'It was a challenge to which there were two solutions. Either the Community should break up as regards fisheries, with each Member State going its own way, but this would have been a disaster. Or, we had to try to find joint solutions and joint positions vis-à-vis third countries' ⁽²⁾. A very small team in the fisheries division in DG VI then prepared the Commission's response to the challenge and the first proposals for fleshing out the CFP.

In February 1976, the Commission submitted a communication to the Council proposing an overall solution to the management of a potential 200-mile zone. Resource conservation was at the forefront of the Commission's concerns and total allowable catches (TACs) were the suggested method by which fishing should be regulated. As to the question of access, the Commission recommended that the derogations in the act of accession be extended. Hence, all waters extending between the 12-mile and 200-mile limits would be Community waters governed by the equal access principle ⁽³⁾.

The communication acknowledged that future Commission proposals would have to cater for both the increasingly technological high-seas fishing fleet and small-scale inshore fishing. On the one hand, many fishing vessels were geared towards cod fishing in the extreme North Atlantic and, if banned from these fishing grounds, would have to be equipped to fish for other species or be taken out of production to avoid overfishing. On the other hand, small-scale coastal fishing was widespread, in particular in structurally weak regions. It accounted for one third of the production and three quarters of fishermen. Hence, the Commission proposed special measures for these zones under Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70. As all Member States, except Italy, fished outside their 200-mile zone, agreements with third countries were vital. For example, the British fleet would suffer most from Iceland and Norway extending their zones, as demonstrated by the so-called cod wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom in the early to mid-1970s.

When it came to developing concrete policy proposals from this communication, the main point of contention in the Commission was the question of equal access. In a dramatic all-night session on 22 September 1976, against the fierce resistance of

⁽¹⁾ Louis Mordrel archives, Louis Mordrel, Note for the attention of Van Lierde, 27 May 1974.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Louis Mordrel, 16 June 2011.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, 'Problems which the introduction of economic zones of 200 miles poses for the Community in the sea fishing sector', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(76) 59 final, 18 February 1976.

the Irish (Patrick Hillery) and British (Christopher Soames and George Thomson) commissioners, the Commission decided that exemptions from the equal access principle were to be limited to a 12-mile zone. The Irish and British commissioners had fought for a better deal for their countries, knowing that this was a matter of major importance in both countries. The Commission also proposed to extend the regime of Articles 100 and 101 beyond 31 December 1982 ⁽¹⁾.

On 23 September 1976, the Commission submitted suggestions to the Council of Ministers ⁽²⁾. These contained four essential points. The first was that Member States should, in a concerted move on 1 January 1977, extend the fishing zone off their coasts to 200 miles. Second, the management of this new zone should be undertaken by the Community and not by the Member States. The 6-mile zone referred to in Article 100 of the act of accession should be extended to 12 miles, and this arrangement should be continued beyond 31 December 1982. Historic fishing rights within the 12-mile zone had to be respected. Third, the Commission should, on behalf of the Community, negotiate agreements with third countries that would grant vessels of the Member States the right to fish inside their 200-mile zone and would permit some vessels from third countries to fish in Community waters. And fourth, the Community would contribute financially to the restructuring and adaptation of the Community fishing fleet.

On 8 October, a draft regulation containing these principles was submitted to the Council. However, the Irish and British governments had hoped for an exclusive zone of up to 50 miles, something that was not acceptable to the other Member States or to the Commission, as it violated the non-discrim-

ination principle in the treaty. Hence, the Council was divided on most issues and could not reach an agreement by the deadline of 1 January 1977. Foreign ministers reached a compromise at a European political cooperation meeting in The Hague, which the Council formally adopted on 3 November 1976 (the The Hague resolution). This contained an agreement to establish in concert, on 1 January 1977, a 200-mile zone and to authorise the Commission to negotiate agreements with third countries. However, it would take another 6 years and much hard work and skilful negotiation on the part of the Commission before the Council would come to an agreement on the CFP.

Second phase: the battle over access and quotas, 1977–83

In a very difficult context of declining fishing resources, which made draconian conservation measures necessary, a fierce battle ensued, lasting nearly 7 years, between the founding Member States and new Member States. The former, led by France, wanted to apply the principle of free access and share the resources in line with traditional fishing activities, including in the waters of other Member States. The new Member States, basically Ireland and the United Kingdom, only agreed to allow the others to have any surplus which they did not fish themselves in accordance with the consensus which had emerged at the conference on the law of the sea ⁽³⁾.

A deadlock in the Council had occurred over the questions of access to fishing grounds and the distribution of resources. The extreme positions were held by the United Kingdom, and to some extent Ireland, which wanted access to their coastal waters to be permanently limited in the largest possible area (ranging from 12 to 50 miles in some areas), and France, which insisted on historic fishing rights and equal access.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 397, second part, meeting of 22 September 1976.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, 'Future external fisheries policy and internal fisheries system', COM(76) 500 final, 23 September 1976.

⁽³⁾ Comment by François Benda on the initial draft of this chapter.

The positions became more and more intransigent and angry rhetoric both in the Council and among the population of the Member States aggravated the situation. With the Conservative Peter Walker replacing British Fisheries Minister John Silkin in May 1979, the new Thatcher government sent more conciliatory signals. Although breakthrough was not yet reached, the Council was able to adopt the first annual total allowable catch regulation in 1980. The Commission tabled several compromise formulas and the Council now centred its work on achieving a compromise on the basis of an exclusive 12-mile zone. It looked as if the deadline of the end of 1980, set by the Council's declaration of 30 May 1980 ⁽¹⁾, could be met as Member States were coming together on a compromise formula. Progress on the British budgetary question in 1980 may also have improved matters in the fisheries sector ⁽²⁾.

Apart from the question of access, Member States' shares of the available resources, that is quotas, were also highly contentious. Initially the United Kingdom demanded to be allocated 60 % of the quota of the main species; this was later scaled down to 45 %, whereas the Commission's proposal of 1978 suggested 31 % for the United Kingdom. Finally, the Commission's proposal of 3 December 1980 on the allocation of quotas was deemed acceptable by most Member States, attributing 36.1 % to the United Kingdom, 24.1 % to Denmark and 13.6 % to France. However, in December 1980, a domestic policy issue prevented an overall agreement from being reached — the upcoming French presidential elections and the coming to office of the new French president, François Mitterrand, who was hoping to negotiate better access and a better quota for French fishermen. Matters improved only in 1982 when the approaching enlargement to include Spain, a country where fishing is an important activity, and the

threat of the 10-year derogation expiring on 31 December 1982, accelerated decision-making. The Commission tabled its final compromise proposals in June 1982 ⁽³⁾. The last obstacle to an agreement was the Danish government seeking last-minute improvements in a few areas, in particular in its catch quota for mackerel.

On 25 January 1983, the Council finally took a decision on access and quotas and put in place a Community regime for fisheries and aquaculture. The solution corresponded largely to the Commission's initial proposals of 1976: the derogation (the 12-mile regime) was extended for another 10 years, until 1992, renewable for another period of the same duration, and it was extended to cover the waters up to 12 miles off the coastlines of all Member States. Exceptions were made for those holding historic fishing rights. The objectives of the Community fisheries regime were laid down in the basic Regulation (EEC) No 170/83: to 'ensure the protection of fishing grounds, the conservation of the biological resources of the sea and their balanced exploitation on a lasting basis and in appropriate economic and social conditions'. This included a system of TACs, to be divided into quotas for each Member State, a regulation setting TACs for 1982 and the conditions under which they may be fished ((EEC) No 172/83) and a regulation providing for the common management and conservation of resources ((EEC) No 171/83). A scientific and technical committee was set up to ensure the TACs met scientific standards of stock conservation.

The 1983 decisions included an important agreement on structural policy, an area that had also suffered from the 6-year deadlock. In 1977 and 1978, the Commission had put forward a proposal for a directive to facilitate the adaptation of production

⁽¹⁾ Council declaration of 30 May 1980 on the common fisheries policy, OJ C 158, 27.6.1980, p. 2.

⁽²⁾ Leigh, M., *European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy*, Croom Helm, London, 1983, p. 84.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, 'Modified proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) establishing a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources', COM(82) 368 final, 11 June 1982; COM(82) 368 final/2, 22 June 1982.

and processing capacity to the new circumstances. While the Council did not adopt this proposal, some Member States applied measures from the directive in the form of state aid measures, which were mostly approved by the Commission under Article 92. In response to the May 1980 Council declaration, the Commission came up with a new revised proposal regarding structural policy which it submitted to the Council on 22 July 1980 ⁽¹⁾. The Council pledged to adopt the necessary measures in a resolution of 25 January 1983. Finally, on 4 October 1983, the Council agreed on what was later called the multiannual guidance programme (MAGP) (Regulations (EEC) No 2908/83 and (EEC) No 2909/83). These regulations were geared towards restructuring the fishing industry and reducing and modernising the fishing fleet. The first MAGP (1983–86) was purely indicative but the following one, adopted in December 1986 ⁽²⁾, introduced an obligation for Member States to reduce the capacity of their fleet by 2 % (engine power) and 3 % (vessel tonnage) over a 5-year period.

As was agreed in the The Hague resolution of 1976, and in spite of the deadlock in the Council, the Commission negotiated numerous agreements with third countries. In cases of reciprocal interest in each other's fishing grounds, the Commission aimed for framework agreements such as those signed in 1978 and subsequent years with Sweden, the Faeroe Islands, Canada, Finland and Norway for fishing within the 200-mile Community zone. Where a country had nothing to offer, its vessels were banned from Community waters; this was the case with the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. This freed up fishing capacities for Community vessels. As some Member States fished in African

waters in the central-east and south-east Atlantic, the Commission started exploratory talks and concluded agreements with, among others, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal. The European Community became a member of several regional fisheries management organisations such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (1979) and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (1982) ⁽³⁾.

Enlargement, stock conservation, control and enforcement

The breathing space obtained after the breakthrough of January 1983 ended with the Spanish and Portuguese enlargement. A new phase began, bringing with it a new set of problems which threatened to disturb the hard-fought balance of quotas and access. Eugenio Pino, a former director in DG XIV, remembers: 'The accession of Spain and Portugal posed a new challenge. This accession resulted in the virtual doubling of problems, and capacity and people employed in the fisheries sector' ⁽⁴⁾. The third enlargement would double the number of fishermen and see an increase of 65 % in the tonnage of the Community fisheries fleet and 45 % in fishing ⁽⁵⁾. At the same time, Iberian waters contained no major fishing areas and hence would not increase the overall availability of resources. If Spain and Portugal were to be granted full access to Community waters, existing Member States would have to reduce their catch quotas considerably as stocks were already fully exploited. Even though the Spanish government, in its declaration of 21 July 1980, underlined the importance of fisheries for its economy, it was out of the question to grant Spanish vessels equal access. Not surprisingly, the accession

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 36/1980/450, 'Proposals concerning the coordination and promotion of fisheries research', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(80) 420 final, 18 July 1980.

⁽²⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 4028/86 of 18 December 1986 on Community measures to improve and adapt structures in the fisheries and aquaculture sector, OJ L 376, 31.12.1986, p. 7.

⁽³⁾ Churchill, R. R. and Owen, D., *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 8.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Eugenio Pino, 10 October 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Lequesne, C., 'Quand l'Union européenne gouverne les poissons : pour quoi une politique commune de la pêche?', *Les Études du CERI*, No 61, December 1999, p. 5.

negotiations in this area were particularly testing and the final outcome was that in the 1986 accession treaty, access of the Spanish and Portuguese fleets to Irish and British waters was restricted for a transitional period lasting until 2002.

Stock protection to secure a future for the fisheries sector was one of the main reasons why, in 1976, the Commission thought it vital to put into place an efficient conservation policy for the Community 200-mile zone ⁽¹⁾. The absence of an agreement in the Council meant that the Community's stock conservation policy remained ineffective. Some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, were taking unilateral conservation measures, something the Commission could not tolerate. The case was brought to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which ruled in favour of the Commission ⁽²⁾. When the new policy was delivered in 1976, fish stocks of some species, for example herring, were already diminishing dramatically. The lack of firm Community commitments to the Commission's proposed TACs and quotas led to overfishing in the years 1980 and 1981. As no agreement could be reached on the protection of marine resources, voluntary compliance with the Commission's TAC proposals as well as interim conservation and resource management regulations and national measures, agreed by the Commission, provided a temporary but unsatisfactory solution.

Given the dwindling fish stocks, the question of enforcing the rules of the new CFP was a crucial one. The Commission had limited powers in enforcing the CFP. In 1983, a team of inspectors was established to ensure compliance with TACs and quotas, but the head of the inspection team reported considerable difficulties in detecting fraud as the Commission had to alert national authorities and announce the arrival of its inspectors in advance. He

also complained that all too often the Community inspectors were not able to assert themselves against local authorities, which were turning a blind eye to irregularities ⁽³⁾.

Under a regulation adopted in 1982 establishing certain control measures for fishing activities by vessels of the Member States ⁽⁴⁾, the Commission issued and implemented a number of measures designed to ensure compliance with the fishing restrictions imposed by the Council.

- (i) An inspection force composed of agents appointed by the Commission was set up to assist in the control operations carried out by the national authorities at sea and in the ports.
- (ii) On several occasions, decisions were taken to cease the fishing of species for which the stocks, in the light of the catch figures reported by the Member States, had been found to be exhausted.
- (iii) A logbook to be kept by the masters of fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State or registered in a Member State was introduced in a regulation adopted on 22 September 1983 ⁽⁵⁾. This document, which came into force in 1984, was to show, for the species for which a TAC had been fixed, at least the quantities of each species caught and kept on board, the date and position of each catch and the type of gear used. A licensing system was also introduced to manage the activities of Community ships in a biologically sensitive area north of Scotland ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Louis Mordrel archives; Louis Mordrel, 'L'adaptation de la politique commune de la pêche', 2 August 1976.

⁽²⁾ Interview with John Temple Lang, 15 February 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with François Benda, 2 November 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 2057/82 of 29 June 1982 establishing certain control measures for fishing activities by vessels of Member States, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1729/83, OJ L 220, 29.7.1982, p. 1.

⁽⁵⁾ Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 of 22 September 1983 laying down detailed rules for recording information on Member States' catches of fish, OJ L 276, 10.10.1983, pp. 1–18.

⁽⁶⁾ EC Commission, *Seventeenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1983*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1984, p. 195.

Conclusion

In the period from 1973 to 1986, the achievements of the CFP were considerable. In response to an international challenge, the Commission devised adequate solutions, provided the necessary proposals and guided the Council through extremely difficult negotiations, which resulted in the establishment of a fully fledged Community conservation and management system for fisheries in 1983. Moreover, by negotiating bilateral agreements and participating in international negotiations such as those of the UN on the law of the sea, the Commission took on an important external relations

role for the Community. However, the fisheries policy was and remains a controversial issue, with Member State interests diverging widely. The new policy rules could not even out these differences. In spite of TACs and quotas, the problems of over-fishing could not be controlled effectively either, as the inspection system remained a paper tiger. The Commission's task with regard to the CFP was enormous: it had to reconcile the demands of fisheries ministers and discontented fishermen with the need to monitor and conserve fish stocks — often an almost impossible task.

KATJA SEIDEL

Chapter 17

Regional policy: a tangible expression of European solidarity

Since its inception, European regional policy has helped finance a host of development and conversion programmes in Europe using instruments known as Structural Funds. It has come to play an increasingly central role in pursuing the objectives set by the European treaties. The situation today is the culmination of a long process dating back to 1973. Before that ‘there was no regional policy, nor was there a directorate bearing that name ... There was only a division in the Directorate-General for Economic Affairs which dealt with the regional dimension of national economic policies’ ⁽¹⁾. The Treaty of Rome had very little to say on the subject and contained no provisions on regional policy. Nonetheless, one of the basic objectives of the EEC was to ‘strengthen the unity of [the Member States] economies and to ensure their harmonious develop-

ment by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions’ ⁽²⁾.

Some of the implementing arrangements for competition rules set out in the EEC Treaty can, however, be regarded as paving the way for a European regional policy. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 92 to 94 of the treaty, state aid was considered incompatible with the common market in so far as it distorted trade between the Member States. But these same articles provided for an exception, namely for state aid granted to areas ‘where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment’ ⁽³⁾. The Commission’s objective in examining the various state aid systems was both to safeguard the conditions

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Carmelo Messina, 23 November 2010.

⁽²⁾ Preamble to the EEC Treaty, fifth paragraph, and Article 2.

⁽³⁾ Article 92(3)(a) and (c) of the EEC Treaty.

for effective competition and to promote orderly regional development in the Member States. Regional aid was the subject of a communication from the Commission to the Council in 1971. The aim was to put an end to bidding contests in the area of regional aid and to properly coordinate these aid systems at Community level ⁽¹⁾. The objective over time was to concentrate national aid on the most disadvantaged regions of the Community, which would be identified using criteria set at Community level. Although some progress was made during the period in question, no truly satisfactory outcome was achieved.

Commission studies and reports from that time confirm the existence of regional disparities which, against the wider backdrop of an economic and oil crisis, failed to dissipate with the progressive establishment of the common market. This failure to achieve economic convergence in the six Member States would help raise awareness of the need for the Community to take action to help its most disadvantaged regions. Accordingly, the heads of state or government reached agreement at their Paris conference of October 1972 on the principal means of addressing the structural and regional imbalances which posed a threat to the achievement of the objective of economic and monetary union by 1980. Enlargement to Ireland and the United Kingdom added further major regional difficulties to those already encountered by the Six, in particular Italy.

A formative period, 1973–75

The first enlargement exacerbated the regional problems, completely redrawing the map of socio-economic disparities between the Member States. Ireland's gross domestic product stood at 60 % of the EEC average, while that of all of the United

Kingdom's regions but one (the South East) was below 80 % of the average. This situation was to recur with the accession of Greece in 1981, which raised from 9 to 16 the number of regions whose GDP was less than 50 % of that of the 10-member EEC. Furthermore, the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 saw the average income of the 12 Member States (expressed as GDP per capita) drop by 8 % compared with that of the Community of Six. Meanwhile, in the wake of the oil crisis, the economic and social disparities between the regions of the Community continued to widen rather than narrow in line with the treaty objectives.

The Copenhagen Summit of December 1973 sealed the commitment undertaken in October 1972 on the principle of setting up a regional development fund. The decision to launch the fund was taken in Paris in December 1974. In an effort to resolve coordination problems between national



Cartoon from February 1973 on the delay in implementing a regional development fund. The decision to implement the fund was finally adopted in Paris in December 1975.

⁽¹⁾ OJ C 111, 4.11.1971, pp. 7–9.

and European structures active in the field of regional policy, George Thomson, the British commissioner responsible for the newly launched policy, announced the five key tenets of a Community regional policy, inspired by a report on regional disparities in the enlarged Community presented to the Parliament and the Council in May 1973. 'One of the key tenets is not only to develop a policy in support of the poorest regions, but also to strive for a better overall territorial balance,' underlined Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG XVI (Regional Policy) in February 1975 ⁽¹⁾. Ruggiero went on to highlight the coordinating role of the policy and the need for complementarity. 'Community regional policy cannot, and should not, replace the regional policies of the Member States. It should, on the other hand, coordinate and complement those policies by providing additional financial support. Community efforts in the field should not be limited to providing new forms of financial assistance, but should give a decisive impetus to all the other policies, including the sectoral ones such as agricultural policy.'

Regional policy advanced British interests in so far as the United Kingdom was dealing not only with industrial areas in decline, but also with poorly developed rural areas like its Irish neighbour, a beneficiary country which was determined to stand its ground when it came to certain issues. 'Ireland's case was a difficult one ... Because ... its economic situation, which was very weak, its level of development, its geographical location and, furthermore, its relatively complex — not to say fraught — relations with the United Kingdom and with Northern Ireland, called for a different approach from that taken towards the rest of Europe' ⁽²⁾. The impact of the first enlargement on regional policy was to be replicated further down the line. According to Georges

Rencki, director in charge of the coordination of national policies, studies and analyses at the Directorate-General for Regional Policy: 'Each successive enlargement of the Community right up until the last one, and with only one exception (Austria, Finland and Sweden), led to an increase in development disparities (per capita GDP) in the Community. Furthermore, if you look at the increases in the regional policy budget, you can see that they were linked on the one hand to the enlargements and on the other hand to the progress achieved on economic integration. Every step towards the dismantling of customs barriers made it increasingly difficult for the poorest countries to remain competitive, and the concerns they expressed could not be ignored. Measures taken in respect of monetary union also served to heighten fears, leading Jacques Delors to put forward the concept of "economic and social cohesion" which he would go on to have adopted as part of the Single European Act' ⁽³⁾.

Negotiations on the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) proved particularly difficult owing to budget pressures caused by the difficult economic situation and the geographical distribution of assistance from the fund. The Commission proposed the establishment of a European Regional Development Fund (with co-financing to be provided by the beneficiary Member States) to the tune of 2.25 billion units of account (UA — almost at par with the dollar) over the next 3 years, i.e. from 1974 to 1976. In January 1974, the Ortolí Commission managed to convince the Heath government to accept the German offer of a regional fund worth 1.25 billion UA in exchange for a guaranteed share of 25 %. However, the budget proposed fell far short of Irish and Italian expectations and the negotiations on Community policies and actions ground to a halt following changes of government in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In October

⁽¹⁾ HAEU, 'La politique régionale de la Communauté européenne', Speech given by Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG XVI, fifth European Management Symposium, Davos, 3 February 1975, p. 3.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Carmelo Messina, 23 November 2010.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Georges Rencki, 7 June 2012.



Map showing aid to French regions in 1978. The ERDF subsequently developed a more 'community' approach.

1974, the Commission proposed a compromise in respect of the size of the budget envelope and the eligibility conditions for the fund. This was largely to win round Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, and amounted to 1.4 billion UA over 3 years. The Paris Summit of 9 and 10 December 1974 gave the green light to the establishment of the ERDF for a 3-year period starting on 1 January 1975. The final budget allocation amounted to 1.3 billion UA — a far cry from the Commission's original proposal. On Sicco Mansholt's initiative, part of the total was financed by EAGGF reserves, to the tune of 150 million UA.

The budget was divided into national quotas set during ad hoc negotiations. The Member States with the most severe regional imbalances received proportionally higher shares. The need to develop structural policies was recognised from the outset. The Marjolin report of 1975 on economic and monetary union called for the implementation of a structural regional policy funded by the ERDF and

the European Investment Bank (EIB) ⁽¹⁾. The European Social Fund, set up by Article 123 of the EEC Treaty, was overhauled in 1972 and underwent further changes in 1977 to ensure a better balance between the regional measures to boost employment and those intended to help vulnerable people enter the labour market ⁽²⁾. In the 1980s, measures supported by the fund were increasingly targeted at the most vulnerable citizens.

Antonio Giolitti took over from George Thomson as commissioner responsible for regional policy from 1977 to 1985, flanked initially by Renato Ruggiero, the first director-general of DG XVI, who was succeeded by Pierre Mathijssen in March 1977.

DG XVI was divided into two main directorates. The development of regional policies came under the remit of Directorate A, headed by Georges Rencki (who replaced Philippe de Castelbajac), a Frenchman of Polish origin and an ardent federalist. A former member of the Mansholt cabinet, he would occupy the post until 1991. Directorate B (Development and Conversion Operations) had the task of managing the funds. It was headed from 1968 by Rosario Solima, an Italian official who took forward the work begun at the end of the 1960s. The activities of this directorate were more focused on the management of the ERDF appropriations and the ECSC conversion loans. Before the ERDF was set up in 1975, extra staff were assigned to DG XVI to enable it to cope with the task of managing the fund. The DG was also responsible both for policy development (analyses of regional disparities, regional impact of Community policy, etc.) and for managing the ERDF.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 214/1991/161, EC Commission, 'Report of the study group "Economic and monetary union 1980"', Marjolin report, Brussels, March 1975.

⁽²⁾ EC Commission, 'European Social Fund — official texts', Brussels, 2nd edn, 1977, p. 3.

After a long battle, the ERDF came into being

The European Regional Development Fund was established by a Council regulation of 18 March 1975 ⁽¹⁾. Its purpose was to make a financial contribution to measures approved by the Member States in the form of grants or soft loans to support investment in industrial, craft or service activities. The fund could also be used to help finance infrastructure (up to a maximum of 30 % of the Member State contribution). The funding was intended primarily for job creation measures, but could also be granted for investments to help maintain employment in connection with conversion plans or company restructuring. This clause was of particular interest to the United Kingdom, which was facing the large-scale conversion and modernisation of old industrial plants. In 1975, the first year of operation of the ERDF, requests for assistance were received from the Member States in respect of 1 521 projects, 1 183 of which were accepted by the Commission. The ERDF was the main instrument for mobilising Community financial resources for the regions.

It did not take long for the wheels of the ERDF machine to start turning and the programme was up and running by summer 1975. The fund committee helped DG XVI to develop and implement the rules and procedures governing the funds and was also consulted on the quality of the projects. It was composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission. If its opinion was unfavourable, an appeal could be submitted to the Council. When the ERDF was launched, a regional policy committee was set up within the Council and the Commission to help coordinate the regional policies of the Member States. The establishment of this committee was one of the sticking points prior to the adoption of the 1975 regulation. There

were two questions at issue. First, the French permanent representative did not share the Commission's view that the committee should be set up within both the Council and the Commission, and called for it to be established solely at Council level, with the Commission closely cooperating. However, the eight other countries sided with the Commission, whose viewpoint ultimately prevailed. Second, there was disagreement on whether the regional policy committee should grant a consultative role to professional organisations. Opinions diverged on this matter among the various Member States. In the end, on the basis of a suggestion by Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG XVI, it was decided that the consultation procedure would be set out in the regional policy committee's rules of procedure.

The chair of the regional policy committee was elected by its members, while its secretariat was provided by DG XVI (Directorate A). The committee became operational in July 1975 with the aim of helping coordinate the regional policies of the Member States. It was also responsible for preparing a blueprint for a common regional development programme in the Member States.

Since its inception, Community regional policy had to contend with the strong desire on the part of Member States to retain centralised control and not to delegate authority to the regions, and to retain their monopoly over relations with the Community institutions, particularly the Commission and its departments. The Commission sought to loosen these ties by fostering direct relations, particularly at an informal level, with regional and local authorities. This caused a certain amount of friction with governments. These local contacts encouraged representative bodies — where they existed — to become involved in preparing regional development programmes (with the exception of the budgetary aspects thereof). The second-generation ERDF, post-1985, did not usher in any major changes to the set-up, which varied at any rate from one Member

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EEC) No 724/75, OJ L 73, 21.3.1975, p 1.

State to another. The national administrations continued to dominate project selection and the implementation of the funds, while the Commission played a more active role, particularly in connection with non-quota operations. It was actually easier to manage consultations under multiannual programmes than on the basis of a plethora of individual projects.


Active efforts were made to identify programmes which could be financed under the non-quota section. Regions such as the German *Länder*, the Belgian regions and the island regions, but also Brittany and Scotland, led the way when it came to the (still severely restricted, albeit increasing) involvement of sub-national territories in preparing and managing ERDF programmes. Relations with these associations would be rendered official by the Commission decision to create a consultative committee of regional and local authorities — the forerunner of the Committee of the Regions, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty as a Community consultative body.

A major political problem: which regions should receive assistance?

Although it was the Commission that conducted the analyses and highlighted the existing regional disparities, it was the Member States that determined the regions that should receive ERDF funding. The primary aim was to give priority to the regions facing the most serious problems and most in need in economic and social terms. But whose job should it be to determine regional priorities? This was a difficult question to answer. Although that was the Commission's role, the British, for example, felt that the Member States were best placed to set priorities for the allocation of Community funding in the social sphere at regional level and that, therefore, this task should be left to them. The definition of the nature of regional disparities and the selection of indicators to measure them enabled

decisions to be taken on which regions should be eligible for Community assistance. The process was an extremely tricky one because of the considerable financial and political implications of the decisions made in respect of the distribution of resources. Before specific indicators could be established, a number of technical difficulties had to be resolved, linked primarily to the initial lack of comparability of the statistical data provided by the different countries. It took several years to resolve these difficulties and, as a result, a number of regions in prosperous Member States which were eligible for regional aid at national level also benefited from ERDF assistance and appeared on the Commission maps although their wealth considerably exceeded the Community average. This situation, which nullified positive discrimination efforts to ensure that Community assistance went to the poorest areas, would be changed in 1979 with the adoption of the first regional policy reform, which stipulated that account had to be taken of the principles of coordination of regional aid at Community level when deciding which national priority areas were to receive ERDF investment aid. This provided a first indication of the Commission's powers in the area of competition, as it set limits on certain types of regional aid granted to prosperous countries. From 1980 onwards, the Commission would use a synthetic index composed of per capita GDP (considered as reflecting economic or business potential) and the unemployment rate, measured against the Community average. This approach painted a picture of the socioeconomic situation of the regions, which differed in many key respects from the national averages used for the national regional policies. This kick-started a lengthy process, culminating in a system from 1986 onwards which saw ERDF assistance concentrated in the least developed regions, which were defined using the per capita GDP indicator measured against the Community averages. In the end, purely national regional aid was also granted using the same criteria, despite the initial reticence of a number of Member States, particularly Germany.

European regional fund aid, 1975–84



Distribution of ERDF aid per region during its first 10 years, in millions of ECU. ('The European Community and its regions: 10 years of Community regional policy and of the European Regional Development Fund', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985.)

When the ERDF was launched in 1975, the regions eligible for assistance represented some 100 million inhabitants, or 38 % of the Community's total population. During this initial period, the Commission defended the following two principles: first, the complementary nature of the assistance as a means of making an additional contribution to regional development and concentrating resources and, second, a rule that aid should be granted as a matter of priority to the regions most in need. On 19 December 1975, Commissioner Thomson contacted the ministers responsible for regional policy in the Member States to draw their attention to the Commission's concerns about the ERDF ⁽¹⁾. He underlined the importance of the complementarity principle, whereby the additional resources provided through contributions from the fund enabled the Member States to spend more on regional development than would otherwise have been the case. The commissioner stressed that the objectives set could not be attained if this principle was not applied correctly, underlining that 'that should be equally clear to the Community partners and Community public opinion' ⁽²⁾. The main aim was to prevent the ERDF from subsidising projects which had already been finalised. For the Commission, it was essential to raise public awareness of the fact that new relations were being established between the Community and the Member States in the regional development field.

From its very first year of operation, the ERDF emphasised a number of features which were to prove important for the development of European regional policy, such as the ERDF contribution in terms of additional resources. Emphasis was also placed on the need for geographical concentration in priority areas and for precedence to be given to investments to boost employment. The importance of the proper

preparation and implementation of regional development programmes governing future ERDF operations was also underlined.

A first reform of regional policy, 1979

In 1977, an exhaustive review of Community regional policy was launched in line with the provisions of the ERDF regulation. The time had come for the Community to establish a clear blueprint for Community regional policy for the years to come ⁽³⁾. It was also important, as Commissioner Antonio Giolitti underlined in March 1980, to provide the general public with tangible evidence that the Community had not been set up with the sole aim of running the common market, but also to tackle the problems affecting the everyday lives of its inhabitants ⁽⁴⁾. New problems emerged in connection with the overall development needs of the traditionally more backward regions. These problems were compounded by difficulties in adapting and converting certain sectors in crisis such as textiles or steel, even in the richest regions. Community regional policy would also be called upon shortly to help resolve the problems connected with the latest accessions, in particular by contributing to the development of certain Mediterranean regions. The aid system set up during the first phase of the ERDF was not spared criticism from some quarters, undoubtedly because of the fact that some Member States could not meet the co-financing obligation. These criticisms, which Commissioner Grigoris Varfis alluded to at the 10th anniversary of the ERDF, stemmed primarily from the fact that the richest regions sometimes received more fund-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/177, SEC (76) 685, 19 February 1976, including in Annex B the letter sent by Mr Thomson to the ministers responsible for regional policy in the Member States.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/178, 'Guidelines for Community regional policy', Communication and proposals from the Commission to the Council, COM(77) 195 final, 1 June 1977.

⁽⁴⁾ 'The regional policy of the European Community', Text of speech given by Antonio Giolitti at the VIIIth International Congress of Regional Economics, Brussels, 3 May 1980, p. 3.

ing than the less-developed regions, whose limited resources meant that they received less from the national purse and from the Commission (owing to their inability to provide co-financing) ⁽¹⁾.

A major review of Community regional policy was necessary, all the while bearing in mind that unanimous agreement was required from the Council for initiatives in this field. Against this backdrop, the Commission adopted its guidelines for Community regional policy on 1 June 1977 ⁽²⁾. In this document, the Commission highlighted two key objectives: to reduce existing regional imbalances and to curtail the risk of new imbalances occurring as a result of global economic developments or Community policy decisions.

A number of new plans were put forward and accepted by the Council on 26 and 27 June 1978. They can be summarised as follows: regional policy instruments were to become more diverse and to include non-financial aspects to ensure that the policy's outcomes in the various regions would dovetail with those of other Community policies and vice versa. Regional policy was considered an integral part of the economic policies of the Community and the Member States. Finally, the Commission was to prepare regular reports on the state of play and socioeconomic development of the Community's regions.

Two key mechanisms were established

Alongside the national programmes of Community interest for which the Member States had the right of initiative and which helped further the development of the regions, sometimes on a multiannual

basis, the Commission helped establish two new mechanisms which would turn out to be pivotal.

The first was the obligation on DG XVI to carry out regular analyses (positive or negative) of the impact of other Community policies on the regions. These were commonly referred to as regional impact analyses (RIAs). Accordingly, studies were carried out on the regional impact of the common agricultural policy, on trade policy and on fisheries. The RIAs were intended to do away with or bring in compensatory measures to attenuate the negative effects of Community policies or reinforce the positive ones. The end result, following a parliamentary debate, was to steer agricultural income support measures more towards products from southern European regions.

The second mechanism was the establishment of a new section of the ERDF, which, while modest in financial terms, offered greater flexibility. A so-called non-quota section set at 75 million UA for 1978 and 1979, i.e. 5 % of the ERDF budget, was made available for the financing of specific Community actions. The non-quota section was approved by unanimous decision of the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission and following the opinion of the European Parliament. It provided funding for specific development measures prompted by the regional impact of Community policies. Thus, the non-quota section was intended to increase the Community's influence on national policies — hence the reticence on the part of the Member States ⁽³⁾.

So-called specific Community development measures, eligible for assistance from the non-quota section of the regional fund, were adopted by the Council in October 1980. These measures, which were implemented in the form of special multi-

⁽¹⁾ HAEU, Emanuele Gazzo papers (EG-98), 'Event to mark the 10th anniversary of the ERDF', Brussels, 28 November 1985, p. 5.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/178, 'Guidelines for Community regional policy', Communication and proposals from the Commission to the Council, COM(77) 195 final, 1 June 1977.

⁽³⁾ According to French MEP François Musso in his *a posteriori* analysis of the situation, European Parliament, session document 1988/89, 21 October 1988, series A, p. 18.

annual programmes as opposed to individual projects, provided funding for investment aid, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. Their role in respect of job creation was not limited to physical investments (e.g. the construction of a factory and provision of the necessary equipment), but also extended to intangible investments (e.g. consultancy and management fees, tourist accommodation in rural areas, market study costs and the costs of restoring derelict sites) in areas which were not necessarily situated in ERDF regions ⁽¹⁾. The financing was determined on the basis of a project framework. One of the first specific measures concerned the regeneration of the steel areas affected by the restrictive measures of the Davignon plan, followed by others concerning the areas affected by the crises in the shipbuilding and textile industries. A second series of Community programmes was adopted in 1984 to help in particular the regions of the south affected by the forthcoming accessions of Spain and Portugal.

On 6 February 1979, the ERDF regulation, amended by the Council, was adopted by the latter, paving the way for the development of a regional policy that was more Community-oriented and global in outlook. The financing allocated to the fund increased to 945 million UA, up from 581 million UA in 1978; this 63 % rise owed much to the European Parliament's tenacity in the face of a European Council which was reticent to say the least ⁽²⁾.

This reform of the ERDF reflected the Commission's desire to improve coordination between the Member States on regional policy and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the funds. Better coordination was achieved by two key means, the first of these being strengthened regional development programmes (RDPs) which were to run for several years on the basis of a compulsory common framework. The RDPs submitted by the Member States

to the Commission would now comprise new information on the policy side (priorities, budgetary aspects, statistical overviews for each region, results obtained in terms of investment and employment). On receiving the information in question, the Commission would examine it in order to 'determine the priority areas for fund intervention'. Despite this, funding from the quota section of the ERDF was still allocated on a project-by-project basis, a situation which was to remain unchanged until 1984. The second means of achieving better coordination between the Member States was through improvements to Community management of national regional aid, taking due account of competition rules.

A second reform in 1984

The new ERDF reform was implemented following a report on improving the effectiveness of the Community's Structural Funds, produced by the Commission at the request of the Stuttgart European Council of June 1983. One of the Commission's key proposals was to step up its dialogue with the Member States on the use of resources.

The adoption of a new regulation on 19 June 1984 following 3 years of negotiation further emphasised the Community character of regional policy in at least three areas ⁽³⁾. First, the non-financial instruments formed an integral part of the regulation: Title 1 was devoted to the coordination of regional policies. Second, national quotas were replaced by a band system for 3 years and only a minimum was guaranteed for each Member State. Third, the non-quota measures continued and their share of the ERDF budget rose rapidly from 5 % to 9 %. A number of new Community actions were launched in areas hard hit by industrial decline, and measures were also taken to provide access to advanced telecommunications services in the most disadvantaged

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Georges Rencki, 27 October 2011.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 36, 9.2.1979, p. 12.

⁽³⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84, 19 June 1984, OJ L 169, 28.6.1984, p. 1.

regions and to encourage the exploitation of endogenous energy potential. Non-quota programmes would now be adopted by qualified majority rather than unanimity. Clearly, the allocation of funding to multiannual programmes (as was the case with non-quota operations) rather than to individual projects gave the Commission a greater say in discussions with Member States on the future of their development policy than had been the case in the past, when piecemeal contributions were made in respect of individual investment projects.

This financing approach was extended to all of the funds, albeit very gradually. The objective pursued at the outset was that at least 20 % of the assistance should be earmarked for the financing of programmes, while the remainder could be used to finance individual projects, as had been the case since the launch of the ERDF. The RDPs could also co-finance aid schemes for business investment. These programmes, which required the Commission's approval for the very first time, and which provided for the possibility of appeals to be made to the Council, were to be more specific and had to include quantified objectives. The Member States were to report annually on the results of regional action in terms of investment and jobs.

This period of reform was punctuated by intense internal discussions within the Commission on how to cope with the increasingly difficult task of carrying out effective examinations in Brussels of the growing number of individual projects. A number of officials felt that the system no longer enabled the Commission to have a coherent overview and to have a say on the policy side, i.e. regarding the choice of objectives and priorities for the development of the eligible regions to ensure that Community priorities were taken into account. Nonetheless, financing on a project-by-project basis had its proponents because of the high profile it afforded 'on the ground' and so this approach was retained for large-scale projects. The 1984 ERDF reform underscored the horizontal or global nature of regional policy

and paved the way for more in-depth regional impact analyses. This development was also attributable to staff in the Directorate-General for Regional Policy, who were adamant that greater account should be taken of the considerable positive or negative impact that other Community and national sectoral policies (e.g. agriculture, competition, transport and even research) could have on the development of the poorest regions of the Community.

The 1984 reform helped increase the Commission's influence vis-à-vis the Member States, which still regarded this dossier as very political and difficult to manage. The Commission's margin of discretion increased as a result both of the funds being concentrated in the poorest regions and of the shift from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting in the Council. Undeniably, the intention in 1986 was to bolster the Commission's role in allocating and using the funds, and this was borne out by developments at the beginning of the following decade ⁽¹⁾.

Furthermore, the European Parliament asked the Commission on a number of occasions to ensure compliance with the principle of additionality in respect of Community action. The Commission's job was to check that the Member States did not relax their efforts regarding the level of eligible ERDF expenditure, to ensure that the growth sparked by Community input would have a real impact on the regional economies. It was not until 1988, however, that the additionality principle would be adopted.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Eneko Landaburu, 20 January 2012; Barca, F., 'An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy — A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations', Independent report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy, April 2009.

Towards specific Community measures: non-quota operations

As a follow-up to the Council regulation of February 1979, which created specific Community co-financed regional development actions under the non-quota section of the ERDF, from 1980 onwards, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the Council adopted a series of Community measures valid for 5 years (a number of which were extended). These actions could also cover different areas from those covered by the non-quota section. In this context, the fund co-financed Commission-approved multiannual programmes as opposed to individual projects. Some of these programmes are mentioned here by way of example, in order to illustrate the two particularities of non-quota actions: first, their very *raison d'être* and, second, the nature of the aid granted.

The aim of one of these programmes was to improve the economic and social situation of the border areas of Ireland and Northern Ireland by developing their considerable tourist potential. These areas were lagging severely behind in economic terms and were known at the time as areas of violent political confrontation. Another programme aimed to reinforce the economic structures of the regions of south-west France (Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-Roussillon) and Italy (Mezzogiorno) whose agriculture was at risk owing to the forthcoming accession of Spain and Portugal. The programme provided for investment aid in SMEs and the craft industry as well as the promotion of rural tourism within the framework of agricultural development. It was clearly, therefore, a preventative action. It is important to highlight the reservations expressed by Commissioner Christopher Tugendhat (Commission Vice-President) when the action was being prepared. The British quota was to be reduced and, consequently, that of France increased. Commissioner Giolitti confirmed to his colleague that these figures were correct, but only if the two sections of the ERDF



La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, set up in 1950, played a significant role in the development of southern Italy until it was abolished in 1986. Thanks to ERDF aid, it financed infrastructure like this aqueduct in Sicily, built in 1976.

were brought together for the calculation (quota and non-quota) ⁽¹⁾.

A third programme was concerned with energy supply in the mountainous regions of the Mezzogiorno. Investment aid was granted for mini hydroelectric turbines (new technology) and for other alternative energy sources. These measures were implemented as special multiannual programmes and no longer as individual projects, such as those financed in the quota section of the ERDF. This measure was intended to respond to the risk of oil imports being disrupted. Italy depended on this raw material for its energy needs and its electrical power

⁽¹⁾ Personal archives of Georges Rencki, and informal interview with him on 7 June 2012.

reserves were particularly low compared with the other Member States. These factors all limited the development possibilities in the Mezzogiorno, especially in the mountain regions where the need for the creation of new sectors of activity was particularly keenly felt.

With the entry into force on 1 January 1985 of the new ERDF regulation, the first two Community programmes (STAR and Valoren) co-financed by the regional fund were launched. These concerned the least-developed regions of the Community, i.e. Greece, Ireland, the Mezzogiorno, Northern Ireland, Corsica and the French overseas departments, as well as Spanish and Portuguese regions which remained to be determined. As well as contributing to regional development, these two programmes therefore helped to achieve the objectives of other Community policies such as telecommunications and energy policy. The first programme, STAR, provided for better access to advanced telecommunications services while the second, Valoren, was concerned with exploiting endogenous energy potential.

The other particularity of specific Community measures concerns the different nature of the eligible operations compared with those usually entitled to receive ERDF funding.

Examples here are the measures targeted at the areas affected by the restructuring of the steel industry as a result of production overcapacity. Adopted in 1980 and renewed in 1984 for a further 5-year period, these measures concerned regions in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in addition to traditional business investment aid, a series of measures were aimed at 'overcoming constraints hampering the development of new economic activities'. These aid measures covered the rehabilitation of derelict sites, targeting the modernisation of premises for SMEs, the creation of

green spaces, work to improve the attractiveness of sites, the development of adjoining road infrastructure and contributions to whatever construction work was necessary to promote new activities, such as accommodation for workers.

In August 1985, on the initiative of Commissioner Lorenzo Natali, who was responsible for the enlargement negotiations, the Commission launched an action similar to the ERDF non-quota programme which was targeted at south-west France and the Italian Mezzogiorno, but then extended to Greece and also to other Community funds, including the Social Fund and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.

These programmes heralded a new era in regional development, proposing an overall integrated approach, combining aid for investment in firms with agricultural support and measures to help address social and vocational training issues. They therefore touched upon a variety of new development areas and mobilised all sources of Community, national, regional and local financing for a particularly long period (7 years). This was the first attempt at a large-scale integrated Community operation. The national authorities were no longer alone in holding the reins since each IMP was the subject of a tripartite agreement between the Commission, the Member State and the regional authorities concerned. Unfortunately, the integrated programmes were not to become a key feature of the future Structural Funds landscape. One plausible explanation for this is the comparatively low financial contributions made by the Community in a given region compared with the financing granted by the various national ministries. Thus, some years later, the structure set up specifically to promote this type of integrated activity was wound up. The IMPs did, however, leave behind a legacy of improved fund coordination and, as such, they can be considered as having provided real added value.

Inclusion in the treaty

In the decade following the establishment of the ERDF, the Commission managed to transform an instrument which had been set up with the primary aim of achieving a financial balance between Member States at different stages of development into a real policy for Community solidarity which would benefit from a steady increase in resources (13 % of the total European Community budget in 1985). Furthermore, the policy was to become enshrined in the EEC Treaty thanks to the Single European Act and the efforts of Jacques Delors, who was president of the Commission at the time. The Commission could henceforth put greater emphasis on Community priorities via the initiatives and programmes which it promoted and funded. From a simple compensation instrument, Community regional policy progressively became a major financial instrument for redistributing wealth to the less developed countries, and subsequently to all of Europe's peripheral regions.

Despite this, considerable disparities continued to exist between the various regions of the Community throughout this period. In 1985, the per capita income of the 10 richest regions of the European Community was more than triple that of the 10 least prosperous regions, a gap that was at least twice as wide as that observed in the United States. The gradual reduction of these disparities would be a long-term endeavour requiring a major, prolonged display of solidarity. It was a sign of the

times that regional policy was to focus increasingly on endogenous development to emphasise the fact that the regions themselves were the main drivers of their own development. In his Strasbourg speech in January 1984, Commissioner Giolitti could not have put it better when he said that 'development is like a plant which needs to be adapted to local conditions and to be fed and cultivated by local energy; otherwise it will produce only a scattering of flowers in the desert' ⁽¹⁾.

In conclusion, the period from 1973 to 1986, which began with the birth of regional policy solely as a means of co-financing national policies, came to a close with the ERDF as an established Community policy whose rise in power could be seen, inter alia, from the almost twofold increase (from 4.8 % to 7.3 % in 10 years) in the ERDF share of the budget alone — the ERDF being one of the major instruments of regional policy — and from the tireless efforts to achieve greater effectiveness in the field of regional development ⁽²⁾. Every individual involved had to face up to their responsibilities since 'our role was to make a contribution to efforts that needed to be made by the countries and regions themselves; even though our funds increased dramatically and substantial sums of money were made available, particularly in the areas previously known as Objective 1 regions, i.e. those which were lagging behind, the Community contribution was, fortunately, not the main catalyst for development' ⁽³⁾.

PIERRE TILLY

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, 'Le rôle des régions dans la construction d'une Europe démocratique', Speech given by Antonio Giolitti at the Conference of the Regions of the European Community and the candidate countries, Spain and Portugal, Strasbourg, 27 January 1984, p. 11.

⁽²⁾ 'The regions of Europe: a means of strengthening EC cohesion', Interview with Grigoris Varfis on 'These regions which make up Europe', June 1985, p. 49.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Eneko Landaburu, 20 January 2012.

Chapter 18

Free movement of workers, social rights and social affairs

The creation of a social Europe is founded on a number of provisions of the Treaty of Rome, various legislative measures and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities ⁽¹⁾. In this regard, the period from 1973 to 1986 saw little change in approach. It began with the adoption of a social action programme and continued with a number of initiatives in areas as diverse as health and safety at work, equal opportunities, social security for migrant workers and industrial relations ⁽²⁾. From the outset, governments, the Commission and the other European institutions were guided by a desire for social harmonisation with the aim of improving the functioning of the common market and making progress towards attaining the

social objectives of the Treaty of Rome. However, the economic crisis and deep changes to the industrial fabric changed the assumptions inherited from three decades of post-war economic boom, giving rise to the implementation of measures which essentially aimed to cushion the social impact of the crisis. A marked change to the Community's political and economic approach therefore occurred at the end of the 1970s/beginning of the 1980s, with increasing attention being paid to competitiveness and social support measures for workers affected by economic restructuring. Then, in 1986, the Single European Act launched a new stage characterised by a desire to create a European social area through Community legislation based on Commission initiatives, but also — and this is what was new — on agreements between the two sides of industry. The undertaking was driven forward by Jacques Delors, a former Christian trade unionist, who had been appointed president of the Commission in 1985.

⁽¹⁾ De Schutter, O., 'L'équilibre entre l'économie et le social dans les traités européens', *Revue française des affaires sociales*, No 1, 2006, p. 131.

⁽²⁾ Council resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme, OJ C 13, 12.2.1974, p. 1.

The early years, 1958–73

While the Treaty of Rome established some of the elements of social policy — the European Social Fund (ESF), the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and a number of common principles in the area of professional training — the initial Community objectives were still focused on increasing production and opening up markets. Social policy was merely meant to support economic integration between the Member States of the Community ⁽¹⁾. Although there was a Directorate-General for Social Affairs in the Commission, it essentially dealt with the freedom of movement for workers and professional training, two areas for which the Treaty of Rome provided a basis for action.

The context changed in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Well before the 1973 oil crisis, economic overheating had led to a drop in growth, and structural unemployment was re-emerging in Europe (in 1971 unemployment in the EEC stood at 1.4 million; by 1972 it had risen to 1.6 million), accompanied by a new rise in inflation. This gave rise to new social imperatives: combating unemployment, providing support measures for restructuring, etc. Willy Brandt's coming to power in Germany, with the support of the powerful DGB trade union, relaunched the debate on a social Europe. A new dynamic was forming. Not only did Community provisions — including those applicable in the social domain — have to be extended to the new Member States, it was also necessary to absorb countries which, in their approach to social matters, did not always have the same vision as the original Six. Indeed, the fact that the newcomers' social protection systems were based on different principles than those of the founding Member States put paid to the hopes of social harmonisation in Europe that

had been held since the beginning of the European Community. This schism ran through the Community from 1973 onwards.

The road towards a social Europe opens up, 1974–85

At the time of the 1973 enlargement, optimism was the order of the day, all the more so because the 1972 Paris conference had given the Commission a mandate to draw up a social action programme before 1 January 1974. A major impulse seemed to have been given to the idea of a social Europe, and the Community was able to invest in major projects, such as the protection of migrant workers, the fight against poverty and insecurity, employment, the position of women at work and social dialogue.

On 21 January 1974, the Council adopted a resolution concerning a social action programme, based on work done by the Commission during 1973. It covered a 2-year period (1974–76), and the Commission was to draw up another social action programme by 31 December 1976. The text adopted by the Council stressed that social policy had a specific role to play vis-à-vis other fields of Community action and set three objectives: the attainment of full employment, the improvement of living and working conditions, and increased involvement of management and labour in Community decision-making ⁽²⁾. Roland Tavitian, who worked in the Directorate-General for Social Affairs in October 1972, described the context as follows: 'I arrived in a DG, led by Léo Crijns, which was geared up for the task of drafting [the social action programme]. And it was a great, almost euphoric period. The Community was growing. The British were arriving together with Denmark and Ireland. The first step-by-step plan for EMU was emerging. And the So-

⁽¹⁾ Varsori, A., 'The emergence of a social Europe', in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 427–441.

⁽²⁾ Heynig, E., 'Le programme d'action sociale de la Communauté européenne', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 173, 1974, pp. 111–120.

The Economic and Social Committee

Relations between the Commission and the Economic and Social Committee, made up of representatives of economic and social life and civil society, developed slowly between the mid-1970s and the signing of the Single European Act. The influence which this consultative assembly had on Community political decisions grew in relative terms over this period, particularly following a number of reforms aimed at improving its relations with the Commission and strengthening its institutional role.

At the Paris Summit in October 1972, the ESC was given the right to examine any issue relating to Community law without being asked by the Commission or Council, fulfilling the ESC's wish for greater recognition. This decision was a first step towards increased ESC involvement in Community decision-making. In the same year, the committee was also granted the right to publish its opinions in the Official Journal and to open its doors to the press, thus putting an end to the restriction on its deliberations being made public.

During the 1970s, the ESC, which was still very much in the shadows, militated for better institutional cooperation and greater involvement in developing major action programmes. Its director-general, Roger Louet, stated in 1975 that the ESC wished to be involved at the stage of reflection and research so that it could contribute towards formulating Commission

proposals, ensuring that greater account would be taken of the concerns of the circles it represented ⁽²⁾.

Despite an increasingly dynamic approach, the effectiveness of the ESC's involvement remained limited, with the Council and the Commission tending to ignore its opinions or to consult it at too late a stage ⁽³⁾. Nevertheless, the Commission did play a greater role in meetings of the various ESC bodies (sections, sub-groups, study groups, plenary sessions), sending senior officials and sometimes even commissioners to represent it. For his part, the president of the Commission undertook to attend an ESC plenary session at least once a year to speak about the political situation of the Community.

It was only in the mid-1980s that the ESC truly emerged from the shadows. When Jacques Delors became Commission president, the number of requests for opinions coming directly from the Commission increased considerably. The Single European Act confirmed this trend by significantly widening the areas in which consultation of the ESC was mandatory. In a context of economic crisis, this demonstrated the Commission's desire for socioeconomic groups to be more involved in Community political decision-making.

Élisabeth Palmero

cial Fund had just been reformed in order to make it more automatic, to link it better to Community priorities and to develop, in the words of Raymond Rifflet, an active employment policy' ⁽¹⁾.

But the euphoria of 1972–73 did not last long. The optimism of enlargement on the economic front quickly crumbled as a result of international monetary instability and the first oil crisis. Economic growth slackened. Social policy could no longer be conceived of as a policy merely geared towards redistribution, as Roland Tavitian pointed out: 'In

around 1975–76, the Commission's activities were focused on four or five main priorities: youth employment, equal opportunities for men and women, the Vredeling directives on worker participation, health and safety at work and, of course, the creation of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) and the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), tools designed to

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010; see also box 'The Commission and the agencies: a difficult start', p. 354.

⁽²⁾ 'Activité et influence du CES', Roger Louet, Director-General, *Courrier du personnel*, No 352, 7 February 1975, p. 18.

⁽³⁾ Alphonse Lappas, ESC President, in *30 Jours d'Europe*, No 188, March 1974, p. 32.

The Commission and the agencies: a difficult start

The European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), both set up in 1975 during a period of economic difficulties and rapid social change, are the oldest of the Community's decentralised bodies. These two 'satellite' agencies assisted the Community institutions, and in particular the Commission, in achieving the objectives set by the first social action programme adopted in the wake of the 1974 Paris Summit.

Initially located in West Berlin, Cedefop ⁽¹⁾ aimed to promote social dialogue and to encourage the promotion and development of vocational and continuing training at Community level. The first few years of its existence were not an unmitigated success. For a long time, its precise role, structure and budget and the status of those who worked for it remained uncertain. It was only from the second half of the 1980s and in the run-up to the Single European Act that Cedefop's structure and links with the Commission were strengthened, as social policy and the development of vocational training came to play a prominent role in the Community debate ⁽²⁾.

The mission of Eurofound, established in Dublin in 1976 ⁽³⁾, was to ensure that the technical and scientific information necessary for planning and achieving better living and working conditions was available, in particular to the Commission. Through its research and analysis activities, it helped facilitate discussions on subjects such as the impact of teleworking or of technological development on shift work.

During the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the Commission and the two agencies were uncertain and limited and the negotiations between them delicate. As a result, DG V (Social Affairs) and the foundation tended to duplicate each other's work rather than coordinate



Cedefop publications.

their research efforts. This was despite the fact that the Commission sent representatives to both boards of directors. Jean Degimbe, director of Cedefop for 3 years and of the foundation for 10, confirms this state of affairs, stressing that the Commission and its agencies belonged to 'two different worlds, treating each other with distrust' ⁽⁴⁾.

Élisabeth Palmero

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 of 10 February 1975, OJ L 39, 13.2.1975, p. 1. Cedefop would move to Thessaloniki in 1995.

⁽²⁾ Varsori, A., 'Vocational education and training in European social policy from its origins to Cedefop', *European Journal of Vocational Training*, No 32, 2004.

⁽³⁾ Council Regulation (EEC) No 1365/75 of 26 May 1975, OJ L 139, 30.5.1975, p. 1 (Article 2(1)).

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Jean Degimbe, 13 July 2010.

encourage an effective dialogue between management and labour' ⁽¹⁾.

To help it cope with the huge diversity of tasks facing it, the Directorate-General for Social Affairs was able to draw on the experience gained in the social field since the establishment of the ECSC and to rely on people who were familiar with the practices and realities of the world of employment and work. The period 1973–86 saw three successive directors-general. The Belgian Raymond Rifflet held the post up to May 1973, and his successor, Michael Shanks, who came from industry (British Oxygen), remained at the helm for 18 months, thereby demonstrating the importance of social affairs to the British, who were faced at the time with major industrial restructuring problems. In 1976, another Belgian, Jean Degimbe, took over. During his time as a member of the Ortoli cabinet, he had chaired the group of heads of cabinet whose task it was to examine the social action programme approved by the Council in January 1974. A former Christian trade unionist, he had worked in the cabinet of Vice-President Raymond Barre in the Rey Commission and in the cabinet of President François-Xavier Ortoli. Degimbe remained in charge of the DG until 1992, an exceptionally long tenure of office. Under him, the DG developed a grassroots approach. Here again, Roland Tavitian's testimony is enlightening: 'There was no question of applying any kind of "manual". Perhaps more than elsewhere, social affairs can only work seriously by having regular contact with the grassroots and with experts. This presupposes a crucial element of trust on the part of the hierarchy — within reasonable limits, of course' ⁽²⁾.

A major step towards gender equality ⁽³⁾

Female employment was a particular concern of the Commission at the time, and the Commission helped secure spectacular advances in the area of gender equality from the second half of the 1970s. This has to be seen as a reflection of its desire to protect social rights and so bolster the internal market, to avoid distortions of competition between Member States and also as the outcome of a (gradual) shift in attitudes.

The directive on equal pay for men and women adopted by the Council on 10 February 1975, fittingly in the United Nations' International Women's Year, was symbolic of this proactive approach. Although the Council initially favoured addressing the issue by means of a recommendation, the Commission's efforts meant that it was possible to take the route of a directive. For Jacqueline Nonon, head of unit at the time, the context arising from the 1973 enlargement made such progress easier: 'The opportunity came with the arrival of the British, because they already had their equal opportunities legislation in place. They were proud to show just how far ahead they were, and I was lucky enough to have a commissioner, the Irishman [Patrick] Hillery, who fully backed me, and a director-general, Michael Shanks, who was supportive as well' ⁽⁴⁾.

A second directive, adopted in 1976, dealt with equal treatment in access to employment, vocational training, promotion and working conditions. This Commission proposal, annexed to its 1975 memorandum on the situation of workers, was a response to the growing influx of women to the labour market. Investigation had shown that women remained confined to a limited number of jobs.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁾ See Quintin, O., 'L'égalité entre hommes et femmes: une réalisation spécifique de la politique sociale communautaire', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 288, 1985, pp. 309–318.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Jacqueline Nonon, 25 October 2010.



Poster advertising the Community health and safety at work week from 2 to 8 May 1977. Working conditions were high on the list of workers' demands in the 1970s.

This reinforced existing discrimination, a situation that had to be resolved, as the case of Gabrielle Defrenne, an employee of the Belgian airline Sabena, showed. In the *Defrenne* judgments, the European court established the principle of direct effect (enabling individuals to invoke European rules directly before a national or European court) with regard to Article 141 of the EEC Treaty ⁽¹⁾. The prohibition of all discrimination based on gender has, indeed, become a general legal principle. A third directive, adopted in 1978, supplemented the legislation by establishing equal treatment in the area of social security, though it did not come into effect until

1984. These initial steps owed much to the intensive efforts of Jacqueline Nonon, Marie Josée Jonczy and other officials within the Legal Service. The Commission continued to develop its thinking in this area, and significant advances were achieved in the 1980s. An action programme (1982–85) included specific measures to remedy the factors hampering women's employment prospects ⁽²⁾. The aim was to help women create businesses or to encourage them to invest in areas traditionally considered to be the preserve of men. It also advocated further discussion on part-time working so as to allow parental responsibilities to be better shared and to end discrimination in this area ⁽³⁾.

Health and safety at work

The Commission was also active in the field of health and safety at work, an important issue ever since the beginning of the 1950s. In 1974, a tripartite committee set up by a Council decision of 27 June was assigned the task of assisting the Commission in preparing and implementing appropriate measures, for example with regard to medical prevention or the protection of workers. It would enable cooperation to be stepped up between national authorities and organisations representing workers and employers.

In 1978, and again in 1984, the first health and safety action programmes were launched ⁽⁴⁾. The first framework directive on health and safety at work was adopted in 1980. It was concerned with protecting workers from the risks of exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 April 1976 in Case 43/75 *Defrenne v SABENA* [1976] ECR 455.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 186, 21.7.1982, p. 3.

⁽³⁾ Proposal for a Council directive on parental leave and leave for family reasons, 24 November 1983, OJ C 333, 9.12.1983, p. 6.

⁽⁴⁾ A first directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on the protection of the health of workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer also entered into force on 29 June 1978 (Council Directive 78/610/EEC, OJ L 197, 22.7.1978, p. 12).

⁽⁵⁾ Council Directive 80/1107/EEC of 27 November 1980, OJ L 327, 3.12.1980, p. 8.

The directive on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work ⁽¹⁾ was concerned with one chemical agent in particular. It gave rise to strong opposition from employers, but was nevertheless a first step towards solving a problem that would become increasingly important and give rise to much debate.



Raising awareness of occupational health, European Trade Union Confederation poster, 1970.

This series of directives was completed with the adoption on 12 May 1986 of the directive on the protection of workers from the risks related to ex-

posure to noise at work ⁽²⁾. Owing to the absence of explicit legislative competence in the treaty up to the mid-1980s, this issue was, however, generally considered to be an add-on to market harmonisation and the Community's economic policies. The Single European Act was a major step forward in that it introduced into the treaty a new provision for the enactment of social policy legislation aimed at promoting 'improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers' ⁽³⁾. This also formed part of a wider shift towards an approach focusing on prevention. The Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No 155), adopted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1981, was a key instrument in this context.

Facilitating the free movement of people

Progress towards the free movement of workers started in the 1950s ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission's action programme of 18 December 1974 related mainly to the situation of migrant workers and their families. The first result was an amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on improving the application of social security schemes to migrant workers ⁽⁵⁾. It was in this context that mention would be made of the possible creation of a passport union between the Member States based on the gradual harmonisation of legislation relating to foreign nationals, lead-

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 83/477/EEC, OJ L 263, 24.9.1983, p. 25.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 86/188/EEC, OJ L 137, 24.5.1986, p. 28.

⁽³⁾ Two new articles inserted by the Single European Act opened up major prospects in this area. These were Article 118a, which authorised the Council to adopt minimum requirements to encourage 'improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers', and Article 110a, which aimed to eliminate all trade barriers in the single market and allow goods to move freely across borders.


⁽⁴⁾ This owed much to Regulation No 15 and to the directive of 16 August 1961 (OJ L 57, 26.8.1961, p. 1073) and, above all, to Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and to Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2 and p. 13.

⁽⁵⁾ Degimbe, J., *La politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité d'Amsterdam*, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 1999, p. 107.

ing eventually to the abolition of passport checks within the Community ⁽¹⁾.

The freedom of movement for employed workers would be the subject of a number of directives aimed at improving the coordination of rules on access to and the pursuit of professions. These include, for example, the directive of 16 June 1975 on the activities of doctors ⁽²⁾. This was the first time that directives coordinating national laws on a profession had been extended to an activity exercised in an employed capacity. It was also a step forward in terms of the mutual recognition of diplomas applicable to both employed and self-employed doctors. But coordination of social security schemes applicable to self-employed workers would continue to be problematic, and it was not until 1981 that Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 and (EEC) No 574/72 were extended to the self-employed and to their family members ⁽³⁾.

Regulations (EEC) No 1407/71 and (EEC) No 574/72, which also cover the payment of family benefits to migrant workers and their families, were the subject of a proposal from the Commission to the Council on 10 April 1975. The actual entry into force of these regulations was vital to achieving the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. The Commission wanted a uniform solution to be implemented in all Member States so as to make the principle of family benefits being granted by the host country a general one. This meant eliminating differences in treatment where the worker's family resided in their country of origin. These Community-level arrangements required adjustments at the level of national administrations. However, some Member States were reluctant to adapt their laws and practices. One example was



Cartoon by Plantu on the freedom of establishment for doctors in EEC countries in March 1977. The harmonisation and mutual recognition of qualifications happened fastest in the health sector.

France, which for a long time refused to pay family benefits to Community workers for family members who remained in their country of origin. The Commission's effort in terms of both drafting and implementing legislation was thus crucial, giving rise to a substantial number of references for preliminary rulings before the Court of Justice, for which the Commission always prepared a written submission, as Head of Unit Annette Bosscher recalls: 'When I left social security for migrant workers (in 1981), I think there were 150 Court judgments relating to preliminary rulings or infringements, and I sometimes went to the Court to help the Commission's lawyer on the technical details' ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 7, 1975; Cited in Ribas, J.-J., Jonczy, M.-J. and Séché, J.-C., *Traité de droit social européen*, Presses universitaires de France, 1st edn, Paris, 1978, p. 194.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 167, 30.6.1975, p. 1.

⁽³⁾ By virtue of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1390/81, 15 May 1981, OJ L 143, 29.5.1981, p. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Annette Bosscher, 13 August 2010.

The Court of Justice played a major role in interpreting Community rules on the freedom of movement of workers and equal treatment in the area of social protection, but it was not until specific rulings in 1986 and 1989 that France finally relented on the question of paying family benefits to Community workers. Following the *Pinna* judgments concerning an Italian national working in the Savoy region of France whose family continued to reside in Italy, amendments had to be made to both Community and French legislation. In particular, the Court declared the former Article 73(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 invalid on the grounds that it precluded the award to employed persons subject to French legislation of French family benefits for members of their family residing in another Member State. It considered this to be a covert form of discrimination in that the conditions were more difficult to meet for a non-national than for a national. The *Pinna* case ultimately led to the adoption of Regulation (EEC) No 3427/89 of 30 October 1989, which made it a general principle in all Member States that the law of the country of employment would apply. For the Commission, as Annette Bosscher explains, stressing the importance of the *Pinna* judgment, ‘This was a great victory ... because we had tried several times to make the system the same for everybody: France had always been very opposed, while Germany considered it to be a fairly good system ... So after the preliminary ruling, I think we had to launch three infringement procedures. It took 15 years in all, I think, before France finally accepted it’ ⁽¹⁾.

Social dialogue: early promise gives way to disappointment

As far as the involvement of management and labour in the dialogue and management of the Community is concerned, the results were more mixed de-

spite a promising start following the creation in 1970 of the Standing Committee on Employment ⁽²⁾. The Commission played an active role in establishing dialogue with stakeholders, and Jean Degimbe contributed to this from the moment he took over as director-general: ‘As soon as I arrived in 1976, I wasted no time in bringing management and labour together; that was in my first week, and it was the first time in ages. We talked at length and promised to meet very regularly’ ⁽³⁾. This dialogue took shape in tripartite conferences prepared by the Commission. It was felt at the time that a tripartite meeting would above all allow an initial contact to take place with employer and trade union representatives, and President Ortolí was very keen on the idea. When Roy Jenkins took over as Commission president in January 1977, contacts with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP) intensified, at least in the initial phase of his Presidency. They discussed the political priorities and work programme that the Commission had put forward. At the Commission’s initiative, advisory committees were set up on hygiene and health protection at work, social security for migrant workers and the free movement of workers. Prepared by the Commission, which also presented a report on the relevant subject at each conference, these tripartite meetings were an opportunity to compare different points of view (business and trade associations would also make their views known on the subject under discussion). Statements would be issued at the end of these conferences, and it was up to the Commission and the Council to draw the necessary conclusions.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Annette Bosscher, 13 August 2010.

⁽²⁾ Paulus, D., *La création du Comité permanent de l’emploi des Communautés européennes*, Travaux de l’Institut d’études européennes, ULB, Brussels, 1972.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.

The dialogue which the conferences were supposed to foster proved particularly difficult ⁽¹⁾. The June 1976 conference set the tone for this. It must be pointed out that economic growth was very disappointing at the time. Attempts to analyse the causes and propose remedies divided the various parties to such an extent that it proved impossible to adopt a joint statement. The only tangible decision was in favour of a study programme on employment issues. The growing differences between trade unions and employer organisations and between trade unions and the public authorities were again exposed. In reality, they had existed in the social dialogue since the beginning of the decade. Employer representatives insisted on the need to control wage rises and for the public authorities to disengage from the economy, while the trade unions were unable to speak with a single voice. Those in favour of moderate social dialogue (the German DGB trade union, for example) opposed those who wanted a different type of growth based on a reduction in working hours, controls on prices and capital movements and the maintenance of a strong public sector. At the very least, this was a long way from the objectives set out by the Commission.

Employers and trade unions became increasingly divided, for example on the question of the organisation of working time from 1979. One of those involved remembers the ambiguities: 'We opted for proposing a directive on the organisation of working time. A young German from the DG had done some extraordinary groundwork. Two years were spent working intensely with expert groups and employer and trade union organisations developing economic models to try to gauge the results and the alternatives. The whole exercise finally boiled down to a few texts on minimum working hours (plus a very vague agreement at the tripartite conference) that fell well short of the unions' demands. It was

as if we were just throwing them a bone. And this illustrated the very ambiguity of European social policy. It is an area in which subsidiarity applies very strictly; but taking action (or appearing to do so) was essential for the sake of public opinion' ⁽²⁾.

Despite these very mixed results in relation to Community social dialogue, the Commission nevertheless did important work in other areas linked to industrial relations. It drew up a text, which was adopted as a directive in 1975, on collective redundancies requiring the consultation of employee representatives. For the Commission, the 1975 directive met the need to give workers and their elected representatives the means to influence the restructuring operations that were becoming ever more widespread. But the Commission did not stop there: issues such as a reduction in working time, the need for consultation and dialogue at the time of factory closures and greater emphasis on training also attracted its attention. Another issue, the European company statute and the need to inform and consult workers, would prove much tougher.

The Vredeling proposal: a fierce debate

On 30 June 1970, the Commission presented an initial proposal on a statute for a European company as a step towards the abolition of internal borders and the elimination of restrictions on the right of establishment. The proposed regulation established a legal framework to enable companies to be created on a European Community rather than a national basis. The aim was to facilitate the interpenetration of European companies and to harmonise working conditions between Member States. The idea was also to relaunch dialogue between management and labour and to provide more information to employees on the operating conditions of transnational companies. Indeed, Member States themselves, somewhat

⁽¹⁾ On tripartite conferences, see Laudat, G., 'Une nouvelle instance communautaire: les conférences tripartites', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 213, 1978, pp. 30–39.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010.



Belgian metal workers demonstrate in front of the Berlaymont on 11 February 1982. Trade unions took widespread action to put pressure on the Commission during the crisis in the European steel industry.

powerless in the face of entities, about which it was not always possible to know where decisions were taken or who they were made up of, wished to impose a degree of discipline on such companies.

Having failed at its first attempt, on 9 October 1972 the Commission submitted a new proposal to the Council of Ministers. This set out to grant employees a right of scrutiny with regard to company matters, thereby extending the German dual system to the entire Community ⁽¹⁾. It was planned to es-

tablish a European works council representing the interests of all employees in Europe and competent for all matters relating to several establishments. It would also have a right of veto on certain important decisions. However, this transposition of the German co-decision model to Community level was far from unanimously supported by business and social stakeholders. At the end of 1974, the Commission had to abandon the project in the face of opposition from ETUC ⁽²⁾. But most employer organisations were also against this project, with UNICE express-

⁽¹⁾ The dual system applicable at the time in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and partly in France was based on the existence of two bodies with different missions. An executive board dealt with the management of the company, while a supervisory board monitored the activities of the executive board and took part in adopting important decisions relevant to the company.

⁽²⁾ Signs of opposition which are found in the first action programme launched at the 1974 Copenhagen Congress (European Trade Union Confederation archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, file 736, Copenhagen Congress, 23–25 March 1974).



A delegation of Belgian trade unions in the metal-working sector holds talks with the Commission on 11 February 1982 in connection with the restructuring of the Cockerill group in Liège and Charleroi.

ing its strong opposition to legislation which, in its view, infringed the freedom to take management decisions.

In 1978, after a further attempt to harmonise national company law legislation, the Commission failed to secure the support of the Member States. In 1980, it supported the proposal of Henk Vredeling, the commissioner responsible for employment and social affairs, on procedures for informing and consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings ⁽¹⁾. This

proposal was welcomed by ETUC, which saw in the Vredeling directive the expression of some of its demands and a necessary complement to the codes of good conduct adopted by international bodies such as the OECD and the ILO. It came as no surprise that employers opposed the project, although several employer associations, including the German one, found it hard to come up with reasons for any fierce opposition. But UNICE and the employers' side in general felt there was no need for Community intervention. But European employers were not the most hostile opponents in this debate. Indeed, it was hardly relevant to the majority who had become accustomed to informing and consulting their employees. In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, companies had for years had to come to terms with national legislation requiring them to

⁽¹⁾ Proposal for a Council directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings, known as the Vredeling directive, OJ C 297, 15.11.1980, p. 3.

do so. The draft directive did not therefore contain anything new or controversial. However, American multinationals lobbied hard to fight the directive, denouncing its aim, its hypothetical economic benefits and its general impact on industrial relations. As far as American business circles were concerned, the by-pass, a system proposed in the directive, which implied extraterritorial power for the Community vis-à-vis multinationals with subsidiaries in Europe, was met with horror. The system would allow employee representatives to address a group's parent company management directly if they did not receive adequate information. The Commission had to do a lot of explaining and make considerable sacrifices in order to persuade American interest groups that the system had relatively little impact on American multinationals. The commissioner responsible for social affairs, Ivor Richard, who had taken over from Henk Vredeling, defended the directive in the United States in March 1982 at a time when employers were waging a campaign against the project. It was no easy task, as the former commissioner explains: 'I inherited something called the Vredeling directive. [Henk] Vredeling was the commissioner for social affairs immediately before me. And for some reason he got [Étienne] Davignon to put his name to the proposal as well, which was one that said workers would be consulted at any great change. This caused horror, of course, to European employers, and to American. I remember I had to go to America about three times in order to argue it in New York. But we pushed it pretty hard, and at the end we got a terribly diluted version of it, which got through the European Parliament. But now that took up quite a lot of time' (1).

Appearing before the European Parliament, Ivor Richard, from the British Labour Party, declared his readiness to remove the most controversial aspects from the text of the directive in order to rescue the essential ones. Several attempts were made

to revive the idea, either by turning it into a recommendation or by having its content incorporated into collective agreements. Another proposal was for the debate to continue at the level of dialogue between management and labour and to limit its content to technological issues. The whole scheme seems to have been buried in 1982, even though the Commission proposed a new version in July 1983. In May 1986, the European Council decided at the suggestion of the Dutch Presidency to put discussions on the Vredeling project on hold until 1989, calling on management and labour to continue to negotiate during this period.

The Commission's social action in the midst of the crisis of the first half of the 1980s

Changes in the international economic system profoundly altered the European context in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The crisis triggered major shifts and raised the question of the role of public intervention and what means it could use. As a result of the second oil crisis in 1979, the issue of social dismantling reared its head in a new way: what should be done for those people affected by the economic impact of the increase in oil prices? There was also the prospect of enlargement to include the countries of the Mediterranean. The standard of living there called for a transfer of resources and an active regional policy, while an effort also had to be made to avoid social dumping to the detriment of the existing Member States. 'The great expectations of the public related much more to the social consequences of economic Europe (unemployment, youth employment, restructuring) than to building a genuine social policy at European level covering the huge range of issues involved (social protection, health, retirement). Even the demands of national trade unions were mainly concerned with the overall issue of employment (which is essentially economic in nature) and a few important, but limited, issues that had already been well identified, such as

(1) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.

the Vredeling directive, restructuring and worker consultation' ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission was dealing with issues such as restructuring and employment at a particularly difficult economic and social juncture, insists Jean Degimbe: 'We had no legal instruments whatsoever regarding employment. There wasn't even an employment chapter in the treaty. When I took over as director-general, the directorate-general was the Directorate for Social Affairs ... The word "employment" didn't even feature in the title ... to give you some idea of attitudes at the time' ⁽²⁾. With growing unemployment, the Community institutions were faced with critical problems, which led the Commission to approach matters from two angles by promoting an active employment policy and seeking to achieve social progress based on equal opportunities. In the words of Degimbe: 'Via the Social Fund we were able to focus our efforts on retraining workers facing great difficulty who, without the Social Fund, would have certainly been unemployed for longer and who in any case had the opportunity to retrain. I'm not saying that it solved all the problems. Far from it. But the Commission was nevertheless extremely useful in this area' ⁽³⁾.

In April 1983, the Commission proposed a new job-creation strategy for young people (2.5 million jobs in 5 years). This was based on technological innovation and a reduction and reorganisation of working time, presupposing that, in addition to vocational training, any jobs created as a result of the reorganisation of working time would be allocated as a priority to young people. It would then also be possible to reserve jobs for young people in the voluntary and public sectors. Finally, support would be available for young people who wanted to venture into setting up private or associative businesses. As far as the Commission was concerned, it was up to

the Member States to implement such measures. But it was also necessary to rely on employer organisations, which believed that the cost of employing young people had to be reduced in order to make it more attractive.

The Single European Act: an historic boost for social policy

The economic upturn in the second half of the 1980s prompted a wave of optimism and put the creation of the single market back on track once and for all. The thinking of the Delors Commission was that the Single European Act had to be accompanied by a forward-looking social policy, because if growth was to be fanned by the single market, the risk of social division between rich and poor regions and skilled and unskilled workers could not be underestimated. Support for the labour market was envisaged by Article 118a, which provided for a gradual harmonisation of minimum requirements relating to working conditions. The need for social and economic cohesion was confirmed (Article 130), including further reform of the Structural Funds, with a substantial increase in funding thanks to the adoption of the 'Delors package'. The Single European Act (Article 118b) also promoted dialogue between management and labour, whose role would be enhanced by the Maastricht Treaty.

The premises of a *sui generis* social dialogue

Social dialogue was one of the elements for reinforcing social cohesion, which was at the heart of the concept of a European social dimension. Commissioner Richard's office felt that the Commission should go beyond protection and wealth redistribution systems. His view was that 'good economic policy may be a condition for an efficient social policy,

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean Degimbe, 13 July 2010.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

but a good social policy may also be crucial for good economic policy'. To promote this approach, the Commission considered the possibility of concluding European collective agreements or, failing that, getting Member States to define binding minimum wages. They would then have to be induced to accept the same specific objectives and hence to adopt a common approach to social policy. The economic changes taking place at the beginning of the 1980s raised the question of how much leeway countries had, and social policy did not come through unscathed. The Commission was convinced that social policy issues could no longer be resolved by national action alone. It was therefore necessary to 'Europeanise' the dialogue between management and labour and not keep it exclusively at national level.

These concerns tallied with those of the new president, Jacques Delors, whose vision was moulded by his involvement in the Christian trade union movement. The White Paper on the single market was accompanied by initiatives aimed at providing structure to the dialogue between management and labour. Indeed, UNICE and ETUC were asked by Delors from the beginning of 1985 to contribute to his project. Throughout that year, various commissioners, including the president himself, hosted meetings with the social partners. These began even before Delors officially took over at the head of the Commission. This was the start of a break with the past, with management and labour coming together as part of an overall design. From January 1985, Delors spoke of the need for a European collective agreement, which he considered would strengthen democracy in Europe. This depended on 'the vitality of social relations and the involvement of as many people as possible'. For Delors, management and labour had to be involved in creating the Community. This policy of consensus on the part of Brussels could, it was felt, allow national laws to be harmonised and — in the context of the single market project — give rise to a European labour market. By giving priority to agreement over legislation, the Commission was recognising the independence of

the players, between whom it was organising a dialogue.

Important groundwork

Delors hoped that the meeting of 31 January 1985 would relaunch the social dialogue and place it on a fresh footing compared with 1984 ⁽¹⁾. Alongside the president and Émile Noël, four commissioners attended the meeting: Peter Sutherland, Arthur Cockfield, Karl-Heinz Narjes and Alois Pfeiffer. They embarked not on a general discussion of social issues, but on a process of reflection about overall Community developments. The meeting would, it was hoped, launch dialogue between the two sides of industry. A series of meetings took place during 1985 for which the Commission provided memos and analyses. Jean Degimbe, assisted by Carlo Savoini, chaired the meetings at the request of Commissioner Marín. As Degimbe recalls: 'I reported back, of course. Indeed, Marín said in the Commission that we still had our own opinion ... And we gradually saw the atmosphere becoming more relaxed during meetings. People began to say to themselves that the text was a good one, and gradually trust was established. It took 5 to 6 months for this to happen. I am not saying that they always agreed. Far from it. But relations then were a lot easier. For example, they agreed that I myself should draw up a summary report [of the discussions] after meetings which would serve as a basis for the next meeting' ⁽²⁾. The aim was to reach joint conclusions between the partners and to identify possible areas of agreement. Sectoral and inter-professional issues were discussed, and technological developments were examined. Working groups were set up to continue the dialogue, and in the autumn of 1985 a first debate on growth and employment was chaired by Commissioner Pfeiffer. This was followed by a sec-

⁽¹⁾ Didry, C. and Mias, A., *Le moment Delors, les syndicats au cœur de l'Europe sociale*, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.

ond one on the introduction of new technologies, under Commissioner Sutherland. The process was under way, as Jean Degimbe recalls. ‘The change we saw along the way among those who took part in discussions on the preparation of opinions [sic]. At the outset, we sensed some resistance and a degree of hostility between the parties. One side was trying to read between the lines of what the others were saying and work out what they actually meant’ (1). Despite disagreements, the Delors Commission nevertheless laid the foundations for major changes in the run-up to the signing of the Single European Act. The first change was that the dialogue indicated that the agreement between the two sides could be transformed into a European agreement. This consensual approach, rooted in the notion of joint management, also sowed the seeds for another development: the emergence of a European society, an issue that the two sides — like the Commission — cared about and something they both helped to define. The qualitative leap forward was potentially significant. To achieve it, the market would have to be accompanied by a social dimension and would have to meet certain concerns of unions and employers alike. But did the means exist to transform the discussions into directives, decisions and recommendations? After all, national governments retained important prerogatives in this area, and employers and trade unions might be tempted to rely more on them, unless the dialogue between them could offer a way for the Commission to create the conditions for a European social policy by giving rise to objectives which could be transformed into texts and which the Member States would find it difficult to object to. This was a huge challenge in 1986. The dialogue between management and labour would gain renewed momentum in 1989 before being institutionalised by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

Conclusion

Faced with the crisis of the 1970s and the widespread protests across Europe at the end of the decade, the Commission adopted the approach of seeking to remedy economic failings by means of social measures. It shrewdly exploited the few levers which — alongside freedom of movement for workers, which was already largely a reality — enabled it to support Member States’ action in specific areas, primarily via the Social Fund: vocational training and the transition to working life, and working conditions linked to the internal market (equal treatment, health and safety at work). Nor did it forget to cement European ties through its proposals. Nevertheless, it found it hard to get management and labour fully involved, and the Member States retained primary responsibility in this area. It became clear that there were limits to the idea of social harmonisation, as to the establishment of minimum standards.

The lines were redrawn as circumstances changed at the start of the 1980s. It became clear that social policy could be a factor in the economic health of Europe. Consequently, the Commission launched and fostered a discussion of the qualitative aspects. It had to face up to the loss of momentum experienced in Europe in the early 1980s. After the Stuttgart Summit, and even more so after Fontainebleau, it adopted a slightly different approach. Without in any way changing its previous course, it sought to establish a dialogue between management and labour that would involve the two sides in the Community venture. Encouraging the participation of the trade unions was vital for the success of this process, not only at central level (the tripartite conferences and the standing committee were already up and running), but also through the development of sector-based dialogue. Here the political dimension was at least as important as the social aspects. By allowing management and labour to take part in defining and writing European rules, the Commission was taking the objectives of the Treaty of Rome to their logical conclusion. It had reason to hope

(1) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.

that it might enjoy greater leeway despite the Member States' prerogatives, which were still substantial in this area. But they — and certainly Spain and Portugal, which joined the EEC in 1986 — were counting above all on receiving Community funding — partly from the more limited ESF, but mainly

from the ERDF — in order to deal with social imbalances. Since the early 1970s, regional policy had become one of the EEC's major successes as well as an important tool of social policy.

SYLVAIN SCHIRMANN AND PIERRE TILLY

Chapter 19

Transport policy in transition

Until 1972, transport policy was the ‘bastion of nationalisms’ that prevented the establishment of a common policy as envisaged in Title IV of the EEC Treaty ⁽¹⁾, an obstacle largely due to the historical context facing the Commission. In 1973, transport in the Community was the result of decades of national policy shaped by a range of geographical circumstances and traditions of state intervention, depending on combinations specific to each country. In the early 1970s, transport in Europe was an assortment of systems, all with their own internal coherence, far removed from the kind of European system which the establishment of a common mar-

ket increasingly demanded. Within the Community, relations between national systems, particularly in the road sector, were more often than not the subject of bilateral quota agreements designed to protect internal land transport markets. Air transport was subject to the same type of regulation at European and international levels, whilst in the case of maritime transport, cabotage was restricted to national fleets.

Until then, the DG for Transport (DG VII), headed by Commissioner Lambert Schaus between 1958 and 1967, had tried to adopt a policy of global liberalisation for all sectors, the aim being to end the competition restrictions caused by this situation. This approach was subsequently deemed too theoretical, opening the door to an endless debate on liberalisation versus harmonisation, resulting in near stalemate despite partial progress in terms of harmonising competition conditions and national aid.

⁽¹⁾ Dumoulin, M., ‘Transport: “bastion of nationalisms”’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 443–455; Ebert, V. and Harter, P.-A., *Europa ohne Fahrplan? Anfänge und Entwicklung der gemeinsamen Verkehrspolitik in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (1957–85)*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010; Patel, K. K. and Schot, J., ‘Twisted paths to European integration: comparing agriculture and transport policies in a transnational perspective’, *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 20, No 4, 2011, pp. 383–403.



The major transport networks connecting Europeans.
(*Euroforum*, 23 November 1979.)

The people behind transport policy

During the 1960s, DG VII came under the responsibility of Luxembourgish Commissioners Lambert Schaus and Victor Bodson, and then Albert Coppé of Belgium (1970–73), who was succeeded by the Italian Christian Democrat Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (1973–77). He was followed by Richard Burke (1978–81), an Irish politician from the same political family, Giorgios Contogeorgis (1982–85), a Greek conservative senior official, and then the British socialist Stanley Clinton Davis (1985–88).

In contrast to the succession of commissioners of different nationalities, there was much greater con-

tinuity in the post of director-general. As soon as the Commission opened its doors to British officials, they laid claim to the position of director-general, reflecting British interest in this sector, given the United Kingdom's leading position in European maritime and air transport. Raymond Le Goy (1973–80) was succeeded by another Briton, John Roderic Steele (1981–86), who had spent his career in his national civil service in transport-related positions, with particular experience in the aviation sector. His replacement by the Spaniard Eduardo Peña Abizanda (1986–90) came at a time when the transport portfolio had just been assigned to Stanley Clinton Davis, a British commissioner from the Labour Party, assisted by a very proactive British head of cabinet, Graham Meadows ⁽¹⁾.

A policy renewed

The work programme submitted by the Commission in October 1973 on the development of the common transport policy ⁽²⁾ marked a change of direction compared to previous policies. On the one hand, it set out the objective of a market with undistorted competition, based on, amongst other things, the free provision of services. But it also involved a more nuanced approach to state intervention which, where required, would be harmonised rather than prohibited ⁽³⁾. This policy became more global and less segmented than previously, its aim being to bring about a Community system, promoting in particular combinations of modes of transport, whose overall coherence would replace that of previous national systems. Another objective was to bring transport into line with other Community policies (regional policy, industrial

⁽¹⁾ Peña Abizanda, E., 'Un Español en la Comisión Delors', *Información Comercial Española*, No 831, 2006, pp. 185–197; Interview with Eduardo Peña Abizanda, 22 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ 'Common transport policy: objectives and programmes', Communication of the Commission to the Council, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 16, 1973.

⁽³⁾ Erdmenger, J., *Vers une politique des transports pour l'Europe*, Éditions Labor, Brussels, 1984, p. 37.



Lorries transporting car bodies (23 September 1980).

policy, social policy) and to take account of the interests of users, of those working in the sector and of companies.

The result was a pragmatic approach to both infrastructure and the organisation of the market. The infrastructure policy started in 1976 aimed to gradually end the divisions between national systems by entrusting the coordination of investment projects to an infrastructure coordination committee. This convergence of priorities, planned on a gradual basis, would be based on a programme of support for projects of Community interest, designed to remove the many bottlenecks within the Community area, and to encourage the emergence of a European transport network. A consultation on the Channel Tunnel was launched by the Commission

in February 1974 ⁽¹⁾. In 1982, an initial investment programme (1983–87) was proposed, while the Commission, with the help of the European Parliament, managed to ensure the creation of an initial — albeit modest — budget line for certain projects.

The aim behind the organisation of the road and rail transport market was to promote the most rational combination of modes of transport. The principle adopted was to pass the cost of network maintenance on to users. Harmonising tariffs and national tax systems, which the Commission was working towards throughout this entire period,

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 5/1981/65, Memo from J. Doucet to the Director-General of the DG for Regional Policy on the results of the consultation with Member States on the Channel Tunnel project, 25 February 1974.



A car disembarking onto the dockside in Athens.

therefore played a critical role. The Commission was also committed to approximating rules on companies' access to the international and national markets, and on access to professions, safety, including employment issues, the environment and technical aspects of transport ⁽¹⁾. Nevertheless, measures could only be taken across the board and had to avoid any strictly sectoral approach: otherwise, how could an individual Member State with a large rail network be persuaded to liberalise road transport services if this liberalisation could increase the deficit of the national railway company? The liberalisation of road transport at Community level would therefore have to be achieved through, amongst other things,

a coordinated policy of financial stabilisation of the railways ⁽²⁾. The Commission embarked on this task in 1973 and encouraged rail companies to be managerially independent, but was unable to limit the increase in national subsidies for companies in the difficult economic climate of the 1970s. In 1983, the Commission proposed separating the management and financing of network infrastructures (which would be transferred to the states) from the transport activities of the railway companies ⁽³⁾. In road transport, the approach adopted was a gradual one and was intended to promote the transition from a regulatory system organised around bilateral quotas to a multilateral system based on Community quo-

⁽¹⁾ Erdmenger, J., *Vers une politique des transports pour l'Europe*, Éditions Labor, Brussels, 1984, pp. 26–27.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

tas. One of the objectives behind the harmonisation policy was also to standardise maximum loads per axle for lorries, an issue which would have an impact on maintenance costs for road networks and cost prices charged by carriers, but also major industrial implications for manufacturers of HGVs. In December 1984, the Commission came to a solution following a series of lengthy negotiations ⁽¹⁾.

Meanwhile, in maritime transport, Europe watched with mounting concern as Eastern bloc and African countries restricted import and export transport to their own fleets, thus denying European carriers access to this market. It was therefore decided to take steps with international institutions to make all European Community Member States party to the United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. Regulation (EEC) No 854/79 established a link between the Community's policy and the international standards adopted by the UN ⁽²⁾. However, the Commission also took action on safety-related issues, learning lessons from the sinking of the *Amoco Cadiz* off the coast of Brittany in March 1978. Starting in 1978, the steps taken by the Commission in this area resulted in a series of directives and proposals for rules on the monitoring of oil tankers. In its 1985 memorandum, the Commission also provided a detailed analysis of Community interests as regards global maritime navigation and submitted a package of four proposals on this subject, which was adopted by the Council in December 1986 ⁽³⁾.

Regarding air transport, the existence of national companies belonging to Member States made the possibility of agreements at Community level very difficult. All Member States wanted to ensure their

own independence by reserving the right to negotiate access to their airspace on a bilateral basis. This was also true outside the Community as regards relations with third countries. A system of this type led to high prices for users and, following the example of increasing deregulation in the United States, the Commission took the lead in 1979 with a memorandum on the development of air transport services. The Commission wanted to be able to move to a multilateral system controlled by European agencies. It proceeded with caution by first making bilateral agreements more flexible ⁽⁴⁾. Its second memorandum in March 1984 and the proposals added to it resulted in a first package of Community measures on this subject adopted by the Council in 1987 ⁽⁵⁾. But, as with maritime transport, the Commission also intervened in the area of safety and the environment, for instance as regards noise emissions, putting pressure on airlines to renew their aircraft fleets in order to comply with noise pollution levels, whilst also allowing the reduction of CO₂ emissions and improving safety.

Relaunch and continuity

In 1973, the Commission was well aware that the implementation of its programme would be a lengthy process. It therefore made plans for a 10-year programme of cautious changes aimed not so much at pitting Community and national interests against each other as at securing convergence between them, as Commissioner Contogeorgis was still suggesting in 1984 when he spoke of 'meeting, in a balanced way, Member States' mutual interests' ⁽⁶⁾. However, in order to do so, substantial negotiating skill was required on the part of the Commission in order to reach compromises. This was partly due to Member

⁽¹⁾ Ramírez-Pérez, S., 'Automobile standardisation in Europe: between technological choices and neo-protectionism', in Bouneau, C., Burigana, D. and Varsori, A. (eds), *Trends in Technological Innovation and the European Construction*, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2010, pp. 187–205.

⁽²⁾ Erdmenger, J., *Vers une politique des transports pour l'Europe*, Éditions Labor, Brussels, 1984.

⁽³⁾ Regulations (EEC) No 4055/86 to (EEC) No 4058/86 of 22 December 1986, OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 1 et seq.

⁽⁴⁾ 'Air transport: a Community approach', Memorandum of the Commission, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1979; HAEC, Civil aviation: Memorandum No 2, COM(84) 72, 15 March 1984.

⁽⁵⁾ Regulations (EEC) No 3975/87 and (EEC) No 3976/87 and Directives 87/601/EEC and 87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987, OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 1 et seq.

⁽⁶⁾ Erdmenger, J., *Vers une politique des transports pour l'Europe*, Éditions Labor, Brussels, 1984, p. 7.

States hardening their positions owing to the economic difficulties of the 1970s but also, for example, to structural differences between national systems. The action programme for 1974–77 covered all areas of transport policy and also included a swathe of new initiatives. In November 1977, the Commission proposed a new programme, which was to last until 1980, but noted that many of the proposals had already been put to the Council. In October 1980, encouraged by the first directly elected European Parliament, the Commission proposed a new work programme for 1981–83 and, once again at Parliament's request, issued a communication entitled 'Towards a common transport policy' in 1983.

The picture in the early 1980s was therefore mixed. The Commission had defined a series of objectives and the economic and legal bases of a common policy. There had been a sharp rise in the number of decisions taken since the mid-1970s and the foundations for Community transport law had in part been laid. However, progress was frequently blocked by the Council: in late 1981, some 40 proposals were still pending ⁽¹⁾, and there was pressure from Parliament and the business community to relaunch the process.

There was a boost to land transport policy on 22 May 1985 when the Court of Justice of the European Communities ruled against the Council for failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty of Rome as regards the freedom to provide transport services ⁽²⁾. These proceedings were brought before the Court by the European Parliament. A leading figure behind the European Parliament's case was Horst Seefeld, Chairman of its Transport Committee between 1979 and 1989. However, the battle was really fought thanks to a close partnership between Parliament's Transport Committee and the DG for Transport at the Commission. As explained by Jürgen Erdmenger, a director in the DG for Transport between 1973 and

1998, 'it was primarily the staff and departments of my directorate who helped Parliament's Transport Committee to draft its complaint ... We worked together very closely. We drafted the submissions for this complaint with Mr Seefeld ... At official level, the Commission joined forces with the Parliament in the complaint against the Council. We followed the case very closely with the Legal Service. There was a genuine team effort: the Transport Committee, the DG for Transport, Parliament's Legal Service, the Commission's Legal Service ... It was a network, an alliance ... I remember, I was there with Mr Ehlermann before the Court when the Commission was pleading alongside the Parliament's legal team. Mr Ehlermann himself, as director-general of the legal service, spoke after Parliament's representative and I was behind Mr Ehlermann, whispering extra arguments in his ear' ⁽³⁾.

The consequences of the Court of Justice ruling were not long in coming, since the judgment clearly stated that the freedom to provide services in the inland transport sector was an obligation under the treaty to be met before the transitional period. The Transport Council took account of this judgment in its political decision of November 1985, finally defining an action programme which the Commission had called for so many times ⁽⁴⁾. However, the Court's judgment also formed part of the dynamism created by the Commission White Paper on the internal market, approved by the European Council in Milan in June 1985. The relaunching of transport policy was therefore part of a dual framework: it was seen as an objective in itself, whilst also affecting the implementation of the more global objective of completing the internal market.

By invoking both the judgment of 22 May and the Council's decisions in Milan, the Commission was able to give new impetus to its activities from 1985 onwards. There was no sharp break with previous

⁽¹⁾ Interview with John Roderic Steele, 4 August 2010.

⁽²⁾ Judgment of 22 May 1985, Case 13/83, *Parliament v Council* [1985] ECR 1513, Common transport policy — obligations of the Council.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Jürgen Erdmenger, 30 September 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Council press release 10358/85 (Press 169).



Controls at the French/Belgian border (29 September 1980).

initiatives; they were most often reoriented and accelerated. It was therefore a case of removing quotas for international road transport and facilitating access of non-resident carriers to national transport by road or inland waterway. The method adopted was still a progressive one, although its implementation was accelerated in the run-up to 1992. In the rail sector, the Commission tried to accelerate the process of companies' financial recovery while establishing rules for the relationship between companies and the state. It also sought to simplify border inspection procedures and initiate a series of initiatives for taxation or working conditions ⁽¹⁾.

It is also worth mentioning the Commission's efforts in developing relations with third countries concerning land transport. For road haulage, this involved contacts and negotiations with Austria and Yugoslavia to facilitate transit across the Alps and towards Greece. Given the importance of the Rhine as the main axis for European inland navigation, the Commission continued to work very closely with the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine in Strasbourg.

Lastly, the prospect of a single market made the promotion of wider European networks even more necessary. The fact that these networks had been found to be inadequate and inconsistent has formed the basis for the Commission's activities in this area since the 1970s. This shortcoming was also cited by

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, *Nineteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1985*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986.



A lorry with trailer at the Greek border (25 September 1980).

businesses at the European Round Table of Industrialists and, when Commissioner Stanley Clinton Davis and President Jacques Delors described infrastructure development strategies as ‘an integral part of economic and industrial strategy’, they were building on ideas that had become firmly established since the 1970s. Both 1986 memoranda, one with a medium-term programme for the development of transport infrastructure and the other on ways of financing this, provided the foundations of the trans-European networks initiative which was later included in the Maastricht Treaty ⁽¹⁾.

The policy pursued after 1985 did not therefore differ greatly from its predecessor from the 1970s. It

represented a fundamental continuity in terms of objectives: the creation of an intermodal system, open and competitive at European level, integrating transport policy with the other common policies, without neglecting certain types of intervention aimed at promoting investment in networks and facilitating the regular provision of services. Transport policy therefore experienced developments similar to those seen in industrial policy over the same period.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE
AND SIGFRIDO RAMÍREZ-PÉREZ

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(86) 340 final, 27 June 1986; COM(86) 722 final, 15 December 1986.


Chapter 20

At the centre of a web of interdependence: energy

The 1970s brought energy issues to the forefront of the Commission's concerns and policies. The initial challenge was how to fashion what was termed an overall energy strategy by Christopher Audland, the director-general for energy between 1981 and 1986, out of a diverse range of elements few of which amounted to concrete measures. But this alone was enough to put energy at the centre of a new and highly interlinked economic and political agenda — also including the environment, economic and monetary issues, networks and Mediterranean policy — where the Commission needed to adjust its approach and bring together a series of disparate ideas and elements more effectively than it had done in the past. This was no easy task, since in the energy sector, the Commission's capacity to act varied significantly: thus the ECSC and Euratom treaties gave the Commission quite extensive powers in the coal and nuclear sectors, whereas the EEC Treaty afforded the Commission some influence over hydrocarbons and electricity through its commercial and competition policies and the rules of the inter-

nal market. The combined use of these powers would favour a comprehensive and coherent approach to energy problems, but would not remove the legal inconsistencies. At the time of the 1973 oil crisis, DG XVII (Energy) was responsible for energy as a whole (as well as the Euratom safeguards inherited from the Euratom Treaty, with half of the relevant workforce in Luxembourg). The necessary overview required by the specific nature of this sector and the circumstances strongly influenced the distribution of tasks between directorates — energy savings, coal, oil, nuclear and electricity — which in 1973 were all placed under the coordination of Robert De Bauw, who was responsible for energy policy under the authority of the director-general, Fernand Spaak.

The staff of this DG — 200 people at the beginning of the 1980s — held talks with a series of very different stakeholders. The Member States themselves still defined, to a large extent, their extremely heterogeneous national energy frameworks, within which there were, according to the type of energy,



Europe in the throes of the energy crisis. Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt, 1974.

highly liberalised systems and monopolies, private companies and public ones, with or without a monopoly in their domestic market, and sometimes integrated into international groups, operating globally. But there were also international institutional structures such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) created in 1974 after the first oil crisis within the framework of the OECD.

That first crisis on the back of the Arab–Israeli war of October 1973 did not catch the Commission entirely unprepared. As early as 1968, it had outlined the contours for a comprehensive policy combining the compilation of statistics, security of supply, re-

search and investment and storage obligations on oil companies. In July 1973, a directive was adopted by the Council requiring governments to adopt the regulatory instruments necessary to take emergency measures in the event of an oil supply crisis. But there was more disunity than unity during the 1973 oil crisis, an outcome that owes as much to differences in market structures and supply policy as it does to more political factors like the lack of a common response and the absence of solidarity in the face of the first shock ⁽¹⁾. This was why, at the end of 1974, the Council allowed the Commission to

⁽¹⁾ 'Compte-rendu succinct de la 244ème session du Conseil consacré aux problèmes énergétiques des 22–23 mai 1973', SEC(73) 1911/12, 30 May 1973.

set up an Energy Committee bringing together representatives of the Member States under its chairmanship with a mandate to ensure the coordinated implementation by the Member States of the measures taken by the Community in the field of energy policy, to facilitate an exchange of information on energy supply conditions and prospects and, finally, to assist the Commission in drawing up the proposals it intended to make ⁽¹⁾. So the events of 1973, by highlighting serious weaknesses caused by the diverse nature of the Community energy market, also pushed the Commission into taking action.

From 1974, the Commission did the groundwork for a long-term energy policy. This built upon the

guidelines in place since 1968, designed to reduce the Community's vulnerability by means of a more effective sharing of energy sources, a diversification of supply and energy savings. The stated objective in December 1974 was to reduce the level of external dependence from 63 % to 40 % of consumption within 10 years. The general approach was to reduce the proportion of oil by shifting consumption to solid fuels, gas and nuclear energy. But the objectives for 1985 could be met only by taking into account the diversity of the structures and instruments of national policy as shown by the recurring debates in the Energy Council from May 1973 ⁽²⁾. This fact became fully clear when the Commission attempted to foster cooperation at Community



Car-free Sunday in Brussels (1973).

⁽¹⁾ For different reasons, this committee gradually lost credibility and was no longer effective. From the middle of the 1980s, it stopped meeting. Memo by Robert De Bauw, September 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, 'Community energy policy — objectives for 1985', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(74) 1960 final, 27 November 1974; 'Council resolution of 17 December 1974 concerning Community energy policy objectives for 1985', OJ C 153, 9.7.1975, p. 2.



In search of new forms of energy. (*30 jours d'Europe.*)

level in order to provide the EEC with the uranium enrichment capabilities essential to the production of nuclear power ⁽¹⁾. Although the principal Member States approved of that objective, they were unable to reach agreement on a joint project for the industry and split into two alliances, Urenco around Germany and Eurodif around France, which then implemented their projects separately. This meant that, although the efforts of each Member State contributed to the overall objective, they worked along different lines, some countries, such as the United Kingdom, benefiting from new North Sea oil and gas production, while others, like Belgium or France, pressed ahead with their production of nuclear electricity. The second oil crisis in 1979–80 underlined the need to renew an effort that had thus far yielded insufficient results. Yet the objec-

tives for 1990 prepared by the Commission in 1978 and endorsed by the Council in 1980 hardly differed from those previously set out, with the level of dependence not to exceed 50 % by the end of the decade. In order to achieve this, the Commission concentrated on energy savings, the development of new energies and a partial return to coal, but the development of nuclear power remained 'one of the key elements in the Community's energy strategy' ⁽²⁾.

Overall, the objectives set at the beginning of the 1980s were reached by the middle of the decade. This result was due to efforts made in the areas of savings, redeployment and investment, but was also the result of the economic downturn caused by the second crisis. The Commission did not want those efforts to slacken, as appeared to be in danger of happening following the fall in petrol prices from 1984 onwards, and then the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in Ukraine. In September 1986, new objectives for 1995 set the target level of reliance at 40 % ⁽³⁾.

The two oil crises served to highlight the heterogeneity and lack of transparency prevailing in the Community energy market, with all the attendant negative consequences in terms of efficiency and solidarity. From 1974, the Commission therefore focused on obtaining the information necessary in terms of national energy balances, flows and prices. It was thus able to obtain more reliable statistics on supply flows and encourage the creation of reserve stocks, which increased from 102 days of oil consumption in February 1979 to 113 days a year

⁽¹⁾ Energy Council, 22 and 23 May 1973.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 144/1987/276, Preparatory document to 'Energy objectives for 1990 and programmes of the Member States', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(78) 613, presented at the Energy Council of December 1978; EC Commission, *Sixteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1982*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983, p. 201.

⁽³⁾ EC Commission, *Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, pp. 274 et seq.

later ⁽¹⁾. This improved information also made it possible to develop scenarios for crisis management based on the interoperability of stocks between Member States and contributed in addition to determining the overall targets for oil consumption during the second crisis. The Commission also sought more transparency from oil companies in the pricing of imported oil and tried to curb the upward pressure on prices caused by a speculative 'spot' market which was not representative of actual transactions and was a destabilising factor because of its excessive rates ⁽²⁾. Overall, the experience gained during the second crisis only confirmed the need for a reduction in national differences and a true Community market ⁽³⁾. The Commission therefore managed to secure Council acknowledgement of the need for 'a common approach by Member States on prices setting', but also the fact that 'governmental policies must aim to progressively reduce the artificial obstacles that prevent the market from receiving reliable information'.

The objective of a more unified market was not only a matter of more active policy intervention. It was what the oil industry wanted in order to deal with the refining crisis. At its root was the nationalisation of deposits by crude-oil-producing countries during the 1970s and the willingness of those countries to develop their crude-oil-processing industry and sales of refined products in Europe. The Community refining sector therefore faced new foreign competition and the need to significantly reduce capacity at the same time as having to adapt to a new demand structure, centred around lightweight products. This situation gave rise to a regular dia-



Faced with the crisis, the Community tries to develop alternative energies. Will solar energy help power cars? (*Euroforum*).


logue between the oil companies and the Commission for several years from 1976, these groups generally expressing their desire to see this reduction organised and backed up by a more interventionist Community policy. What actually happened, however, was a reduction and restructuring of refining techniques implemented at company level without any Community intervention ⁽⁴⁾. There was, by contrast, a rather greater degree of intervention in the coal sector. The ECSC Treaty authorised targeted state aid, but also allowed for Community funding in the form of subsidised loans or grants that were deployed after the first oil shock. It was therefore hoped to stabilise coal production through re-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4335, EC Commission, document XVII/103/80, 19 February 1980, 'Situation des stocks pétroliers', prepared for the meeting of 20 March 1980 of the High-Level Group on Oil Supply.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4334, EC Commission, document XVII/515/79-FR, 20 December 1979, 'Note des services, discussions avec les compagnies pétrolières', prepared for the meeting of 11 January 1980 of the High-Level Group on Oil Supply.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4336, EC Commission, document XVII/254/80, 11 June 1980, 'Mesures à prendre pour atténuer les effets d'une sous-crise des approvisionnements pétroliers', prepared for the meeting of 16 July 1980 of the High-Level Group on Oil Supply.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 156/1990/2272, EC Commission, COM/ENER 32/76, 15 September 1976, 'Résumé général des discussions tenues de mai à juillet avec les compagnies pétrolières'.



Europe in search of petroleum during the second oil crisis. Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1979.)

structuring, exploration and the encouragement of consumption by the steel industry and electricity generation. But the Commission struggled to win Council support for its initiatives, and had little effect on European coal production, which decreased steadily during the period. Also developed during these years were a series of increasingly large subsidies directed towards research and development, the promotion of new technologies for the exploration and production of oil and uranium, and the development of potential new sources of energy (coal gasification and liquification and geothermal and solar energy).

More so than in the past, the energy crisis further reminded stakeholders of the degree to which the Community was involved in a series of networks

of interdependence, both political and economic. This dual aspect did not escape the Commission's attention, and some of its action in favour of greater unity in the Community market and the oil policies of the Member States was to promote dialogue with its international partners. The existing dialogue with the United States was essential in this regard. This was difficult at times, such as at the Washington conference of January 1974, at which France set itself apart from its partners by refusing to take part in the creation of the International Energy Agency, or in the early 1980s, when the European partners made arrangements to increase imports of Soviet gas, alarming the Americans and provoking draconian US counter-measures during the Euro–Siberian gas pipeline affair. In both cases, the Commission acted with a view to preserving

Community unity and a dialogue with the Americans, reassuring Washington that any freeze in Soviet gas deliveries could be circumvented by a series of internal Community measures. The Commission also increasingly made its presence felt in the IEA, which represented western interests. It managed to persuade the Members States of the need to support its efforts in monitoring and restricting imports during the second oil crisis through action in the IEA, which was endorsed by the decisions of the G7 in Tokyo in June 1979 ⁽¹⁾. Subsequently, there was a danger that the growing influx on the world market of products refined in the Middle Eastern producer countries would exacerbate still further the position of European refiners — it was feared that other oil-importing countries, such as Japan, would close their markets, thereby shifting all the burden of that influx onto those countries which had kept their markets open. Working closely with the Americans, the Commission was successful in promoting an agreement in the OECD which ensured a fair distribution of the burden between all of the partners.

On the initiative of Roy Jenkins and Étienne Davignon, Director-General Audland finally developed the necessary dialogue with producer countries during the second oil crisis, both within the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council ⁽²⁾. This dual dialogue made it possible to manage the second crisis in a more coordinated way and to mitigate in part its negative consequences for the Community economy.

The energy crisis years thus highlighted the vulnerability that stemmed from the lack of a Community energy market. On a political level, such heterogeneity hindered the solidarity measures needed in the event of an oil supply crisis. On an economic level, it artificially amplified the effects of scarcity on prices. Over the years the Commission had therefore been able to demonstrate the need for profound change and lay the groundwork for the creation of a large energy market from the late 1980s onwards.

ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 36/1984/127, Preliminary draft conclusions of the Council in Strasbourg, 21 and 22 June 1979; BAC 36/1984/127, 'Note on the relationship between discussions on energy at Strasbourg and Tokyo', undated (preparatory document for the Council in Strasbourg of 21 and 22 June 1979).

⁽²⁾ Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 September 2010.

Chapter 21

Environmental and consumer protection

The environment was one of the new European policies of the 1973–86 period. Prior to the 1970s, the only environmental measures enshrined in the European treaties related to the health risks run by mine workers and those employed in the iron, steel and nuclear industries rather than to the protection of the natural environment. It was on the basis of the new impetus given by the The Hague conference in late 1969 that the Community was able to involve itself in areas related to the environment.

The environment included among the Community's competences

The concept of environmental policy was defined only at the beginning of the 1970s and encompassed all issues concerning man's relationship with nature, the preservation of resources and energy, the treatment of waste, urban development, the protec-

tion of nature, the pollution of air and water, noise pollution and soil conservation.

There were several reasons why Europe became involved with environmental matters. Looking beyond the Community institutions, the 1960s were the period in which the impact began to be felt of both a series of alarming scientific reports on the degradation of the environment (notably *Silent Spring* ⁽¹⁾ and *The Population Bomb* ⁽²⁾) and environmental catastrophes, such as the wreck of the *Torrey Canyon* off the English coast in March 1967. The environment also began to attract the attention of international institutions (for example the Council of Europe, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) at its 1968 biosphere conference), and even the European Parliament showed that it was becoming ever more concerned with environmental issues.

⁽¹⁾ Carson, R., *Silent Spring*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1962.

⁽²⁾ Ehrlich, P. R., *The Population Bomb*, Ballantine, New York, 1968.



Waste was a major concern in the first years following the introduction of the policy on the environment. This *Courrier du personnel* cartoon highlights the carefree attitude of inhabitants of the Community to waste disposal.

Meanwhile, the Member States — alert to the risk that competition might be distorted by the new environmental regulations that some of them were having to introduce — began to come round to the idea of the Commission acting as a referee on environmental matters.

It was hence via the approximation of laws that the Commission first engaged with the environmental challenge. It would go on to have a much more direct influence in this area thanks to the actions of the Italian Commissioner for industrial affairs, Altiero Spinelli, who seized the opportunity to explore a new area with the potential to deepen European integration. He asked one of the unit heads in DG III, Michel Carpentier, to draw up the first environmental policy measures. At the beginning of January 1971, Carpentier prepared a communication to the Commission, and Spinelli presented this to his fellow commissioners on 17 February. Having explained why there was a need for action at Community level, he asked for a working party on the en-

vironment to be set up and for a dedicated unit to be established within his directorate-general ⁽¹⁾.

Michel Carpentier headed the new Environmental Problems Unit within DG III and set to work immediately, recruiting a small team of officials — Claude Pleinevaux, Peter Stief-Tauch and Vladimiro Mandl — who were to liaise with a member of Altiero Spinelli's cabinet, Claus Stuffmann. 'That was the starting point, when we began to give some hard thought to the question of what we needed to do to provide a properly structured framework for a future environment policy' ⁽²⁾. The group members got together and began drawing up an initial communication, which was finally presented by Spinelli on 22 July 1971.

In February 1972, Agriculture Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, impressed by the conclusions of the Meadows report commissioned by the Club of Rome and entitled 'Limits to growth', proposed that serious thought be given to current economic policy and the dangers it posed for humanity's future well-being and quality of life. A bold start, then; but the immediate outcome in the Commission was less than spectacular. Altiero Spinelli had little time for this radical position, and it was quickly contested by his colleague, Raymond Barre. Not that this prevented Sicco Mansholt, who had since become Commission president, from pleading the cause at the United Nations Conference on the Environment, held in Stockholm in June 1972. Finally, on 21 October 1972 and following energetic lobbying by Spinelli, the Paris Summit mandated the Commission to formulate a number of proposals on the environment. 'The heads of state or government stressed the value of a Community environment policy. They are therefore requesting the Community institutions to draw up an action programme with a precise schedule before 31 July 1973.'

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 244/1991/1, 'Proposition pour une action communautaire en matière d'environnement', COM(71) 591, 12 February 1971.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Peter Stief-Tauch, 6 June 2011.

This mandate was confirmed by the interministerial conference of environment ministers in Bonn on 31 October, during which eight principles on which future policy ought to be based were defined. Encouraged though they were by this progress, Altiero Spinelli and Michel Carpentier had to make sure that they protected the Commission's right of initiative in environmental matters which was being contested by certain Member States ⁽¹⁾.

Spinelli undeniably played an essential role, then, in the birth of an environment policy. The 'father of environment policy' ⁽²⁾ he may well have been, but he did not feel forever bound to his brainchild. With the approach of Community enlargement and the 1973 Commission changeover, he realised it was impossible to hang on to all of his portfolios and declared himself ready to abandon the environment brief in order to retain those areas of responsibility he thought had higher status ⁽³⁾. There was no rush to take over the vacant portfolio, and in the end it was a former commissioner for agriculture, the Italian Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, who inherited it, together with the transport and information portfolios.

Implementation

On 1 January 1973, the Community could boast of a newly formed Environment and Consumer Protection Service (ECPS). Led by Michel Carpentier, it would survive in that form until January 1981, when it would be given a new incarnation as Directorate-General XI (Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety), headed by a new arrival,

Athanase Andreopoulos, the Commission's first director-general of Greek nationality.

On 17 April 1973, less than 4 months after the service had been created, the Commission proposed a first action programme to the Council, which adopted it on 22 November of the same year. In reality, this programme could be traced directly back to the communication of July 1971 and the decisions taken at the Paris Summit and the Bonn conference. It proposed a blend of short- and long-term measures. Among the principles proposed, three in particular stand out: the 'polluter pays' principle and the principles of prevention and of subsidiarity (whereby action is taken at the most appropriate level). Three main categories of action were provided for, aimed at combating pollution and nuisances, at improving the environment and the quality of life and at involving international



Though covering the fields of education, information and financial protection, the primary aim of the consumer policy launched by the European Commission was the physical protection of consumers, in particular from the toxic substances present in food.

⁽¹⁾ Spinelli, A., *Diario europeo, II: 1970–76*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, p. 343; HAEC, BAC 244/1991/5, Meeting in Bonn of the environment ministers, 31 October 1972, SEC(72) 4042, Memorandum distributed on the instructions of Altiero Spinelli, Brussels, 13 November 1972.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Claude Pleinevaux, 8 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Spinelli, A., *Diario europeo, II: 1970–76*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, pp. 353 and 358.



The consumer policy was slow to develop despite pressure from some quarters. These farmers, for example, demonstrating in Brussels in 1980, were calling for support from consumers for their protests.

organisations. Implementation of this programme gave a boost to protection of the environment, with as many as 44 documents being transmitted to the Council the following year.

Implementation did not, however, always proceed smoothly, as is made clear by a witness who, having failed to define what the ECPS meant by ‘waste’ and being faced by the Council with a request for an explanation, had to reply: ‘Waste is anything anyone wants to get rid of’ ⁽¹⁾. In other cases, success came quickly, for example when, at the end of the 1970s, pioneering research conducted in conjunction with

DG XII (Research, Science and Education) drew attention to the dangers of lead in petrol.

In 1973, consumer protection too was brought into the environmental fold. Why were these two policy areas merged? It is hard to give a precise answer to that question. In Michel Carpentier’s view, it happened ‘more or less by accident’ and ‘without any strategic design on the part of the Commission’ ⁽²⁾. In the opinion of some, environmental issues might just as well have found a home at DG V (Employment and Social Affairs). What appears finally to have clinched it was the health protection dimen-

⁽¹⁾ Johnson, S., *Stanley, I Presume?*, Fourth Estate, London, 2009, p. 267.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.

sion of environmental issues. A number of people did put forward the notion of a horizontal service that would get involved in each area dealt with by the Communities. Given the other DGs' reservations about this idea, what eventually emerged, however, was a small, traditionally structured directorate-general ⁽¹⁾.

Little by little, the small team put together by Michel Carpentier grew in size. The ECPS then consisted of three divisions: two for the environment and one for consumer protection. The British, who had just joined the Communities, made their presence felt, with two of these divisions allocated to them. At the beginning of the 1970s, however, most of the staff came from the Ispra site. Because the Joint Research Centre was having difficulties at the time, a number of engineers from Ispra saw their scientific skills put to good use by the ECPS. They were joined by 'one or two lawyers' ⁽²⁾. Recruitment was therefore essentially on the basis of scientific and legal skills, even if flexibility was sometimes needed, as in the case of the new British head of the division for the prevention of pollution, Stanley Johnson, whose background was in classics ⁽³⁾.

Presided over by the universally respected and admired Carpentier, the service expanded its activities in a very positive atmosphere. Those who were there at the time emphasise how much freedom they had during the first few years when the environment team, being still small, was relatively free from the administrative constraints that would dominate later ⁽⁴⁾. The workload was heavy, but everyone was highly motivated. The 1974 screening group, which assessed the various services of the Commission, thus considered that the analyses carried out at the ECPS 'testified to the considerable mobilisation of energy and thought in an area with very far-reaching

objectives' ⁽⁵⁾. The same report also noted 'that only a very small percentage of A-grade officials (13 %) wanted to be transferred to another administrative unit'. This made the ECPS the department with the lowest proportion of officials wanting to change jobs, a distinction it shared with the service responsible for the administration of the customs union ⁽⁶⁾.

Despite the manifest loyalty of the staff, commissioners came and went. After Altiero Spinelli and Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, another Italian, Lorenzo Natali, took over. He was followed by a German, Karl-Heinz Narjes, and then by Stanley Clinton Davis, from the United Kingdom. 'Environment was the poor relation at that time. Let's be clear. Even within the Commission, it was a portfolio handed out as a consolation prize' ⁽⁷⁾.

This lack of interest in the environment would diminish over time. Without it ever becoming a very prominent portfolio, the environment did become an issue to which several commissioners became attached. In 1985, for instance, Narjes fought hard to retain his environmental duties and insisted upon taking part in the first meetings of the Environmental Council.

Towards a traditional policy

Until the end of the 1970s, Commission departments concentrated on how best to respond to the most urgent environmental problems, on research planning and raising awareness of the issue amongst Member States. The initial programme was aimed at combating the most dangerous forms of pollution, starting with water pollution and its related problems, particularly in view of the pollution in European rivers and the Mediterranean. This en-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Ludwig Krämer, 7 October 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Johnson, S., *Stanley, I Presume?*, Fourth Estate, London, 2009.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid., pp. 265 and 266.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 43/1978/173, 'Report on the organisation and operation of Commission departments', presented by the Screening Group, 30 June 1974.

⁽⁶⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁷⁾ Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010.

abled the Commission not only to propose major legislation (in particular for setting water quality objectives), but also to participate in international conventions (such as those agreed in Paris in 1974 on land-based pollution and in Bonn in 1976 on protecting the Rhine).

The first action programme was followed rapidly by a second in 1977, adopting most of the principles discussed previously. When it came to reducing pollution, priority had always been given to water pollution. This time, however, the emphasis was also on preventive action ⁽¹⁾. The second programme also enabled the launch of longer-term actions on the protection and rational management of the natural environment, and the protection of flora and fauna.

A third programme was prepared in 1981 and adopted in 1983, emphasising continuity, the need to get to grips with economic and social problems (in particular waste), the impact of Community enlargement and, above all, how best to integrate environmental considerations into the full range of Community policies. This last measure was particularly important as, at the beginning, cooperation with the other directorates-general was not always straightforward. ‘We stepped on a lot of toes’ ⁽²⁾, commented a former member of the ECPS. By their very nature, environmental concerns overlapped with those of a lot of other directorates-general. Thus, the environment interservice group was established in the mid-1970s, bringing together members of the various directorates-general with which the ECPS had to work — most obviously those responsible for agriculture, industry, research, transport, energy and regional policy. Beginnings are rarely straightforward, noted one observer in 1975: ‘Even within the Commission, the environment service still has only sporadic influence in areas of activity that touch upon its remit but for which it does not

have direct responsibility ... The service is involved in discussions, but its role is consultative, and disputes are sometimes bitter. It is on such occasions that anyone wishing to put a spoke in the wheels of the ECPS’s policy can make the service feel that, in terms of providing a legal basis for action, a mere summit declaration is no substitute for a treaty article. Not being a directorate-general and having one’s own commissioner is a handicap’ ⁽³⁾.

It was not surprising, therefore, occasionally to hear officials protest that they had no desire to radically change other Community policies: ‘In this respect, we have to make it very clear that our most dangerous friends are those who think that conservation of the environment has to take place through a profound change in the whole structure of our economy or society ... It therefore seems necessary to underline that there is no conflict between the environment and job creation, nor is our approach based on hippyism’ ⁽⁴⁾.

Some things became easier as environment policy developed, even if that very development sometimes produced a certain amount of jealousy given the large increase in the number of staff assigned to this area. Other difficulties persisted, as in the case of the directive devoted to nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide emissions from large industrial plants where the DG for Energy felt it was being presented with a *fait accompli*. In 1982, under pressure from Germany, Karl-Heinz Narjes tried to get the directive passed by the Council. Insufficiently prepared, the proposal faced opposition from the southern European countries and the United Kingdom. It would not finally be adopted until 1988.

Political will on the part of the Member States did not always follow, as was the case initially with the

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 53/1987/269, ENV/396/78-FR, Report by Günter Schneider, Brussels, undated.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Peter Stief-Tauch, 6 June 2011.

⁽³⁾ Bywater, M., ‘La politique de l’environnement de la Communauté’, *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 191, 1975, p. 546.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 53/1987/269, Statement by Claus Stiffman, 22 April 1977, London.

policy on combating atmospheric pollution. A radical change of attitude, passionately supported by those responsible at the Commission, did not come about until the 1980s, as Germany confronted the destruction of its forests by acid rain.

As the years went by, the ECPS and then DG XI attracted a considerably larger number of staff. From 39 people in 1973, the number rose to 90 when, in 1981, the ECPS was converted into a directorate-general, reaching 103 in 1984 — in other words, an increase of 165 % at a time when staff numbers at the Commission as a whole increased by ‘only’ 65 %. This increase in the number of staff reflected the way in which the structure of the service was becoming more complex. In 1986, DG XI finally consisted of two directorates comprising eight divisions, supplemented by four other divisions answering directly to the director-general. In financial terms, the growth was still greater, with budgets increasing from ECU 510 000 in 1973 to almost ECU 10 million 10 years later ⁽¹⁾. The problems in terms of working conditions remained familiar, however: shortages of staff, slow translation and difficulties in obtaining meeting rooms were all part and parcel of the job for environment officials ⁽²⁾.

The appearance and development of the environment policy in this period, characterised by successes and a few failures, makes it a particularly representative example of a ‘creeping competence’. Together with the ‘people’s Europe’, education or consumer protection, environmental policy was one of the relatively few new policies developed during the 1973 to 1986 period and was undoubtedly that which enjoyed the greatest success. It was one of what were known at the time as ‘grey areas’: policy domains that were not mentioned in the treaties and which were not primarily economic in nature. First recognised by the Paris Summit declaration, environmental policy developed rapidly without becoming the equal of other policy areas until its inclusion in the Single European Act. There can be no doubt that being included in this last conveyed a sense of the inherent importance of environmental policy. Together with the designation of 1987 as the European Year of the Environment, it also made it easier for environmental policy to be developed in the Community and to ensure that the policies of the Member States worked towards the same ends.

CHRISTIAN VAN DE VELDE

⁽¹⁾ EC Commission, ‘Ten years of Community environment policy’, unspecified location, March 1984, p. 75.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 53/1987/270, Annex to the memorandum from Michel Carpentier for the attention of ECPS managers of 28 September 1978 concerning the 1979 keynote speech.

Chapter 22

Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics

A turning point for DG VIII

In the 1970s, the EEC's development cooperation policy underwent a major change. Known as association policy, its inclusion in the Treaty of Rome had been the subject of difficult negotiations between the Six. France had made its participation in the EEC conditional on the association of its colonies. A 5-year association convention, annexed to the EEC Treaty, set out the details of this association regime, which consisted of two parts. The first was commercial and aimed ultimately to create a free trade area between Europe and Africa ⁽¹⁾. Customs duties and

barriers between the Six and the associated countries would gradually be eliminated, and the associated countries would apply a system equivalent to that enjoyed by the colonial power to their trading relations with the Six. The second part of the association policy was based on an investment fund, which was originally known as the European Overseas Development Fund (FEDOM), but became the European Development Fund (EDF) after the African states gained their independence. The aim of the EDF was to promote the economic and social development of the associated countries. The administration of the EDF and the other elements of association policy were entrusted to a Commission directorate-general — DG VIII (Development and Cooperation).

After gaining their independence (1960), the associated African states confirmed their desire to maintain the association convention, which was re-

⁽¹⁾ HAEU, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (MAEF), De-Ce, 620, 'Discussion of the United Kingdom's memorandum on the interests of the British territories', 3 October 1957; HAEC, CEAB 1/394, Memo to members of the High Authority of the ECSC, 6 September 1961; HAEU, MAEF archives, De-Ce, 1518, (EEC document) 'Draft report to the Council prepared by the working group on OCTs', 4 November 1961.



Construction of a blood transfusion centre in Senegal, financed by the EDF (1974).

newed first in 1963 and then again in 1969. It was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, the conventions being referred to thereafter as Yaoundé I and II. Despite the transition from a convention ‘granted’ to the associated countries to one negotiated with them in the 1960s, the broad outlines of association policy remained the same as in 1957, namely a policy based on the principle of reciprocal trade preferences, on the one hand, and the EDF for case-by-case funding of projects in the associated countries, on the other ⁽¹⁾.

The situation gradually began to change in the early 1970s, partly because of the Community context

(enlargement, and German and Dutch unease about a policy that concentrated on French-speaking Africa), and partly because of international developments (the growing assertiveness of the Third World and the G77 within the United Nations). The start of accession negotiations with the United Kingdom raised the longer-term issue of the Commonwealth. At the end of the negotiations it was decided that the Community would offer Commonwealth countries that were similar in terms of economic and social characteristics to the countries already associated with the EEC (i.e. the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) a choice of three options:

- ‘participation in the [new] convention of association which, upon the expiry of the [Yaoundé II] Convention ... will govern relations between

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.

the Community and the Associated African and Malagasy States (AASM) ...’;

- ‘the conclusion of one or more special conventions of association on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC Treaty comprising reciprocal rights and obligations, particularly in the field of trade’;
- ‘the conclusion of trade agreements ...’ ⁽¹⁾.

At the same time, other developing countries in the Commonwealth would be offered ad hoc agreements. These proposals, which were grouped in Protocol 22 annexed to the United Kingdom Accession Treaty, had the effect of greatly enlarging the scope of the Community’s development cooperation policy. Henceforth, the Commission’s representatives would be dealing with almost all of Africa ⁽²⁾, as well as with countries in the Caribbean and Pacific.

The change was not just a matter of geography; it also affected the content of association policy. In the early 1970s, the Commission and the Member States realised that development cooperation needed to include new instruments. The debates with Third World countries in the United Nations, and particularly in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), prompted the European countries to discuss issues such as commodity price stability and the industrialisation of developing countries.

In a move that pre-dated these developments, the Commission took the initiative of publishing a memorandum on a Community policy on development cooperation in July 1971. In it, the Commission recognised the need to reform development cooperation policy to take account of the inter-

national context and the new role of the enlarged European Community. It recommended retaining and strengthening the association policy, but also offering other developing countries specific means of cooperation, particularly in the fields of trade policy and commodities ⁽³⁾. A year later, at the Paris Summit of 1972, the Nine formally acknowledged the need to reform development cooperation policy. The communiqué issued at the end of the summit was the result of a careful compromise between old and new priorities and between regionalists and globalists. It reaffirmed the specific responsibilities towards African and Mediterranean countries (with which negotiations were also under way as part of the overall Mediterranean policy) ⁽⁴⁾, while at the same time recognising the need gradually to implement a comprehensive development cooperation policy on a global scale. Such a policy would be based in particular on commodity agreements and improving the generalised system of preferences ⁽⁵⁾.

Preparation of the Lomé Convention

Although it would be many years before a global development cooperation policy for the Third World took off, questions relating to commodities and trade preferences were at the heart of the discussions on the new association agreement. These negotiations, which officially began in July 1973, would end a year and a half later with the signature of the new convention in Lomé, Togo, on 28 February 1975. The talks proved particularly difficult and differed from previous negotiations, not only in the topics covered, but also in the parties involved. The original 19 French-speaking African countries of the association convention had now expanded

⁽¹⁾ Protocol 22 to the United Kingdom Treaty of Accession to the EEC.

⁽²⁾ Moreover, countries that had not belonged to colonial empires (such as Ethiopia and Liberia) and states that had broken with their former colonial power (such as Guinea and Sudan) were also invited to take part in the negotiations.

⁽³⁾ Frisch, D., ‘La politique de développement de l’Union européenne. Un regard personnel sur 50 ans de coopération internationale’, ECDPM Report 15, Maastricht, March 2008, p. 17.

⁽⁴⁾ On Mediterranean policy, see Chapter 24, ‘The Mediterranean challenge’.

⁽⁵⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 10, 1972.

to 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states that would join together to form the Group of ACP States, formalised by the Georgetown (Guyana) agreement of June 1975 after the conclusion of the negotiations. The union of ACP countries, and particularly the African states, was the culmination of a long and difficult process. A number of African organisations, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and particularly the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), helped to foster the dialogue between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries. The secretary-general of the ECA, Robert Gardiner, in particular, saw in these negotiations an opportunity to bridge the division between associated and non-associated countries in Africa and worked hard, with the support of the United Kingdom and the cooperation of the Commission, to foster dialogue between the African countries and disseminate more accurate information about the association arrangement. His efforts were particularly helpful in winning over the Commonwealth countries, which had been very wary of an agreement with the EEC.

On the European side, the original six Member States had now become nine. The proponents of a cooperation policy that was less Africa-centric (the Germans and the Dutch) drew strong support from the Danish and above all the British, who feared that the products of Commonwealth countries which were excluded from the association would be discriminated against. The recruitment of officials from the new Member States to DG VIII also brought significant changes: English gradually joined French as a working language, and DG VIII began to adopt new working practices and methods of evaluation, which inevitably caused some friction.

The Commission, for its part, found itself called upon to play a bigger role, being responsible for the first time for representing the Nine in negotiations with the developing countries. During the Yaoundé Convention negotiations, the president of the Council of Ministers had always acted as spokes-

man. Now, for reasons connected with the need to simplify negotiations that had become highly complicated because of the number of parties, but also because of the credibility which the Commission had gained in this type of exercise, and above all because of a shift in the French position, the Commission was given the task of representing the Community. The preparatory work for the talks was done by DG VIII under its Commissioner Jean-François Deniau and, from April 1973, his successor Claude Cheysson.

Under Deniau's authority, DG VIII produced a memorandum which was crucial in shaping the content of the new convention. The Commission memorandum on the future relations between the Community, the present AASM states (Associated African States and Madagascar) and the countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian and Pacific Oceans, presented to the Council in April 1973, envisaged a number of measures that would profoundly change the Community's development cooperation policy, particularly as regards the stabilisation of commodity markets. Moreover, by not making it a precondition for countries to choose between the three options set out in Protocol 22, the Commission opened the way for talks in which all issues were negotiable, thereby facilitating the participation of the English-speaking countries.

In spite of the importance of Jean-François Deniau and his memorandum, the role played by Claude Cheysson cannot be underestimated. Cheysson, 'who was something of a technocrat, but had an impressive operational intelligence, who had a very rapid grasp of the facts and was an extraordinary man of action' ⁽¹⁾, took up the post of commissioner with the firm intention of reforming the administrative structure of DG VIII and raising the visibility and credibility of the Community in external affairs. Cheysson's hand was strengthened by inter-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.



A group of Togolese catch up with the news on the signing in Lomé of the first ACP–EEC convention (27 February 1975).

national economic developments such as the 1973 oil crisis, the debate on the new international economic order and the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, all of which put North–South issues firmly on the European agenda. Throughout his period as commissioner he was to be one of the principal protagonists in the North–South dialogue.

The Lomé Convention

The international context influenced the negotiations on and content of the new Lomé Convention. This took into account some of the demands made by the G77 in the Unctad, for example with the creation of Stabex (the system for the stabilisation of export earnings), which applied to the main agricul-

tural products exported by the ACP countries, and the abolition of any reciprocal trade requirements: from now on, ACP exports would enjoy free access to the common market, whereas the reverse no longer applied. The abandonment of the principle of the free trade zone marked a real break with the Yaoundé Convention. Another important development was the sugar protocol annexed to the convention which, for the first time, allowed sugar from the ACP countries to benefit from price and market guarantees traditionally reserved for Community products covered by the CAP ⁽¹⁾. The convention also included a new chapter on industrial cooperation. This was not hugely successful, but it is important to recognise that this was another step towards

⁽¹⁾ On the international dimension of agricultural issues see Chapter 16, 'Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy'.

ACP countries questioning the international division of labour, developing their industries in new sectors and benefiting from easier and cheap access to western technology. This marked the dawn of a new policy, based on a truly global approach which took account of various different aspects and was no longer confined to development aid (through the EDF) and trade policy. It even sought to help 'to establish a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order' ⁽¹⁾.

It would be a mistake to single out only the new aspects of the Lomé Convention, as there were significant elements of continuity too. Firstly, the EDF was retained and indeed very significantly increased, from ECU 1 000 million to ECU 3 150 million. But above all, the EEC's development cooperation policy continued to be based on a regional approach focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. As part of the overall Mediterranean policy, agreements were concluded in the course of the 1970s with almost all the countries around the Mediterranean Sea ⁽²⁾. Unlike Lomé, which was a multilateral convention for a term of 5 years, these agreements were bilateral and of unlimited duration. However, the measures enacted, which were based on trade policy and development aid, reflected the cooperation model laid down by Lomé.

DG VIII under Claude Cheysson

The arrival of Claude Cheysson led to a major reorganisation of DG VIII and a complete overhaul of its organisation chart, which inevitably ruffled a few feathers. The launch of the Lomé Convention and the expansion of European cooperation to a large number of new countries had a significant impact on DG VIII's working practices. Until then, the DG had been organised in four directorates, two devoted to the administration of the EDF (one staffed by technical experts, the other by economists) and two focused on analysis and research into development and international issues respectively. One deputy director-general, Jacques Ferrandi, was responsible for coordinating EDF operations, the other, Maurice Foley, for negotiations with the ACP countries.

The administrative reform introduced by Cheysson in 1975 saw the arrival in DG VIII of desk officers responsible for organising and monitoring the programming of aid for one or more developing countries. In order to be able to reply to any question from Cheysson or elsewhere, the desk officers had to oversee all cooperation relations between the Community and the countries for which they were responsible and be familiar with the political, economic and social trends in these countries. The desk officers had a programming role, whereas the technical units prepared the financing proposals. The technical experts could not increase the grant to a project without the authorisation of the desk officer: 'from that point on, the desk officers gradually became the key players ... And the desk officers answered to Foley ... It was clear that this was a deputy director-general who supported his desk officers and would not let himself be pushed around' ⁽³⁾. At the same time, when the new EDF was launched, the programming function acquired a new importance. Before Lomé,

⁽¹⁾ Preamble to the Lomé I Convention.

⁽²⁾ Cyprus (1972 and 1977), Spain (1973), Israel (1975 and 1977), Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (1976) and Malta, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria (1977). These agreements were negotiated in a coordinated way by DG I and DG VIII. DG VIII then retained responsibility for relations with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. This division of labour was to remain in force until 1985. On Mediterranean policy, see Chapter 23, 'Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics', and Chapter 24, 'The Mediterranean challenge'.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.



ACP house in Brussels: its construction was financed by the EDF in order to provide representatives of the ACP countries with a meeting place, especially during the Lomé negotiations.

programming was still in its infancy and decisions were taken case by case, on the basis of criteria that were not specified but usually relied on intuition and experience gained in the field. In fact the style tended towards the paternalistic ⁽¹⁾. From 1975 onwards, however, DG VIII was required to present an indicative programme for each country, setting out the development objectives and priorities. A list of projects could be appended to the report, for example at the suggestion of the Community delegation in the country in question. The indicative programme was then negotiated and signed by the Commission and the beneficiary country ⁽²⁾.

It was a notable change from what came before: 'We were no longer deciding on projects, but on the


country's policy. And the country had an overall figure' ⁽³⁾. The aim was also to make the beneficiary government more responsible in the way in which it managed the aid. This organisational model obviously took away much of Jacques Ferrandi's room for manoeuvre, and the former head of the EDF was to leave at the beginning of 1976. The transition period ended a year later with the retirement of the director-general, Hans Broder Krohn (who had also led the negotiations on the first Lomé Convention), who was replaced by Klaus Meyer.

The Lomé Convention led to a significant change in the status of EDF delegate controllers, who became full Commission delegates, a change that was more than just a matter of job title. Firstly, the role of the EDF delegate controller was not mentioned

⁽¹⁾ 'We didn't have to worry about macroeconomics, that came later ... Ferrandi didn't think much of it,' interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Wim Blonk, 8 March 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.



Meeting of the ACP–EEC Council of Ministers, one of the institutions set up by the Lomé Convention, in Fiji, in April 1977.

in the Yaoundé II Convention. Their powers were governed by intra-Community texts on the implementation of the Yaoundé II Convention, which stipulated that the teams managed by EDF delegate controllers could assume responsibilities for checking and monitoring projects funded with Community aid. Most of the staff had a technical background and were mainly involved in development cooperation. They were employed under contracts administered by the European Association for Cooperation (EAC) ⁽¹⁾ and did not have diplomatic status ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ The EAC was a private, non-profit organisation, set up by DG VIII and funded from Commission resources. Its task was to recruit and manage the experts sent to the EDF beneficiary countries on renewable contracts. See European Commission, 'Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission's external service', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, p. 15. See also Dimier, V., 'The birth of a European diplomatic service: from Contrôleurs-Techniques to the delegates of the Commission in ACP countries', in Deighton, A. and Bossuat, G., *Les Communautés européennes, acteurs de la sécurité mondiale. Bilan de cinquante ans de relations extérieures*, Paris, Soleb, 2007, pp. 114–129.

⁽²⁾ European Commission, 'Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission's external service', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, p. 16.

By contrast, the status of Commission delegates was defined in Protocol 2 to the Lomé Convention on the application of financial and technical cooperation. They are linked to the administration of the EDF. However, delegates are said 'to act as representatives of the Commission in dealings with ACP states "for the purposes of applying the convention", a flexible formula which in practice conferred a very general mandate on delegates to deal with all aspects of cooperation in future' ⁽³⁾. Finally, the Commission delegates had to be approved by the ACP state. This did not entail granting them diplomatic status (which the Member States would not have agreed to), but was the next best thing.

The Lomé Convention thus had two important consequences for the delegates' role: it extended their powers (delegates could now deal with issues that did not strictly fall under the heading of management of the EDF) and led to a significant increase in their numbers. In 1973, there were 21 offices employing 320 people: 120 Europeans (mainly civil engineers and agronomists) and 200 local staff (mainly providing logistical and administrative support). By 1978, there were 41 missions in the ACP with a total staff of 900, of which 250 were Europeans ⁽⁴⁾ recruited from the nine Member States. Candidates to work in the delegations were selected by interviews with a committee containing representatives of the EAC and DG VIII, which on 1 July 1975 was rechristened the Directorate-General for Development. Members of the delegations remained EAC employees, answerable to the EAC. They were not Commission officials, although they wasted no time in seeking this status, which they obtained in 1988 ⁽⁵⁾. The heads of delegation in ACP countries enjoyed considerable

⁽³⁾ Hans Carle papers, Carle, H., 'Du contrôle technique du FED au Service extérieur unifié', unpublished text, 2004, p. 7.

⁽⁴⁾ European Commission, 'Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission's external service', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, pp. 16 and 21.

⁽⁵⁾ On the organisation of the EAC, see interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.

autonomy. Their relations with the ambassadors of the EEC countries varied according to the countries and individuals concerned. Depending on the personalities involved, some delegations were more successful than others in organising meetings for information and even mutual coordination ⁽¹⁾.

The Lomé Convention also led to a significant expansion in the EIB's field of action. It provided loans from its own capital to fund the development of ACP countries and managed the EDF resources earmarked for risk capital operations. As part of a redistribution of responsibilities between the Commission and the Bank, productive investments in the manufacturing, mining and tourism sectors were submitted to the Bank for examination and then given priority funding from the Bank's financial resources. In addition, the Bank joined the Commission on programming missions to ACP countries to prepare indicative financial aid programmes, which were then agreed by representatives of the Community and the ACP states ⁽²⁾.

Towards Lomé II

The end of the 1970s brought a degree of change to the EEC's development cooperation policy. The Lomé Convention was renewed in 1979, but the atmosphere during the negotiations was one of mutual incomprehension. One of the main negotiators of the day described the general context: 'On the European side in general, among the Member States and also the Commission, broadly speaking, there was a feeling that the work had all been done for Lomé I; there were a few marginal improvements to be made here and there, but there was no need for anything new for Lomé II. So it was essentially no more than a formality' ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Robert Cox, 26 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ European Investment Bank, 'Interventions de la BEI dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé', Luxembourg, undated, p. 6.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Bernard Ryelandt, 26 October 2010.



This poster, which lauds the example set by relations between the EEC and developing countries, cites the main components of Community development aid to Lomé signatory countries and 'non-associated' developing countries.

The ACP countries, on the other hand, were disappointed by the results of the first convention and hoped for a thorough reform. The issue of human rights was another source of tension. The British, strongly supported by the Dutch, pressed for the inclusion in the convention of a clause making aid conditional on respect for human rights. In practice, the Commission had already taken steps in this direction when it suspended aid to Uganda under Idi Amin Dada, even though no legal basis existed for such a decision. The issue now went much further and was a source of considerable confusion, even among the nine Member States. In view of the ACP countries' deep hostility, respect for human rights was not included in the text of the Lomé II Convention. However, the debate had begun and the ACP countries would finally be compelled to accept a reference to human rights in the preamble to the Lomé III Convention (1984).



Lomé: preparing the room for the signing ceremony of the second Lomé Convention (31 October 1979).

and a clause in the operational part of the Lomé IV Convention (1989).

Despite the ACP countries' ambition to revolutionise the content of the new convention, there was considerable continuity between Lomé I and II. Nevertheless, the latter did contain a few new features, such as a chapter on cultural cooperation. Another important innovation was Sysmin, an investment facility for the mining sector in ACP countries. Sysmin was the result of the intersection of two different interests: on the one hand, European countries, and particularly Germany, were becoming seriously concerned about the operation of the mining sector in the ACP countries, their main source of many strategic commodities; on the other, the ACP states with huge mining potential hoped to benefit from

a system comparable to Stabex. However, Sysmin operated in a very different way from Stabex: Stabex funding formed part of the budget of the beneficiary state, which was free to spend it as it pleased, subject only to the requirement that it submit a final report (and even this did not always happen). In the case of Sysmin, however, the funding was intended to create a profitable, viable mining sector and went straight to the sector concerned. The state could not allocate it as it pleased. Two conclusions follow from this: the EEC was now beginning to intervene more closely in the aid allocation process, and Sysmin functioned differently because the European countries had a vital interest in the viable exploitation of Africa's mining resources and in securing their supplies. This was hardly surprising, given that 1979 was also the year of the second oil crisis.



The people of Togo at a rally to celebrate the signing of the second Lomé Convention (31 October 1979).

Edgard Pisani, a visionary in the field of development

In 1981, Edgard Pisani replaced Claude Cheysson, who had been appointed French foreign minister. Although he spent only a short time at the Commission (1981–84), Pisani received a warm welcome in DG VIII, which was soon to see the arrival of a new director-general, too: in 1982, Klaus Meyer was replaced by Dieter Frisch, who was to remain in the job until March 1993. While Cheysson was often described as a man of action, Pisani was more of a thinker, ‘a visionary, but slightly unrealistic, and surrounded by people no more realistic than himself’ ⁽¹⁾. In this sense, the commissioner and director-general

were a well-matched couple: Frisch’s pragmatism and years of experience in the Commission and DG VIII were a foil to Pisani’s visionary spirit and political instincts.

Pisani’s arrival and his leadership as from 1984 in DG VIII were followed within a year by a reorganisation of this DG. This reform, which was also the subject of one of the first blue papers on the subject, reorganised the directorate-general around two ‘poles’: the geographical units containing the desk officers and the sectoral policy/thematic units. The aim was to combine the country- (or region-)based approach with an approach driven by sectoral or thematic issues, which were central to Pisani’s concerns. As a result of this reorganisation, the technicians, who had occupied a central position in the projects section, were now regrouped into multidisciplinary technical groups within the geographical

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.

directorates. The desk officers would in future play a pre-eminent role because they were expected to master all aspects of cooperation, whereas the technicians were in danger of being relegated to an unrewarding role of providing technical back-up in their respective specialities ⁽¹⁾. In addition, in response to the commissioner's interest in the human element as a vital factor in development, a new Human Resources Unit was created ⁽²⁾.

Pisani's years in charge of development policy marked a period of intense activity: first, the directorate-general was called upon to help draft a memorandum on relations between the EEC and the Third World. Then came the negotiations on renewing the Lomé II Convention. The memorandum on the Community's development policy was both a review of the EEC's operations and an attempt to adjust its aid and operations to the new international context of the 1980s, marked by a resurgence of Cold War tensions.

The Pisani memorandum was adopted by the Commission in the summer of 1982 and sent to the Council that September. In it, the Commission acknowledged that, despite its volume and the number of instruments involved, the EEC's development aid

was not up to meeting the new challenges. Significant parts of the globe were still underdeveloped, particularly in Africa, where the EEC had concentrated its aid. The North–South dialogue had failed, despite a few isolated successes and agreements. These agreements were either symbolic (the UN Common Fund) or a form of exhortation (the development strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly). Responsibility for this failure was shared by the developing countries, which had been unable to adopt a pragmatic position, instead remaining fixated on essentially political demands, the Communist countries, which had never wanted to participate in the construction of a system of multilateral cooperation and had thus reduced the North–South dialogue to a West–South dialogue, and the developed western countries. Here, the position of the United States was particularly important, and in the first version of the text Pisani observed that the United States 'appeared today to be fascinated by the East–West dimension of international problems to the extent that it saw the Third World merely as the locus of a latent East–West conflict' ⁽³⁾. The Cold War thus threatened to displace North–South issues, undermining the role the EEC and the developing countries could play, given that in the event of war these two parties would 'in all probability be cast as victims or provide the battlefields' ⁽⁴⁾.

Pisani's proposals aimed at giving the Community's development aid the coherence and consistency of a genuine policy sought to reorganise aid along geographical lines, identifying priority areas for intervention (in particular Africa and the Mediterranean). He proposed launching a policy dialogue between the Community and the beneficiary countries so that the aims of Community aid would be defined jointly and the EEC would be able to mobilise rapidly if the aid objectives were in danger



Visit to Brussels of Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal (May 1982). He met with Edgard Pisani, the new development commissioner replacing Claude Cheysson, appointed by François Mitterrand as France's foreign minister.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Charles Van der Vaeren, 27 September 2010.

⁽³⁾ Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, De-Ce 1981–83, 1932, 'Mémoire sur la politique communautaire de développement', August 1982, p. 10.

⁽⁴⁾ Memorandum on the Community's development policy, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1982, p. 12.



Heads of state or government of ACP countries were frequent visitors to Brussels for meetings with Commission representatives, particularly from DG VIII. Here, Roy Jenkins and Claude Cheysson meet with Zaire's President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (21 January 1977).

of not being met. Pisani suggested concentrating on agricultural development, self-sufficiency in food, preserving the ecological balance and upgrading and reinforcing technical training.

Negotiations on the renewal of Lomé II

The Pisani memorandum made a significant contribution to establishing the framework for renewing the Lomé Convention. Agriculture, self-sufficiency in food, sectoral policies and the policy dialogue were key elements in the discussions with the ACP countries. The Commission's chief negotiator, Dieter Frisch, spent hours trying to allay the ACP countries' suspicion of the concept of policy dialogue, which they saw as an attempt to introduce an element of conditionality into the allocation of aid, whereas the Commission regarded it as a way of reaching agreement on reciprocal commitments. Pisani's arrival marked a significant change in the management of the EDF. Whereas

with Cheysson the watchword had been 'the EDF is your money' ⁽¹⁾, Pisani's aim was to launch a joint debate on how this money was spent and the EDF's priorities. Pisani's philosophy was that, before a project was approved, it was necessary to check that it was coherent with the overall context. He therefore placed the emphasis on sectoral policies and the need to establish priorities within them.

The negotiations on the renewal of Lomé II, which took place from 1983 to 1984, were particularly difficult. At a time of global economic recession, the European countries were not inclined to be generous ⁽²⁾. At the same time, the ACP countries were suffering as a result of the debt crisis, falling agricultural prices, desertification and food crises. The Stabex and Sysmin funds had been exhausted by the

⁽¹⁾ 'Under the Lomé framework, the money did not belong to the Commission but to the [beneficiary] country ... De facto it was the Commission that administered it, but legally it was their money which was jointly managed', Interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.

⁽²⁾ The EDF nevertheless increased from ECU 4.6 billion to 7.5 billion, although the agreement was reached only in the final months of the negotiations and by including future contributions from Spain and Portugal.

mid-term and their renewal was in doubt. Efficiency was becoming an increasingly important consideration. The structural adjustment policies advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank entered the debate on Third World development and could not be ignored by DG VIII ⁽¹⁾. This period also saw an intensification of relations with the World Bank, even if there was still some competition for the funding of ‘useful’ projects ⁽²⁾. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that Lomé III, despite elements of continuity, brought changes which would profoundly alter the nature of relations between the Community and the ACP countries. Insisting on greater aid efficiency, the EEC introduced what could be seen as an element of conditionality, although the Commission always rejected this term and referred instead to reciprocal commitments. In financial and technical cooperation, for example, there was a clear shift towards the idea that the EDF should in future fund programmes, not just projects. The influence of the structural adjustment policies adopted by the World Bank and the IMF was clearly apparent in the idea that countries could develop only if they changed their policies. It was no longer a matter of financing ad hoc projects and investments, but of targeting the entire political strategy — hence the importance attached to supporting the ACP countries’ sectoral strategies too (what Pisani called ‘policy support’), developed with the help of the Commission, particularly in the food sector.

Lomé III also had the effect of strengthening the programming phase. Programming, which was the main result of the policy dialogue, aimed essentially at concentrating European aid on a few priority sectors which were agreed with the ACP countries, in order to avoid spreading Community support too

thinly and to achieve greater efficiency. On the same grounds, transfers under Stabex and Sysmin, which were renewed, were subject to strict monitoring.

Food security and the quest for self-sufficiency in food became the convention’s key objectives. In this sense it marked the end of an era in which industrialisation was seen as the motor of development, even if it meant neglecting agriculture. Due to the famine and droughts that had devastated certain ACP countries, agriculture and food security once again became the priority objectives for development. The environment and development dimension was now part of the EDF’s normal intervention approach, particularly in its integrated rural development projects.

The convention also broached new areas. The inclusion of a chapter specifically on promoting and protecting private investment in ACP countries had a strong symbolic significance as these countries had always refused such a concession for fear that it would undermine their national sovereignty. Now they explicitly acknowledged the importance of creating a good environment for private inward investment. In a move that foreshadowed the development of Community cooperation in the 1990s, Lomé III also included in its preamble a reference to the principles of the UN Charter and a reaffirmation of the signatories’ faith in fundamental human rights.

Lorenzo Natali: the first non-French commissioner for development

The new convention was signed in December 1984 and came into effect the following year. It was therefore administered by the new Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors, which took office at the beginning of 1985. In the new Commission, the development portfolio was split between two

⁽¹⁾ Acting on a proposal by DG VIII, the Council, for example, approved a document stating: ‘We are in favour of support for this structural adjustment policy, but structural adjustment must not only be economically and financially viable, it must also be politically and socially acceptable’, interview with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Klaus Roeh, 23 May 2011.

commissioners: the Italian Lorenzo Natali retained responsibility for relations with the ACP countries, while Claude Cheysson ‘vehemently rejected’ ⁽¹⁾ Jacques Delors’ offer of a portfolio based on intra-Community affairs (industry and research) and opted instead for external relations. He was put in charge of agreements with Mediterranean countries and with Central and Latin America, Asia and Oceania. The slightly paradoxical result was that a Directorate for North–South Relations (in DG I, subsequently DG IB) coexisted with the DG for Development (DG VIII).

This division of responsibilities was not well received by DG VIII, and particularly its director-general, who considered it a serious mistake: ‘Of course everyone asked us what the difference was between North–South and development. Frankly, this structure sometimes made us look slightly ridiculous. But once a mistake like that has been made, the consequences can last for 25 years’ ⁽²⁾.

The arrival of the first non-French commissioner at DG VIII did not create much of a stir. Lorenzo Natali ‘was a very courteous man, level-headed, imbued with a degree of political realism; he was not out to change the world, but to secure progress on dossiers while taking into account the interests at stake — what was feasible won out over what was ideally desirable’ ⁽³⁾. A long-standing member of the Commission and a vice-president for the last two terms, Natali knew exactly how to establish himself in the administration of his new directorate ⁽⁴⁾ and quickly developed very close relations with the leaders of the ACP countries. His staff was astonished at the ease with which he engaged with the Africans. His priority was to start implementing the conven-

tion as quickly as possible. To achieve this, he decided to retain DG VIII’s organisational structure and to appoint two officials from the DG to posts in his cabinet. Relations between the new commissioner and the director-general were good and based on mutual trust. The working meetings instituted by Pisani continued: Natali and his head of cabinet would meet with Frisch and his assistant, ‘the director-general would brief the vice-president and present proposals; Lorenzo Natali would listen, ask some questions and then take a decision’ ⁽⁵⁾.

DG VIII continued the practice inaugurated by Pisani of organising informal coordination meetings with the directors-general of the various national development cooperation departments. These meetings, led by Dieter Frisch, enabled the Commission to take initiatives, press ahead with particular issues and pre-empt problems before officially presenting its proposals to the Council.

Under Natali, DG VIII was still very much seen as the odd man out in the Commission for a number of reasons: DG VIII was geographically isolated from the other DGs and had long enjoyed a degree of autonomy. Because the EDF was not part of the Community budget, its funds were subject to monitoring by the Financial Control Service, rather than by the DG for Budget, even though DG VIII had its own internal financial control department. It also had little need to consult other DGs because it had its own economists and lawyers. Dieter Frisch described how this *esprit de corps* developed: ‘The DG for Development — DG VIII as it was then — was always something of a world apart, a club ... — a club in the positive sense of the word ... At some point somebody commented that DG VIII was “a bit of an ivory tower” because we had less contact with other DGs than everyone else ... We were more or less self-sufficient; self-sufficient and independent. We had our own engineers, agronomists and

⁽¹⁾ Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 240; see also interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ ‘In retrospect, I think Lorenzo Natali was the commissioner who most appreciated the work of DG VIII and who, in return, was most respected by officials. You knew where you were with him’, interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.



Maurice Foley, Deputy Director-General of the DG for Development, meets with Edward Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica, and members of his delegation.

economists who were all, ultimately, specialised in this area. And we didn't need to call on anyone else very much. So this cut two ways. On the one hand we were a bit isolated, but on the other this helped to develop an *esprit de corps*' ⁽¹⁾. Towards the end of the 1980s, DG VIII even started publishing an internal newsletter, called *Tam-tam 8* and later *News 8*. This sense of being different from the rest of the Commission was also partly due to the idea that DG VIII, unlike other DGs, was not so much defending the interests of the Community and its Member States as those of the developing countries. The fact that staff mobility was still not yet universally applied and a significant number of officials stayed in DG VIII for many years, or even their whole career, reinforced this tendency.

Conclusions

Between 1973 and 1986, European development cooperation policy went through several important stages. This evolution, due largely to initiatives by

the Commission itself, was all the more remarkable because 'this policy lacked a specific legal base until the Treaty of Maastricht (1993)' ⁽²⁾.

With the Lomé Convention, the Community embarked on a cooperation policy that was no longer limited to the states of French-speaking Africa but extended to virtually all of the African continent and to countries in the Caribbean and Pacific. The instruments of cooperation policy changed too. It concerned itself with the stabilisation of the commodity markets and the need to promote industrialisation in the ACP countries, it provided special guarantees for sugar from ACP countries and abolished inverse preferences. Under pressure from the British, strongly backed by the Germans and the Dutch, a number of measures were introduced for countries that remained outside the Lomé Convention: in 1976, an initial budget allocation of ECU 20 million was made available for non-associated countries ⁽³⁾. Bilateral agreements were signed with countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean as part of the overall Mediterranean policy. This was a policy with pro-Third World overtones, which gave the Community and its development commissioner an essential role in the North–South dialogue.

At the same time, DG VIII also underwent a change. Following the first enlargement, Danish, Irish and British officials joined the DG and English gradually became a working language alongside French. Claude Cheysson radically reshaped the DG's organisational structure in order to implement the Lomé Convention. Geographical desk officer posts were created with responsibility for drafting and implementing development programmes. The programming of Community aid acquired a completely new importance. The early 1980s saw the dawn of a new

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011.

⁽²⁾ Frisch, D., *La politique de développement de l'Union européenne. Un regard personnel sur 50 ans de coopération internationale*, ECDPM Report 15, Maastricht, March 2008, p. viii.

⁽³⁾ For aid to the non-associated countries, see the interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.

Edgard Pisani and the memorandum on development cooperation policy

Born in Tunis in 1918 of Maltese parents, Edgard Pisani was educated in Paris at the *lycée* Louis le Grand. He joined the Resistance in the Second World War and participated in the liberation of Paris. He served as head of the office of the Paris police commissioner in 1944 and 2 years later became the youngest *préfet* in France. It was in this post that he began to take an interest in regional development and agriculture, a subject that remained close to his heart throughout his career.

In 1954, Pisani was elected to the Senate as a member of the Democratic Left and sat on the national defence committee. In 1961, he was appointed minister for agriculture in Michel Debré's government, which was facing a serious crisis in agriculture. Among Pisani's priorities was to re-establish dialogue with the farmers, who were calling for new concessions and demanding a voice in the preparation and introduction of the common agricultural policy.

Pisani remained minister for agriculture in Georges Pompidou's government, but had an uncomfortable relationship with Pompidou himself. His position in the government became increasingly isolated and marginal. In 1966, he became minister for housing, appointed by Charles de Gaulle to look into the problem of housing, urban development and regional infrastructure. In this role he drafted legislation on town planning, which was adopted in 1967. However, after the parliamentary elections of March 1967 (when he became member for Angers, representing the *Regroupement pour la Cinquième République* (the grouping for the fifth republic)) he resigned from the government in protest against the adoption of special powers. In May 1968, he considered the government to be incapable of dealing with the situation and supported the vote of no confidence. He therefore left the majority and joined the socialists, working with Michel Rocard and developing closer contacts with François Mitterrand. In the late 1970s, he was appointed a member of the Brandt Commission set up to produce a report on North–South relations. He was a member of the European Parliament from 1978 to 1981.

The possibility of appointing him as commissioner for development in Brussels had already been mooted at the end of 1980, when President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was reluctant to retain Claude Cheysson in his post. Pisani was appointed commissioner in 1981 when Cheysson became minister for foreign affairs after Mitterrand's victory in the French presidential election.

He remained at the Commission for a relatively short, but intense, time (1981–84), which saw the adoption of the memorandum on development cooperation policy (October 1982) and the negotiations on the third Lomé Convention (1983–84). On his arrival in Brussels, Pisani wanted to mobilise DG VIII in a collective effort to rethink cooperation policy in the decade to come. The memorandum on development cooperation policy was drafted after consulting DG VIII officials: their replies to the questionnaire they had been sent provided material for the discussion within the Pisani cabinet.

The purpose of the Pisani memorandum was to redefine the EEC's role and the objectives of development cooperation policy in the new international context of resurgent Cold War tension. Pisani saw several reasons for revising European aid: the difficulties experienced by the developing countries, particularly in Africa, caused people to question the strategies adopted until then; at the same time, the international economic crisis and high unemployment affecting many European countries raised doubts about the Community's ability and willingness to contribute to Third World development. Two other factors also played a role: the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC, which called for a redefinition of the objectives of the enlarged Community, and the crisis in North–South negotiations, which involved issues of great importance for many European countries.

Finally, the opening of the negotiations on the renewal of the Lomé Convention, scheduled for 1983, set a deadline by which the Community had to agree on its objectives.

As Pisani saw it, the EEC had undoubtedly made remarkable efforts in the field of development aid, but the various legal, financial and trade





instruments it had adopted lacked the consistency and coherence of an effective policy. He therefore proposed incorporating the various measures adopted by the EEC into a comprehensive approach (and debate). However, recognising that ‘the Community cannot claim to cover every corner of the globe where development action is desirable’ ⁽¹⁾, he identified geographical priorities, which remained Africa, the southern Mediterranean and the poorest of the developing countries.

Pisani’s most important proposals included the adoption of sectoral strategies, particularly in agriculture, and the introduction of a policy dialogue. The adoption of sectoral strategies meant placing the emphasis on programmes rather than projects, as had been the practice in the past. The decision to concentrate on rural rather than industrial development also marked a break with the past. Finally, in Pisani’s eyes the policy dialogue represented a collective undertaking by the Community and the beneficiary countries so that the aims of Community aid would be defined jointly and the EEC would be able to mobilise rapidly if the aid objectives were in danger of not being met. Although Pisani had no intention of introducing conditionality into the policy dialogue, it was nevertheless the case that the introduction of the dialogue signalled a move on the Community’s part to regain some control over the management and use of aid. This was also what the EEC Member States had in mind

when they supported the idea of the policy dialogue, whereas the representatives of the ACP states were very suspicious of this innovation.

As regards Lomé, Pisani proposed the adoption of a convention of unlimited duration, accompanied by regional protocols that would be periodically renewed, as well as the budgetisation of all the resources allocated by the Community to development. Finally, as headline policies, he suggested adopting certain symbolically important measures such as a commitment to dedicate 0.1 % of European gross national product (GNP) to official development aid by the end of the decade ⁽²⁾.

The Pisani memorandum was adopted by the Commission in October 1982 and transmitted to the Council of Ministers, which debated it at length. It received a mixed response: the EEC Member States reacted cautiously to the memorandum’s proposals, and only the policy dialogue commanded something like consensus. At a time when it was deadlocked over the British contribution to the Community budget, the EEC believed it would be difficult to implement Pisani’s ideas. Having said that, although the memorandum failed in its objective of securing the adoption by the EEC of a comprehensive approach to European aid, it did significantly help to shape the negotiations on the third Lomé Convention.

⁽¹⁾ Memorandum on the Community’s development policy, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1982, p. 18.

⁽²⁾ ‘The Commission proposes that the Community set itself the figure of 0.1 % of the Community’s GNP as its development aid target and that it attain that target in stages over the next 10 years’, Memorandum on the Community’s development policy, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1982, p. 24.

phase. The low level of development of many ACP countries and the ineffectiveness of aid prompted a debate and led to a serious questioning of Community policy and the EDF. The reforms to European aid during this period foreshadowed the changes that would affect European aid policy after 1989. During the negotiations on the renewal of the Lomé II Convention, Pisani and Frisch, the new director-general, insisted on the notion of policy dialogue. This was to be the instrument whereby the ACP countries and the Community jointly identified priority areas of intervention. Responding to the failure of development policies in many countries, particularly in Africa where European aid had been concentrated, but also to the renewed tensions connected with the Cold

War, Pisani suggested to the ACP countries that they coordinate more closely in order to select priority sectors for intervention. Although the Community distanced itself to some extent from the conditionality practised by the IMF and the World Bank, the influence of these two institutions started to be felt. This was also apparent from the fact that the EDF gradually began to focus not only on projects, but also on programmes. Finally, the question of human rights also emerged during this period in the relations with the ACP countries, although a provision protecting human rights would only be introduced with the fourth Lomé Convention in 1989.

GUIA MIGANI

Chapter 23

Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics

Between 1973 and 1986, a series of new dynamics affected the Commission's actions in the external relations field. Some of them emerged as a consequence of long-established trends: commercial policy for instance was grounded in the completion of the customs union in 1968. But the range of economic issues handled by the Commission constantly increased as the areas covered by international rules grew following the Tokyo Round (1973–79) and then the Uruguay Round (launched in 1986). New prospects also opened up following the first enlargement in 1973 and the implementation of political cooperation, in which the Commission was determined to play its part alongside the Member States. Despite the significance of these developments, the governing structures remained largely unchanged, apart from some necessary adjustments.

Staff and management structures

In 1973, when the Ortolí Commission took office, all the departments were combined into a single Directorate-General for External Relations (DG I) by merging the former DG I with the former DG XI (External Trade) and the delegation for the enlargement negotiations. At the same time as this merger, responsibility for the Mediterranean basin, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad) and commodities was transferred to DG VIII (Development and Cooperation). The former DG I's responsibilities for bilateral relations in the scientific, technical and nuclear fields were placed under the authority of the commissioner responsible for research and transferred to a new DG XII

(Research, Science and Education). The new DG I became what might be described as large trade policy department, with an approach that was both functional (the design of external economic policy and its instruments; interaction with agricultural and industrial policy; trade defence) and geographical.

The real aim of this new organisational approach was to bring the creation and management of trade policy instruments closer to the geographical departments that would have to implement them, with the exception of trade defence and safeguard clauses. In this way, units with horizontal responsibilities could be closely involved with those in charge of applying them, the geographical units being bound to seek their agreement to carry through their activities. It would not have been possible to devise the sectoral policies that at the time were very important — shipbuilding, aerospace, steel and textiles — without the participation of the geographical departments concerned ⁽¹⁾. The considerable clout that trade policy enjoyed was clear from the overall organisation of DG I ⁽²⁾.

The suitability of this structure was called into question a few years later. The distribution of tasks was unsatisfactory, the work of some units was not up to scratch and weaknesses were appearing in middle management ⁽³⁾. There was a succession of critical reports, and constant efforts to streamline and requests for more staff ⁽⁴⁾. The changing nature of the challenges faced by DG I simply increased the pressure on it: changes in multilateral trade regulation systems, which were being extended to cover new areas; a growing network of contractual and auton-

omous measures affecting international trade; and the priority attached to promoting relations with certain countries.

In 1979, the decision was taken to remedy several of these shortcomings and reinforce the key units. The bulk of the changes were made in the departments most involved with the GATT Tokyo Round. But this first stage of reorganisation was not enough. In a climate of worsening economic crisis, defending the Community's interests took on increasing importance. The Commission needed to be equipped to face up to a widespread resurgence of protectionist tendencies ⁽⁵⁾. The arrival of the Delors Commission in 1985 was the occasion for a comprehensive reorganisation, taking into account the growing overlap between trade issues specifically within the Community field and development aid, conflict resolution and, more generally, external policy where responsibilities specifically held by the Member States and those within the Community sphere of competence were becoming increasingly intertwined. External relations had become too complex and DG I had to reflect this reality and adapt accordingly. DG I's departments were therefore reorganised around two main themes. The first included everything that specifically concerned foreign trade (external relations and trade policy) and a whole sector of activity was grouped into a second, more political, area of responsibility (North–South relations and Mediterranean policy). With some minor adjustments, this organisation chart was maintained during the first two Delors Commissions.

These changes were the result of action by the commissioners responsible for external relations but also of the enlargements that led to a string of changes in management positions. The portfolios covered by DG I were held successively by British, German

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from Edmund Wellenstein to the DG for External Relations officials, 19 February 1973, and to the DG for External Relations heads of services, 11 April 1973; Interview with Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010. According to Hayes, the aim was to prevent a possible break-up of the new DG I.

⁽²⁾ HAEU, EN (Émile Noël) No 653, 'Rapport sur la structure et le fonctionnement de la direction générale des relations extérieures', April 1976.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Paul Luyten, 5 October 2010, and Raymond Phan Van Phi, 6 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9.

⁽⁵⁾ And also to check systematically the application of Community legislation in areas where it was not sufficiently robust. Audland, C., *Right Place — Right Time*, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2004, p. 245. The United Kingdom, for its part, lobbied for trade defence instruments to be beefed up (interview with Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010).

and Dutch/French commissioners. In the Ortolí Commission, a key political figure — the former British ambassador to Paris, Christopher Soames — took charge of external relations in his capacity as vice-president of the Commission. With his head of cabinet, David Hannay, he ensured that British officials, hand-picked by Whitehall for their European commitment and command of French, joined the ranks of the Commission. The Community is indebted to Soames for breathing new life into relations with the United States, which backed European integration at the political level but was less inclined to make concessions to it in the economic field. He succeeded in developing a high-level dialogue between the Commission and the American administration that paved the way for reciprocal visits, including visits by several presidents of the United States for one-to-one meetings with that of the Commission ⁽¹⁾. He also encouraged the policy of anchoring to Europe pursued by the Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau. Looking to the longer term, his personal commitment to opening up trade relations with China deserves mention ⁽²⁾.

The new DG I, placed under Christopher Soames's political responsibility, was put in the hands of Edmund Wellenstein, a senior official who had been in charge of the former DG for Trade and the delegation for the first enlargement. The 1973 enlargement had a major impact and led to innovations in DG I's working methods, innovations that sometimes clashed with the procedures already in place. These were not very conducive to mobility and paid insufficient attention to the calibre of officials or their career paths ⁽³⁾.

In the Jenkins Commission (1977–80), Christopher Soames's successor was Vice-President Wilhelm Haferkamp, with Franz Froschmaier as his head of cabinet ⁽⁴⁾. Personal relations between Soames and his successor were very close. Haferkamp had four priorities: the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, thanks to his friendship with the American trade representative, Robert Strauss; closer relations with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); closer links with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); and better relations with Latin America. Wilhelm Haferkamp's role was particularly significant because he held the same portfolio — with Eberhard Rhein as his head of cabinet ⁽⁵⁾ — in the Thorn Commission.

The impact and the extension of the tasks handled by DG I explains why the portfolios were split in 1985. Willy De Clercq (head of cabinet: Alexander Schaub) dealt with international trade and relations with industrialised countries, China and South Korea. Claude Cheysson (head of cabinet: Philippe Soubestre) took charge of North–South relations and consequently relations with non-ACP developing countries. While Willy De Clercq's chief objective was to conduct the new multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round), Claude Cheysson's sights were chiefly set on Latin America, Asia and the Gulf at the same time as enhancing Mediterranean policy. Mediterranean policy had been under the responsibility of Cheysson, in his capacity as development commissioner, in the Ortolí Commission, then under Vice-President Natali in the Thorn Commission.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Günter Burghardt, 3 October 2011.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011. Wellenstein described the curious circumstances in which the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Community took place; HAEC, BAC 83/1984/325, Note for the file from Horst Krenzler on the 'Troika'–China ministerial meeting, Paris, 6 April 1984.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Leslie Fielding, 28 October 2010, and Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010; Fielding, L., *Kindly Call Me God*, Boermans Books, Reading, 2009; Fielding, L., 'Europe as a global partner — The external relations of the European Community', University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Occasional Papers, No 7, London, 1991, pp. 259 et seq.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Eberhard Rhein, 22 September 2010.



The second ASEAN–EEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The EEC was represented by President Gaston Thorn and Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp (7 March 1980).

External economic relations: a wider range of activities

Until the beginning of the 1980s, the main focus was on trade policy. This reflected the central position that trade policy had assumed in the first two decades of the European project because of the exclusive powers vested in the Commission in this field and the growing importance of multilateral negotiations. But it also arose because of the difficult economic climate of the 1970–80 period, which tended to make for strained relations with the United States, whose trade balance with the EEC became very negative at the beginning of the 1980s (deficit of ECU 20 billion in 1986), and with Japan for the opposite reasons (EEC deficit of ECU 20 billion in 1986). The rules governing trade,

adjustments to import arrangements and sectoral issues were therefore fundamental aspects of relations with non-member countries. But the geographical scope of the Commission's activities was expanding because of the priority given to developing economic relations with several groups of countries. These changes gave DG I a much wider field of action. The global economic crisis at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s simply raised the commercial stakes. With the 1973 enlargement, the EEC had consolidated its position as the world's leading trading power. In 1983, its external trade accounted for over 30 % of world trade.

But its trade balance with the three large blocs, namely the United States, Asia (Japan and the newly industrialised countries) and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),

was very negative, respectively USD 20 billion, USD 12.1 billion and USD 37 billion in 1980. Although the figures improved as of 1986 with OPEC (USD 3.1 billion deficit) and the United States (USD 18.5 billion surplus), they remained negative with Japan and Asia (deficit of USD 25.4 billion) ⁽¹⁾. Tensions therefore ran high between the main world trading powers and this was reflected in the GATT multilateral negotiations.

From this point of view, the agreements signed in 1972 between the EFTA and the EEC countries and the gradual elimination of customs duties and quotas brought about a major opening-up of borders. This was so much so that between 1972 and 1986 trade between the Community and the EFTA countries increased fivefold. Discussions between the Commission and the EFTA countries were a permanent fixture and addressed all the key areas (the economy, monetary affairs, transport, environment, development cooperation and so on). In the mid-1980s, in the run-up to the Mediterranean enlargement, the need was felt for a more comprehensive approach to EEC/EFTA relations. At the first ministerial meeting held between the two groups of countries in Luxembourg in April 1984, reference was made to setting up a European economic area, a project that would be taken over by the Delors Commission in 1989.

Multilateral negotiations therefore provided the main framework for DG I's activity. Launched in April 1973 by President Richard Nixon, the Tokyo Round represented a major challenge for the EEC as the United States, in the midst of an economic and financial depression, no longer had the means or the desire to offer concessions to its main partners without some sort of quid pro quo. The issues dealt with became increasingly technical with the growing importance of non-tariff barriers to trade but, as



Vice-President Étienne Davignon delivers a speech on EEC–United States relations (17 November 1982).

Soames said to the European Parliament, ‘the technical trees of the negotiations must not be allowed to hide the political forest’. The Commission sought — and managed — to get these non-tariff barriers put on the negotiating table. One of the main objectives was to secure the adoption by the GATT of specialised codes that would limit the scope of instruments such as the American selling price or anti-dumping duties. On the tariff front, the Commission could be satisfied because, while it had undertaken to cut its average industrial tariff from 9.8 % to 7.5 %, the United States had gone down from 8.2 % to 5.7 %. The Commission had above all defended the status quo on the agricultural front, which was a priority for the United States and the developing countries ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Eurostat, cited by Debon-Jay, M.-A., Lemoine, F. and Merviel, P., *Économie de l'intégration européenne*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1992, p. 350.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Summary of Vice-President Haferkamp’s address to the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft’, Frankfurt, 22 March 1979.



The European challenge: in the early 1970s, the longstanding readiness of the United States to accept the economic consequences of European integration as a price worth paying for the potential political gains seemed to diminish, especially after the first enlargement. This new chapter of more problematic transatlantic relations would reach its climax in 1973 with the row following Henry Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' speech.

But the pressure mounted at the end of November 1982 at the first GATT ministerial meeting since the end of the Tokyo Round. It was a particularly difficult meeting, mainly because of the clashes in Geneva with the United States and some major agricultural exporters ⁽¹⁾, but also because of the difficulty of reaching a common position within the Council. Here there were disagreements between countries like the United Kingdom, which was keen for a new round of global negotiations to be launched, incorporating services, in particular, and other

countries like France, which wanted to adopt a more defensive position. One of the objectives was to avoid calling into question a whole swathe of Community agricultural and industrial subsidies and self-limitation agreements on imports, and to avoid making too many concessions on barriers affecting services (tourism, IT services, financial services). Above all, the Commission considered it premature to launch a new round so soon after the Tokyo Round, even if it meant giving its partners the impression that it was a fortress ⁽²⁾. As no agreement was reached in November 1982, the decision to launch a new round of multilateral negotiations was postponed.

A fresh start was made thanks to the GATT secretary-general, Arthur Dunkel, and the Leutwiler working party, which proposed a set of measures to ease tensions with a view to a new round of negotiations. The Commission therefore endorsed the United States' request of November 1984 to hold a meeting to explore this possibility. The request was also backed by the G7 in Bonn in November 1985.

In September 1986, the 92 countries attending the Punta del Este conference decided to launch a new round of negotiations — the Uruguay Round — whose work would culminate a few years later in the setting-up of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Under the authority of Vice-President De Clercq, who had prepared the ground for the March 1985 General Affairs Council meeting at which it was agreed to take an active part in the new round, the Commission played a major role in this process as the launch of new GATT negotiations in parallel with the single market programme opened the way for new initiatives — such as the inclusion of services in the negotiations — and for commitments that would have been politically unthinkable before 1985.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, 'The Commission's overall view on the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations', Christopher Soames's reply before the European Parliament in Luxembourg, 4 April 1973, contribution by Paul Luyten.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 133/1987/17, Memo from Eberhard Rhein, 'GATT ministerial conference: an initial political assessment', 1 December 1982, and background brief on the GATT ministerial meeting of 1 December 1982 (see section 4.1, 'Coordination and decision-making process in the Commission') for the European Council meeting of 3 and 4 December 1982.



The G7 (summit of the industrialised countries) meeting in Bonn on 16 July 1978. Commission President Roy Jenkins (first on the left) found it hard to be invited into the G7 club.

All these discussions helped to create a highly specific administrative culture ⁽¹⁾, born out of the need to address issues raised by the industrialised partners. The British presence and the input of leading trade policy experts (Edmund Wellenstein, Theodorus Hijzen and Paul Luyten) ensured that the pitfalls of protectionism were avoided ⁽²⁾. The steel crisis and the United States' measures nonetheless led to multiple trade defence measures. An initial common strategy towards Japan, access to whose market was very difficult, was only established in 1978. When a 3-year action plan was drawn up in 1985, it focused mainly on tariff barriers, certification standards and procedures, public procurement, financial services and import promotion measures.

Outside the context of the multilateral negotiations, there were major developments in relations with several groups of countries, notably the state-trading countries. This was not yet a growth sector, except in the case of China, with which a first trade agreement was signed in 1978 ⁽³⁾. However, trade with the Eastern bloc countries was expected to grow following the Helsinki agreements (1975) under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Negotiations ⁽⁴⁾ on an agreement with Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) began in 1978, but without much success. However, Romania, which sought to develop some margin of manoeuvre in respect of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), signed

⁽¹⁾ Borrell, J. R., *La centralidad perdida de la política comercial*, Información Comercial Española, No 831, 2006, pp. 67–80.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Leslie Fielding, 28 October 2010, Paul Luyten, 5 October 2010, and Raymond Phan Van Phi, 6 October 2010.

⁽³⁾ Denman, R., *The Mandarin's Tale*, Politico's Publishing, London, 2002, p. 226.

⁽⁴⁾ An opening-up by Comecon that included a Soviet manoeuvre to invite the President of the European Commission to Moscow had to be circumvented. The USSR was against bilateral negotiations with the countries in its sphere of influence. Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.

an agreement with the Community on industrial products in 1980. A joint committee was set up to ensure its application in the following years. Lastly, in 1982, it was decided to grant humanitarian aid to Poland via non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the wake of the events there.

External activities diversified towards the south and to other continents. The Community developed a network of more complex relations with the newly independent countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. At the same time as strengthening its relations with the ACP states, the Community wanted to make advances towards the countries of the Mediterranean basin.

In 1975, an agreement with Israel came into force; in 1976, cooperation agreements were signed with the Maghreb countries and in 1977 with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Community asked for fairly significant tariff dismantling for industrial products, but was not prepared to offer equivalent concessions in the agricultural sector. The underlying principle was that the main component would be the creation of a partial free trade area. This had to be defended before the GATT, where a successful case was made for the aspects of these agreements that promoted development, even though the generalised system of preferences (GSP) worked pretty well for the region, particularly for textiles ⁽¹⁾. Little by little, the beginnings of financial and technical cooperation were added in, once the considerable difficulties of its budgeting had been overcome ⁽²⁾.

The Euro–Arab dialogue got under way in 1974. It was a ground-breaking operation as it was handled both as a Community activity and in the context of political cooperation. Even though the economic interests (energy, volume of Community exports,

possibilities of increasing mutual investment and others) identified by the Commission with a view to a regional approach were considerable ⁽³⁾, the concrete results did not live up to expectations. By contrast, the signing of the agreement with ASEAN in 1980 deserves mention: it was the first time that the Community had concluded an agreement with a group of countries outside the industrialised world and the ACP framework. In the other cases, aspects such as development aid, humanitarian aid and even aid to refugees predominated since non-preferential, so-called first generation, agreements (with Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, etc.) did not have a very wide scope.

The Commission was also following very closely the negotiations on the new international economic order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as well as the North–South dialogue. A first indication of this was its participation in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), the so-called North–South conference, held in Paris between 1975 and 1977. The former director-general, Wellenstein, held one of the four co-Presidencies held by the north, the others being filled by the United States, Japan and the rotating Presidency of the Council ⁽⁴⁾. In this dialogue, the generalised trade preferences policy exerted a powerful leverage effect.

Claude Cheysson, who was in charge of these matters in the Delors Commission, brought his own experience to bear on the conduct of development policy, which he wanted to be more ambitious. The challenge was to apply it to a larger geographical area, in particular in Asia, Latin America and the Gulf. To that end, the DG VIII officials who were in charge of non-ACP development projects were

⁽¹⁾ Informal communication from Roderick Abbott to Angel Viñas.

⁽²⁾ Since 1971, the Commission had been working on the problems that enlargement would cause for the Mediterranean countries. HAEC, BAC 250/1980/101 and BAC 250/1980/20 contain extensive documentation.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, 'The economic objectives of the Community in the context of the Euro–Arab dialogue', Commission communication to the Council, COM(78) 506 final, 3 October 1978.

⁽⁴⁾ Informal communication from Edmund Wellenstein to Angel Viñas.

transferred to DG I ⁽¹⁾. The most burning issues concerned Latin America, owing to long-standing external factors and internal factors connected with Spain and Portugal's accession.

Commissioner Haferkamp had already felt this need and a communication to the College was drafted in 1980 ⁽²⁾. The need for Community action in Latin America was acknowledged but the means of implementing it were not very innovative and this attempt came to nothing. However, the conflict in Central America made it all the more urgent. The third enlargement finally created new conditions within the Community for launching an initiative. The stepping-up of the Commission's activities meant that relations with Asia also needed to be modernised, with the United Kingdom taking great care to ensure that the position of those countries not included in the Lomé system was maintained, in particular as regards financial and technical aid. This new sector continued to grow in importance under the Delors Commission.

Finally, one new area of activity that became particularly significant was the support for democratisation and the strengthening of civil society in Chile under General Augusto Pinochet. Up until this point, there had been little scope for this type of action, even as part of the Member States' foreign policies. In the 1986 budget, the European Parliament set up budget heading 992, with an allocation of ECU 2 million, and the Commission, through its office in Santiago, offered valuable assistance to Chilean democratic forces. This was a new departure which foreshadowed further aid for democratic transition in Europe after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. The subject was considered so impor-

tant that Cheysson himself reserved the right to take decisions on all operations carried out in this context ⁽³⁾.

In this expanding area of activity, the Commission managed to make its presence and its role felt, both vis-à-vis the Member States and in the main discussion forums where international economic and trade issues were of vital significance. It took part in discussions on the trade aspects of the G7 Summit in London in 1977 thanks to President Jenkins's initiative and the support of the Benelux countries and Ireland ⁽⁴⁾. Similarly, at the GATT, the OECD and trade ministers' informal quadrilateral meetings (with Canada, Japan and the United States), the Commission demonstrated its expertise and managed to steer a difficult course between the interests at stake. Nonetheless, it often had to fight to be present at all the meetings held in these different contexts ⁽⁵⁾. It also sometimes found it difficult to gain acknowledgement of its role as the Community's exclusive spokesman vis-à-vis the Presidency during the GATT negotiations, despite its efforts to reach a political agreement with the countries that had the most reservations about this requirement, such as France and the United Kingdom ⁽⁶⁾.

DG I thus found that their activities changed considerably as a result of the first enlargement and the expansion of the activities just described. The Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations required major efforts to implement the new rules on, for example, technical requirements and standards in relation to adjustments to public procurement legislation. Similarly, the contractual and autono-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/10. Their continued assignment to DG VIII had given rise in the past to lengthy discussions.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, 'Latin America: a Community strategy', COM(80) 517, 4 September 1980; Denman, R., *The Mandarin's Tale*, Politico's Publishing, London, 2002, p. 235. Its main author acknowledged that the communication suggested 'nothing sensational but [pulled] together the threads of what we were doing ... and suggesting some modest further steps. [It] was quietly done down by the French.'

⁽³⁾ Interview with Dieter Oldekop, 4 October 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ Bossuat, G., *Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission européenne*, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, p. 240. Roy Jenkins would later on say to the Commission that separating trade from other issues was neither logical nor satisfactory; HAEC, COM(77), Special minutes No 429, second part, meeting of 11 May 1977.

⁽⁵⁾ For instance, at the Versailles Summit; HAEC, COM(82), Special minutes No 644, second part, meeting of 6 April 1982.

⁽⁶⁾ HAEC, BAC 83/1984/190, Memos for the acts of H. Étienne on the 1023rd meeting of the Committee of Deputy Permanent Representatives: International Cocoa Agreement, 26 March 1981.

mous measures developed in sectors such as textiles, steel or footwear represented a large volume of work for the Commission departments. Implementation of the Multifibre Arrangement called for 24 bilateral agreements with the low-price export countries, most of which were initialled in December 1977. In the case of steel, no fewer than 17 arrangements were concluded for the following year. Lastly, active management of economic policy and external trade instruments, including trade defence against dumping or the granting of premiums or subsidies, was taking place alongside developments in the GATT context in Geneva ⁽¹⁾. From the beginning of the 1980s, the Commission was also faced with a whole set of new tasks connected with the implementation and management of codes and agreements concluded in Geneva, either involving incorporating them in Community legislation or monitoring their application by non-member countries ⁽²⁾.

With a view to ensuring consistent external action, DG I also had to step up its coordination efforts, both for agricultural and industrial trade policy and for other areas of internal policy with external repercussions ⁽³⁾. The lack of staff and technical expertise meant that other directorates-general had to be called in to tackle complex sectoral issues. More effective exchanges of information and closer coordination were becoming vital. Difficulties emerged as regards the external action of DG VI (Agriculture), which managed to set up a large department to tackle the repercussions on the common agricultural policy of developments in international negotiations. In Geneva, DG VI defended a line with a purely sectoral focus that did not necessarily reflect the more global objectives of the Commission, which had to face the challenge of developing the external relations of the Community as a whole. As a result, DG I realised that its image and its effec-

tiveness depended on its capacity to play to the full its role as interlocutor with the other departments and to ensure that the interests of external trade policy were also taken into account when devising measures internal to the Community market. As a result, external relations inevitably became one of the Commission's main growth areas.

The expansion of external representation

The representative offices — or representations — in non-member countries or attached to several international organisations came under DG I. They dealt with the external repercussions of Community policies. Obviously there were other forms of representation, but their task was either to implement development aid (responsibility of DG VIII through EDF delegate controllers) or information activities (offices under the responsibility of DG X) ⁽⁴⁾.

To begin with, the network was very small and its expansion met with many difficulties. Administrative structures in the central departments were limited and compounded by budgetary costs and a constant shortage of staff. Nor did the pace of development of Community policies other than trade policy always justify the necessary investment. There was another reason — partly hidden — that also acted as a brake: the lack of enthusiasm shown by several Member States at the Commission developing an active presence abroad ⁽⁵⁾ outside the specific context of Geneva. Here, the Commission, thanks to the commitment of Paul Luyten and the support of the secretary-general of the GATT,

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Johannes Friedrich Beseler, 27 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from Paul Luyten, 26 March 1980.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Roderick Abbott, 2 February 2012, Leslie Fielding, 28 October 2010, Paul Luyten, 5 October 2010, and Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 22, 'Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics'.

⁽⁵⁾ Fielding, L., 'Europe as a global partner — The external relations of the European Community', University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Occasional Papers, No 7, London, 1991, p. 40; HAEC, BAC 300/1980/367, Report from the Working Party on Information to Coreper, 8 October 1963.

Eric Wyndham White, had its way and became the Community's spokesman after a long period of experimentation. A satisfactory balance was also reached at the OECD ⁽¹⁾. The case of New York was the total opposite.

As part of the international development strategy for the second United Nations development decade, several Member States wanted to have a Commission representative present in order to help them draw up positions on matters falling within the Community's sphere of competence. In October 1974, after the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to the UN, the General Assembly decided to grant the EEC permanent observer status. The resolution allowed the EEC to participate in the sessions of the assembly and its committees without voting rights. In June 1974, the Economic and Social Council also invited the EEC to send an observer to the Council's work on matters within its remit.

From the point of view of representation in non-member countries, in 1973 the Commission was represented only in Washington ⁽²⁾ and Santiago de Chile, the seat of the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute (important for the ECSC) and of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Officials in representations had great difficulty making themselves heard in areas other than trade. Their basic role was to prepare for official visits by commissioners and the hierarchy and to serve as a channel for communication with the authorities. When the College discussed the question of external representation on 30 May 1973, several commissioners called for closer coordination between action by Commission officials and Member States' representatives. Soames was in favour of extending cooperation in fields where the

Community was most experienced, while avoiding any overstepping into more political areas ⁽³⁾.

Setting up in Washington would not all be plain sailing. The American capital housed one of the very first of the Commission's external representations (together with the United Kingdom before the first enlargement). Jean Monnet had already set up an ECSC information office there. But the decision to embark on a high-level dialogue came up against difficulties in the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper). Under Soames, however, it was felt that the Washington representation should be strengthened by an official ambassador. The Italian diplomat Aldo Mazio was appointed, but Secretary-General Émile Noël had to promise in writing that the request made by the Commission for Washington would not be repeated elsewhere. Noël also had to agree that the accreditation of the Commission representative would not be to the president of the United States, but to the secretary of state ⁽⁴⁾.

The move towards a bigger network of representations took a different course. Initially the Commission considered the possibility of setting up information offices in Tokyo and Ottawa, but the host countries proved somewhat touchy and demanded that proper delegations be created. In February 1973, the Japanese mission to Brussels announced this to the Soames cabinet. In November 1973, the vice-president replied to the Canadians that 'the Commission, unlike a national government, cannot take a decision autonomously on this issue' ⁽⁵⁾. Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Brussels a year later and Canadian lobbying of the Member States broke the deadlock. The Member States' ambassadors on the spot also encouraged the setting-up of

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with Jean-Pierre Leng, 11 July 2011, and Raymond Phan Van Phi, 6 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 328/1993/142. Diplomatic privileges and immunities had been granted by the United States at the end of 1972.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from David Hannay, 30 May 1973.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Günter Burghardt, 3 October 2011. Burghardt played a significant operational role as assistant to Leslie Fielding and then to Roy Denman in DGI.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 416/1991/27, Press conference of Christopher Soames, Ottawa, 2 November 1973.

delegations. This was the case in Delhi ⁽¹⁾. But the lack of posts and funds meant that many requests were put on hold. Towards the end of the Ortolí Commission, the possibilities of reinforcing the network were examined and it was acknowledged that political considerations increasingly tended to take precedence over other issues ⁽²⁾.

The process sped up for two reasons: the *coup d'état* in Chile and the ambitions of the commissioner for development, the budget and Mediterranean policy. The arrival of General Pinochet's regime in September 1973 had had a considerable impact in Europe. There were fierce debates in the European Parliament on the merits of maintaining a representation in Santiago. The Commission, which would have preferred to leave things as they were, finally gave way to Parliament after bitter internal discussions. The delegation was accordingly transferred to Caracas, but a small office was left in Chile. In April 1975, David Hannay informed the cabinet of the president, who had visited Delhi, that the case of India could not be considered in isolation. The establishment of the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta created a new and even more pressing possibility. DG VIII also made efforts to set up representations in the Mediterranean area (which was the case 3 years later under the Jenkins Commission in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Delegations were set up in Bangkok (advocated by Haferkamp for the ASEAN countries with subsequent accreditation in Burma, Afghanistan and Nepal), in Vienna (for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)), and in Canberra and Belgrade ⁽³⁾. Things slowed down under Thorn (accreditations in

Bangladesh and India, 1983), but picked up again in the first 2 years of the Delors Commission (Brazil, Pakistan, Costa Rica and Indonesia).

Thanks to the efforts of the director responsible, Leslie Fielding, the Commission managed to introduce various diplomatic practices that until then had been sadly lacking. These concerned the procedures to follow to obtain approval of the heads of delegation and the proper drawing-up of credentials and letters of recall ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission took a long time to persuade the Member States and several host countries that the heads of delegation should be accredited at head of state or government level and have the rank and title of ambassador. This meant having to define the application to the Commission of the right to establish diplomatic relations with other states, which was a long, complex process. Thus, for example, Commission representatives in the ACP countries and, initially, in the Mediterranean area were not considered to be diplomats and were therefore not entitled to diplomatic protection under international conventions. When security conditions deteriorated in certain countries (Lebanon, Chad, Uganda, etc.) they had to take serious personal risks. Progress on the external representation front was all the more necessary as the Commission sought to step up its participation in European political cooperation (EPC) mechanisms and needed to rely on its representatives in non-member countries. It was not possible to merge the delegations and information offices under the same authority. All the commissioners responsible for information were opposed to this ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 416/1991/27 for Canada; BAC 300/1980/368 for Japan; BAC 136/1987/166 for Delhi.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 48/1984/20, Memo from E. Volpi to Leslie Fielding, 9 December 1976.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 300/1980/367 for New York; BAC 39/1980/1157 for Bangkok, Memo from Eberhard Rhein, 30 September 1977, and memo from R. Houlston to E. Volpi, dated 6 August 1979; BAC 39/1980/1158, Memo from Émile Noël to Vice-President Haferkamp, 21 May 1984.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1980/560, Memo from Roy Denman to Franz Froschmaier, 14 December 1978.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010.

The challenges of European political cooperation

According to the Luxembourg report of October 1970, also known as the Davignon report ⁽¹⁾, EPC had to maintain close contact with the Community institutions. The Commission would be invited to make known its views when EPC affected the activities of the European Communities. This left the Member States with a wide margin of interpretation and consolidated the divide between EPC and the Community framework. The pragmatic principles that had governed the Commission's inclusion were highlighted in the second report on EPC of July 1973: 'The Commission of the Communities has been invited to participate in ministerial discussions and in sessions of the Political Committee and of groups of experts when the agenda of the meeting provides for the examination of questions affecting the activities of the Communities.'

The Commission was first represented in the EPC context (at political director level) by Edmund Wellenstein, at the invitation of the first Danish Presidency ⁽²⁾. But after his departure in 1976 the practice was abandoned. At operational level, responsibility for ensuring the follow-up to and arrangements for the Commission's participation in EPC work lay with the secretary-general ⁽³⁾, who acted as liaison with the various Community institutions, in particular the Parliament and the Council. Little by little, officials from DG I and DG VIII

(for the ACP and Mediterranean countries) took part in the work, but at lower levels than that of the political directors. However, the president and the commissioners responsible for external relations paid close attention to EPC and the practices developing there. From 1974 they attended all ministerial meetings.

The Commission had to endeavour to make its voice heard at operational levels. But the diplomats — particularly the French — had been given instructions to prevent the possibility of its being involved in discussions on matters outside its sphere of competence. Sometimes its representatives were not allowed into the room where the meetings were held. The Commission's path was therefore long and hard and punctuated by arguments over competence.

At first, very modest resources were made available to EPC. It did not have a proper framework of common action or its own economic mechanisms (financial aid, trade, granting of preferences). Its sole instruments were the Member States' joint negotiating power, their votes in international forums, the alignment of diplomatic procedures (*démarches* towards other states) and declarations sometimes thrashed out on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The separation between the political/diplomatic and economic/trade spheres established strict limits between these fields, even though they had to be brought together at a higher level by the European Council and the conferences of foreign ministers. Even so, the Commission considered that attempts to integrate should focus on areas where Community competence and that of the Member States were closely interlinked. It was particularly in favour of using procedures to ensure that the Community and the Member States spoke with one voice through joint representations of the Presidency and the Commission ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Gainar M., *Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne*, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels ... Vienna, 2012, pp. 48–62.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.

⁽³⁾ Émile Noël had from the outset sought to bring the Commission in via the economic part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Bossuat, G., *Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission européenne*, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, pp. 224–225. In 1972, Commission officials were invited to participate in EPC for the first time. Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., *Dix ans de Coopération Politique Européenne*, Brussels, p. 14 (mimeographed manuscript dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author); the Commission gained wide experience in trade and economic negotiations with state-trading countries and Louis Kawan became a key go-between. Interviews with Louis Kawan, 15 December 2011 and 5 March 2012.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, Special minutes, EC Commission, 28 January 1976.

For many years, Community officials were therefore confined, in substantive terms, to the status of observer, to whom requests for information were made from time to time. However, their participation in EPC activities gradually stepped up. The agendas of meetings and any invitations depended on the Presidency in office. The vital question of knowing whether Community matters would be addressed therefore depended on its representatives, even though the presence or otherwise of the Commission was subject to the Presidency's interpretation (and the other delegations that had a sort of right of veto). Hence a degree of instability and a series of difficulties arose. The Commission could not ensure that it was present at all the working parties, even in cases where economic or development-related issues were discussed. Lastly, there were Presidencies on which the Commission had to exert pressure to ensure that reports with a mainly economic content were also made available to Coreper and not just to the Political Committee.

The first objective was to convince the Member States that Commission officials should, as a general rule, take part in all the working parties. If the Presidency found that their presence was not desirable, it had to get in touch with the Commission. If, during a meeting, a delegation considered their participation to be unjustified, it had to refer the matter to the Presidency or, if necessary, the Political Committee. Some of the difficulties encountered in this regard were, however, overcome in the spring of 1977 ⁽¹⁾.

But participation in several working parties continued to be problematic. In addition, there was the question of the presence of Commission representatives in those meetings which were not primarily the responsibility of the ministers of foreign affairs. From this point of view, the possibility of establish-

ing a precedent arose in October 1978 when the German Presidency wanted to invite the Commission to a meeting of justice ministers to discuss the European judicial area. Member States' opinions were divided. The German Presidency insisted and the Commission ended up attending the meeting ⁽²⁾. Similarly, the political activities or statements of certain commissioners, for example during meetings with foreign political figures, sometime caused tensions that had to be managed.

The topics most frequently addressed by EPC during its first years of operation were the Middle East, south-west Africa, Cyprus and the CSCE. The participation of Commission representatives in the CSCE was settled, in principle, from September 1973 as far as economic issues were concerned. Their names had to appear on the list of the delegation of the country holding the Council Presidency, but they had to be entered separately and state their position and job title. They expressed Community points of view both in plenary sessions and in working groups to the extent required by their responsibilities and procedures. Although the approach was clear, further problems arose after the signing of the Helsinki final act. The question of the Commission's participation in the implementation of the conclusions caused new difficulties as the Commission considered that, for problems falling within its remit, its spokesman would speak on behalf of the Member States ⁽³⁾. For its part, the Council Presidency insisted on its role in disseminating documents in international forums in order to make known the Community's position ⁽⁴⁾. In practice, by 1979 the only outstanding major difficulties for

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/784, Memo from Klaus Meyer to Roy Jenkins, 25 January 1977; Note for the file from H. da Fonseca-Wollheim, dated 1 April 1977.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791. Most of the work concerned extradition issues and certain criminal law problems. Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., *Dix ans de coopération politique européenne*, Brussels, p. 10 (mimeographed manuscript dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author).

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 250/1980/679, Memo from Theodorus Hijzen to Émile Noël, 14 January 1977.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM (77) 435, Minutes, second part, meeting of 22 June 1977.

the Commission were discussions on the Middle East and eastern Europe ⁽¹⁾.

Given these difficulties, it was therefore not surprising that the Commission's views about the effectiveness of EPC were somewhat mixed. In 1979, President Jenkins confided to the Irish minister who was going to take over the rotating Presidency of the Council that the performance of EPC was far from satisfactory. It was hesitant and slow to define its position. The strict division between the economic and political areas proved to be artificial ⁽²⁾. A memo dated May 1979 drafted by Christopher Audland underlined the need for the Member States to show more determination and to extend EPC activities. The Commission was well aware of the primarily reactive nature of EPC to crises and conflicts all over the world. The improvement of the system needed to go beyond expanding its geographical reach. There was also room for much more consultation in terms of content. In the Commission's view, any collaboration between Member States was a good thing, even if it took place outside the Community framework. Experience showed that many of the topics addressed in EPC tended, once they had become tangible and technical, gradually to move on to Community forums.

The organic development of EPC therefore essentially consisted of problems of interface. The dividing line varied depending on the subject and in a number of areas the separation between the

Community sphere and Member States' responsibility was simply artificial. Consequently, there was yet another call for the Commission to participate systematically in all EPC working parties and forums ⁽³⁾. This was the approach advocated by the London report of October 1981 and developments on the international scene in the following months showed to what extent the narrowing of the interface was desirable, even necessary. The Falklands War marked a stage in this realisation.

Following Argentina's occupation of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, Margaret Thatcher called on her partners to show their solidarity in order to bring political and economic pressure to bear on Argentina, on the basis of Article 224 of the treaty. At the operational level, the Commission reacted immediately through the director-general, Roy Denman, raising the possibility of also resorting to Article 113 and excluding Argentina from the benefits of the GSP or suspending all imports originating from that country for a period of 1 month — the time needed to reach a diplomatic solution. The question arose of the extent to which seeking a political consensus on the principle of combined action by the Member States and the Community was necessary in order to act. The reason for this discussion was the diverging views on the scope of Article 113. Certain Member States took the line that only measures that pursued a purely commercial objective came under trade policy. Recourse to Article 113 for sanctions was therefore fundamentally at odds with this approach ⁽⁴⁾. The Member States finally decided that the precondition for any economic sanctions was an EPC decision. On 9 April, the Political Committee managed to draw up conclusions on this basis.

The subsequent handling of the war confirmed that EPC mechanisms and Community procedures

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791, Memo from Christopher Audland to Eberhard Rhein, 26 July 1979. In his memoirs, Audland was fairly circumspect on the limitations of EPC. Several Member States had even tried to 'protect' the bilateral nature of their relations with the Eastern bloc countries against the 'interference' of EPC; da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., *Dix ans de coopération politique européenne*, Brussels, p. 7 (mimeographed manuscript dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author).

⁽²⁾ The case of Portugal after the revolution, the UN conference on refugees from Indochina and the supply of agricultural products to Poland on favourable terms in 1981 had shown the need to use Community instruments for foreign policy purposes. Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., *Dix ans de coopération politique européenne*, Brussels, pp. 23–25 (mimeographed manuscript dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author); Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791, Note for the file from Christopher Audland with annexes, 23 May 1979.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 252/1992/35, Memo from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann on the measures to be taken, 20 April 1982; Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.

were moving closer together. Discussions continued in parallel in the two forums and trade sanctions were approved by the Council on a proposal from the Commission (Regulation (EEC) No 877/82 of 16 April 1982). These sanctions were extended twice (Regulations (EEC) No 1176/82 of 18 May 1982 and (EEC) No 1254/82 of 24 May 1982) despite the final defection of Ireland and Italy, which opted for national measures under Article 224 rather than applying the second extension.

The Falklands War showed, in terms of both substance and procedure, the increasing closeness between the Community and the EPC context ⁽¹⁾. Accordingly, following the London report of October 1981 and the Falklands War, the Community's participation in EPC work developed on stronger bases even though certain operational problems concerning the interface still persisted. Many of these were settled in 1986 when the Single European Act came into force, since it placed the EPC on a more solid legal footing, and confirmed the involvement of the Commission in all of its activities.

Conclusion

The period between 1973 and 1986 began with the first enlargement and ended with the third. The

completion of the customs union provided a solid backdrop against which the Community's external relations, conducted through the intermediary of the Commission, changed radically. The Community's influence grew considerably. Its external relations expanded. Community/EFTA relations were consolidated. Despite occasional tensions, relations with the United States and Japan were marked more by cooperation than confrontation, even though confrontation in the commercial field was sharp at times. New partners began to emerge. The external context also helped. There were negative factors: the complexity of trade rules in certain sectors, the external repercussions of the CAP and reluctance on the part of the Member States to see the role of the Commission grow in the field of external relations. The Commission nevertheless managed to create new approaches and synergies to ensure that it became more involved on the international scene. The Community's distinctive personality gained increasing international recognition, which allowed it to participate in international agreements. The Commission did not hesitate to press ahead, enabling it to expand its representation in non-member countries and its role in EPC.

ANGEL VIÑAS, SIGFRIDO RAMÍREZ-PÉREZ
AND ÉRIC BUSSIÈRE

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 252/1992/35.

Chapter 24

The Mediterranean challenge

When membership negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom were concluded in January 1972, the European Community had every reason to expect that it would not have to deal again with the issue of enlargement for some time. With Greece, Spain and Portugal still under authoritarian rule, and the Austrians, Finns, Swedes and Swiss debarred from EC membership because of their status as Cold War neutrals, no western-leaning, democratic European countries remained outside the EEC — except of course for Norway, whose population voted to reject membership in 1972, and Iceland, which showed no sign of contemplating membership. The Commission thus seemed justified in disbanding the high-calibre task force it had put together to handle the enlargement talks and allowing most of its members to rejoin the extensively reorganised DG I. A new round of enlargement negotiations did not seem to be on the cards.

Relations with the countries of southern Europe which remained outside the EEC remained important, of course. Indeed, 1972 to 1974 was a period during which a sustained effort was made

by the Community to bring together within a new global Mediterranean policy the rather untidy patchwork of commercial agreements with Mediterranean countries that it had inherited from the previous decade. Prompted in part by the free trade arrangements which Portugal had with the EEC as an EFTA member, France and several other Member States pressed for similar trade arrangements to be extended more widely across the Mediterranean region ⁽¹⁾. Their campaign was rewarded at the Paris Summit of October 1972 at which the six Member States and the three countries due to join in January 1973 jointly accepted the importance of the Mediterranean region to the Community; they said that agreements with the Mediterranean countries required ‘a comprehensive and balanced approach’ ⁽²⁾. Over the years that followed a number of further deals were struck with countries on both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

⁽¹⁾ Bicchì, F., *European Foreign Policymaking toward the Mediterranean*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 63–101.

⁽²⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 10, 1972, p. 22.

The prospects of actual membership for any countries in the region seemed, however, to be dwindling rather than increasing. In the 1960s, Greece had been on course to join the Community, since the 1961 Treaty of Athens, the Community's first ever association agreement, had explicitly provided for full membership as the final outcome of the process, albeit without specifying any precise timetable. The Colonels' coup in 1967, however, interrupted this slow advance towards the EEC. The implementation of the association agreement was partially frozen, financial transfers were stopped and dialogue between Athens and the Community was reduced to a minimum. The EEC's tough stance on Greece also reinforced the growing consensus amongst the Nine that neither Spain nor Portugal could be considered for membership either, given their lack of democratic government. In 1973, therefore, no Mediterranean country looked likely to be in a position to seek entry into the Community in the near future. Trade agreements would have to suffice.

In the course of the next 2 years, this seemingly clear situation was to be transformed by a succession of events in southern Europe ⁽¹⁾. The first change occurred in Portugal, with the outbreak of the Carnation Revolution in April 1974. In the short term, admittedly, the confused state of politics in Lisbon, with different factions and parties competing for power, did more to highlight the potential instability of transition in southern Europe than to suggest that EEC membership was imminent ⁽²⁾. But with the end of the Estado Novo regime it was already clear that a new phase of EEC–Portugal relations was being ushered in. By March 1977, the government of Mario Soares was in a position to write to

the president of the Council applying for Community membership ⁽³⁾.

The Commission and the years of dictatorship in Greece

Democracy was restored in Greece in 1974. In 1975, the Commission received Greece's application for membership. It may be worth mentioning the approach adopted by the Commission during the dictatorship. The Commission took a courageous stance, despite the difficult position it found itself in after the institutional crisis and the Luxembourg compromise.

When the Colonels seized power in April 1967, the association agreement with Greece was frozen at the Commission's request, against opposition from some Member States. Thereafter, the Commission resisted any attempt to revive the agreement as long as the colonels remained in power.

That was the institution's official position: some leading figures in the Commission — commissioners or officials — discreetly offered personal and private support to the Greek resistance to the dictatorship. This took the form, for example, of material aid for Greeks in exile and direct links with democrats still in Greece.

Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi

The collapse of the Colonels' regime in Greece in July 1974 was followed by the triumphant return to power of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the man who had signed the 1961 Athens Treaty and a longstanding advocate of Greece's European vocation. Greece therefore moved swiftly to tighten its links with the Community, applying for full membership on 12 June 1975, less than a year after Karamanlis's return from exile ⁽⁴⁾. In Spain, also,

⁽¹⁾ Del Pero, M., Gavin, V. and Varsori, A., *Democrazie: l'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature*, Le Monnier, Florence, 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽³⁾ Historical archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels. Accession of Portugal. Application for accession to the EEC lodged by Portugal on 28 March 1977 under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, CM5/ADH3/82.

⁽⁴⁾ For a new, archive-based account, see Karamouzi, E., *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).



Portugal, Greece and Spain broke free from authoritarian rule in the course of the 1970s. Their success demanded a response from the European Community.

the prospects for change grew as General Franco's health deteriorated. Western Europe's last dictator died on 20 November 1975. As in neighbouring Portugal, the transition process was a complex one, and did not immediately result in a clear turn to Europe. But in July 1977 Spain, too, submitted a formal application to join the EEC ⁽¹⁾. In the space of 4 years, therefore, a further round of enlargement had gone from being a remote prospect to a very immediate challenge.

The tenor of the Community's response was shaped by two inescapable realities. The first was the political imperative of doing everything possible to help consolidate democracy in southern Europe and the region's alignment with the west, an objective that became all the more vital at a time when western governments fretted about the Cold War vulner-

ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) 'southern flank'. The new governments in Greece, Spain and Portugal remained fragile, and the prospect of Community membership might well prove invaluable by giving them an objective and an incentive not to abandon economic reform and democratisation; indeed, many European politicians and political parties sought to encourage those working for reform in all three southern countries by promising them Community membership as a reward for success ⁽²⁾. Now the EEC had to deliver. Roy Jenkins set out the issue clearly to the Luxembourg Council in October 1977: 'The Commission believes that any reply which we might give to the candidate countries which rejected their applications, even implicitly or indirectly, would not be acceptable. A straight refusal would be a severe blow to the fragile democratic regimes which have emerged with the open encouragement of the Community and which are already to some extent dependent on us' ⁽³⁾.

The second, countervailing reality was that southern enlargement could prove economically and institutionally difficult for the Community, especially at a time of ongoing economic and institutional difficulties within the EEC. All three applicants were much poorer than the Member States. Per capita GDP in Greece stood at 44 % of the Community average ⁽⁴⁾, that of Portugal at 55 % and that of Spain at 77 % ⁽⁵⁾. Spain also had a serious problem of unemployment, with a rate running

⁽¹⁾ MacLennan, J. C., *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957–85*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000.

⁽²⁾ See, for example, Ortuno Anaya, P., *European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Statement by President Jenkins to the Council in Luxembourg, 18 October 1977.

⁽⁴⁾ Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, 'The Community of Ten', First periodic report on the economic and social situation of the regions of the Community, 1981, p. 114.

⁽⁵⁾ Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, 'General characteristics of the enlarged Community', Graph 2.1, 'Gross domestic product per head of population', Third periodic report on the social and economic situation and development of the regions of the Community, 1987, p. 9.

at twice the Community average in 1986 ⁽¹⁾. All three would pose challenges in terms of the ability of their administrative systems to fully adapt to the *acquis communautaire*. The difficulties the Commission was to experience during the membership talks in obtaining accurate statistics on the economic situation in Greece did not augur well for the administrative challenge ahead ⁽²⁾. An additional three Member States would also put great strain on a Community institutional system that seemed to be struggling to absorb the new countries that had entered in 1973. Furthermore, Spain in particular was a major agricultural producer and had a large fishing fleet, which was likely to pose problems for two key Community policies, the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy, both of which were already under pressure in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The similarity between Greek, Spanish and Portuguese agricultural produce and that of southern France and Italy meant that the costs of southern expansion would fall disproportionately on agricultural regions that already felt disadvantaged within the existing CAP. Honouring the political imperative to enlarge would be no easy task. The row between the Commission and the Council over the Commission's opinion on Greek membership, described below, was just a foretaste of how difficult it was to be to reconcile these twin realities.

A final difficulty arose over the question of whether or not all three applications should be considered as a package, or whether Greece's 2-year head-start should be respected. The temptation to take an overall approach was obvious: all three countries posed similar challenges, and a rational response would be easier to devise were the Greek, Spanish

and Portuguese cases considered together ⁽³⁾. There would also be substantial administrative and political advantages to dealing with the three applications at once. In the end, however, the Greeks' determination to avoid having their application delayed in order to allow the Spanish and Portuguese to catch up prevailed. The Community's southern enlargement thus became a two-stage affair, with Greece reaching the finishing line in 1981 and the Iberian countries not until 1986.

Greece's accession: a political and a technical challenge

The dilemmas underlying the process of southern enlargement were apparent from the very start of the Greek membership bid. The Council asked the Commission for its opinion on 24 June 1975 ⁽⁴⁾. On 27 January 1976, President François-Xavier Ortoli met Greece's permanent representative, Stefanos Stathatos, who referred to reports in the Greek press and the *International Herald Tribune* that there were doubts as to whether the Commission would reply favourably. After two heated meetings, the Commission issued its opinion on 29 January 1976 ⁽⁵⁾. Of the various proposals on the table, only that of Christopher Soames, vice-president responsible for external relations, met with majority approval. The four French and Italian commissioners, including François-Xavier Ortoli and Altiero Spinelli, voted against. The opinion adopted suggested that negotiations be opened after a pre-accession period, which must 'in any case be limited', in order to encourage economic reforms. A pre-accession phase

⁽¹⁾ Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, 'General characteristics of the enlarged Community', Table 2.2.1-B.1, 'Comparable unemployment rates', Third periodic report on the social and economic situation and development of the regions of the Community, 1987.

⁽²⁾ Karamouzi, E., *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(78) 120 final, 24 April 1978. The Commission did attempt an overall assessment of the three enlargement bids in its 1978 'Fresco'.

⁽⁴⁾ The Commission organised itself internally to draw up its opinion by setting up an interdepartmental working party. Its first meeting was on 8 October 1975. The interim report of DG I (in charge of the interdepartmental working party) on Greece's membership application was issued on 6 November 1975.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, COM(76) 30 final, 29 January 1976.

would also have the merit of giving more time for arrangements to be found with Turkey that might prevent Community membership from becoming a further source of discord between the two eastern Mediterranean rivals. Soames stressed that the Commission's opinion was firmly in favour of the principle of Greece's membership ⁽¹⁾. The Commission's position was, however, publicly condemned by one of its members, Spinelli, who voiced his views in the international press ⁽²⁾.

On 9 February 1976, the Council accepted Greece's application without adopting the Commission's proposal to impose a pre-accession probationary period. Both Germany and France backed its candidacy for mainly political reasons. Despite the ambiguity of the Commission's opinion, they persuaded their European partners to come out clearly in favour of opening negotiations. The constant pressure exerted by the Greek government also played its part in this decision ⁽³⁾. The negotiations officially started on 27 July 1976. The basic uncertainties about the feasibility of a rapid enlargement highlighted in the Commission opinion had not gone away, however, despite this political decision to press ahead.

The Commission's misgivings also surfaced in the debate — internal and external — about whether to view the Greek application in isolation, or as part of a wider process of southern enlargement. In the end, the overall approach adopted for the 1973 enlargement was discarded in favour of negotiations with Greece that were kept separate from those with Spain and Portugal ⁽⁴⁾ so as to deal with



Cover page of *Euroforum* on Greece's accession to the European Communities.

the specific nature of Greece's social, economic and political structures ⁽⁵⁾ and to assess its candidacy per se. This was not an easy decision to reach, and the situation remained strained for a year and a half after the official opening of negotiations with Greece. The Commission was aware that the three candidates had problems in common and it carried out a number of informal studies on common aspects of industrial policy, the setting-up of

⁽¹⁾ For a full view of the debates and proposals discussed within the Commission, see HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 369, second part, meeting of 28 and 29 January 1976, sitting of 28 January, pp. 18–30.

⁽²⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.

⁽³⁾ Karamouzi, E., *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 442, second part, meeting of 13 and of 16–18 September 1977, sitting of 17 September, pp. 16–17, Minutes of the discussions at the informal Commission meeting at La Roche-en-Ardenne on the economic problems arising from enlargement.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 66/1985/192, Memo from David Goodchild (Task Force on Greece) to President Jenkins, 22 July 1977, p. 2.

new financial instruments and institutional matters ⁽¹⁾. These overall studies show how aware the Commission was that, as well as the candidate countries adapting to EEC membership, the Community was going to have to adapt to enlargement. One of the more detailed Commission studies of the implications of enlargement, the ‘Fresco’ of April 1978, highlighted, for instance, the need for the Nine to rethink their approach to Mediterranean agriculture as part of the enlargement process and to make a serious effort to address ‘the tendency of the decision-making process to become more cumbersome as a result of the involvement of a larger number of Member States’ ⁽²⁾.

Faced with the risk of an overall approach and the possibility that its membership bid would be put in the mix with those of the other applicants ⁽³⁾, Greece exerted pressure to get a fast-track, individual process. On 27 January 1978, Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek prime minister, argued the case for Greece’s unique position and insisted on speeding up the timetable. Panayiotis Papaligouras, the Greek minister for economic coordination, used the association agreement to support the case for Greece’s unique position. On 19 December 1977, he submitted a tight timetable, proposing that all of the remaining substantive issues be tied up by July 1978. This pressure began to have an effect. The Commission and the Member States were aware that any delay might work in favour of anti-democratic and anti-European forces in the country. The November 1977 elections, for instance, while won comfortably by Karamanlis, had shown a strong surge in support for parties hostile to Greece’s EEC bid. As a result, the Commission became more and more aware of the political

imperative to press ahead, despite the difficulties that this might involve. President Jenkins emphasised that they had to distinguish between opinions and the negotiations themselves, as the main reason for the applications was political. Any accession procedure that was politically unacceptable to these countries could undermine the whole process.

The Commission organised itself internally for the negotiations (see table ‘The Commission’s internal organisation responsible for preparing Greece’s accession’, page 435). Concerning the order of the negotiating chapters, the Commission wanted to start with the customs union, followed by external relations. Agriculture and state aid were also priority chapters. Greece presented a memorandum on agriculture early in the negotiations. The speed at which the Community formulated its negotiating positions in this sector was, however, slower than Greece would have liked.

For Greece, the Commission inaugurated a ‘flexible’ transition model ⁽⁴⁾. Compared with the first enlargement, the transitional period was longer and was staggered. It varied by sector and involved sweeping exemptions. This contrasted with the first enlargement, during which exemptions were limited to the transitional period. But when Greece asked for significant and permanent exemptions, the Commission referred to the 1973 precedent.

While the Commission thought that the transitional period should be between 5 and 10 years, Greece wanted at most 5 years (customs union and external relations), with shorter periods in certain cases where the *acquis* would apply immediately. On agricultural policy (especially fruit exports), state aid and the free movement of labour, there were political disagreements between the Com-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, BAC 66/1985/192, Memo from the Task Force on Greece to President Jenkins, 31 March 1977.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, ‘General considerations on the problem of enlargement’, Commission communication to the Council, COM(78) 120 final, 24 April 1978.

⁽³⁾ Greece reacted negatively to this approach, which favoured policy coordination before accession. After accession, its different economic structure became its key argument for adoption of the memorandum.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 49, ‘Avant-projet de rapport du groupe de travail sur les questions institutionnelles liées à l’élargissement sur “La période de transition”’, 30 November 1977, interdepartmental group on enlargement of the Communities — institutional aspects (the Kergorlay group), December 1977.

The Commission's internal organisation responsible for preparing Greece's accession

Year	Theme	DG
1977	Working party on the general institutional implications of enlargement	Secretariat-General Chaired by the Secretary-General, Émile Noël
	Task force on new accessions	DG for External Relations
	Delegation for negotiations with Greece	DG for External Relations Roland de Kergorlay was responsible for general coordination
	Task Force on Greece	DG for External Relations
	Interdepartmental working party on enlargement issues	Secretariat-General Chaired by Vice-President Lorenzo Natali
	Working party on enlargement-related institutional issues	Secretariat-General
1978	Subgroup on the administrative aspects of enlargement	Secretariat-General Chaired by Christopher Audland
	Delegation for negotiations on enlargement	DG for External Relations Roland de Kergorlay was responsible for general coordination
	Three thematic interdepartmental working parties (economy, agriculture and industry/state aid)	Chaired by the DGs for Economic and Financial Affairs, for Agriculture and for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs The enlargement delegation acted as secretariat
	Committee of deputies to improve the negotiation structures	

mission, the Council and Greece. From the very start of the negotiations, Panayiotis Papaligouras demanded that provision be made in the accession act for a declaration recognising the importance of state aid. The Commission thought there was no need for transitional periods in this area. Nevertheless, it agreed to the Greek demand. After accession it would have the job of examining existing forms of aid and setting time limits and transitional arrangements under Articles 92 et seq. of the treaty of accession.

Greece's accession also offered the Commission an opportunity to put forward some innovative ideas on institutional matters inspired by the 1975 Tindemans report ⁽¹⁾. In response to the suggestion by some Member States that the blocking minority be frozen, despite the increase in the total number of votes with enlargement, the Commission came up with a compromise proposal that involved

⁽¹⁾ See the introduction to Part Three.

aligning the votes awarded to Greece closely on the current percentages. In addition, it set a new qualified majority which, in turn, changed the blocking minority (45 of 63 votes for the new majority) ⁽¹⁾. Another idea canvassed in the light of the conclusions of the Spierenburg report ⁽²⁾ was to reduce the number of commissioners when Greece joined, and various formulas were proposed (one commissioner per Member State, junior Commission members, etc.). In the end, despite the addition of a new member, the proposal to maintain the relative strength of the Member States carried the day.

This institutional conservatism reflected a more general characteristic of the Greek membership bid, namely that the Nine and the Commission ultimately decided for political reasons to push ahead with the bid, despite the fact that a number of fundamental issues had not been wholly resolved. This is why neither the breakthrough in the membership talks under the German Council Presidency in the second half of 1978 nor the final mopping up of the remaining issues in the first months of 1979 led to any radical rethink of the approach to Mediterranean agriculture or of institutional rebalancing, as advocated in earlier Commission documents such as the 'Fresco'.

Discussions on both issues were already under way, but no immediate agreement was in sight. The Greek membership application hence ended much as it had begun, with the desire to think through the broader implications of enlargement expressed in the initial Commission opinion swept aside once more by the political imperatives of enlargement. This certainly helped the task of Karamanlis. Indeed, the Greek leader's skilful personal diplomacy with his fellow European leaders, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in particular, but also Roy Jenkins,

was almost certainly one of the key reasons why the pressure to enlarge quickly overcame the need fully to equip both the applicants and the Community for the challenges ahead. But as will be seen below, this decision to put off a thorough consideration of how an enlarged Europe would function was a step that was to have serious implications for the other two southern European applicants.

On 28 May 1979, the treaty of accession bringing Greece into the EEC was signed, amid much pomp and splendour, at a ceremony in Athens. Eighteen months later, on 1 January 1981, Greece took its place amongst the Community Member States. As had earlier been the case with the United Kingdom, however, formal entry did not bring a definitive end to uncertainty over Greece's place within the EEC. Within months of accession, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which had campaigned in favour of Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the EEC, won a general election. On 22 March 1982, the new Greek government sent a memorandum pointing out the weakness of the Greek economy and asking for more concessions and financial support. On 29 March 1982, the Commission proposed to the Council an approach that took some account of these demands. The Greek government reacted favourably and the Council supported the proposal. The Commission tasked Richard Burke, a member of the Commission, with coordinating the operation, which involved preparing a number of proposals and maintaining relations with the Greek authorities to ensure that the Community *acquis* was being implemented. The Commission strove to get agreement with the Greek authorities on a tight timetable for getting Greece to comply with Community rules ⁽¹⁾. Some years later, under the first Delors Commission, it became clear that very little progress had been made, particularly as regards transposing Community directives as entailed by the act of accession. Arthur Cockfield, vice-president responsible for the internal market, visited Greece with a view to a thorough inquiry. Regular contacts continued over the years.

⁽¹⁾ It was the Danish, French and British delegations that wanted to keep the number of blocking minority votes as it was, on the lines of the Community of Nine. See COM(78) 356 final, proposal from the Commission, communication of 20 July 1978.

⁽²⁾ See Chapter 6, 'An administrative culture in transition'.

The arrival of Greek officials in Brussels

Unlike the Iberian applicants, whose case is discussed below, Greek officials arrived in Brussels and joined their new institutions in the course of the period to be covered by this volume. It is therefore important briefly to review the process by which they were chosen and their overall numbers.

The Commission calculated that Greeks should make up 6 % of all staff (A and B categories) in order to establish a new geographical balance. To avoid significant deficits in some grades, as happened in 1973, the Commission decided to recruit gradually over 2 years, from 1980 to 1982. Only 15 officials in grades A1–A3 were due to retire by 1981; at least half of the posts would have to be found by creating new ones. The Commission suggested changes to the pension scheme ⁽²⁾. Filling lower grades did not pose any particular problem. Greece's quotas for the higher grades entitled it to one A1, five A2s and 13 A3s. Candidates for the political A1 and A2 posts were put forward by the Greek government by means of a list offering alternative candidates for each post, sent via the Greek commissioner. Greece wanted to use the same method for A3s, a grade for which the Commission normally reserved the right to look for candidates from elsewhere. Eleven months before

accession, the Greek government submitted to the Commission a (partisan-based) list of 45 candidates ⁽³⁾ for 15 posts. In May 1980, the Commission acknowledged that Greece constituted a special case ⁽⁴⁾. The newly elected socialist government of Greece put forward a new list of candidates in February 1982. It also planned to transmit other names (which would also be valid for A2 and A3 posts). The tactic of bundling appointments thus continued ⁽⁵⁾. Seeing that the A2 candidates did not satisfy the profile requested, the Commission let it be known that it wanted to replace one A2 post by a number of A3s ⁽⁶⁾. Grigoris Varfis and Wilhelm Haferkamp agreed to replace the A2 post in DG I by two (well-placed) A3 posts in the same DG ⁽⁷⁾.

The Greek authorities believed that the Commission had been more exacting for the recruitment of Greek staff than for staff in 1973 and that their lists had been disregarded. While striving not to give the impression that it was constantly ignoring the Greek government's recommendations, the Commission steadily pushed ahead with appointments between the end of 1982 and the end of 1983 (see table 'High-grade posts awarded to Greek nationals at 2 December 1983', page 438).

⁽¹⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 3, 1982, pp. 96–100; No 4, 1983, p. 69.

⁽²⁾ In 1973, Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No 2530/72 provided for exceptions to the staff regulations. The Commission incorporated the new officials in a single operation. In Greece's case, the special arrangements consisted in encouraging retirement at 60 and early retirement between 50 and 60, and imposing mandatory retirement at 65.

⁽³⁾ The opposition Greek press referred to it as the 'pinnacle of byzantinism' and special treatment (*Eleutherotypia*, 23 June 1979). Karamanlis's governing party was accused of excluding from the recruitment lists candidates close to the socialist and communist parties (*Eleutherotypia*, 27 June 1980).

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, BAC 39/1986/82, Memo by Henri Étienne, 12 May 1980, concerning the meeting between Christopher Tugendhat and deputy permanent representatives on 8 May 1980 to discuss the recruitment of Greek officials.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Grigoris Varfis, 6 October 2010.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Ioannis Yennimatas, 7 October 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 2916, Follow-up to enlargement ('Fresco') 1982, Greek recruitment 1981–83 (documents 1980 to 1986).

High-grade posts awarded to Greek nationals at 2 December 1983 ⁽¹⁾

Category	Number	Post	% of category
A1	1	DG XI	0.9 %
A2	3	Cabinet (1), DG V (1), SOEC (1)	6 %
A3	13	DG II (2), DG III (1), DG IV (1), DG VI (2), DG VII (1), DG VIII (1), DG IX (1), DG X (1), DG XVI (1), Legal Service (2)	11.4 %
A4–A7	97	Including two A5s and two A7s in the cabinet	

Enlargement to include Spain and Portugal

The accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 completed the Community's southwards extension. The background to these accessions was quite different and the situations of the countries were dissimilar.

The case of Spain

Spain was excluded from European organisations for many years. Its international position was weak because of the regime in power. After a long wait, the Community offered it an opening in the form of a two-phase preferential trade agreement, which also avoided obstacles within the GATT. The agreement was signed in 1970. Wisely, the conditions for moving from one phase to another were not specified. The basic problem was the lack of democracy in Spain.

The first enlargement affected Spain's trade with the three new Member States and so the existing agreement needed amendment. Political developments,

however, created an obstacle. In March 1975, several members of the Commission (Claude Cheysson, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Henri Simonet, Altiero Spinelli and George Thomson), though speaking in a personal capacity, issued firmly worded protests about acts of repression against opposition leaders in Spain. In September, the Commission as an institution expressed concern about a number of death sentences. When the executions went ahead there was an outcry. By early October, the Community decided that there was no point in pursuing negotiations on the revision of the trade agreement. The possibility of Commission representation at Franco's funeral in 1975 was regarded with serious misgivings. The Danish Commissioner, Finn Olav Gundelach, represented the Commission at the religious ceremony and at the swearing-in of King Juan Carlos I on November 27. The Commission decided that, if questioned by the media, it would focus on its openness to strengthening relations between the Community and a democratic Spain ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 2917, Follow-up to enlargement ('Fresco') 1982, Greek recruitment 1981–83 (documents 1980 to 1986).

⁽²⁾ HAEC, COM(75) Minutes No 333, second part, 25 March 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 350, meeting of 10 September 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 352, second part, 24 September 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 353, meeting of 1 October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 354, second part, 8 October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 357, second part, 28 and 29 October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 360, meeting of 17, 19 and 20 November 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 361, second part, 26 November 1975.



The anxieties of French farmers threatened to derail the Iberian enlargement.

At last the negotiations resumed. The new Foreign Minister, José María de Areilza, Count of Motrico, visited Member State capitals and Brussels in February 1976. He outlined the new government's democratisation plans and its desire to limit negotiations to a revamping of the 1970 agreement. He also spoke of the desire to join the Community. It was made plain to him that this was impossible until a truly democratic system was in place ⁽¹⁾.

The negotiations ran into considerable difficulties ⁽²⁾. In March 1977, the Commission envisaged purely technical adjustments to the bilateral agreement. But this proved an inadequate response in the light of the fast-moving political situation in Spain. In late March 1977, Étienne Davignon and Finn Olav Gundelach argued for a detailed analy-

the industrial and agricultural situation in the countries that were already unofficially considered to be applicants ⁽³⁾. The expectation was fulfilled. Four months after Portugal, and after the first free elections since 1936, the Spanish government presented an official request to become a member.

The time taken to draw up the opinion on Spain was similar to that taken for Portugal. It was sent to the Council on 29 November 1978 ⁽⁴⁾. Politically, the Commission welcomed the prospect of a democratic Spain as a member of the Community. From an economic point of view, however, it foresaw that integration would not be easy. It would involve dealing with the problems of industrial restructuring, strengthening agriculture and implementing regional and social recovery measures in Spain. All

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 372, second part, 17 and 18 February 1975, p. 15.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 250/1980/674 and 675 contain abundant documentation.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 420, second part, 2 and 3 March 1977; COM(77) Minutes No 424, second part, 30 March and 1 April 1977.

⁽⁴⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 9, 1978.

that would take time and money. Transition would take place over 10 years. The Council responded as promptly as it had for Portugal. Negotiations opened in February 1979.

The case of Portugal

Portugal was a founder member of NATO and of EFTA. It had more room for manoeuvre on the international scene than Spain, and was seen as more acceptable by European organisations. The Carnation Revolution of April 1974 created an unprecedented situation. The fact that a communist party had achieved such influence in a NATO member state provoked consternation. Germany provided financial, political and diplomatic support, and facilitated the development of the socialist party to act as a counterweight. From there it was only a step to advocate Community intervention.

Portugal regarded continued access to the British market as an absolute priority, but did not immediately seek to change its institutional links with the Community. It preferred to improve trading arrangements and establish industrial, technical and financial cooperation. However, as early as November 1974 it let it be known that it did not exclude the possibility of establishing new links. Concerns about the situation in Portugal led to a proliferation of high-level contacts. Several prominent figures visited Portugal, including Willy Brandt, James Callaghan, Max van der Stoep and Altiero Spinelli. In June 1974, President Ortoli and Vice-President Soames held talks with the prime minister and the foreign minister. In October, Portugal's requests went beyond trade and focused on access to loans from the European Investment Bank.

The Commission sent Soames to Lisbon in February 1975 ⁽¹⁾. A month later, the Commission dis-

cussed Spinelli's suggestion that it issue a statement expressing the hope that the democratic order be confirmed. The idea of offering Portugal an association agreement was dropped. However, work started on establishing a free trade area for goods in Chapters 25 to 99 of the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) ⁽²⁾. The proposals submitted by the Commission to the Council demonstrated its philosophy: 'For its part, the Community from the first moment welcomed the establishment of democracy in Portugal and the possibilities this opened up for closer relations between the Community and Portugal. This attitude stems from the Community's very nature, consecrated in the treaty, namely that of an open Community based on the principles of democracy and freedom. It has a natural interest therefore in supporting wholeheartedly Portugal's effort to reinforce its democratic order and its economic and social progress' ⁽³⁾.

Work in the Council on the provision of emergency aid took time. The political situation was far from settled and uncertainty was growing. Economic collapse had to be prevented. Aid therefore had to be effective and fast ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission gave instructions for vigorous action to speed up work within the Council and its working parties as much as possible.

The Portuguese government was notified of an aid grant of 180 million units of account on 7 October 1975. The EIB would provide loans on favourable terms ⁽⁵⁾. Several Member States wanted projects to be approved by a procedure that was managed and controlled by their representatives. The Commis-

⁽¹⁾ Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2010.

⁽²⁾ The above analysis is based on a wide variety of documents kept at the HAEC, BAC 250/1980/372 and 505, and BAC 147/1991/439, and on the minutes of Commission meetings, first and second parts.

⁽³⁾ HAEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council on measures in favour of Portugal, COM(75) 287 final, 11 June 1975.

⁽⁴⁾ The Council meeting on 16 and 17 July 1975 discussed the proposals and declared that the European Community would support only a pluralist democracy. The ministerial meeting with the Portuguese was postponed because of political turmoil in Portugal.

⁽⁵⁾ HAEC, BAC 250/1980/378, 381 and 382 contain abundant documentation.

sion opposed this; under the general policy guidelines agreed with the Council, responsibility for the management of the aid was to rest with the Commission ⁽¹⁾.

The Portuguese authorities were now favouring the prospect of joining the Community. The Commission had been preparing for this since the end of 1976. On 14 January 1977, Lorenzo Natali announced that a comprehensive study on the problems of further enlargement was needed. Two months later the Portuguese government officially applied for membership. The uncertainty was over.

The Commission's opinion was sent to the Council on 19 May 1978, 14 months after the application for membership ⁽²⁾. An unambiguously favourable reply should be given, it said. Economically, membership would have only a small direct impact on the Community, given the relative size of the Portuguese economy. The more serious problems were linked to the wide development gaps. They could hold up progress towards greater Community convergence, but they were far from being considered insurmountable.

The Council reacted immediately and gave the green light on 6 June. Negotiations officially opened in October 1978.

The membership negotiations

The membership negotiations lasted 6 years and were a frustrating episode for candidates and the Community alike ⁽³⁾. To some extent this slowness reflected the genuine substantive problems thrown up by Spanish and Portuguese membership. As

the Commission's opinions had made clear, the two Iberian applicants, Spain in particular, posed some very real difficulties to the Community, especially given the pre-existing concerns within the EEC about two of the policies most likely to be affected by enlargement, namely the CAP and the CFP. It was also going to be difficult to cope with the budgetary implications of enlargement and the inclusion of two poorer countries, each of which would be in need of substantial injections of Community money, at a time when the whole issue of how the Community was financed was the subject of bitter controversy among the Member States and the Community institutions ⁽⁴⁾. There was also a widespread awareness that the underlying questions raised by enlargement to the south that had not been answered in the course of the Greek membership negotiations could not be escaped this time around. But even more fundamentally, the slowness of the process reflected the collision of the two inescapable realities mentioned above: the Community could not afford to reject membership requests from the two new Iberian democracies, but equally, at a time of economic and institutional crisis within the EEC, the Member States recoiled from accepting the costs — economic and financial — which Spanish and Portuguese membership would bring. Delay and procrastination were the inevitable result.

The team assembled by the European Commission to handle the Iberian negotiations was a high-calibre one. At Commission level, responsibility lay with the experienced Italian Vice-President, Lorenzo Natali, who hence became a regular visitor to both of the applicant countries ⁽⁵⁾. A member of the Jenkins, Thorn and Delors Commissions, Natali provided an important element of continuity in the Commission's approach to the Iberian membership negotiations. Reporting to Lorenzo Natali was a team led initially by Roland de Kergorlay and then

⁽¹⁾ One of these cases was brought to the attention of the whole Commission in October 1981.

⁽²⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1978.

⁽³⁾ The most detailed account from the Spanish side is Bassols, R., *España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE 1957–85*, Política Exterior, Madrid, 1995.

⁽⁴⁾ See Chapter 11, 'The politics of the Community budget'.

⁽⁵⁾ See Gramaglia, G. (ed.), *Lorenzo Natali in Europa. Ricordi e testimonianze*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2010, pp. 57–66 and 155–163.

Fernand Spaak, before finally becoming the responsibility of Inger Nielsen. In such complex negotiations, the enlargement task force, and subsequently, from May 1979, the Commission delegation to the enlargement negotiations, while officially part of DG I, had to liaise constantly with multiple other parts of the Commission, notably DG VI and DG XIV.

Neither the Commission's high level of expertise nor its clear desire to see the negotiations advance relatively quickly were sufficient to overcome the hesitations and misgivings of the Member States about enlargement. As in the 1960s, it was France that proved most open about its reservations concerning a rapid extension of Community membership. In June 1980, President Giscard d'Estaing gave a speech in which he outlined his serious doubts about rapid enlargement to Spain and Portugal and emphasised the need for the existing Member States to settle their internal differences, especially those resulting from the 1973 enlargement, before further countries were allowed to enter: the Community's priority should be to complete the first enlargement before embarking on a second, he declared ⁽¹⁾. This move was greeted with fury in Spain, where the press talked of a *giscardazo*, a 'hammer blow from Giscard' ⁽²⁾. The parallels drawn with General de Gaulle's treatment of the United Kingdom two decades earlier seemed alarming.

The Commission sought to distance itself from Giscard d'Estaing's stance. The official response of the Commission spokesman to the news was sufficiently positive to earn praise and gratitude from Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the Spanish minister in charge of the EEC membership negotiations, at

a meeting with President Jenkins ⁽³⁾. At the same meeting, President Jenkins himself emphasised that the Commission remained committed to the simultaneous entry of both Iberian applicants, preferably by 1 January 1983 ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission president once again sought to be as positive as possible about the prospects of progress in the negotiations when he visited Madrid in October 1980 ⁽⁵⁾. The next Commission President, Gaston Thorn, likewise assured Spanish and Portuguese representatives of the Commission's goodwill. Commission negotiators meanwhile sought to press ahead with their discussions and examination of the multiple technical problems raised by Spanish and Portuguese entry.

There was no escaping the fact, however, that rapid progress in the talks with Spain and Portugal had become dependent on the European Community resolving a number of serious internal disagreements ⁽⁶⁾. The first of these was the vexed question of how the Community should be financed and the allocation of the EEC budget, both between sectors and between Member States. The issues raised by the row over the United Kingdom's budgetary contribution were, in other words, also casting their shadow over enlargement. Second, progress on containing CAP expenditure was equally vital; with the agricultural policy already struggling to cope, the entry of a big producer like Spain posed major difficulties. Third, the Community needed to move ahead with the completion of the common fisheries policy before being able to contemplate the incorporation of the Spanish and Portuguese fishing industries, which would increase the number of people

⁽¹⁾ Quoted in Trouvé, M., *L'Espagne et l'Europe. De la dictature de Franco à l'Union européenne*, 'Euroclio' collection, Vol. 43, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2008, p. 333.

⁽²⁾ Alonso, A., *España en el Mercado Común. Del acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de Doce*, Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1985, pp. 140–141; Bassols, R., *España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE 1957–85*, Política Exterior, Madrid, 1995, pp. 237–248.

⁽³⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 18, Note of a meeting between the President of the European Commission and the Spanish minister for relations with the Community, 16 July 1980.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁵⁾ Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, file 18, Record of conversation between the President of the European Commission and the President of the Government of Spain, Palacio de la Moncloa, Madrid, 2 October 1980, and record of a conversation between the President of the European Commission and the Spanish minister for community relations at la Trinidad, Madrid, 2 October 1980.

⁽⁶⁾ See 'Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals', Commission communication to the European Council, 3 and 4 December 1982, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 8, 1982.



The Spanish and Portuguese flags are raised outside the Berlaymont in December 1985 to mark the imminent arrival of the two new Member States.

involved in the EEC fisheries sector by 133 %, and the size of the total Community fleet by 86 % ⁽¹⁾. Fourth, the wider issue of the Community's whole approach to the Mediterranean region had to be reassessed ⁽²⁾. And last but not least, the sclerotic performance of the Community's decision-making procedure needed to be addressed before the addition of two further Member States could be envisaged. On this issue, the Commission had no doubt that a greater use of majority voting in the Council was an important part of the solution ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Figures quoted by Trouvé, M., *L'Espagne et l'Europe. De la dictature de Franco à l'Union européenne*, 'Euroclio' collection, Vol. 43, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2008, p. 437.

⁽²⁾ An issue that Lorenzo Natali in particular was keen to emphasise. See, for instance, HAEC, Archive of speeches, 'L'Élargissement de la Communauté européenne vers le sud', Speech by Lorenzo Natali at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation conference, Brussels, 2 and 3 December 1982.

⁽³⁾ See 'Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals', Commission communication to the European Council, 3 and 4 December 1982, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 8, 1982, pp. 8–9.

In such circumstances, rapid advance towards a Community of Twelve was impossible. The Commission could do its best to sustain the morale of the applicants. It could also contribute usefully to finding solutions for these multiple internal difficulties. But unless and until the Ten rediscovered the ability to advance collectively towards CAP and CFP reform, budgetary agreement, new ideas on policy towards the Mediterranean region and institutional change, the Iberian applicants were likely to remain frustrated in their desire to enter the EEC. Neither the failed coup of February 1981, which seemed to underline the fragility of Spanish democracy, nor the victory of Felipe González's PSOE party in the 1982 Spanish elections, which by contrast seemed to demonstrate its vitality, sufficed immediately to alter the situation. Instead, an impasse remained. The road to enlargement seemed very uncertain indeed.

The breakthrough, when it finally happened, seemed to have more to do with the general revival of the integration process in 1984–85, than with

any specific change in the enlargement dossier. Crucial in this respect was the renewed determination on the part of François Mitterrand's government to move Europe forward: not only did the French government work hard on mending its highly strained relations with Madrid, but the French Presidency of the first half of 1984 also, and crucially, managed to end the budgetary gridlock at the Fontainebleau Summit. President Thorn's speech in Lisbon in July 1984 left little doubt as to the importance of this. 'My visit to your country, prime minister, comes, as you remarked yourself, at a crucial time for the Community and for the accession of Portugal. The recent European Council meeting at Fontainebleau has enabled the Community to overcome the budgetary difficulties that have occupied us for many years. We have thus dealt with a problem that has hindered somewhat the conclusion of the accession negotiations' ⁽¹⁾.

Also important was the Council agreement of March 1984 to introduce milk quotas, a step that would help to rein in runaway CAP spending ⁽²⁾.

The earlier 1983 settlement on the CFP further increased the feasibility of Iberian enlargement ⁽³⁾. Helpful too was the progress in Commission thinking on integrated Mediterranean programmes, a policy framework which would allow Spanish and Portuguese membership to occur within the context of a more generalised attempt to redirect the attention and resources of the Community towards its southern Member States and their immediate neighbours. It nevertheless took two successive marathon Council meetings in March 1985, masterminded by the veteran Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, before full agreement was reached and the membership negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion. Spain and Portugal were thus able to take their place in the Community on 1 January 1986, over a decade after the internal political transformations that had put them on the long road to EEC membership.

PIERS LUDLOW, FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU,
ANGEL VIÑAS, SIGFRIDO RAMÍREZ-PÉREZ
AND JÜRGEN ELVERT

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches (unofficial translation), Speech by President Thorn on an official visit to Lisbon, 2 July 1984.

⁽²⁾ See Chapter 16, 'Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy'.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

Chapter 25

At the service of the European citizen: information policy, a people's Europe, culture, education and training

Information policy

In 1973, the DG for Information (DG X) entered into a long period of turbulence. After the birth and infant years described in the earlier volume came the adolescence of what some consider to be the *enfant terrible* ⁽¹⁾ of the Commission. Although it would be the structure and staff of the Community information policy set-up that bore the brunt of this turbulence, fundamental question marks continued to surround its nature, objectives and purpose throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The end of an era

Structurally speaking, the Commission's information services had already known many shapes and forms since their modest origins 20 years earlier ⁽²⁾. But DG X's transformation was of a different order, often described as an 'upheaval' or 'rupture' by those who went through it ⁽³⁾. Although the word 'upheaval' reveals some of the intensity of the changes — as they were perceived at the time and still

⁽¹⁾ 'Nachlese zur Direktwahl', *Courrier du personnel*, No 457, October 1984, p. 3.

⁽²⁾ Dumoulin, M., 'What information policy?', in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 507–531.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011, and Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011.



On leaving his post as director-general for information in 1973, Jacques-René Rabier proposed to the administration the establishment of a mechanism for periodic public opinion polls in the Member States. 'I was really keen on the idea as I had done a lot of political science. I had studied what surveys and their authors said about Europe. There were surveys in this country or that country, but nothing coordinated and no follow-up,' he recalls (interview with Jacques-René Rabier, 5 July 2010). This led to the birth of Eurobarometer, initially published twice a year. Jacques-René Rabier was in charge of Eurobarometer from 1986 to 1997.

seem today — the word 'rupture' emphasises the end of an era, that of the founders and the spirit of commitment that they embodied. The most significant of the departures was undoubtedly that of the director-general, Jacques-René Rabier.

Rabier, the founder of the information services, was mentor to many officials who worked for him or who knew him. This 'exceptional man' ⁽¹⁾ was among the associates of Jean Monnet and belongs,

according to Jacqueline Lastenouse, 'to the generation of founders ... who have always been there to accompany and guide us' ⁽²⁾. His departure marked the end of an era. However, he continued to work as consultant, creating, in 1973, the well-known Eurobarometer.

Jacques-René Rabier's successor was Seán Ronan, an Irish diplomat. Although he had little experience in the information field, he could rely on two newly appointed and competent directors: Frenchman Paul Collowald, deputy spokesman since 1959, and Roy Pryce, from the United Kingdom, founder-director of the Centre for Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex. Seán Ronan could also count on the experience and dedication of his Belgian assistant, Robert Pendville. Pendville, who had been in the department since 1960, was able to exercise real influence over this multifaceted DG X in part by remaining there as assistant to the director general until 1988.

Decentralisation of the information service

Following the first enlargement, the patchwork of press and information offices (PIOs) was extended by the establishment of offices in Copenhagen and Dublin, while the delegation in London became a full PIO. In step with the report of MEP Wilhelmus Schuijt of 7 February 1972 ⁽³⁾, the Commission took the view at the time that it was 'absolutely necessary to decentralise its activity ... by giving greater stimulus to its offices abroad' or by giving priority 'in certain countries ... to the immediate setting-up of "antennae" or "mobile teams" attached to existing information offices' ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.

⁽³⁾ European Parliament, document 246/71.

⁽⁴⁾ EC Commission, *Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1973*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, p. 100.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Ivo Dubois and Guy Vanhaeverbeke, 7 April 2011.

The decision was taken in 1973, on the basis of a memorandum submitted to the College by Commissioner Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, to provide the offices in London and Rome initially with two 'antennae' each ⁽¹⁾. However, the Council categorically refused to grant any requests for appropriations for this ⁽²⁾. It was 1976 before the two subsidiary British offices in Cardiff and Edinburgh were opened ⁽³⁾, to be followed by one in Belfast in 1978. The Rome PIO had to make do with a peripatetic team until the Milan office was set up in 1981.

Thus, although regionalisation of information seemed to be among the priorities of the Commission at the time of the first enlargement, it took some time before it became a reality. The lack of means provided by the Council ⁽⁴⁾, as well as political objections at regional and national levels ⁽⁵⁾, are the reasons most often given for the lack of progress.

Merger

The next Commission also represented a period of transformation which resulted in DG X being completely merged with the spokesman's group being placed under the direct authority of President Jenkins. While Renato Ruggiero was entrusted with



A journalist by training, Fausta Deshormes La Valle entered the Communities' Joint Press and Information Service in 1961. She covered university issues and youth affairs until 1973, when she joined the cabinet of Commissioner Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, where she stayed until 1976. In 1977, she was put in charge of a newly created information unit in DG X dealing specifically with the media and women's groups. 'I wanted to inform women about European issues,' she recalls. 'Not just so that they knew what the Community was about, but also to make them feel closer to Europe, to make them aware of the need for European integration ...' (interview with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011, pp. 19-20). Above is the cover page of the 27th edition of the *Cahiers de Femmes d'Europe* (1988), the supplement to the *Femmes d'Europe* magazine, then celebrating its 10th year in existence. Fausta Deshormes La Valle was the driving force behind these information channels aimed at women until her retirement in 1992.

the dual responsibility of spokesman and director-general, Bino Olivi and Seán Ronan were both retired.

It would appear that it was the Welshman, Aneurin ('Nye') Hughes, Head of the Internal Coordination Division of the Secretariat-General, who started this reform. Shortly before Jenkins's time, Hughes conducted an evaluation of the information ser-

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(73), Minutes No 257, 20 June 1973, p. 23.

(2) HAEC, BAC 136/1987/174, Memo from Robert Sunnen to Armando Toledo-Laredo, 25 February 1974.

⁽³⁾ A temporary solution — which lasted 2 years — was adopted: two officials from the London PIO, Gwyn Morgan and Stanley Budd, were tasked with improving the regional dissemination of European information in Cardiff and Edinburgh respectively. Working with the London mission expenses budget, they stayed in a hotel and did not even have a car. See HAEC, BAC 136/1987/174.

(⁴) HAEC, BAC 136/1987/174, Memo from Seán Ronan to Stanley Budd and Gwyn Morgan, 6 July 1976. See also 'Philosophie des bureaux de presse et d'information de la Commission', *Courrier du personnel*, No 375, 14 October 1976, pp. 42–43.

⁽⁵⁾ The example of DATAR (Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale — Interministerial delegation for planning and regional attractiveness) in France is well known. See Collowald, P., 'La "Trajectoire" Strasbourg-Luxembourg-Bruxelles', in Dassetto, F. et Dumoulin, M. (eds), 'Naissance et développement de l'information européenne, Actes des journées d'étude [proceedings of study days] Louvain-la-Neuve, 22 May and 14 November 1990', 'Euroclio' collection, 'Études et documents' series, Peter Lang, Bern ... Vienna, 1993, p. 43.

vices of the Commission at the request of Émile Noël and produced an extremely negative report in which he suggested a series of reforms, the main one being to amalgamate the Spokesman's Service and DG X into a single entity under the responsibility of the president of the Commission. When the project was completed, Hughes was asked to become Ruggiero's adviser ⁽¹⁾.

Unfortunately, the climate resulting from the reform was evidently far from calm, since the leadership was now split and, in short, the roles unclear. In the view of most people, Ruggiero paid too little attention to his post as director-general because most of his time was taken with his duties as spokesman ⁽²⁾. True, Collowald and Pryce were both still highly engaged — the latter as principal adviser from 1978 — and heavily involved in the information campaign around the 1979 elections. The exact role and actual influence of Aneurin Hughes, the '*consigliere*' or '*lieutenant*' ⁽³⁾ that Renato Ruggiero brought with him despite the presence of two assistants, Robert Pendville and Paul Cerf, are difficult to determine, in particular because of the close links he kept with the Jenkins cabinet, which was responsible for overseeing information policy.

New enlargement, new Commission, more changes

After the well-known Schall report found that this reform had 'undermined the essential task of information policy' inasmuch as it had resulted in 'a weakening or even break-up of DG X' ⁽⁴⁾, the directorate-general regained its former autonomy under the Thorn Commission, in which the infor-

mation portfolio was returned to an Italian commissioner, Lorenzo Natali. But the winds of change were blowing again. Enzo Perlot, who had replaced Renato Ruggiero when he moved to pastures new during his term of office, resigned in September 1980. Manuel Santarelli and Paul Collowald then covered the roles of spokesman and director-general respectively. However, while Santarelli was confirmed as spokesman, Collowald — like Pryce before him — was replaced despite 8 years of good and loyal service. Once again, DG X was left leaderless.

The new director-general — the sixth in less than 10 years — was the German Franz Froschmaier, who had been head of cabinet to Wilhelm Haferkamp. He remained in the post until 1987, thus providing a certain amount of continuity at the head of the DG for Information, which had been renamed DG 'Information, Communication and Culture' under the Delors Commission. The Frenchman Philippe Soubestre, former head of cabinet to Claude Cheysson, and the Italian Marco Piccarolo, whose links to the Natali cabinet were strong ⁽⁵⁾, took over the two directorates; Philippe Soubestre was replaced in 1985 by Manuel Santarelli who succeeded Franz Froschmaier in 1987.

These periodic reorganisations undoubtedly affected DG X in terms of its working atmosphere or even its motivation ⁽⁶⁾, while also, according to some, giving it a poor reputation within the Commission. With the service accused of amateurism by some ⁽⁷⁾, information tended to be seen as a minor portfolio which the responsible commissioners — Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, Lorenzo Natali and Carlo Ripa di Meana in the period that concerns us — had probably not sought to obtain ⁽⁸⁾. However, the many structural

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽²⁾ Interviews with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010, Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011, Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010, Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011, and Niels Jørgen Thøgersen, 10 May 2011. Robert Pendville seemed to be the only one not to share this view (interview with Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011).

⁽³⁾ Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ European Parliament, document 1-596/80, p. 27.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Marco Piccarolo, 23 November 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011, and Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011.

⁽⁷⁾ Interviews with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011, Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011, and Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.

⁽⁸⁾ Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011, Gerardo Mombelli, 2 June 2011, and Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.

University information

Although the main initiatives for targeting information at the university sector were launched during the 1960s by Jean Moreau ⁽¹⁾, it was Jacqueline Lastenouse who, for more than 35 years, was the point of contact for universities in the Commission.

She arrived as a trainee in November 1962, and worked under Moreau, maintaining the course set by him after he left following the first enlargement. She managed to maintain it despite the structural upheavals experienced by DG X, from which the Division for Information aimed at Schools, Universities and Young People did not escape.

While 1973 was seen as ‘a break with the founders’ (Jacques-René Rabier, Jean Moreau, Fausta Deshormes La Valle) ⁽²⁾, the Jenkins era saw the division led until 1979 by Adriaan Sprey slotted into DG XII (Research, Science and Education) in a directorate called ‘Education, Training and the Cultural Sector’. Informing and

promoting contacts with the world of academia is one thing; developing a Community policy on education is quite another. According to Jacqueline Lastenouse, ‘it was clear that we did not have any contact with the educational structures and policies of the Member States’ ⁽³⁾. As a result in particular of the intervention of the European Parliament ⁽⁴⁾, the division was quite logically brought back under DG X when the next Commission took office. The twofold task of disseminating information and networking with university academics (academic lawyers, political scientists, economists and, from 1981, historians) studying European issues was pursued during the 1980s without major difficulty despite a chronic lack of means and staff. The end of the decade was marked by the launch of the Jean Monnet programme. ‘What I always thought was important was precisely the work of creating that community of specialists in European integration and European studies within the academic world, beyond borders, in their subject and in their discipline’ ⁽⁵⁾.

reforms that it underwent, in particular under President Roy Jenkins between 1977 and 1980, suggest that, just as in the earlier period, what was at stake was not without significance.

The rise of information for the general public

Equally significant are the issues that the information policy is intended to promote. Arguably the most important event in this respect was the first election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. Since a citizen is, to use Alfred Sauvy’s formula, a well-informed person, DG X was fully mobilised. As Paul Collowald recalls: ‘... I said

to myself: “This is going to be something extraordinary because, for the first time, European citizens are going to the polls”. But going to the polls with what impression of Europe? People have to feel motivated. How do you motivate people? You have to feel involved. How do you get to feel involved? Simple: by being well informed. So I said to myself: “We have a great part to play here. We have to mobilise” ⁽⁶⁾.

Although the aim was to show how Community policies affected the day-to-day life of Europeans (by showing what the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, among others, had done for them) ⁽⁷⁾, the thrust of the information campaign was largely quantitative. The

⁽¹⁾ Dumoulin, M., ‘What information policy?’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 507–531.

⁽²⁾ Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.

⁽³⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁴⁾ OJ C 28, 9.2.1981, p. 75.

⁽⁵⁾ Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.

⁽⁷⁾ ‘Preparing the people for direct elections’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 369, 29 March 1976, p. 23.

Parliament and the Commission decided to combine their efforts and set up a joint committee and drew up a joint special programme. With a budget of ECU 8.5 million, this programme comprised a wide range of activities designed to raise awareness so as to attract as many voters as possible to the polls. These included posters, competitions in the press, advertising on TV and radio, exhibitions and the distribution of stickers, badges and leaflets ⁽¹⁾.

In that regard, the 1979 elections were indeed a turning point. The Community information effort had hitherto been mainly directed towards ‘priority circles’ — i.e. opinion formers — because they acted as multipliers ⁽²⁾, but it now sought to engage the general public ⁽³⁾, in the 1980s by means of sporting, artistic and other high-profile events. One example is the well-known Euroshow, for which a series of European variety artists took to the stage in Forest National (Belgium) on 5 May 1984, shortly before the second European elections. The show, which was distributed by the main TV channels of the Member States and aimed to ensure as broad a participation as possible in the 1984 elections, was interspersed with contributions from European personalities and short reports on landmark political, cultural and popular events in the Community since the 1950s ⁽⁴⁾. But above all it represented the kind of public relations work to which DG X was increasingly dedicating its efforts.

The language of the time is telling. This was the era of ‘communication’, a word which even featured in the name of the DG. Fewer magazines, brochures and other publications were produced and prior-

ity was given to audiovisual media production ⁽⁵⁾. Franz Froschmaier, in an interview in the autumn of 1984, said that it was now a question of ‘selling’ the Community to the various parts of the general public with each section of public opinion a different market that needed to be approached in a distinct fashion ⁽⁶⁾.

‘... it is clear that our information policy, as it stands, is unable to create a massively pro-Community trend ... the focus should not be on rational argument but we should appeal more to the emotions and use psychology’ ⁽⁷⁾.

At the same time as it was taking this more pragmatic approach, DG X still had those who argued for a more targeted approach. The fact that these two divergent philosophies coexisted within the same directorate-general could, according to some, give rise to misunderstandings or even clashes. Thus, Pierre Bockstael, a more recent arrival, claimed there was a need to renew methods he, among others, considered old-fashioned or even outdated ⁽⁸⁾. Similarly, Robert Cox advocated the need to break up a number of ‘fiefdoms’ whose impact was considered to be very limited ⁽⁹⁾. On the other hand, some representatives of the old guard, such as Robert Pendville ⁽¹⁰⁾, were not very convinced of the results of disseminating information through large-scale popular events, while others, such as Fausta Deshormes La Valle ⁽¹¹⁾, recall their difficult relations with the senior management which constantly sought to thwart their efforts.

This row between the old and the new, however real it may have been, must not be allowed to over-

⁽¹⁾ For more details, see ‘Strengthening the Community in the hearts and minds of its citizens’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 401, 26 April 1979, pp. 8–16.

⁽²⁾ Dumoulin, M., ‘What information policy?’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories of an Institution*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 507–531.

⁽³⁾ Interviews with Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011, Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010, and Marco Piccarolo, 23 November 2011.

⁽⁴⁾ ‘DG X Eurocoup — Euroshow seen by ten millions’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 454, 14 and 17 June 1984, pp. 3–7.

⁽⁵⁾ See the General Reports of the European Communities of the 1980s.

⁽⁶⁾ ‘Nachlese zur Direktwahl’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 457, October 1984, pp. 2–7.

⁽⁷⁾ HAEC, BAC 408/1991/44, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Émile Noël, 2 October 1984.

⁽⁸⁾ Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010.

⁽⁹⁾ Interview with Robert Cox, 26 October 2010.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Interview with Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011.

⁽¹¹⁾ Interview with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011.



When he took over DG X's 'Radio and television' unit in 1980, Robert Jarrett recalls: 'At that time ... none of the radio and television organisations from the Member States had their own facilities in Brussels. They had a correspondent, certainly, but they didn't have their own technical facilities ... So the radio and television studios ... were used much more by radio and television correspondents from the different stations than by the Commission. We provided a facility for them in order to try to encourage them to cover European affairs as much as possible' (interview with Robert Jarrett, 14 October 2010). In the photo (from left to right): Poul Dalsager, Lorenzo Natali, Gaston Thorn and Christopher Tugendhat inaugurate the new Commission television studios (6 November 1984).

shadow the basic agreement between both sides as to the fundamental aim of the Community's information policy. The efforts made to develop more intensively a communication strategy aimed at the general public were in line, it was true, with the imperatives of an increasingly audiovisual age. But behind this divergence of method, the old and new approaches shared a common goal, namely that of presenting a living, relevant and concrete Europe to its citizens ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.

A people's Europe

The concept of a 'people's Europe' first appeared during this period, created as a counterbalance to the 'businessman's Europe' brought into being by the Treaty of Rome. In the early 1970s, a period of crisis if ever there was one, Member States' governments wanted to give Europe a more approachable and a more human face as it sought legitimacy by developing new Community policies and highlighting a number of actions and measures directly and specifically affecting the lives of European citizens.



Produced in 1977, i.e. 2 years after the Tindemans report on 'A citizen's Europe' and 2 years before the first European elections, this poster illustrates the Community's preoccupation with encouraging men and women of all ages to embrace the European venture.

Foundations

Thus, the well-known declaration on European Union made during the Paris Summit of October 1972 stated that ‘economic expansion ... is not an end in itself’, since the objective of the Community is ‘an improved quality as well as an improved standard of life’ for its citizens. It went on: ‘special attention will be paid to non-material values ...’⁽¹⁾. It was at this time that Community action in the cultural sector, among others, was born, a topic to which we shall return.

The December 1974 Paris Summit was a milestone in the emergence of a notion of European union that included citizenship. First, it decided in favour of the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. Second, it called for the establishment of a passport union to be looked into and, in anticipation of this, the introduction of a uniform passport and special rights which could be conferred on the citizens of the nine Member States⁽²⁾.

The Commission got to work and produced two technical reports which it submitted to the Council on 3 July 1975 under a single title: ‘Towards a people’s Europe’. It took the view that the uniform passport — one of the advantages of which would be ‘to emphasise the feeling ... of belonging’ of its holders to ‘the Community’ issuing it to them⁽³⁾ — and the abolition of the control of such passports at the internal frontiers of the Community were two objectives achievable in the short term. The special rights in question were, in its view, both political and civic and consisted mainly of voting rights, eligibility and access to public services within the Community.

The Tindemans report

The well-known Tindemans report⁽⁴⁾, published on 29 December 1975, was partly based on this work. The report, containing a chapter entitled ‘A citizen’s Europe’, proposed, in addition to the social policy measures it advocated elsewhere, two categories of action: the protection of the rights of Europeans — fundamental rights, consumer rights and the protection of the environment — and the development of ‘external signs discernible in everyday life’, including ‘the gradual disappearance of frontier controls on persons moving between member countries’ (as advocated by the Commission) and ‘greater integration in educational matters by promoting student exchanges’⁽⁵⁾.

Chapter IV of the Tindemans Report — which, as is well known, quickly joined ‘the Community good intentions’⁽⁶⁾ that had not been realised — concluded with the proposal to create a European foundation designed to promote ‘anything which could help towards greater understanding among our peoples by placing the emphasis on human contact’⁽⁷⁾. The idea was taken up and the Commission, at the request of the Council, with the assistance of a group of independent experts, issued a report in which it said that the institution’s work would help to ‘develop the European citizen’s sense of belonging to one and the same community’⁽⁸⁾. Despite completing this first stage, the project did not take off. It was not until March 1982 that the representatives of the Member States signed an agreement es-

⁽⁴⁾ See the introduction to Part Three.

⁽⁵⁾ ‘European Union — Report by Mr Leo Tindemans to the European Council’, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 1, 1976, pp. 26–28. For a more detailed study of the Tindemans report, see, among others, Van de Gaer, S., *Le rapport Tindemans: évolution et évaluation*, dissertation, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Olivi, B. and Giaccone, A., *L’Europe difficile. Histoire politique de la construction européenne*, 3rd edn, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 143.

⁽⁷⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 1, 1976, p. 30.

⁽⁸⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1977, p. 8.

⁽¹⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 10, 1972, pp. 15–16.

⁽²⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 12, 1974, p. 8.

⁽³⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 7, 1975, p. 9.

tablishing the foundation which, in the end, never came into existence ⁽¹⁾.

Although the political impetus given by the Council was quite significant at the beginning of the decade, it slowed down during the next few years. The Commission continued, however, throughout its range of activities to develop areas that were seen as ‘close to the citizens’, such as environmental protection, social policy, etc. There was also a report on the protection of fundamental rights ⁽²⁾, not to mention the first European elections in June 1979, an event which was as tangible as it was emblematic of the citizen’s involvement in the European project and to which, as has been stated above, the Commission was fully committed.

The Adonnino Committee

Despite the good intentions expressed in the solemn declaration on European Union (Stuttgart European Council, 17 to 19 June 1983) regarding cultural cooperation and exchanges of teachers and students, as well as those in the Spinelli draft treaty on citizenship, it was not until the Fontainebleau European Council (25 and 26 June 1984) that the heads of state or government took any action.

Having agreed in principle to the creation of a European passport, Europe’s leaders also decided to set up an ad hoc committee for a people’s Europe, known as the Adonnino Committee, after its chairman Pietro Adonnino, and at the same time agreed in principle to the creation of a European passport. Tasked with studying ‘measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and the rest of the world’, the committee produced a first report, which was ap-



This Plantu cartoon (26 June 1984) ironically portrays the main ‘successes’ of the Fontainebleau European Council of 25 and 26 June 1984: on one side there is the European passport, a symbol of greater union and citizenship adopted after more than 10 years of negotiation, which is being brandished by an emotional President Mitterrand of France in the midst of his counterparts; on the other, in the form of a ‘cheque’, there is the rebate granted to the United Kingdom which puts an end to the problem of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the Community budget, a symbol of much less idealism and solidarity, but which an equally emotional British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, is waving in the air. Two contrasting victories for two equally contrasting concepts of Europe.

proved by the Brussels European Council (29 and 30 March 1985), followed by a final report. These documents constitute an audacious collection of provisions on the free movement of people and goods, special rights of citizens, culture, communication, youth, education, sport, health and social security, as well as on symbols (flags, emblems, anthem, stamps) to strengthen the image and identity of the Community.

The Milan European Council (28 and 29 June 1985) approved the proposals in the ad hoc committee’s final report and called on the Commission and the Member States to implement them, although it did express some concern over the delay in implementing the measures put forward by the first report ⁽³⁾. The Commission, cut to the quick, responded indignantly. On 19 November, it sent a communication to the Council in which it described the Council’s record on following up the committee’s reports as ‘unsatis-

⁽¹⁾ Interviews with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010, and Robert Toulemon, 22 September 2010.

⁽²⁾ ‘The protection of fundamental rights in the European Community’, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 5, 1976.

⁽³⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 6, 1985, p. 14.

factory' ⁽¹⁾. In the same vein, Carlo Ripa di Meana, the (first) commissioner responsible for the people's Europe, among other things, stated at the General Affairs Council of 26 November that 'the Commission cannot be held responsible for any delays of the Council' and that, for its part, it had drawn up 'a work programme whose priorities are based on the proposals of the Adonnino Committee' ⁽²⁾.

The following year, the Commission did not miss the opportunity to remind the European Council meeting in The Hague (26 and 27 June 1986) that it had not yet adopted 'any of the more meaningful proposals in terms of popular impact', and to request 'fresh political impetus' ⁽³⁾. The Commission's reminder was prompted by lack of progress on flagship proposals such as the easing of internal border controls, the right of residence and the gen-

eral system for the mutual recognition of diplomas, aspects which remained pending in the absence of approval by the Council ⁽⁴⁾.

Main achievements

The most substantive achievements of a people's Europe did not arrive, it is true, until after 1986, but they were made possible by the relatively long incubation period described in these pages. Moreover, a number of highly symbolic measures were put in place before the end of the 1980s. Thus, citizens of the Member States have been able to carry a common identity document, a European passport and a Community driving licence since 1985. And the European institutions have had a flag and an anthem since 1986.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, 'A people's Europe', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(85) 640 final, 19 November 1985.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, Archive of speeches, Statement by Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana at the General Affairs Council of 26 November 1985, 'People's Europe'.

⁽³⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 6, 1986, p. 51.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid.

The European flag

The European flag, blue with a circle of 12 golden stars, was originally that chosen by the Council of Europe in 1955. It took 30 years for the Community institutions as well to adopt this symbol of the union of the peoples of Europe.

The Commission seemed to pay little attention to the matter. Admittedly, in November 1978 it did select a single emblem for itself — a stylised letter 'E' on a dark blue background — but only in a 'reduced' way 'limited to matters related to dissemination of information and in a few cases of external representation, without any political significance whatsoever' ⁽¹⁾. DG X, for its part, disapproved of the European Parliament's resolution of 11 April 1983 in favour of the adoption of the flag of the Council of Europe for the whole of the European Community ⁽²⁾. While, in Franz Froschmaier's view, it was desirable to adopt a flag, the choice of that of the Council of Europe 'ran counter to any attempt to create a "brand image" for the Community' ⁽³⁾.

The Adonnino Committee, on completion of a study which it had been asked to carry out on 'symbols of

the Community's existence, such as a flag and an anthem' ⁽⁴⁾, among other things, took the same view as the Parliament, but suggested adding the Commission's golden 'E' in the centre of the circle of stars to avoid confusion between the European Community and the Council of Europe. This was not the choice of DG X which, in the spring of 1985, made clear its opposition to it on the basis of a semiological analysis ⁽⁵⁾. In the same period, DG X commissioned a separate independent study which, on the basis of a poll of a sample of citizens in three Member States, put forward seven possible models for a European flag ⁽⁶⁾.

Finally, the matter was settled in the spring of 1986, first informally ⁽⁷⁾ and then formally. On 22 April, the Council declared that it would in future use the flag of the Council of Europe, a decision which was immediately followed by the Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice ⁽⁷⁾. The formal adoption of the European flag was marked by a ceremony held in Brussels on 29 May 1986 in front of the Berlaymont building.

⁽¹⁾ HAEC, COM(78), Minutes No 492 final, meeting of 8 November 1978, p. 22.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 128, 16.5.1983, pp. 18–19.

⁽³⁾ Bockstaël papers, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Lorenzo Natali, 21 April 1983.

⁽⁴⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 6, 1984, p. 11.

⁽⁵⁾ Pierre Bockstaël papers, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Carlo Ripa di Meana, 23 April 1985.

⁽⁶⁾ Pierre Bockstaël papers, IMADI (Instituut voor Marketing-Diagnostiek), 'The European flag — A study into the symbolic meaning which European citizens in France, Belgium and the Netherlands desire "their" flag to express, their perception of the flags of the USA, Japan and the USSR and the degree to which seven "European" alternative flag designs satisfy the requirements for symbolic expression of the European citizen', 31 May 1985.

⁽⁷⁾ Collowald, P., 'La "Trajectoire" Strasbourg–Luxembourg–Bruxelles', in Dassetto, F. and Dumoulin, M. (eds), *Naissance et développement de l'information européenne, Actes des journées d'étude [proceedings of study days], Louvain-la-Neuve, 22 May and 14 November 1990*, 'Euroclio' collection, 'Études et documents' series, Peter Lang, Berne ... Vienna, 1993, p. 43; Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., *Mémoires*, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 318.

⁽⁸⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 4, 1986, p. 50. See also Donat, M. (von) and Krenzler, H. G., 'Europa zeigt Flagge', *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft*, No 23, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, pp. 282–286.



After lengthy discussions, the European institutions decided to adopt the flag of the Council of Europe. On 29 May 1986 this was raised for the first time in front of the Berlaymont.



The first 'Tour de l'Avenir' European Community cycle race, organised with the joint support of the European Commission and the European Parliament, took place from 11 to 22 September 1986. Most of the route ran through Spain and Portugal, to mark their recent accession. This sporting test, part of the efforts to promote the people's Europe, was also an opportunity to familiarise inhabitants of the regions along the route with the European flag and anthem adopted by the Community institutions 3½ months earlier.

In the same vein, it is worth pointing out the large-scale sporting and cultural events, such as the Tour de l'Avenir in September 1986. As the second great sporting event sponsored by the Commission ⁽¹⁾, the cycling race won by Miguel Indurain was an opportunity to draw attention to Spain, Italy and Portugal since that year the race started in Porto and finished in Turin ⁽²⁾. In the same way, the concept of European Capital of Culture began with Athens in 1985 ⁽³⁾. This event — the polar opposite of the businessman's Europe — brings us now to the field from which it sprang, namely culture.

Culture

Although it was not until the 1970s that culture made its first official, if somewhat modest, appearance in the list of Community subject areas, there had been some interesting attempts during the 1960s, such as the report presented in June 1963 by Leo De Block, an MEP, or that of his colleague Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, in 1966, on cinema ⁽⁴⁾. Those initiatives were never followed up.

Community action in the field of culture

Altiero Spinelli, commissioner for industrial, technological and scientific affairs from July 1970, gave a decisive impetus to culture. At his behest,

⁽¹⁾ The first event was the 'Course de l'Europe à la voile' (European sailing regatta) the year before.

⁽²⁾ For more information, see HAEC, BAC 178/1992/91.

⁽³⁾ 'L'Europe des citoyens se construit pas à pas', *Courrier du personnel*, No 477, September 1986, pp. 6–23.

⁽⁴⁾ Dumoulin, M., 'Europe de la culture, culture européenne', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 5, No 2, 1999, pp. 7–16.



Florence became the second European Capital of Culture, a landmark initiative in the area of cultural cooperation between Member States launched in 1985. Following Athens, the cradle of the ancient world, Florence, the city of the Renaissance and Humanism, was selected to host exhibitions, theatre, cinema, music, dance and a whole range of artistic and cultural events.

two teaching and education working groups were set up in 1971, chaired by the Frenchman Félix-Paul Mercereau, former head of cabinet to Étienne Hirsch, President of Euratom.

Since he believed that teaching and culture were strongly linked and because he felt that, after nearly a year, Mercereau and his team had made little headway ⁽¹⁾, Spinelli asked that the scope of the groups should be extended to cover the concepts of

civilisation, society and culture ⁽²⁾. The Frenchman Robert Grégoire took matters in hand. A former ECSC official who had started his professional career as a theatre director, Grégoire, who was 'passionate about culture' ⁽³⁾, quickly focused entirely on that aspect and wrote a document entitled 'Pour une action communautaire dans le domaine de la culture' (Community action in the field of culture) ⁽⁴⁾. It became a cornerstone. It was innovative both in terms of the socioeconomic approach and of the language it contained. As its title indicates, the aim was to propose action in the cultural field and not a cultural policy, an expression which would certainly have been considered too intrusive by Member States, jealous of their powers in this field, and by artists fearing that their freedom might be curtailed, not to mention those international organisations already dealing with culture (including the Council of Europe and Unesco).

The Community has no call, in principle, to become involved in this field, since neither the word 'culture' nor the word 'cultural' are to be found in the EEC Treaty ⁽⁵⁾. Thus, rather than interfering in culture itself (its content and purpose, among other things), Grégoire approached the matter in the only way possible under the treaty, namely from the socioeconomic angle. By considering artists as cultural workers and works of art as cultural goods, the Community 'primarily seeks to support culture by the gradual establishment of an economic environment and a social environment which are more

⁽¹⁾ Spinelli, A., *Diario europeo: 1970–76*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, p. 247: 'January [1972], Friday — I spoke to Mercereau and Stuffmann about the activities of the Mercereau group on education. I do not think they are making much headway'.

⁽²⁾ Grégoire, R., *Vers une Europe de la culture. Du théâtre à l'action communautaire*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 181.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Paolo Ponzano, Jean-Claude Eeckhout and Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010, p. 44.

⁽⁴⁾ HAEC, Communication from Altiero Spinelli to the members of the Commission, SEC(72) 4250, 6 December 1972.

⁽⁵⁾ The only allusion is contained in Article 36 of the treaty which refers to the protection of 'national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value'.

favourable to it' ⁽¹⁾. The objective, in short, is not to intervene *in* culture but *for* culture ⁽²⁾.

'Félix-Paul Mercereau and I did not have long to wait for the reaction of Altiero Spinelli. He called us into his office. Then he asked me a strange question: "How did you do it?" Then he said, "I'm going to put your memorandum to the Commission without changing a word"' ⁽³⁾.

The early years

The memorandum was transmitted to the Commission on 6 December 1972 and was well received ⁽⁴⁾. The Mercereau group was disbanded and a division devoted to 'Issues in the Cultural Sector', headed by Grégoire, was created within DG XII, itself re-branded under the Ortolí Commission as the DG for 'Research, Science and Education'. The commissioner in whose portfolio it was included was the German Ralf Dahrendorf, who was succeeded by his compatriot Guido Brunner in autumn 1974. In September 1974, the Commission set itself the objective to develop proposals in a number of areas related to the cultural sector, including the freedom of movement for cultural works and cultural workers, the tax treatment of cultural foundations and philanthropic giving, and legislation on copyright ⁽⁵⁾ and, on 1 July 1975, submitted the first action plan to the European Parliament. The Parliament acknowledged the work carried out, but asked the Commission to develop its proposals, granting it new financial resources for the following year (under budget heading 393, 'Expenditure related to cultural action'). This decision led to a tussle

between the Council and the Parliament, which in the end got its way ⁽⁶⁾. However laudable the sense of economic prudence demonstrated by the Council on this occasion may appear, the incident, while trivial in material terms (the sum in question amounted to ECU 20 700), is clearly indicative of a level of disapproval on the part of the Member States, which thought of culture as their own private preserve. This did not prevent the Commission from putting forward to the Parliament in January 1976 a more developed communication, the Brunner document. This was followed, the following year, by a communication to the Council in which the Commission gave a progress report on Community action in the cultural sector and set out the steps still needing to be taken.

The free trade in cultural goods, the fight against the theft and trafficking of such goods, the freedom of movement and of establishment of those working in the cultural sphere, legal and fiscal harmonisation (notably of copyright), social measures (promoting the exchange and mobility of young cultural workers, their social security cover, etc.) — it was thanks to the systematic application of treaty rules to such issues, combined with the valuable political and financial support given by the European Parliament, that the cultural sector had, by the end of the 1970s, become a genuine component of the European economic space ⁽⁷⁾.

The support of ministers

Encouraged by the increasing interest in its actions, Robert Grégoire's division moved from DG XII in 1981 to the Secrétariat-General. It reported directly to the new Commission president, Gaston Thorn. Now that it could count more than ever on the support of the European Parliament, Community ac-

⁽¹⁾ Grégoire, R., 'L'action communautaire dans le secteur culturel', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 217, 1978, p. 230.

⁽²⁾ This phrase was based on a resolution of the European Parliament of 18 November 1983, cited in Grégoire, R., 'La Communauté et la culture', *Revue du Marché Commun*, No 274, 1984, p. 56.

⁽³⁾ Grégoire, R., *Vers une Europe de la culture. Du théâtre à l'action communautaire*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000, pp. 182–183.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(72), Minutes No 230 final, meeting of 6 December 1972, p. 9.

⁽⁵⁾ EC Commission, *Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1974*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1975, p. 184.

⁽⁶⁾ Dumoulin, M., 'Europe de la culture, culture européenne', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 5, No 2, 1999, p. 15.

⁽⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

tion in the cultural sector found new allies among politicians in charge of culture in their respective countries. Thus, on the initiative of Jack Lang and Vincenzo Scotti, a first informal meeting of ministers for culture took place in Naples in September 1982. Even though some of their colleagues showed less enthusiasm for ‘far-reaching initiatives and real action at European level’ ⁽¹⁾, a genuine head of steam had now been created at Member State level.

For its part, the Commission continued with its work and, on 12 October 1982, it submitted a communication to the Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Stronger Community action in the cultural sector’. The document proposed a series of actions along four main lines: free trade in cultural goods (the removal of administrative barriers at intra-Community frontiers); the improvement of living and working conditions for cultural workers (action on unemployment, income protection and improved social security, among others); the attraction of wider audiences (Community participation in the organisation of festivals, exhibitions and other cultural events); and the protection of Europe’s architectural heritage (provision by the EIB of interest-free loans for conservation). The Commission communication was the subject of a Parliament report (the Fanti report) adopted in October 1983 and, a month later, it was also examined by the ministers of culture of the Ten during their second and final informal session — they would henceforth meet as a Council — chaired by the Greek minister Melina Mercouri. At that session, the ministers stated their readiness to ‘promote concrete cultural cooperation within the Community’ ⁽²⁾. It was thus decided, among other things, to designate a European city of culture each year — starting with Athens in 1985 — probably one of the achievements best known by the general public.

The move to DG X: priority on the audiovisual sector

As Community action in the cultural sector began to grow visibly in scale, the time came for Grégoire to pass on the baton. In 1986, his division was incorporated in DG X which had changed its name to ‘Information, Communication and Culture’. Frans De Koster, a former colleague and friend of Robert Grégoire in the Secretariat-General, put it succinctly: ‘He has done a remarkable job. All that the Community, and the Commission in particular, has achieved in terms of culture, it was he that started it and really mapped out the guidelines’ ⁽³⁾. However, those who still remember the handover have a slightly different view of Grégoire and his achievements. Gerardo Mombelli, Carlo Ripa di Meana’s deputy head of cabinet at the time, remembers the ‘strange official from Marseille, protected by Noël’ whose record he judged as good, but limited. ‘From the beginning we tried to broaden the scope of the work and to suggest a wide range of new perspectives, actions and initiatives. At the time there was very little of that’ ⁽⁴⁾. This perception, shared by others, was in keeping with the phenomenon already mentioned, namely the emergence of an approach which now sought to develop Community action on a more ambitious scale, geared to the public at large. The departure of Grégoire thus truly marked the end of an era. And the start of another.

He was succeeded by the Belgian Pierre Bockstal as head of a division which was now called ‘Cultural Action and Audiovisual Policy’. It was in fact from that moment that the Community began to draw up an audiovisual policy, starting with the proposal for a directive adopted by the Commission in March 1986 entitled ‘The Community’s broadcasting policy’ ⁽⁵⁾. This was closely followed by an action programme in favour of European audiovisual pro-

⁽¹⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 9, 1982, p. 40.

⁽²⁾ HAEC, BAC 343/1991/88, Minutes of the informal meeting of ministers of culture (Athens, 28 November 1983), 15 December 1983, p. 1.

⁽³⁾ Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010.

⁽⁴⁾ Interview with Gerardo Mombelli, 2 June 2011.

⁽⁵⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 3, 1986, p. 11; No 5, 1986.

duction (the MEDIA programme) ⁽¹⁾, a communication on the European Cinema and Television Year (scheduled for 1988) ⁽²⁾ and the signature of an agreement with the Europa-TV consortium which had been distributing the multilingual European television programme of the same name since October 1985 ⁽³⁾. However, Europa-TV was dropped in November 1986 because of financial difficulties.

A lot of ground had been covered since Spinelli's creation of two working groups at the beginning of the 1970s. Few would have been able to predict at the time that such a step would lead to the development of Community activity in the cultural sector outlined above. But that it is not all, since out of the same two groups emerged a strand of Community action in education to which we now must turn.

Education and training

The original status of education within the Community's remit was comparable to that of culture. With no explicit mention of it in the EEC Treaty — unlike vocational training, which is referred to in Articles 118 and 128 — education is a sensitive policy field since it is closely linked to the sovereign competence of states. As with the field of culture, therefore, it was not until the early 1970s that there were the first truly Community-wide developments in this area, especially as, until then, it had been the Council of Europe that was regarded as the preferred channel for dealing with the issues at European level.

From cultural matters to social matters

However, at the beginning of the decade, the process of making education a Community policy was undoubtedly more advanced. In a crisis in which youth unemployment was growing, education and vocational training were an answer to the socioeconomic problems of the time and hence more likely to be integrated into Community policies. Thus, shortly after the establishment within the Commission of the two groups on teaching and education, there was an initial meeting of the Community education ministers in November 1971. This meeting dealt mainly with the issue of the equivalence of qualifications and the European university project — which had been under discussion since the 1950s — but what really mattered historically was that ministers had demonstrated their readiness to start cooperation as such in the field of education ⁽⁴⁾.

So far as the Commission is concerned, education saw its Community legitimacy confirmed in structural terms in 1973, when it became part of DG XII in the shape of a directorate under Alan Bath, a British official. The Directorate for Teaching and Education, which at first consisted of four divisions — the number has varied over time — including one under Robert Grégoire, was renamed 'Education, Training and the Cultural Sector' after 1976 and then moved to DG V (Employment and Social Affairs) in 1981 while, as we saw before, the cultural sector came under the Secretariat-General. The directorate which then came under Hywel Ceri Jones, a British official who had headed one of the divisions since 1973, was renamed 'Education, Vocational Training and Youth Policy', a name which it kept beyond 1986.

The move to DG V, which amounted to a delinking from the cultural sector, attested not only to the shift in the way in which education had been

⁽¹⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 4, 1986, p. 49.

⁽²⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 6, 1986, p. 51.

⁽³⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 10, 1986, p. 36; No 11, 1986, p. 56.

⁽⁴⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 12, 1971, pp. 28–30.

perceived over time but also to its twofold nature: socioeconomic on the one hand and cultural on the other. Jones, whose role in relation to education in the Commission was comparable to that of Grégoire for culture, had always considered it essential to reinforce the links between education and vocational training.

‘One big breakthrough from a policy point of view came in 1981, when the Commission proved itself to be in the avant-garde by recognising the inextricable links between education and vocational training, and thus the vital role of education in social and employment policy. The decision to merge education and vocational training in a single directorate within the DG responsible for social policy, DG V, supported the argument that many of us had been making for years’ ⁽¹⁾.

The first action programme

At the Commission’s request, in February 1973, the former Belgian Minister of Education Henri Janne presented a critical analysis of the issues surrounding education in Europe. The Janne report pinpointed the underlying tension, finding, first, that ‘the close link which exists between education and culture’ cannot be ignored and, second, that ‘the economic (and therefore the “professional”) needs of training are not separable from the education system in general’ ⁽²⁾. It was on the basis of this document in particular that, a year later, the Commission submitted a series of proposals to the Council for action aimed at developing Community-level cooperation in the field of education ⁽³⁾. The Commission communication of March 1974 marked the ‘starting point of the political debate on the content and modalities of future Community cooperation

in education’ ⁽⁴⁾, touching on areas such as mobility, education of children of migrant workers, the acquisition of modern languages and the academic recognition of diplomas. These proposals were considered by the ministers for education of the Nine, meeting for the second time in June 1974. A resolution setting out future areas of cooperation was adopted ⁽⁵⁾ and it was decided to create an education committee which was to submit a report by the end of 1975 outlining the activities to be implemented in the seven priority areas selected by the ministers ⁽⁶⁾.

The committee, consisting of representatives of Member States and of the Commission, met for the first time in October 1974 and submitted, as agreed, a report and a draft resolution containing an action programme to European education ministers on 10 December 1975. The ministers approved the report and instructed the committee to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the action programme and to prepare meetings of the Education Council. The Education Committee, which met every month, would play a key role over the years, acting as a veritable link between not only the relevant Commission departments and the Education Council, but also the Community and the Member States.

Finally adopted by the Council on 9 February 1976 ⁽⁷⁾, the action programme was a key document laying the foundations for all subsequent cooperation measures in the field of education. Remarkably, it anticipated virtually all of the areas where the Community was to launch educational initiatives, both up until 1986 and well beyond: foreign language teaching, the education of migrant workers and their children, equal opportunities in education, the study of Europe at school, cooperation in

⁽¹⁾ ‘The action programme — Interview with Hywel Ceri Jones’, *Courrier du personnel*, No 472, February 1986, p. 64.

⁽²⁾ ‘For a Community policy on education’, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 10, 1973, pp. 11–12.

⁽³⁾ ‘Education in the European Community’, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 3, 1974.

⁽⁴⁾ European Commission, *The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 65.

⁽⁵⁾ OJ C 98, 20.8.1974, p. 2.

⁽⁶⁾ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 3, 1974, pp. 17–18.

⁽⁷⁾ OJ C 38, 19.2.1976, p. 1.

the field of higher education, the occupational integration of young people, the compilation of documentation and statistics in the field of education and improving the interconnections between the various educational systems in Europe.

Flagship achievements

Although the action programme initially faced difficult conditions (a small budget and a chronic lack of staff on the one hand and objections from certain Member States in the Council on the other) ⁽¹⁾, a number of initiatives were successfully launched by the Commission through study visits, exchanges of information, pilot projects and joint study programmes, among others, which achieved results which have become emblematic of European co-operation in education.

Higher education was a focal point inasmuch as a considerable number of joint study programmes

(over 600 in 10 years) were carried out in that field. They included, for example, the efforts made to provide information in the shape of the *Student Handbook*, which the Commission published from 1977; the Eurydice network which, as far back as 1980, made information exchange possible between policymakers and stakeholders in education across Europe; and, since 1984, the NARIC network, the Community network of national information centres on academic recognition of diplomas, supporting student mobility. But it was not until the second half of the 1980s, thanks in particular to the judgment in the *Gravier* case ⁽²⁾, which saw higher education brought within the scope of the treaty, that the Commission was able to launch the major Community education and training programmes that have had such an impact: Comett, Erasmus, PETRA, Youth for Europe, Lingua, Eurotecnet and FORCE, among others.

PIERRE-OLIVIER LALOUX

⁽¹⁾ Several witnesses recall this. See, for example, the interviews with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010, and Anne-Marie Lizin, 15 December 2010; *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No 6, 1976, p. 58; No 11, 1978, p. 59 and No 10, 1979, p. 66.

⁽²⁾ Judgment of 13 February 1985, Case 293/83, *Gravier v Ville de Liège* [1985] ECR 593.

Jacques Delors: surfing the crest of the European wave

No Commission president has had the impact, both perceived and real, of Jacques Delors. The longest serving of all Commission presidents, the former French minister of finance presided over a 10-year period during which the integration process was dramatically revitalised, and both the pace of change and the status of the European Commission increased massively. A Community pronounced 'moribund' by *The Economist* in 1982 ⁽¹⁾ stood a decade later on the verge of completing a functioning internal market, had seen its institutional operation transformed and was at the centre of international attention ⁽²⁾. As Commission president, Delors was deeply involved in this extraordinary rebirth.

To some extent, of course, Delors benefited from inheriting the job at exactly the right moment. The

year 1985 was an excellent time to become president of the Commission. After a difficult first half of the 1980s, expectations were low. Below the surface though, the period immediately prior to Delors' arrival had seen a number of the obstacles to rapid advance at Community level swept away — notably with the resolution of the long-running British budgetary dispute at the Fontainebleau Council of June 1984. Furthermore, while the economic difficulties of the 1970s and the early 1980s were still fresh enough in the memories of all European leaders for radical solutions to be attractive, the economic fortunes of the continent were beginning to revive, marking the start of a period where a European relaunch might have an immediate positive effect. Lastly, the European leaders of the day all shared a readiness to allow a greater degree of market orientation in their national and European policies. By 1985, this consensus included François Mitterrand, whose economic volte-face in 1982–83 made him ready to embrace

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter 16, 'Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy'.

⁽²⁾ *The Economist*, 26 March 1982.



Jacques Delors reads the solemn declaration before the European Court of Justice presided over by Alexander Mackenzie Stuart in Luxembourg on 24 January 1985. Seated behind him is Stanley Clinton Davis, wearing headphones, and to his left Willy De Clercq.

a more liberal approach, but eager also to see the success of a Europe in the name of which he had abandoned his initial economic policy.

The opportunity still needed to be seized, however, and Delors deserves much credit for doing so effectively. In order to analyse how Delors was to achieve this, the following profile will first highlight the importance of the 1992 project upon which he initially focused. It will then explain how the renewed sense of purpose gained from the single market objective was used to advance not only the Commission's own morale and pace of work, but also the rapport between the Commission and other European institutions — especially the European Council — as well as the prominence of the integration process in the imagination and interest of the wider European public and, final-

ly, the whole agenda and scope of the integration project.

The central idea which Delors seized upon in order to rejuvenate the integration process was a very simple one — identify a single target, to which all participating states and institutions could adhere, set a deadline for the completion of this objective and lay out clearly the steps that would be needed to attain this target by this deadline ⁽¹⁾. The goal selected — the establishment of a European single market by the end of 1992 — was at one level profoundly unoriginal. Not only was the establishment of a functioning internal market an avowed intention of the original Treaty of Rome,

⁽¹⁾ Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.



Gaston Thorn (on the right) hands over to Jacques Delors (on the left), 7 January 1985.

but it was also something that had been extensively discussed amongst corporate leaders, senior politicians and within the Commission in the years prior to 1985 ⁽¹⁾. But in many ways this lack of originality was its great strength, for so commonplace an objective was by the same token a very hard goal to reject, especially within the context of a European Economic Community. How could the EEC not discuss the manner in which economic interchange within Europe had become clogged

up by innumerable non-tariff barriers and other obstacles to trade? And yet, while obvious, it was also far-reaching, since its realisation would have profound implications for the manner in which all of the Community institutions functioned, could have a huge impact on the whole western European economy and might produce a cascade of further integration in separate but related fields.

The first aspect of transformation was the manner in which the Commission itself functioned, and also how it regarded itself. Both Delors himself, and the commissioner to whom he entrusted the

⁽¹⁾ Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J., '1992: Recasting the European bargain', *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No 1, 1989, pp. 95–128.



Jacques Delors welcomes Pope John Paul II to the Commission in May 1985.

internal market project, Arthur Cockfield, threw themselves into their new jobs with immense energy and zeal. They also made clear that they expected equal levels of commitment from all those they worked with. In the case of Delors, this message was backed up by a particularly formidable cabinet, led by Pascal Lamy, who quickly became feared as much as he was respected⁽¹⁾. The identification of a single target also helped renew the sense of purpose and morale of an institution that had previously seen so many of its endeavours come to nothing. This became all the more true once the target was endorsed by all of the Member States' governments and once the first results began to be achieved. The Delors I budgetary package and the second banking directive, achieved in 1988 and 1989 respectively, were of particular impor-

tance in this regard. Levels of motivation rose still higher when the quest for the single market target broke the enduring impasse on institutional reform. With the introduction of more majority voting by the Single European Act — a treaty Delors himself had an important role in shaping — many long-cherished targets of the European Commission that had been regarded as unattainable because of the opposition of a minority of Member States suddenly became conceivable.

The second major change concerned the Commission's position in relation to the other Community institutions. Throughout the Presidencies of Roy Jenkins and Gaston Thorn, interinstitutional relations had been a perennial source of anxiety and delay⁽²⁾. Under Delors, they were altered profound-

⁽¹⁾ Ross, G., 'Inside the Delors cabinet', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No 4, 1994.

⁽²⁾ See introduction to Part Three.



European flag-bearer: Jacques Delors poses beside the recently launched European flag in September 1986.

ly, partly because a new agreed target facilitated interaction, and partly because results, once they began to arrive, created a virtuous circle of ambition, success and further ambition. Nowhere was this change more evident than at the level of the European Council, where Delors was able to become a major protagonist in a way that no previous Commission president had. The exact manner in which this was accomplished is explored elsewhere in this volume ⁽¹⁾. Finally, of course, Delors' ability to achieve results at this level depended upon the presence of national leaders eager to see integration advance and willing to allow the Commission president to play a major role to that end. But at least up until the early 1990s, such a consensus did exist at European Council level, allowing Delors ample scope to push for his own goals at the most senior echelon of European decision-making, thereby reinforcing his authority within the Commission. Success at European Council level also, of course, fed through into better relations with — and greater

respect from — the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

The third effect was on the level of public interest in the European integration process. This was something that had waned significantly since its 1960s heyday, being replaced during much of the 1970s with a mixture of public ignorance, indifference and frustration regarding what was going on in Brussels. Despite high hopes, the advent of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 had not succeeded in reversing this trend ⁽²⁾. But in the mid- to late 1980s, the Delors Commission managed to persuade the wider European public — and indeed an audience that stretched well beyond the existing Community borders — that the integration process was relevant, exciting and liable to advance very rapidly. An avalanche of media coverage, academic interest and public attention was one result; the proliferation of non-member countries seeking to refresh and improve their ties with the suddenly fashionable and dynamic European Community was another. In the process, Delors himself achieved a level of public recognition and prominence unprecedented among Commission presidents.

Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the revitalisation of the integration process, which initially centred on the idea of a single market by 1992, helped create an atmosphere conducive to many other goals for European integration. The broadening of the Community's agenda was not an entirely new phenomenon, with many aspects of what would become the wide range of activities set out in the Maastricht Treaty dimly discernible from the 1970s onwards. But it was with the mid-1980s renewal of the Community's original purpose — trade liberalisation — that the pressures for, and the

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter 8, 'Relations with the European Council'.

⁽²⁾ Both the problem and the hope that direct elections would prove a cure were acknowledged in Richard Burke's speech to the Association internationale des anciens des Communautés européennes (International Association of Former Officials of the European Communities), Paris, 3 May 1979 (HAEC, Archive of speeches).



Jacques Delors greets crowds of children in June 1985: the new president proved remarkably effective at attracting popular attention.

feasibility of, the much broader new agenda, comprising further monetary integration, a more active competition policy, environmental policy, justice and home affairs coordination, a common foreign policy and much else besides, suddenly rose significantly. The way in which the Single European Act also included a section devoted to economic and social cohesion — thereby creating the necessary legal basis for the subsequent expansion of Community spending directed towards the less wealthy regions of Europe — further underlined how the identification of one core objective had clear knock-on effects in other policy fields. And the success of the Single European Act made further institutional change much more likely. The pattern of deepening and institutional transformation that would mark the

1990s would owe a good portion of its initial impetus to Delors' arrival in Brussels and the launch of the single market project.

Needless to say, to attribute everything that happened at European level in the 1980s and 1990s to Delors and his impact would be a massive over-simplification. The causes of the renewal of European integration during this period were much deeper and more varied. Nonetheless, it is clear that Delors proved to be a Commission leader perfectly capable of seizing the initial opportunity and then, once momentum had built up, of deftly navigating a particularly powerful European current. Eventually, of course, the tide would ebb. The 1990s would see the start of a public and po-



Jacques Delors holding the Unicef Sport Aid torch in May 1986.

litical backlash against the pace and scope of the revitalised integration process. And the Community, now Union, is in some ways still coming to terms with the full extent of the changes initiated in the mid-1980s. But what is already clear is that because of the transformations that were wrought, the Brussels that Delors would leave in 1995 would be fundamentally different to the one he had arrived in a little over a decade earlier.

PIERS LUDLOW

Annexes

Timeline 1973–86

1973

1 January	Enlargement of the European Communities to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
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The Commission from 6 January 1973 to 5 January 1977

Composition: François-Xavier Ortoli (President), Albert Borschette (in office until 14 July 1976, replaced by Raymond Vouel on 20 July 1976), Ralf Dahrendorf (in office until 31 October 1974, replaced by Guido Brunner on 12 November 1974), Jean-François Deniau (in office until 12 April 1973, replaced by Claude Cheysson on 19 April 1973), Finn Olav Gundelach, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Patrick Hillery, Pierre Lardinois, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, Henri Simonet, Christopher Soames, Altiero Spinelli (in office until 4 July 1976, replaced by Cesidio Guazzaroni on 13 July 1976), George Thomson.

1973

3 April	European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) set up
3 July	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opens in Helsinki
12 September	New round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations opens in Tokyo
6–27 October	Yom Kippur War. First oil shock

1974

1 April	British government seeks 'renegotiation' of the treaty of accession
25 April	Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the end of the Salazar dictatorship
31 May	Permanent delegation of the European Commission opens in Tokyo
24 July	End of the Greek military junta
9–10 December	Paris Summit. European Council established

1975

28 February	First Lomé Convention (Lomé I) signed between the Community and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states
18 March	European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) set up
20 March	Official inauguration of the European University Institute in Florence
9 May	25th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration
5 June	Referendum in the United Kingdom. The British people vote in favour of keeping their country in the Community
12 June	Official accession application by Greece
22 July	European Court of Auditors established
1 August	Final act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki
16 September	Establishment of official relations between China and the Communities
25 November	Death of Franco. Start of the democratisation process in Spain
29 December	Presentation of the Tindemans report on European union

1976

2–16 February	Barcelona Conference. Adoption of a draft convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea
1 April	Lomé I enters into force
25–27 April	Commission signs, on behalf of the EEC, a general cooperation agreement with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia)
27 July	Official opening of accession negotiations with Greece
20 September	Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage signed

The Commission from 6 January 1977 to 5 January 1981

Composition: Roy Jenkins (President), Guido Brunner (in office until 4 November 1980), Richard Burke, Claude Cheysson, Étienne Davignon, Antonio Giolitti, Finn Olav Gundelach, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Lorenzo Natali, François-Xavier Ortoli, Christopher Tugendhat, Raymond Vouel, Henk Vredeling.

1977

18 January	Commission signs, on behalf of the EEC, a general cooperation agreement with the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan and Syria)
March	Davignon plan on restructuring the steel industry
9 March	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) opens in Berlin
28 March	Official accession application by Portugal
7–8 May	Downing Street Summit. The President of the Commission attends a G7 Summit for the first time
1 July	Customs union in the enlarged Communities completed
28 July	Official accession application by Spain
27 October	Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, gives a speech in Florence on the prospects for monetary union

1978

6 January	Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, visits the Commission
6 February	Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, concluded in February 1976, enters into force
6–7 July	Principles of the European Monetary System (EMS) adopted

1979

5 February	Official opening of accession negotiations with Spain
20 February	<i>Cassis de Dijon</i> judgment establishing the principle of mutual recognition
13 March	European Monetary System (EMS) enters into force
16 March	Jean Monnet dies
28 May	Accession treaty signed with Greece
7–10 June	First elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
31 October	Second Lomé Convention (Lomé II) signed
13 December	European Parliament rejects the budget for the first time
17 December	The Community signs the agreements on the GATT multilateral trade negotiations (Tokyo Round)

1980

7–8 March	EEC–ASEAN cooperation agreement signed
1 October	EEC–ASEAN cooperation agreement enters into force
October	Commission declares a state of manifest crisis in the steel industry

1981

1 January	Enlargement of the European Communities to include Greece Lomé II enters into force
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The Commission from 6 January 1981 to 5 January 1985

Composition: Gaston Thorn (President), Frans Andriessen, Claude Cheysson (in office until 22 May 1981, replaced by Edgard Pisani, in office from 26 May 1981 to 3 December 1984), Giorgios Contogeorgis, Étienne Davignon, Antonio Giolitti, Finn Olav Gundelach (in office until 13 January 1981, replaced by Poul Dalsager on 21 January 1981), Wilhelm Haferkamp, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Lorenzo Natali, Michael O’Kennedy (in office until 9 March 1982, replaced by Richard Burke on 1 April 1982), François-Xavier Ortoli (in office until 26 October 1984), Ivor Richard, Christopher Tugendhat.

1981

20 February	Communication from the Commission on restructuring the steel industry
October	Set of communications on the single market and common policies
19 November	Genscher–Colombo plan on improving institutional mechanisms

1982

23 February	Referendum in Greenland (Denmark) on leaving the EEC
25 March	25th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome
26 May	Commission sends a communication on information technology (Esprit programme) to the Council
24 June	Council adopts the Seveso directive (industrial risks)

1983

25 January	Agreement on establishing a common fisheries policy
21 March	General realignment of central rates under the EMS

1984

14 February	European Parliament adopts the Spinelli draft treaty on a European union
28 February	Council adopts the Esprit programme
9 April	Joint European Torus (JET) opens in Culham
25–26 June	Fontainebleau European Council: establishment of the Adonnino Committee (people's Europe) and the Dooge Committee (institutions) for the revision of the treaties. Increase in budgetary resources and compromise on the British budgetary contribution
8 December	Third Lomé Convention (Lomé III) signed

The Commission from 6 January 1985 to 5 January 1989

Composition: Jacques Delors (President), Frans Andriessen, António José Baptista Cardoso e Cunha (in office from 5 January 1986), Claude Cheysson, Henning Christophersen, Stanley Clinton Davis, Arthur Cockfield, Willy De Clercq, Manuel Marín (in office from 5 January 1986), Abel Matutes (in office from 5 January 1986), Nicolas Mosar, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Lorenzo Natali, Alois Pfeiffer (in office until 1 August 1987, replaced by Peter Schmidhuber, in office from 22 September 1987), Carlo Ripa di Meana, Peter Sutherland, Grigoris Varfis.

1985

14 January	Speech by Jacques Delors before the European Parliament
1 February	Greenland leaves the European Communities, but remains associated thereto as an overseas territory
12 June	Act on the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities signed
14 June	Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands sign the Schengen Convention White Paper on the completion of the internal market by 1992
28–29 June	Milan European Council decides to convene an intergovernmental conference on the revision of the treaties Final report of the ad hoc committee for a people's Europe (Adonnino Committee)

1986

1 January	Enlargement of the European Communities to include Spain and Portugal
17 and 28 February	Single European Act signed in Luxembourg
29 May	The European flag is raised for the first time, to the sound of <i>Ode to Joy</i>

PIERRE-OLIVIER LALOUX

Organisation charts of the Commission

Organisation chart of the Commission of the European Communities, 5 November 1973 ⁽¹⁾

The Commission

- President
- Vice-Presidents
- Members of the Commission

Secretariat-General of the Commission

- Secretary-General
- Deputy Secretaries-General
- Chief Advisers
- Adviser

Legal Service

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General

Spokesman's Group

- Spokesman
- Deputy Spokesman

Statistical Office

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Statistical methods and processing of data
- Directorate B — General statistics and national accounts
- Directorate C — Demographic and social statistics
- Directorate D — Agricultural, forestry and fisheries statistics
- Directorate E — Energy, industry and small business statistics
- Directorate F — Trade, transport and services statistics

Administration of the Customs Union

- Director
- Chief Advisers

⁽¹⁾ Chart published in *Courrier du personnel*, No 283, 5 November 1973.

Environment and Consumer Protection Service

- Director

DG I — External Relations

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - External economic policy planning staff
- Directorate A — Relations with international organisations
- Directorate B — Relations with North America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa; commercial questions with respect to agriculture; protocol; external offices
- Directorate C — Bilateral and multilateral relations with the developing countries in Latin America and Asia (except Far East); United Nations economic agencies other than Unctad; generalised tariff preferences; coordination with the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation concerning questions relating to the developing countries
- Directorate D — General questions and instruments of external economic policy; commercial questions in respect of industry; Far East
- Directorate E — Multilateral relations and specific questions of trade with countries with planned economies in Europe; credit insurance and export credit
- Directorate F — Relations with countries of northern, central and southern Europe
- External offices:
 - Washington
 - Paris (delegation to the OECD)
 - Santiago de Chile
 - Geneva (delegation to the international organisations)

DG II — Economic and Financial Affairs

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Secretary of the Monetary Committee
- Directorate A — National economies and economic trends
- Directorate B — Economic structure and development
- Directorate C — Monetary matters I
- Directorate D — Monetary matters II
- Directorate E — Budgetary and financial affairs

DG III — Industrial and Technological Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - Industrial and technological problems in relation to non-member countries
 - Harmonisation of industrial policy with development cooperation policy
- Directorate A — Industry, technology and steel
- Directorate B — Industry, technology, nuclear and energy sectors
- Directorate C — Industry, technology, electronics, data processing, telecommunications, aerospace, land transport and new means of transport
- Directorate D — Industry, technology and various sectors
- Directorate E — Industrial and technological policy

DG IV — Competition

- Director-General
- Directorate A — General competition policy
- Directorate B — Restrictive practices and dominant positions
- Directorate C — Corporate combinations, rules of competition, ECSC Treaty, industrial property rights, energy and transport
- Directorate D — State aids, public discrimination, public enterprises and state monopolies
- Directorate E — Inspection

DG V — Social Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Reports, analyses and social aspects of Community policies
- Administrative unit attached to the Deputy Director-General:
 - Preparatory work for intervention measures (studies and pilot schemes)
- Directorate A — Employment policy
- Directorate B — European Social Fund (operations)
- Directorate C — Social security and European social budget
- Directorate D — Living and working conditions
- Directorate E — Industrial relations

Luxembourg

- Directorate F — Health protection
- Directorate G — Industrial safety and medicine

DG VI — Agriculture

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Directorate A — International affairs relating to agriculture
- Directorate B — Organisation of markets in crop products
- Directorate C — Organisation of markets in livestock products
- Directorate D — Organisation of markets in specialised crops and fisheries
- Directorate E — Agricultural structures and environment
- Directorate F — European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
- Directorate G — Agricultural economics
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Relations with non-governmental organisations
- Directorate H — Agricultural legislation

DG VII — Transport

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Directorate A — General development of the common transport policy and coordination with the other policies
- Directorate B — Organisation of the transport market and air and sea transport
- Directorate C — Financial, infrastructure and technical aspects

DG VIII — Development and Cooperation

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Administrative units directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for coordination of EDF operations:
 - Financial matters concerning the EDF
 - Secretariat of the EDF Committee
- Directorate A — General affairs and primary products
- Directorate B — Trade and development
- Directorate C — EDF programmes and projects
- Directorate D — EDF technical operations

DG IX — Personnel and Administration

- Director-General
- Advisers
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Medical Service
- Directorate A — Personnel
- Directorate B — Welfare, training and staff information
- Directorate C — General services and office equipment
- Directorate D — Translation, documentation, reproduction and library
- Directorate E — Interpreters and conference services
- Director (in Luxembourg)

DG X — Information

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Coordination and programming
- Directorate B — Information operations
- Information offices:
 1. *Community countries*
 - Brussels
 - Bonn
 - Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
 - Copenhagen
 - Dublin
 - The Hague
 - London
 - Luxembourg
 - Paris
 - Rome
 2. *Non-member countries*
 - Washington
 - New York (suboffice attached to Washington office)
 - Geneva

DG XI — Internal Market

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Movement of goods
- Directorate B — Right of establishment, freedom to provide services, approximation of commercial and economic laws
- Directorate C — Approximation of laws: companies and firms, public contracts, intellectual property, fair competition, general matters

DG XII — Research, Science and Education

- Director-General
- Chief Adviser
- Directorate A — Education and training, external relations in research, science and education
- Directorate B — Research and development policy
- Directorate C — Scientific programmes and cooperation with national centres, research councils and scientific associations
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Fusion programme

DG XVII — Energy and Euratom Safeguards

- Director-General
- Chief Adviser
- Adviser
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Energy policy
- Directorate A — Energy economy
- Directorate B — Coal
- Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
- Directorate D — Nuclear energy, other primary sources and electricity
- Luxembourg*
- Directorate E — Euratom safeguards

DG XIII — Scientific and Technical Information and Information Management

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Transfer of technology and industrial property questions
- Directorate B — Information management

DG XVIII — Credit and Investments

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Borrowings and administration of funds
- Directorate B — Investments and loans

DG XV ⁽¹⁾ — Financial Institutions and Taxation

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Financial institutions
- Directorate B — Taxation

DG XIX — Budgets

- Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Methods, analyses and programmes
- Directorate A — Budgets
- Directorate B — Own resources and accounting

DG XVI — Regional Policy

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Directorate A — Analysis, documentation and objectives
- Directorate B — Coordination and programmes
- Directorate C — Development and conversion operations

DG XX — Financial Control

- Director-General — Financial Controller
- Director — Deputy Financial Controller
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - EDF, Social Fund, readaptation of ECSC manpower
 - EAGGF, revenue and management of assets
- Directorate A — Administrative and research expenditure

⁽¹⁾ There was no DG XIV.

Joint Research Centre

- Director-General of the JRC
- Chief Adviser

Geel establishment (Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements)

- Director
- Chief Adviser to the Director

Karlsruhe establishment (Institute for Transuranic Elements)

- Director

Petten establishment

- Director

Ispra establishment

- Scientific Director
- Deputy Scientific Director
- Director of General Services

Euratom Supply Agency

- Director-General ⁽¹⁾

Security Office

- Director

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

- Director
- Publishing
- Sales Service

⁽¹⁾ As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.

Organisation chart of the Commission of the European Communities, September 1977 ⁽¹⁾

The Commission

- President
- Vice-Presidents
- Members of the Commission

Administration of the Customs Union

- Director
- Chief Advisers

Secretariat-General of the Commission

- Secretary-General
- Deputy Secretaries-General
- Director
- Chief Advisers

Environment and Consumer Protection Service

- Head of Service
- Adviser

Legal Service

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General

Statistical Office

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Statistical methods and processing of data
- Directorate B — General statistics and national accounts
- Directorate C — Demographic and social statistics
- Directorate D — Agricultural, forestry and fisheries statistics
- Directorate E — Industrial and environment statistics
- Directorate F — External relations, transport and services statistics

DG I — External Relations

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Chief Advisers
- Protocol
- Directorate A — Relations with international organisations, commercial questions with respect to agriculture and fisheries and relations with South Africa
- Directorate B — Relations with North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan
- Directorate C — Bilateral and multilateral relations with the developing countries in Latin America and Asia (except Middle and Far East); United Nations economic agencies other than Unctad and coordination with the Directorate-General for Development concerning questions relating to the developing countries
- Directorate D — General questions and instruments of external economic policy and commercial questions in respect of industry and energy
- Directorate E — Attached to one of the Deputy Directors-General:
 - Generalised tariff preferences — Special Representative for Textile Negotiations
 - Negotiation and management of textile agreements

⁽¹⁾ Based on the 'Directory of the Commission of the European Communities (September 1977)', edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1977.



- Directorate F — Relations with countries of northern, central and southern Europe
- Directorate G — Delegation for the accession negotiations with Greece
- Directorate H — Directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Special Representative for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Adviser on Relations with State-Trading Countries
- External offices:
 - Paris (delegation to the OECD)
 - Geneva (delegation to the international organisations)
 - Washington
 - New York (delegation to the United Nations)
 - Ottawa
 - Santiago de Chile
 - Tokyo

DG II — Economic and Financial Affairs

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Secretary of the Monetary Committee
- Attached to the Director-General:
 - Economic advisers
- Directorate A — National economies and economic trends
- Directorate B — Economic structure and development
- Directorate C — Monetary matters I
- Directorate D — Monetary matters II
- Directorate E — Budgetary and financial affairs

DG III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Advisers
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Industrial and technological problems in relation to non-member countries; industrial cooperation
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for coordination of sectoral measures:
 - Secretariat for internal and external work on raw materials
- Directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for coordination of regulations and standards:
 - Chief Adviser
- Directorate A — Industrial affairs I (removal of technical barriers, mechanical engineering, motor vehicles, chemicals and foodstuffs)
- Directorate B — Industrial affairs II (public contracts, electronics, data processing, telecommunications and aircraft)
- Directorate C — Industrial affairs III (intervention, shipbuilding, textiles, paper and footwear and construction)
- Directorate D — Approximation of laws and right of establishment and services
- Directorate E — Steel
- Directorate F — Commerce; small and medium-sized enterprises; pharmacy; commercial law and economic legislation
- Unit attached to DG III for administrative purposes
 - Business Cooperation Centre

DG IV — Competition

- Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - General competition policy
- Directorate A — Inspection and studies
- Directorate B — Restrictive practices and dominant positions
- Directorate C — Corporate combinations, rules of competition, ECSC Treaty, industrial property rights, energy and transport
- Directorate D — State aids, public discrimination, public enterprises and state monopolies

DG V — Employment and Social Affairs

- Director-General
- Chief Adviser
- Directorate A — General social policy guidelines
- Directorate B — Employment and vocational training
- Directorate C — European Social Fund
- Directorate D — Working conditions and migrant worker policies
- Directorate E — Industrial relations and labour law
- Luxembourg*
- Directorate F — Health and safety

DG VI — Agriculture

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Directorate A — International affairs relating to agriculture
- Directorate B — Organisation of markets in crop products
- Directorate C — Organisation of markets in livestock products
- Directorate D — Organisation of markets in specialised crops
- Directorate E — Agricultural structures and environment
- Directorate F — European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
- Directorate G — Agricultural economics
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Relations with non-governmental organisations
- Directorate H — Agricultural legislation

DG VII — Transport

- Director-General
- Directorate A — General development of the common transport policy; air and sea transport
- Directorate B — Organisation of the transport market; ports
- Directorate C — Financial, infrastructure and technical aspects

DG VIII — Development

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Relations with Commission Delegates
- Directorate A — General development policy and international relations covered by that policy in coordination with DG I
- Directorate B — Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
- Administrative units directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for Directorate B:
 - Maghreb, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria; and coordination with DG I on general matters relating to the Mediterranean area (VIII/1)
 - Relations with Community and EEC-ACP institutions and with non-governmental circles (VIII/2)
- Directorate C — Projects
- Directorate D — Operations
- Directorate E — Finance and administration
- Attached to the Finance and Administration Unit
 - European Agency for Cooperation (EAC)
- Directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for Directorates C and D and Administrative Unit E
 - Secretariat of the Financing Committee

DG IX — Personnel and Administration

- Director-General
- Adviser

Brussels

- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Medical Service
- Directorate A — Personnel
- Directorate B — Welfare, training and staff information
- Directorate C — General services and office equipment
- Directorate D — Translation, documentation, reproduction and library
- Directorate E — Interpreters and conference services

Luxembourg

- Director

Ispra

- Attached to the Director-General:
 - Medical Service

DG X — Spokesman's Group and Directorate-General for Information

- Spokesman and Director-General
- Adviser

Spokesman's Group

- Deputy Spokesman
- Members

Directorate-General for Information

- Directors
- Information offices ⁽¹⁾

1. Community countries

- Brussels
- Copenhagen
- Bonn
- Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
- Paris
- Dublin
- Rome
- Luxembourg
- The Hague
- London
- Cardiff (suboffice attached to London office)
- Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London office)

2. Non-member countries

- Santiago de Chile
- Ottawa
- Washington
- New York (suboffice attached to Washington office)
- Athens
- Tokyo
- Geneva
- Ankara

DG XII ⁽²⁾ — Research, Science and Education

- Director-General
- Chief Adviser
- Directorate A — Education, training and cultural questions
- Directorate B — Research and development policy
- Directorate C — Scientific and technological programmes; external relations in research, science and education
- Directorate D — Research, development and nuclear policy
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Fusion and plasma physics programme
 - Biology, radiation protection and medical research programme

DG XIII — Scientific and Technical Information and Information Management

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Transfer of technology and industrial property questions
- Directorate B — Information management

DG XIV — Fisheries

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Resources
- Directorate B — Market and structures
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Data processing and internal information

⁽¹⁾ In alphabetical order by country in which Commission information offices are located.

⁽²⁾ There was no DG XI.

DG XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Financial institutions
- Directorate B — Taxation

DG XVI — Regional Policy

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Coordination, programmes, studies and analyses
- Directorate B — Development and conversion operations

DG XVII — Energy

- Director-General
- Chief Advisers
- Adviser

Brussels

- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Energy policy
- Direction A — Energy economy
- Directorate B — Coal
- Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
- Directorate D — Nuclear energy, other primary sources and electricity

Luxembourg

- Directorate E — Euratom safeguards

DG XIX — Budgets

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - General budget, financial management and information
- Directorate A — Financial intervention appropriations
- Directorate B — Financing of the budget, general affairs

DG XX — Financial Control

- Director-General (Financial Controller)
- Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - Control of revenue, the EAGGF 'Guarantee' section, and of food aid
 - Control of the EAGGF 'Guidance' section, of the Social Fund, of the European Regional Development Fund, and of the readaptation of ECSC manpower
 - Control of the EDF
- Directorate A — Control of administrative and research expenditure

DG XVIII — Credit and Investments

- Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Special studies and special cases
- Directorate A — Borrowings and administration of funds
- Directorate B — Investments and loans

Joint Research Centre

Brussels

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Services directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Director of JRC programmes
 - Administrative coordination

Ispra

- Establishment Director
- Site Director
- Director for Forward Studies
- Projects Director
- Director of the Computers, Mathematics and Systems Analysis Department
- Director of the Applied Sciences and Technology Department
- Director of the Natural and Physical Sciences Department

Geel

- Establishment Director

Karlsruhe

- Establishment Director

Petten

- Establishment Director

Euratom Supply Agency

- Director-General ⁽¹⁾

Security Office

- Director

Special Assignments

- Public Relations
- Advisers *hors classe*

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

- Director
- Adviser

⁽¹⁾ As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.

Commission delegations to ACP countries

- Dutch Antilles
- Barbados ⁽¹⁾
- Benin
- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
- Burundi
- Cameroon ⁽²⁾
- Central African Empire
- Congo
- Ivory Coast
- Ethiopia
- Pacific (Fiji, West Samoa, Tonga) ⁽³⁾
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea Bissau
- Guinea Conakry
- Guyana ⁽⁴⁾
- Upper Volta
- Mauritius ⁽⁵⁾
- Jamaica ⁽⁶⁾

- Kenya
- Liberia
- Madagascar ⁽⁷⁾
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Uganda
- Rwanda
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Surinam
- Tanzania
- Chad
- Togo
- Trinidad and Tobago ⁽⁸⁾
- Zaïre
- Zambia

⁽¹⁾ Also responsible for St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, Dominica, Antigua, St Vincent, Montserrat, St Lucia and the British Virgin Islands.

⁽²⁾ Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.

⁽³⁾ Also responsible for the Pacific overseas territories.

⁽⁴⁾ Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.

⁽⁵⁾ Also responsible for Comoros, Réunion and Seychelles.

⁽⁶⁾ Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the Caicos Islands.

⁽⁷⁾ Also responsible for responsible for Djibouti.

⁽⁸⁾ Also responsible for responsible for Grenada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and the South Atlantic overseas territories.

Organisation chart of the Commission of the European Communities, December 1981 ⁽¹⁾

The Commission

- President
- Vice-Presidents
- Members of the Commission

Secretariat-General of the Commission

- Secretary-General
- Deputy Secretary-General
- Directors
- Chief Advisers
- Adviser

Legal Service

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General

Joint Interpreting and Conference Service

- Director
- Adviser

Statistical Office

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - Software design and development
 - Data-processing management
- Directorate A — General economic statistics
- Directorate B — Demographic and social statistics
- Directorate C — Industrial, transport and services statistics
- Directorate D — Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and energy statistics
- Directorate E — External trade, ACP and non-member countries statistics

Customs Union Service

- Director-General — Head of Service
- Directorate A — Tariff questions
- Directorate B — Customs legislation

⁽¹⁾ Based on the 'Directory of the Commission of the European Communities (December 1981)', edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981.

DG I — External Relations

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Chief Adviser
- Adviser
- Directorate A — GATT, OECD (commercial matters), commercial questions with respect to agriculture and fisheries, and relations with South Africa
- Directorate B — Relations with North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan
- Directorate C — Relations with the developing countries in Latin America and Asia (except the Far East); coordination with the Directorate-General for Development on related questions and generalised tariff preferences
- Directorate D — General questions and instruments of external economic policy, commercial policy in the field of industrial raw materials, coordination with the Directorate-General for Development on general questions relating to the developing countries, and relations with international organisations other than Unctad
- Directorate E — Negotiation and management of textile agreements; trade in industrial products
- Directorate F — Relations with countries of northern, central and southern Europe
- G — Relations with state-trading countries
- Protocol
- H — Delegation for enlargement; accession negotiations and bilateral relations

DG II — Economic and Financial Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Adviser
- Secretary of the Monetary Committee and the Economic Policy Committee
- Attached to the Director-General:
 - Economic advisers
- Directorate A — National economies
- Directorate B — Economic structure and Community intervention
- Directorate C — Macroeconomic analyses and policies
- Directorate D — Monetary matters

DG III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Directorate A — Distributive trades and industrial affairs I (removal of technical barriers to trade, motor vehicles, mechanical engineering, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, electricity and chemicals)
- Directorate B — Industrial affairs II (telematics, data processing, telecommunications, transport and public contracts)
- Directorate C — Industrial affairs III (textiles, leather, paper, shipbuilding, miscellaneous industries and non-tariff barriers)
- Directorate D — Approximation of laws, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
- Directorate E — Steel
- Directorate F — Industrial restructuring, non-member countries and raw materials

DG IV — Competition

- Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - General competition policy
- Directorate A — Inspection and documentation
- Directorate B — Restrictive practices and dominant positions
- Directorate C — Corporate combinations, ECSC Treaty rules of competition, industrial property rights, energy and transport
- Directorate D — State aids, public discrimination, public enterprises and state monopolies

DG V — Employment, Social Affairs and Education

- Director-General
- Chief Adviser
- Adviser

Brussels

- Directorate A — General social policy guidelines
- Directorate B — Employment
- Directorate C — European Social Fund
- Directorate D — Working conditions and migrant worker policies
- Directorate E — Education, vocational training and youth policy

Luxembourg

- Directorate F — Health and safety

DG VI — Agriculture

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Economic and general matters
- Directorate A — General matters
- Directorate B — Agricultural legislation
- Directorate C — Organisation of markets in crop products
- Directorate D — Organisation of markets in livestock products
- Directorate E — Organisation of markets in specialised crops
- Unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for Directorates C, D and E
 - Periodic agricultural instruments and joint secretariat of management committees
- Directorate F — Agricultural structure and forestry
- Directorate G — European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
- Directorate H — International affairs relating to agriculture

DG VII — Transport

- Director-General
- Directorate A — General programming; international and institutional relations; air and maritime transport
- Directorate B — Inland transport markets; transport and energy
- Directorate C — Infrastructures; transport technology; state intervention

DG VIII — Development

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Directorate A — General development policy
- Directorate B — Coordination of aid policies and programmes
- Administrative units directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for Directorate B:
 - VIII/1 — Agreements with the Mashreq and Maghreb countries and Israel
 - VIII/2 — Cooperation with non-governmental organisations
- Directorate C — Projects
- Directorate D — Operations
- Directorate E — Finance and administration
- Unit attached to Directorate E (Finance and administration)
 - European Agency for Cooperation (EAC)
- Unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-General with special responsibility for Directorates C, D and E
 - Secretariat of the Financing Committee

DG IX — Personnel and Administration

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Adviser — Mediator
- Management and organisation
- Directorate A — Personnel
- Directorate B — Administration
- Directorate C — Translation, documentation, reproduction and library
- Directorate D — Personnel and administration — Luxembourg
- Directorate E — Informatics
- Attached to the Director-General:
 - Medical service for decentralised staff
 - Medical service for Brussels staff
 - Medical service, Luxembourg
 - Medical service, Ispra

DG X — Information

- Director-General
- Planning and programming
- Directorate A — Information to Member States, applicant countries, ACP and non-member countries and priority milieux
- Directorate B — Methods and media

Spokesman's Group ⁽¹⁾

- Spokesman
- Deputy Spokesman

DG XI — Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety

- Director-General
- Administrative units directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Legal and legislative aspects of implementation of programmes
 - International affairs (implementation of conventions, exchange of information with non-member countries and activity on specialised committees of international organisations)
- Directorate A — Protection and improvement of the environment
- Directorate B — Protection and promotion of consumer interests

⁽¹⁾ Under the authority of the president.

DG XII — Science, Research and Development

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Scientific and technical coordination, cooperation with non-member countries, and COST
- Directorate B — Scientific and technological research policy and industrial research
- Directorate C — Nuclear research and development
- Directorate D — Alternative energy sources, energy conservation and energy R & D strategy
- Directorate E — Biology, radiation protection and medical research
- Directorate F — Environment, raw materials and materials technologies
- Fusion programme

Joint Research Centre

Brussels

- Director-General

Ispira

- Establishment Director
- Site Director
- Director for Forward Studies
- Projects Director
- Director of the Informatics, Mathematics and Systems Analysis Department
- Director of the Applied Sciences and Technology Department
- Director of the Natural and Physical Sciences Department
- Director of Super SARA Task Force

Geel

- Establishment Director

Karlsruhe

- Establishment Director

Petten

- Establishment Director

DG XIII — Information Market and Innovation

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Adviser for relations with other institutions
 - Adviser for contractual and legal questions
 - Task force on industrial innovation and support to telematics coordination
- Directorate A — New technologies
- Directorate B — Information management

DG XIV — Fisheries

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Resources
- Directorate B — Market and structures
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Data processing and internal information

DG XV — Financial Institutions and Taxation

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Financial institutions
- Directorate B — Taxation

DG XVI — Regional Policy

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Regional development policies
- Directorate B — Development and conversion operations
- Under the direct authority of the Member of the Commission with special responsibility for the coordination of Community funds:
 - Task force for the coordination of structural instruments

DG XVII — Energy

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General

Brussels

- Directorate A — Energy policy, analyses and forecasts, and contracts
- Directorate B — Coal
- Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
- Directorate D — Nuclear energy
- Directorate E — Energy saving and alternative energy sources, electricity and heat

Luxembourg

- Directorate F — Euratom safeguards

DG XX — Financial Control

- Director-General (Financial Controller)
- Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
- Adviser
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - Control of revenues; general matters
 - Control of the EAGGF
- Administrative unit attached to the Deputy Financial Controller:
 - Control of social and regional expenditure
- Directorate A — Control of operating, research and cooperation expenditure

DG XVIII — Credit and Investments

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Borrowings and administration of funds
- Directorate B — Investments and loans

Euratom Supply Agency

- Director-General ⁽¹⁾

Security Office

- Director

DG XIX — Budgets

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Financial intervention appropriations and administrative expenditure
- Directorate B — Financing of the budget
- Directorate C — General affairs and relations with Parliament and the Court of Auditors

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

- Director

⁽¹⁾ As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.

Information offices ⁽¹⁾

- Bonn
- Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
- Brussels
- Copenhagen
- Madrid
- Paris
- Athens
- Dublin
- Rome
- Milan (suboffice attached to Rome office)
- Luxembourg
- The Hague
- Lisbon
- London
- Belfast (suboffice attached to London office)
- Cardiff (suboffice attached to London office)
- Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London office)
- Geneva
- Ankara

External delegations ⁽²⁾

1. *In third countries*

- Algeria
- Australia
- Barbados ⁽³⁾
- Benin
- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
- Burundi
- Cameroon ⁽⁴⁾
- Canada
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Chile ⁽⁵⁾

- Congo
- Dutch Antilles
- Egypt
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea Bissau ⁽⁶⁾
- Guinea Conakry
- Guyana ⁽⁷⁾
- Ivory Coast
- Israel
- Jamaica ⁽⁸⁾
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kenya
- Lebanon
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritius ⁽⁹⁾
- Morocco
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Pacific ⁽¹⁰⁾
- Papua New Guinea ⁽¹¹⁾
- Rwanda
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Surinam
- Syria
- Tanzania

⁽¹⁾ In alphabetical order by country in which Commission information offices are located.

⁽²⁾ In alphabetical order by country in which Commission external delegations are located.

⁽³⁾ Also responsible for Antigua, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Montserrat, St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, St Lucia and St Vincent and for the Caribbean Development Bank.

⁽⁴⁾ Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.

⁽⁵⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for Latin America (see Venezuela).

⁽⁶⁾ Also responsible for Cape Verde.

⁽⁷⁾ Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.

⁽⁸⁾ Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

⁽⁹⁾ Also responsible for Comoros, Djibouti, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Also responsible for Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Brunei, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and dependencies, Vanuatu, Pitcairn, Tuvalu and Wallis and the Futuna Islands.

⁽¹¹⁾ Also responsible for Kiribati and the Solomon Islands.

- ▶ • Thailand (headquarters of the delegation in south and south-east Asia)
- Togo
- Trinidad and Tobago ⁽¹⁾
- Tunisia
- Uganda
- United States:
 - Washington
 - New York
- Upper Volta
- Venezuela (headquarters of the delegation for Latin America)
- Yugoslavia
- Zaïre
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

2. To international organisations

- Geneva
- New York
- Paris
- Vienna

⁽¹⁾ Also responsible for French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe and dependencies, Martinique, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and the South Atlantic overseas territories.

Organisation chart of the Commission of the European Communities, October 1986 ⁽¹⁾

The Commission

- President
- Vice-Presidents
- Members of the Commission

Secretariat-General of the Commission

- Secretary-General
- Deputy Secretary-General
- Directors

Legal Service

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General

Spokesman's Service ⁽²⁾

- Spokesman
- Deputy Spokesman

Joint Interpreting and Conference Service

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Administrative units directly attached to the Director-General:
 - General matters
 - Training
- Conference Services Directorate

Statistical Office

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - OS-1: Office for liaison with Community institutions in Brussels
 - Directorate institutions in Brussels
- Directorate A — Processing and dissemination of statistical information
- Directorate B — General economic statistics
- Directorate C — External trade, ACP and non-member countries, and transport statistics
- Directorate D — Energy and industrial statistics
- Directorate E — Demographic and social statistics; agricultural statistics

⁽¹⁾ Based on the 'Directory of the Commission of the European Communities (October 1986)', edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986.

⁽²⁾ Under the authority of the president.

DG I — External Relations

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Adviser *hors classe*
- Protocol

External relations and regional policy ⁽¹⁾

- Directorate A — GATT, OECD, commercial questions with respect to agriculture, fisheries, services and high technology, and relations with South Africa
- Directorate B — Relations with North America, Australia and New Zealand; external relations in the research, science and nuclear energy fields
- Directorate C — General questions and instruments of external economic policy
- Directorate D — Negotiation and management of textile agreements; trade in industrial products
- Directorate E — Relations with northern and central European countries, and state-trading countries
- Directorate F — Relations with China, Japan, and the other countries of the Far East

North–South relations and Mediterranean policy ⁽²⁾

- Directorate G — Mediterranean, Near and Middle East
- Directorate H — Relations with developing countries in Latin America and Asia (except the Far East)
- Directorate I — North–South relations

DG II — Economic and Financial Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Advisers
- Secretary of the Monetary Committee and the Economic Policy Committee
- Directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Economic advisers
- Administrative unit attached to one of the Deputy Directors-General:
 - Data processing and statistics coordination
- Directorate A — National economies
- Directorate B — Economic structure and Community intervention
- Directorate C — Macroeconomic analyses and policies
- Directorate D — Monetary matters
- Commission/European Investment Bank liaison office

DG III — Internal Market and Industrial Affairs

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Director
- Directorate A — Industrial affairs I
- Directorate C ⁽³⁾ — Industrial affairs III — distributive trades
- Directorate D — Approximation of laws, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
- Directorate E — Steel
- Directorate F — Industrial restructuring, non-member countries and raw materials

Task force — Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

- Director

⁽¹⁾ Special responsibilities of Willy De Clercq.

⁽²⁾ Responsibilities of Claude Cheysson.

⁽³⁾ There is no Directorate B shown for DG III in the organisation chart.

DG IV — Competition

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Hearing Officer
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-General:
 - Directorate A — General competition policy
- Directorate B — Restrictive practices and dominant positions I
- Directorate C — Restrictive practices and dominant positions II
- Directorate D — Coordination of competition decisions
- Directorate E — State aids

DG V — Employment, Social Affairs and Education

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Secretariat for the Social Report (reports and analyses)
- Directorate A — Employment
- Directorate B — Living and working conditions and welfare
- Directorate C — Education, vocational training and youth policy
- Directorate D — European Social Fund
- Directorate E — Health and safety

DG VI — Agriculture

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Director
- Chief Adviser
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Economic affairs and general problems
- Directorate A — General matters
- Directorate B.I — Agro-economic legislation
- Directorate B.II — Quality and health
- Directorate C — Organisation of markets in crop products
- Directorate D — Organisation of markets in livestock products
- Directorate E — Organisation of markets in specialised crops
- Administrative unit directly attached to one of the Deputy Directors-General:
 - Periodic agricultural instruments and joint secretariat of management committees
- Directorate F.I — Agricultural structure and forestry
- Directorate F.II — European Agricultural Guidance Fund and agricultural research
- Directorate G — European Agricultural Guarantee Fund
- Directorate H — International affairs relating to agriculture

DG VII — Transport

- Director-General
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - Relations with other institutions, international relations
- Directorate A — Maritime transport, legislation and transport economics
- Directorate B — Inland transport; market analysis; transport safety; research and technology
- Directorate C — Air transport, transport infrastructure and social and ecological aspects of transport

DG VIII — Development

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Adviser
- Administrative unit attached to the Director-General:
 - VIII/1 — Development analysis and forecast
 - VIII/2 — *The Courier (EEC/ACP)* and documentation
- Directorate A — Development activities
- Administrative unit directly attached to one of the Deputy Directors-General:
 - VIII/3 — Non-governmental organisations
- Directorate B — West and central Africa
- Directorate C — East and southern Africa; the Indian Ocean
- Directorate D — The southern and eastern Mediterranean; the Caribbean and Pacific
- Administrative unit directly attached to one of the Deputy Directors-General:
 - VIII/4 — General planning questions; finance committees
 - VIII/5 — Technical specialists' group
- Directorate E — Finance
- Administrative unit directly attached to Directorate E (Finance)
 - European Association for Cooperation (EAC)

DG IX — Personnel and Administration

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Director
- Adviser — Mediator
- Administrative units attached to the Director-General:
 - External offices
 - Staff information
 - Medical service for decentralised staff
 - Medical service for Brussels staff
 - Medical service, Luxembourg
 - Medical service, Ispra
- Directorate A — Personnel
- Directorate B — Administration
- Directorate C — Translation
- Directorate D — Personnel and administration in Luxembourg and general services
- Directorate E — Informatics
- Directorate F — Coordination and resources

DG X — Information, Communication and Culture

- Director-General
- Cultural activities and audiovisual policy
- Directorate A — Information
- Directorate B — Communication

DG XI — Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety

- Director-General
- Administrative units directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Implementation of programmes and general affairs
 - International affairs
 - Nuclear safety
 - Finance and contracts
- Directorate A — Protection and improvement of the environment
- Directorate B — Protection and promotion of consumer interests

DG XII — Science, Research and Development

- Director-General
- Deputy Directors-General
- Adviser
- Concertation Unit for Biotechnology in Europe
- Directorate A — Scientific and technical coordination, cooperation with non-member countries, and COST
- Directorate B — Means of action
- Directorate C — Technological research
- Directorate D — Nuclear research and development
- Directorate E — Alternative energy sources, energy conservation and energy R & D strategy
- Directorate F — Biology, radiation protection and medical research
- Directorate G — Environment, raw materials and materials technologies
- Fusion programme

Joint Research Centre

Brussels

- Director-General
- Programmes Director
- Adviser

Ispra

- Establishment Director
- Advisers
- Administration Director
- Site Director
- Projects Director
- Director of Department A
- Director of Department B
- Director of Department C

Geel

- Establishment Director

Karlsruhe

- Establishment Director

Petten

- Establishment Director

DG XIII — Telecommunications, Information Industry and Innovation

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Advisers
- Directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Adviser (responsible for contractual and legal questions)
- Task force on industrial innovation and support to telematics coordination
- Directorate A — New technologies
- Directorate B — Information management

Task Force on Information and Telecommunications Technologies

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Information technology — Esprit
- Directorate B — Telecommunications

DG XIV — Fisheries

- Director-General
- Director
- Directorate A — Markets and external resources
- Directorate B — Internal resources and monitoring
- Directorate C — Structures

DG XV — Financial Institutions and Company Law

- Director-General
- Directorate A — Financial institutions
- Directorate B — Company law, company and capital movements taxation

DG XVI — Regional Policy

- Director-General
- Administrative unit directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Financial management, monitoring and *ex post* evaluation
- Directorate A — Guidelines and priorities
- Directorate B — Preparation and assessment of operations
- Directorate C — Development operations

DG XVII — Energy

- Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Directorate A — Energy policy, analyses and forecasts, and contracts
- Directorate B — Coal
- Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
- Directorate D — Nuclear energy
- Directorate E — Energy saving and alternative energy sources, electricity and heat

Luxembourg

- Directorate F — Euratom safeguards

DG XVIII — Credit and Investments

- Director-General
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Borrowings and administration of funds
- Directorate B — Investments and loans

DG XIX — Budgets

- Director-General
- Director with responsibility for general coordination
- Chief Adviser
- Adviser
- Administrative units directly attached to the Director-General:
 - Budget forecasts and economic and financial assessment
 - Coordination of the directorate-general's external relations
 - Documentation and overview
 - Relations with Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control and the Court of Auditors
- Directorate A — Expenditure
- Directorate B — Resources
- Directorate C — Budget execution

DG XX — Financial Control

- Director-General (Financial Controller)
- Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
- Directorate A — Questions of principle; control of operating, research and cooperation expenditure
- Directorate B — Control of revenues, expenditure under the EAGGF, IMPs and the Social and Regional Funds

DG XXI — Customs Union and Indirect Taxation

- Director-General
- Director-General of the Customs Union Service
- Adviser
- Directorate A — Tariff questions
- Directorate B — Customs legislation
- Directorate C — Indirect taxation including elimination of fiscal frontiers

DG XXII — Coordination of Structural Instruments

- Director-General

Euratom Supply Agency

- Director-General ⁽¹⁾

Security Office

- Director

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

- Director

Information offices ⁽²⁾

- Bonn
- Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
- Munich (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
- Brussels
- Copenhagen
- Madrid
- Paris
- Marseille (suboffice attached to Paris office)
- Athens
- Dublin
- Rome
- Milan (suboffice attached to Rome office)
- Luxembourg
- The Hague
- Lisbon
- London
- Belfast (suboffice attached to London office)
- Cardiff (suboffice attached to London office)
- Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London office)
- Geneva
- Ankara

⁽¹⁾ As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.

⁽²⁾ In alphabetical order by country where Commission information offices are located.

External delegations ⁽¹⁾

1. *In third countries*

- Algeria
- Angola
- Antigua and Barbuda ⁽²⁾
- Australia ⁽³⁾
- Bangladesh ⁽⁴⁾
- Barbados ⁽⁵⁾
- Belize ⁽⁶⁾
- Benin
- Botswana
- Brazil
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon ⁽⁷⁾
- Canada
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Chile ⁽⁸⁾
- Comoros ⁽⁹⁾
- Congo
- Costa Rica ⁽¹⁰⁾
- Djibouti
- Egypt
- Equatorial Guinea ⁽¹¹⁾

- Ethiopia
- Gabon ⁽¹²⁾
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Grenada ⁽¹³⁾
- Guinea Bissau
- Guinea Conakry
- Guyana ⁽¹⁴⁾
- Mauritius ⁽¹⁵⁾
- India (headquarters of the delegation for south Asia)
- Indonesia ⁽¹⁶⁾
- Israel
- Ivory Coast
- Jamaica ⁽¹⁷⁾
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kenya
- Lebanon
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Morocco

⁽¹⁾ In alphabetical order by country where Commission external delegations are located.

⁽²⁾ Suboffice of the delegation to Barbados.

⁽³⁾ Also responsible for New Zealand.

⁽⁴⁾ Branch office of the delegation for south Asia (headquarters: see India).

⁽⁵⁾ Also responsible for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Kitts-Nevis, the OCTs of Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat.

⁽⁶⁾ Suboffice of the delegation to Jamaica.

⁽⁷⁾ Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.

⁽⁸⁾ Office of the delegation for Latin America (headquarters: see Venezuela).

⁽⁹⁾ Suboffice of the delegation to Mauritius.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Office of the delegation for Latin America (headquarters: see Venezuela).

⁽¹¹⁾ Suboffice of the delegation to Cameroon.

⁽¹²⁾ Also responsible for the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe.

⁽¹³⁾ Suboffice of the delegation to Trinidad and Tobago.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Also responsible for Comoros, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Office of the delegation for south-east Asia (headquarters: see Thailand).

⁽¹⁷⁾ Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

- Mozambique
- Netherlands Antilles
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Pacific (Fiji) ⁽¹⁾
- Pakistan
- Papua New Guinea ⁽²⁾
- Rwanda
- São Tomé and Príncipe ⁽³⁾
- Senegal
- Seychelles ⁽⁴⁾
- Sierra Leone
- Salomon Islands
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Swaziland
- Syria
- Tanzania
- Thailand (headquarters of the delegation for south-east Asia)
- Togo
- Tonga ⁽⁵⁾
- Trinidad and Tobago ⁽⁶⁾
- Tunisia
- Uganda

- United States:
 - Washington
 - New York
- Vanuatu ⁽⁷⁾
- Venezuela (headquarters of the delegation for Latin America)
- Western Samoa ⁽⁸⁾
- Yugoslavia
- Zaïre
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

2. To international organisations

- Geneva
- New York
- Paris
- Vienna

PIERRE-OLIVIER LALOUX

⁽¹⁾ Also responsible for Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and dependencies, Vanuatu, Pitcairn, Tuvalu and Wallis and the Futuna Islands.

⁽²⁾ Also responsible for Kiribati.

⁽³⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for Gabon.

⁽⁴⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for Mauritius.

⁽⁵⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).

⁽⁶⁾ Also responsible for French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe and dependencies, Martinique, Saint Helena and its dependencies, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, the French southern and Antarctic territories and the British Antarctic territories.

⁽⁷⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).

⁽⁸⁾ Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).

Composition of the Commission

The Ortoli Commission (6 January 1973 to 5 January 1977)

The Commission presided over by François-Xavier Ortoli took office on 6 January 1973. Following the enlargement of the Communities on 1 January 1973 to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the number of members of the Commission was increased to 13: two each for the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom and one each for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Tasks were once again broken down by portfolio.



Meeting of the Ortoli Commission. Starting from François-Xavier Ortoli (seated on the right, without glasses, leaning on the table) and going clockwise round the table: François-Xavier Ortoli; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Albert Borschette; Claude Cheysson; Pierre Lardinois; Altiero Spinelli; Christopher Soames; Wilhelm Haferkamp; Patrick Hillery; Ralf Dahrendorf; Finn Olav Gundelach; George Thomson; Henri Simonet; Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza.

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Albert Borschette (LU) until 14 July 1976, replaced by Raymond Vouel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition • Personnel and administration 	52	Robert Sunnen (LU)
Guido Brunner (DE) from 12 November 1974, succeeding Ralf Dahrendorf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research, science and education • Scientific and technical information and information management • Statistical Office • Joint Research Centre (JRC) 	44	Rolf Möhler (DE)
Claude Cheysson (FR) from 19 April 1973, succeeding Jean- François Deniau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and cooperation • Budget • Financial control 	53	Pierre Duchâteau (FR), 1973 Jacques-Alain de Sédouy (FR), 1973–76 Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1976
Ralf Dahrendorf (DE) until 11 November 1974, replaced by Guido Brunner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research, science and education • Scientific and technical information and information management • Statistical Office • Joint Research Centre (JRC) 	43	Hans Gläsner (DE)
Jean-François Deniau (FR) until 12 April 1973, replaced by Claude Cheysson	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and cooperation • Budget • Financial control 	44	Jean Chapperon (FR)
Cesidio Guazzaroni (IT) from 13 July 1976, succeeding Altiero Spinelli	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industry and technology policy (except steel) • Taxation and financial institutions 	65	Riccardo Perissich (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach (DK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal market • Management of the customs union 	47	Manfred Caspari (DE), 1973–74 Niels Helveg Petersen (DK), 1974–76
Wilhelm Haferkamp (DE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and financial affairs • Credit and investments 	49	Franz Froschmaier (DE)
Patrick John Hillery (IE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social affairs 	49	Edwin Fitzgibbon (IE)
Pierre Lardinois (NL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture 	48	Hans Wijnmaalen (NL)

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
François-Xavier Ortoli (FR) (President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidency • Secretariat-General • Legal Service • Spokesman's Group • Security Office • Office for Official Publications of the European Communities • Personnel and administration (from July 1976) 	47	Philippe de Margerie (FR), 1973–76 Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac (FR), 1976
Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (IT) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport • Information • Environment policy and protection of consumer interests • Parliamentary affairs (with the President) 	52	Giuseppe Jacoangeli (IT), 1973–75 Armando Toledano-Laredo (IT), 1975–76
Henri Simonet (BE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taxation and financial institutions • Energy • Euratom Supply Agency • Industrial and technological policy (for steel from July 1976) 	41	Jean Somers (BE), 1973–75 Michel Vanden Abeele (BE), 1975–76 Félix Trappeniers (BE), 1976
Christopher Soames (UK) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External relations 	52	David Hannay (UK)
Altiero Spinelli (IT) until 4 July 1976, replaced by Cesidio Guazzaroni	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industry and technology policy 	65	Riccardo Perissich (IT)
George Thomson (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional policy 	51	Gwyn Morgan (UK), 1973–75 Michael Jenkins (UK), 1975–76
Raymond Vouel (LU) from 20 July 1976, succeeding Albert Borschette	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition 	53	Robert Sunnen (LU)

The Jenkins Commission (6 January 1977 to 5 January 1981)

The Commission presided over by Roy Jenkins took office on 6 January 1977. Like its predecessor, it was made up of 13 members.



First meeting of the Jenkins Commission, 6 January 1977. Starting from Roy Jenkins (seated on the right, leaning on the table, with a circulation folder in front of him) and going clockwise round the table: Roy Jenkins; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Crispin Tickell, Jenkins's head of cabinet (seated behind); Guido Brunner; Christopher Tugendhat; Richard Burke; Claude Cheysson; Finn Olav Gundelach; François-Xavier Ortoli; Lorenzo Natali; Raymond Vouel; Étienne Davignon; Antonio Giolitti; Henk Vredeling; Wilhelm Haferkamp.

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Guido Brunner (DE) until 4 November 1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research, science and education • Scientific and technical information and information management • Energy • Joint Research Centre (JRC) • Euratom Supply Agency 	46	Rolf Möhler (DE), 1977–78 Jürgen Kühn (DE), 1978–80
Richard Burke (IE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport • Taxation • Consumer affairs • Relations with the European Parliament (until June 1979) • Research, science and education (from November 1980) 	44	John Hogan (IE)
Claude Cheysson (FR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development 	56	Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1976
Étienne Davignon (BE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal market and industrial affairs • Management of the customs union • Information market and innovation (from November 1980) • Energy (from November 1980) 	44	Jean Durieux (BE), 1977 Hugo Paemen (BE), 1977–80 Pierre Defraigne (BE), 1977–80 (for industrial affairs)
Antonio Giolitti (IT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional policy • Coordination of Community funds 	61	Luciano Cafagna (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach (DK) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture • Fisheries 	51	Arne Larsen (DK), 1977 Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK), 1978–80
Wilhelm Haferkamp (DE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External relations 	53	Franz Froschmaier (DE)
Roy Jenkins (UK) (President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidency • Secretariat-General • Legal Service • Spokesman's Group and information • Security Office 	56	Crispin Tickell (UK)

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Lorenzo Natali (IT) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Enlargement • Nuclear safety • Contacts with Member States' governments and public opinion on preparation for direct elections to the European Parliament (until June 1979) • Relations with the European Parliament (from June 1979) 	54	Paolo Pensa (IT)
François-Xavier Ortoli (FR) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and financial affairs • Credit and investments • Statistical Office 	51	Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac (FR), 1976
Christopher Tugendhat (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel and administration • Financial institutions • Budget • Financial control • Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 	39	Richard Hay (UK), 1977–79 Pauline Neville-Jones (UK), 1979–80
Raymond Vouel (LU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition 	53	Robert Sunnen (LU)
Henk Vredeling (NL) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment and social affairs • Tripartite Conference 	52	Robert Cohen (NL), 1977 Nel Barendregt (NL), 1978–80

The Thorn Commission (6 January 1981 to 5 January 1985)

The Commission presided over by Gaston Thorn took office on 6 January 1981. The enlargement of the Communities on 1 January 1981 to include Greece brought the number of members of the Commission to 14.



Meeting of the Thorn Commission, 20 April 1982. Starting from Gaston Thorn (seated on the right, with a folder in front of him) and going clockwise round the table: Gaston Thorn; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Richard Burke; Poul Dalsager; Frans Andriessen; Antonio Giolitti; Lorenzo Natali; François-Xavier Ortoli; Étienne Davignon; Giorgios Contogeorgis; Ivor Richard; Edgard Pisani; Karl-Heinz Narjes; Christopher Tugendhat; Wilhelm Haferkamp.

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Frans Andriessen (NL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition • Relations with the European Parliament 	51	Carlo Trojan (NL)
Richard Burke (IE) from 1 April 1982, following on from Michael O’Kennedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel and administration • Joint Interpreting and Conference Service • Statistical Office • Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 	49	Liam Hourican (IE)
Claude Cheysson (FR) until 22 May 1981, replaced by Edgard Pisani	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development 	60	Philippe Soubestre (FR)
Giorgios Contogeorgis (EL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport • Fisheries • Coordination of questions related to tourism 	68	Ioannis Yennimatas (EL)
Poul Dalsager (DK) from 21 January 1981, following on from Finn Olav Gundelach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture 	51	Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK), 1981 Ove Juul Jørgensen (DK), 1981–84
Étienne Davignon (BE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial affairs (including from 1983 the Information Technology and Telecommunications Task Force) • Science and research • Energy • Euratom Supply Agency • Joint Research Centre (JRC) 	48	Hugo Paemen (BE) Pierre Defraigne (BE), 1981–83 (industrial affairs)
Antonio Giolitti (IT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional policy • Coordination of Community funds 	65	Riccardo Perissich (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach (DK) until 13 January 1981, replaced by Poul Dalsager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture • Fisheries 	55	Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK)
Wilhelm Haferkamp (DE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External relations (including nuclear affairs) 	57	Franz Froschmaier (DE), 1981 Eberhard Rhein (DE), 1981–84

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Karl-Heinz Narjes (DE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal market • Environment, consumer protection and nuclear safety • Innovation and information market • Customs Union Service 	56	Heinrich von Moltke (DE)
Lorenzo Natali (IT) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enlargement • Overall Mediterranean policy • Information 	58	Paolo Pensa (IT)
Michael O’Kennedy (IE) until 9 March 1982 ⁽¹⁾ , replaced by Richard Burke	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel and administration • Joint Interpreting and Conference Service • Statistical Office • Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 	44	Tom O’Dwyer (IE)
François-Xavier Ortoli (FR) (Vice-President) until 26 October 1984	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and financial affairs • Credit and investments 	55	Pierre de Boissieu (FR)
Edgard Pisani (FR) from 26 May 1981 until 3 December 1984, following on from Claude Cheysson	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development 	62	Christian Blanc (FR), 1981–83 Jean Delorme (FR), 1983–84
Ivor Richard (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment and social affairs • Education and vocational training • Tripartite Conference 	48	Aneurin Hughes (UK)
Gaston Thorn (LU) (President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidency • Secretariat-General • Legal Service • Spokesman’s Group • Security Office • Cultural affairs 	52	Adrien Ries (LU), 1981 Fernand Spaak (BE), 1981 Jean Durieux (BE), 1981–84
Christopher Tugendhat (UK) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taxation and financial institutions • Budget • Financial control 	43	Pauline Neville-Jones (UK), 1981–82 Paul Lever (UK), 1982–84

⁽¹⁾ On 2 February 1982, Michael O’Kennedy requested leave of absence from his duties as a member of the Commission in order to stand in the Irish general election on 18 February 1982. His duties within the Commission were carried out *ad interim* by the President, Gaston Thorn, replaced if necessary by Frans Andriessen. Following his election to the Dáil Éireann, Michael O’Kennedy resigned from the Commission on 9 March 1982.

The Delors I Commission (6 January 1985 to 5 January 1989)

The first Commission presided over by Jacques Delors took office on 6 January 1985. It had 14 members. Following the enlargement of the Communities on 1 January 1986 to include Spain and Portugal, the number of members was increased to 17.



First meeting of the enlarged Delors Commission, 6 January 1986. Starting from Jacques Delors (seated on the right, one hand on the table, without glasses) and going clockwise round the table: Jacques Delors; Pascal Lamy, Jacques Delors' head of cabinet (seated behind); Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Claude Cheysson; Nicolas Mosar; António José Baptista Cardoso e Cunha; Peter Sutherland; Willy De Clercq; Manuel Marín; Frans Andriessen; Lorenzo Natali; Arthur Cockfield; Alois Pfeiffer; Stanley Clinton Davis; Abel Matutes; Carlo Ripa di Meana; Grigoris Varfis; Henning Christophersen; Karl-Heinz Narjes.

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Frans Andriessen (NL) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture • Fisheries (in 1985) • Forestry (from 1986) 	55	Carlo Trojan (NL), 1985–87 Hans Wijnmaalen (NL), 1988
António José Baptista Cardoso e Cunha (PT) from 5 January 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fisheries 	52	Eurico Luís Cabral da Fonseca (PT)
Claude Cheysson (FR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediterranean policy and North–South relations 	64	Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1985–87 Daniel Bernard (FR), 1987–88
Henning Christophersen (DK) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel and administration • Budget • Financial control 	45	Bjarne Bladbjerg (DK)
Stanley Clinton Davis (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport • Environment • Consumer protection (in 1985) • Nuclear safety • Forestry (in 1985) 	56	Graham Meadows (UK)
Arthur Cockfield (UK) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal market • Financial institutions and taxation (became financial institutions and company law from 1986) • Customs Union Service (became customs union and indirect taxation in 1986) 	68	Adrian Fortescue (UK)
Willy De Clercq (BE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External relations and trade policy 	57	Alexander Schaub (DE)
Jacques Delors (FR) (President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidency • Secretariat-General • Legal Service • Spokesman's Service • Joint Interpreting and Conference Service • Security Office • Monetary affairs • Coordination of structural instruments (in 1985) 	59	Pascal Lamy (FR)

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Manuel Marín (ES) (Vice-President) from 5 January 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment and social affairs • Education and training 	36	Santiago Gómez-Reino Lecoq (ES)
Abel Matutes (ES) from 5 January 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credit, investments and financial engineering • Small and medium-sized enterprises 	44	Juan Prat y Coll (ES)
Nicolas Mosar (LU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy • Euratom Supply Agency • Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 	57	John Peters (LU), 1985–86 Fernand Thurmes (LU), 1986–88
Karl-Heinz Narjes (DE) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial affairs • Information technology • Science and research • Joint Research Centre (JRC) 	60	Heinrich von Moltke (DE), 1985–86 Johannes Dohmes (DE), 1986–88
Lorenzo Natali (IT) (Vice-President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enlargement (in 1985) • Cooperation and development 	62	Paolo Pensa (IT)
Alois Pfeiffer (DE) until 1 August 1987, replaced by Peter Schmidhuber	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and financial affairs • Enlargement (in 1985) • Credit and investments • Statistical Office • Regional policy (1986–87) 	60	Otto Dibelius (DE)
Carlo Ripa di Meana (IT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional questions • Information • Cultural affairs • Citizen's Europe • Tourism 	55	Riccardo Perissich (IT), 1985–86 Gerardo Mombelli (IT), 1986–88
Peter Schmidhuber (DE) from 22 September 1987, succeeding Alois Pfeiffer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and financial affairs • Regional policy • Statistical Office 	55	Thomas Hertz (DE)
Peter Sutherland (IE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition • Social affairs and education (in 1985) • Relations with the European Parliament (from 1986) 	38	Richard O'Toole (IE)

Member	Duties	Age	Head(s) of cabinet
Grigoris Varfis (EL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional policy (1985) • Relations with the European Parliament (in 1985) • Consumer protection (from 1986) • Coordination of structural instruments (from 1986) 	58	Achilleas Mitsos (EL), 1985–88 Marios Camhis (EL), 1988

NB: The codes in brackets after the names of the members of the Commission and heads of cabinet indicate their nationality: BE = Belgian, DE = German, DK = Danish, EL = Greek, ES = Spanish, FR = French, IE = Irish, IT = Italian, LU = Luxembourgish, NL = Dutch, PT = Portuguese, UK = British. The age given in the third column is the commissioner's age on taking up employment.

PIERRE-OLIVIER LALOUX
AND CHRISTIAN VAN DE VELDE

The Commission, international organisations and multilateral agreements

United Nations system

United Nations Organisation (UN)

Principal organs

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
General Assembly	<p>Observer status pursuant to Resolution 3208(XXIX) of the General Assembly, adopted on 11 October 1974</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in the work of the assembly and its committees</p>	
Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc)	<p>Observer status pursuant to Resolution 1267(XLIII) of Ecosoc, of 3 August 1967, reinforced by decision of 20 May 1971 (further defined by Article 79 of the rules of procedure adopted by Ecosoc Resolution 1949(LVIII) on 8 May 1975)</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions and at meetings of common interest</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation and consultations, based on the exchange of letters of 28 November and 9 December 1958 between the United Nations Secretariat and the Commission</p>

Subsidiary organs

Regional commissions

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)	<p>Consultative status (equivalent to observer status) pursuant to Decision L(XXX) of the ECE, 15 April 1975, based on paragraph 12 of the ECE mandate</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions and at committees' meetings and working groups</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation, joint examination of proposed plans and programmes and consultations, based on the exchange of letters of 30 September and 7 October 1958 between the ECE Secretariat and the Commission</p>
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)	<p>Consultative status (equivalent to observer status), based on paragraph 10 of the ESCAP mandate</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in plenary sessions</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in the Mekong Committee</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation, joint examination of proposed plans and programmes and consultations, based on the exchange of letters of 24 January and 27 February 1959 between the Secretariat, the ECAFE and the Commission</p>
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)	<p>Observer status by decision of ECLA of 1958, based on paragraph 7 of the ECLA mandate</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in plenary sessions</p>	<p>Exchange of information and documentation and consultations between the ECLA Secretariat and the Commission since 1958</p>
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)	<p>Observer status based on paragraph 11 of the ECA mandate</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in plenary sessions</p>	
Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA)	<p>Observer status based on paragraph 7 of Ecosoc Resolution 1818(LV), adopted on 9 August 1973, and Article 66 of the rules of procedure of the ECWA</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in annual sessions</p>	<p>Reciprocal consultations on questions of common interest</p>

Technical organs

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad)	Observer status based on Resolution 1995(XIX) of the General Assembly, adopted on 30 December 1964 > Participation, without the right to vote, in the sessions of the Conference, the Trade and Development Board, subsidiary organs and working groups	Exchange of documentation and consultations between the Unctad Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Observer status based on Article 36 of the rules of procedure of the Governing Council of the UNDP > Participation, without the right to vote, in the sessions of the Governing Council	Exchange of documentation between the UNDP Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)	Consultative status (equivalent to observer status) based on paragraph 35 of Resolution 2152(XXI) of the General Assembly adopted on 17 November 1966, and Article 75 of the rules of procedure of the Industrial Development Board > Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions of the Industrial Development Board and meetings of common interest	Exchange of documentation and information, exchange of views on questions of common interest, cooperation on industrial studies, technical assistance, industrial training, etc., based on the exchange of letters of 25 November 1976 between UNIDO and the Commission
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	Observer status based on paragraph 5 (section IV) of Resolution 2997(XXVII) of the General Assembly adopted on 15 December 1972, and Article 68 of the rules of procedure of UNEP > Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions of the Governing Council and in conferences and working groups	Exchange of documentation and information between the UNEP Secretariat and the Commission since 1972
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral)	Observer status based on paragraph 12 of Resolution 2205(XXI) of the General Assembly, adopted on 17 December 1966 > Participation, without the right to vote, in ordinary sessions and specialised groups	Exchange of documentation and information between the Uncitral Secretariat and the Commission
UN/FAO Inter-governmental Committee of the World Food Programme (WFP)	Observer status based on paragraph 12 of Resolution 1714(XVI) of the General Assembly, adopted on 19 December 1961 > Participation, without the right to vote, in the Committee sessions	Exchange of documentation and information between the WFP Secretariat and the Commission

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
World Food Council (WFC)	Observer status based on Article 60 of the rules of procedure of the Council, adopted in 1976 > Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of the Council and in discussions on all questions of common interest	Exchange of documentation between the WFC Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	Cooperation based on Resolution 302 (IV) of the General Assembly adopted on 8 December 1949 > Allocations of food aid since 1970 > Cash contributions	Exchange of documentation and information between the UNRWA Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef)	Observer status based on Article 61 of the rules of procedure of the Governing Council of Unicef > Annual food aid agreements	Exchange of documentation and information between the Unicef Secretariat and the Commission
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Observer status by decision of the Executive Committee (fourth session, October 1960, Geneva) > Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of the Executive Committee and public sessions > Allocations of food aid > Cash contributions	Exchange of documentation and consultations, based on the exchange of letters of 27 April and 7 May 1960 between the UNHCR and the Commission

Specialised agencies

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
International Labour Organisation (ILO)	Observer status based on Article 12 of the constitution of the ILO > Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions of the Conference and the Governing Body, and conferences and meetings of the International Labour Office	Exchange of documentation, consultations and establishment of joint working committees, based on the agreements between the International Labour Office and the ECSC (OJ 11, 14.8.1953, p. 167), the EEC (OJ 27, 27.4.1959, p. 521) and the EAEC (OJ 18, 9.3.1961, p. 473) Establishment of a standing liaison committee based on the exchange of letters of 5 October and 2 November 1961 between the International Labour Office and the Commission

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)	At the invitation of the Secretariat > Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions and committee meetings	Exchange of documentation, consultations, establishment of joint working committees, exchange of experts, based on the exchange of letters of 25 October and 11 December 1961 between the FAO and the Commission
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Observer status based on Article 3(b) of the agreement of 13 June 1976 establishing IFAD > Participation, without the right to vote, in the meetings of the Preparatory Commission	Exchange of documentation between the IFAD Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco)	Observer status based on Article XI of the convention establishing Unesco > Participation, without the right to vote, in general conferences, ministerial conferences (political and scientific, education) and meetings of government experts, working groups and subgroups	Exchange of information and consultations and joint working groups, based on the exchange of letters of 2 and 15 September 1964 and 12 December 1972 and 14 February 1975 between Unesco and the Commission
World Health Organisation (WHO)	Exchange of letters between the European Community and the WHO of 26 April 1982 > Participation as an observer in sessions of the Plenary Assembly of the Executive Committee, of the Regional Committee for Europe, and in the work of their committees	Two-way exchange of information and documentation Technical assistance for the study of matters of common interest
Codex Alimentarius (joint FAO/WHO programme)	At the invitation of the Secretariat > Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of common interest	Exchange of documentation since 1961
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO)	As observer, at the invitation of the Secretariat according to the 1974 agreement based on Article 47 of the Convention of IMCO > Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions of the Assembly and the Council, and in the work of committees and sub-committees	Exchange of documentation and information, cooperation and consultations on matters of common interest based on the exchange of letters of 11 February and 28 June 1974 between the IMCO Secretariat and the Commission
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)	At the invitation of the Secretariat according to the 1977 agreement based on Article 13 of the Stockholm Convention of 14 July 1967 > Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of common interest	Exchange of documentation and information based on the exchange of letters of 14 July and 15 July 1977 between the WIPO Secretariat and the Commission

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	> Participation in sessions, without the right to vote, based on the statute of the bank (Section 8.a)	Exchange of documentation since 1964
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	> Participation in sessions, without the right to vote, based on Article X of the agreement establishing the IMF	Exchange of documentation since 1958, and cooperation on matters of common interest based on the exchange of letters of 20 January and 20 March 1972 between the IMF Secretariat and the Commission

Autonomous agencies related to the United Nations system

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	<p>Observer status based on Article XVI(A) of the statute of the IAEA</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in sessions and scientific meetings</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation and information, and cooperation in all fields of common interest since 1958 between the IAEA Secretariat and the Commission</p> <p>Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the EAEC and the IAEA on implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — signed on 5 April 1973, entry into force on 21 February 1977</p> <p>Cooperation agreement between the EAEC and the IAEA — signed on 1 December 1975, entry into force on 1 January 1976</p> <p>Agreement on safeguards between the United Kingdom, the EAEC and the IAEA — signed on 6 September 1976, entry into force on 14 August 1978</p> <p>Agreement on safeguards between France, the EAEC and the IAEA — signed on 20 and 27 July 1978, not yet in force</p>
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)	<p>The EEC has implemented concessions (actively and passively) since 1961, as a customs union</p> <p>> Participation in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • sessions of the contracting parties and the Council, and in working groups and various committees as regards matters within the Community's competence • multilateral trade negotiations initiated under the GATT 	Exchange of documentation and consultations between the GATT Secretariat and the Commission since 1958

United Nations study groups on commodities

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Lead and Zinc (International Study Group)	Observer status based on declaration by the study group at its plenary assembly of 18 October 1961 > Participation in sessions, without the right to vote	
Rubber (International Study Group)	Observer status based on decision of the managing committee of March 1962 > Participation in sessions, without the right to vote	
Wool (International Study Group)	Observer status based on decision of the group of October 1961 > Participation in sessions, without the right to vote	

Regional intergovernmental organisations

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Participation, without the right to vote, based on Additional Protocol No 1 to the Convention on the OECD (14 December 1960), in the Council (ministerial level), the Development Assistance Committee as a member, the work of various committees, groups and meetings of experts > Participation in the work of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) under Article 21 of the agency's statute: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishment of a software library at Ispra (JRC) • practical cooperation in all fields relating to nuclear energy based on the formal agreement concluded on 30 June 1964 between the EAEC and the NEA > Participation, without the right to vote, in the work of the IEA (International Energy Agency) which was set up in November 1974 	Exchange of documentation and information between the OECD Secretariat and the Commission

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Council of Europe	<p>Observer status based on the resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its eighth session (May 1951)</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • discussions of the Committee of Ministers as regards problems of a general nature • the Joint Assembly • the work of the committees of experts, subcommittees and working groups 	<p>Exchange of documentation and information, reciprocal consultations based on the exchange of letters of 18 August 1959 between the Council of Europe and the Commission</p>
Western European Union (WEU)	<p>> Participation in the sessions of the assembly</p> <p>> Involvement in the work of the Committee of Ministers as regards economic questions</p>	
Customs Cooperation Council (CCC)	<p>Observer status based on Decision No 175 of the Customs Cooperation Council (July 1968) in application of Article 3(H) of the Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council</p> <p>> Participation in sessions, without the right to vote</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation and information between the CCC Secretariat and the Commission since 1958</p>
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)	<p>At the invitation of the Secretariat</p> <p>> Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of the Council and technical groups of experts on questions of common interest</p> <p>> Mutual assistance in carrying out certain tasks of common interest</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation and information and reciprocal consultations based on the exchange of letters of 3 July and 12 July 1961 between the ICEM and the Commission</p>
Central Office for International Railway Transport (OCTI)	<p>At the invitation of the Secretariat</p> <p>> Participation as observer, without the right to vote, in sessions and meetings of common interest</p>	<p>Exchange of documentation and information and reciprocal consultations based on the exchange of letters of 22 January and 2 March 1959 between the OCTI and the Commission</p>
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT)	<p>> Participation as observer, without the right to vote, in sessions of the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Deputies based on Article 11(a) of the ECMT protocol, and in the work of some subsidiary organs</p>	<p>Based on the exchange of letters between the ECMT and the Council of the European Communities of 27 March and 23 June 1975</p> <p>Exchange of documentation and information and reciprocal consultations based on the exchange of letters of 8 January and 21 November 1962, and subsequently of 18 February, 7 March and 27 June 1972, between the ECMT and the Commission</p>

	Status of the Community	Other methods of cooperation
Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)	> Participation, without the right to vote, in plenary sessions and meetings of common interest based on Article II, stipulation (h) of the Strasbourg Convention of 20 November 1963, amending Article 44 of the Revised Convention for the Navigation of the Rhine signed at Mannheim on 17 October 1868	Exchange of documentation and information, based on the exchange of letters of 6 June 1961 between the CCR and the Commission
North Atlantic Assembly	> Participation in sessions of the assembly and in meetings of committees (economic, science)	
Common Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Organisation (OCAM)	> Participation in sessions, without the right to vote	Exchange of documentation and information, based on the exchange of letters of 24 November 1961 and 21 January 1962 between the OCAM and the Commission
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)	> Participation, without the right to vote, in meetings of the joint study group (two per year)	Exchange of documentation and information, based on the exchange of letters of 7 May 1975 between ASEAN and the Commission
Organisation of American States (OAS)	Observer status based on Articles 52(d) and 118(h) of the charter of the OAS > Participation in meetings of OAS organs	Exchange of documentation and information based on the exchange of letters of 19 December 1970 and 26 February 1971 between the OAS and the Commission
Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU)	> Cooperation agreement between the CAEU and the European Communities of 7 June 1982 > Participation as an observer in meetings where there is a common interest	Two-way exchange of information and documentation

Source: Commission of the European Communities, 'The European Community, international organisations and multilateral agreements', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983.

ÉLISABETH PALMERO

Committees ⁽¹⁾

The annex lists a variety of committees of varying provenance and with differing responsibilities. For example, it includes committees provided for by the treaty (such as the ECSC Consultative Committee), committees established by Council decision (such as the Economic Policy Committee) and committees set up by the Commission itself (such as most advisory committees). As far as responsibilities are concerned, the list contains committees (such as most advisory committees) whose task it is to assist the Commission in its role of drafting legislative proposals, committees (such as the agricultural management committees) that assist the Commission in its role of implementing legislation adopted by the Council, and committees responsible for implementing the agreements concluded with non-member countries (joint committees).

1. Committees of services other than directorates-general

Secretariat-General

- ECSC Consultative Committee

⁽¹⁾ 'Directory of Committees I', IX/C/3 (internal document), Terminology Office, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1980; 'Directory of Committees', Terminology and Computer Applications Department (TAI), Commission of the European Communities, Publications Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986; HAEC, BAC 516/2004/8, 'List of Council and Commission committees', *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement*, No 2, 1980; HAEU, BAC 82/1989/246, 'Note à l'attention des directeurs généraux et chefs des services sur les comités et groupes d'experts', SEC(85) 1709, 18 November 1985.

Eurostat (Statistical office)

- Committee for External Trade Statistics
- Standing Committee for Agricultural Statistics

Customs Union Service (CUS)

- Committee on Origin (of Goods)
- Customs Valuation Committee
- Committee on Common Customs Tariff Nomenclature
- Committee for Customs Processing Arrangements
- Advisory Committee on Customs Matters
- Committee on Duty Free Arrangements
- Committee on Recovery of Claims
- Community Transit Committee
- Committee on General Customs Rules
- Committee for Mutual Assistance
- Committee on Economic Outward Processing Arrangements for Textiles
- Customs Cooperation Committee (EEC–Turkey)
- Customs Cooperation Committee (EEC–countries other than Turkey)
- Committee on Arrangements for the Temporary Movement of Goods within the Community
- Committee on the Movement of Goods

*Joint Research Centre (JRC)***Advisory committees on programme management**

- General Consultative Committee of the JRC; GCC (N) ⁽¹⁾
- Scientific Committee of the JRC
- Scientific Council of the JRC

Euratom Supply Agency

- Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency

⁽¹⁾ (N) = Committee abolished (no longer to be found in 1985).

2. Committees by directorate-general

External Relations (I)

- Select Committee for Consultations on Trade Agreements with Third Countries
- Advisory Committee — Protection Against Dumped or Subsidised Imports; Anti-dumping Committee
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Exports
- Committee for the Administration of Quotas
- Advisory Committee for Export Credit Insurance
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Spain
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Turkey
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Austria
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Sweden
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Switzerland
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Iceland
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Portugal
 - Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Norway
- Select Committee for Cooperation Agreements between Member States and Third Countries
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from the People's Republic of China (N)
- Textile Committee
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from State-trading Countries
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from State-trading Countries; Committee on the Eastern Countries (N)
- Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from the People's Republic of China
- EEC–Yugoslavia Cooperation Committee
- Steel Liaison Committee (CNS 10866/83)
- Advisory Committee for the East European Countries; Advisory committee for import arrangements for products originating in state-trading countries, not liberalised at Community level
- Advisory committee for strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices
- Anti-dumping Committee
- Committee on Rules for Exports
- 'Ad hoc' Advisory Committee on the Reprocessing of Irradiated Nuclear Fuels

Joint committees (comités mixtes)

- EEC–EFTA Joint Committees
- EEC–Canada Joint Cooperation Committee
- Joint committees in charge of managing the bilateral free trade agreement
 - EEC–Iceland
 - EEC–ECSC–Finland
 - EEC–ECSC–Norway
 - EEC–ECSC–Sweden
 - EEC–ECSC–Austria
 - EEC–ECSC–Switzerland
 - EEC–ECSC–Portugal

Joint committees (commissions mixtes)

- Joint Committee on the Agreement between Switzerland and the EEC on the processing traffic in textiles
- EEC–Spain Joint Committee
- Joint Committee on Community transit: EEC–Switzerland
- Joint Committee on Community transit: EEC–Austria
- EEC–Yugoslavia Joint Committee (replaced since 15 February 1983 by the Cooperation Council)
- EEC–Uruguay Joint Committee
- EEC–Brazil Joint Committee
- Joint committee for the agreement concerning products of the clock and watch industry between the EEC and the Swiss Confederation
- EEC–Sri Lanka Joint Committee
- EEC–Mexico Joint Committee
- EEC–Pakistan Joint Committee
- EEC–China Joint Committee for Trade
- EEC–ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee
- Joint Committee on Fisheries: EEC–Senegal
- Joint Committee on Fisheries: EEC–Guinea–Bissau
- EEC–Romania Joint Committee
- EEC–India Joint Committee
- Joint Cooperation Committee for the EEC/Cartagena Agreement and the member countries thereof: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela
- Joint Cooperation Committee — EEC–Yemen Arab Republic
- EEC–Bangladesh Joint Committee

Economic and Financial Affairs (II)

- Monetary Committee
- Alternates of the Monetary Committee
- Committee of Governors of the Central Banks
- Economic Policy Committee
 - Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Economic’
 - Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Budgetary’
 - Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Medium-term’
 - Working Group on ‘Public Finances’ of the Economic Policy Committee

Internal Market and Industrial Affairs (III)

Committees for adaptation ⁽¹⁾:

- Committee for the Adaptation to (Scientific and) Technical Progress of the Directives on ...
 - ... Motor Vehicles
 - ... Measuring and Checking Instruments
 - ... Dangerous Substances and Preparations ⁽²⁾
 - ... Lifting and Mechanical Handling Appliances
 - ... Agricultural and Forestry Tractors
 - ... Aerosol Dispensers
 - ... Fertilisers
 - ... Electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
 - ... Pressure Vessels
 - ... Apparatus Producing Radio Interference
 - ... Colouring Matters for Medicinal Products
 - ... Detergents
 - ... Appliances Using Gaseous Fuels
 - ... Electro-medical Equipment Used in Medicine
 - ... Construction Plant and Equipment (N)

Advisory Committees on Training:

- Advisory Committee on Medical Training
- Advisory Committee on Training in Nursing (ACTN)
- Advisory Committee on the Training of Dental Practitioners
- Advisory Committee on Veterinary Training
- Advisory Committee on the Training of Midwives

⁽¹⁾ In this list, the first part ‘Committee for the Adaptation to (Scientific and) Technical Progress of the Directives’, which always forms a part of the titles, is not repeated but is represented by ‘...’.

⁽²⁾ From 1986, the committee was managed jointly by DG III and DG XI (it is counted once in DG III).

Concerted action committees (COMACs), Community–COST concertation committees (CCCCs) on ... ⁽¹⁾

- ... Effect of processing on the physical properties of foodstuffs or COMAC — Foodstuffs
- ... Effect of processing on the physical properties of foodstuffs (action COST bis)
- ... Effects of thermal processing and distribution on the quality and nutritive value of food; Quality and nutritive value of food
- ... Effects of processing and distribution on the quality and nutritive value of food ⁽²⁾

Other committees:

- Standing Committee on Foodstuffs
- Fast Reactors Coordinating Committee (N)
- Advisory Committee on Public Contracts
- Scientific Committee for Food
- Pharmaceutical Committee
- Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products
- Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health
- Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs
- Scientific Committee for Pesticides (N)
- Committee on Commerce and Distribution (CCD)
- Contact Committee on the Accounting Directives
- Scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds ⁽³⁾
 - Toxicology section of the scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds
 - Ecotoxicology section of the scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds
- Contact Committee on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies (N)
- Advisory Committee for the Management and Coordination of Data-Processing Programs (ACDP) (N)
- Committee on the Implementation at Community level of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
- Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products
- Standing Committee on Standards and Technical Regulations
- Committee on Community Policy regarding Forestry and Forestry-based Industries
- EC/US Steel Arrangement Committee

⁽¹⁾ In this list, the first part ‘Concerted Action Committee (COMAC)’ or ‘Community–COST Concertation Committee (CCCC)’, which always forms a part of the titles, is not repeated but is represented by ‘...’.

⁽²⁾ From 1986, the committee was managed by DG XII.

⁽³⁾ From 1986, the committee was managed jointly by DG V and DG XI (it was counted in DG III for 1980 and once in DG V for 1986).

Task Force: Information and telecommunications technologies

- Advisory Committee for the Management and Coordination of Data-Processing Programs (CCPI)
- Advisory Committee for Projects Promoting Microelectronic Technology
- Advisory Committee for INSIS (Community interinstitutional integrated services information system) users
- Advisory committee for the European programme for research and development in information technologies (Esprit); Esprit Management Committee (EMC)
- Caddia (Cooperation in Automation of Data and Documentation for Imports/Exports and Agriculture) Steering Committee
- Committees:
 - COST Expert
 - Consultative Committee on Trade Unions
 - Round Table

Competition (IV)

- Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions
- Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions in the Transport Industry

Employment and Social Affairs (V) and education

Joint committees:

- Joint Advisory Committee on Social Problems in Road Transport
- Joint Advisory Committee on Social Problems in Inland Navigation ⁽¹⁾
- Joint Advisory Committee on Social Questions in the Railways (N)
- Joint Committee on the Social Problems of Agricultural Workers
- Joint Committee on Social Problems in Sea Fishing
- Joint Committee for the Footwear Industry
- Joint Committee on Inland Navigation
- Joint Committee on Railways

Adaptation committees:

- Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives on Provision of Security Signs at Places of Work

⁽¹⁾ This committee was replaced by the Joint Committee on Inland Navigation (N).

- Protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work

Other committees:

- Joint Committee for the Harmonisation of Working Conditions in the Coal Mining Industry
- Joint Committee for the Harmonisation of Working Conditions in the Steel Industry
- Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission
- Expert group under Article 37 (of the Euratom Treaty)
- Committee of the European Social Fund
- Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Other Extractive Industries
- Advisory Committee on Vocational Training
- Advisory Committee on Free Movement of Workers
- Technical Committee on Free Movement of Workers
- Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers (CASSTM)
 - Audit Board at the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers
- Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers
- Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work
- Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
- Committee for exceptional financial support in favour of Greece in the social field
- Advisory committee on special measures of Community interest in the field of employment
- Scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds
- Paul Finet Foundation
- Producers' and Workers' Plenary Committee and Sub-Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Occupation Health Care (Article 55 of the ECSC Treaty)
- ECSC research programme

Agriculture (VI)

Management committees:

- Management Committee for Oils and Fats
- Management Committee for Live Plants
- Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products
- Management Committee for Beef and Veal
- Management Committee for Raw Tobacco

- Management Committee for Flax and Hemp
- Management Committee for Hops
- Management Committee for Seeds
- Management Committee for Fruit and Vegetables
- Management Committee for Sugar
- Management Committee for Cereals
- Management Committee for Piguieat
- Management Committee for Poultrymeat and Eggs
- Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables
- Management Committee for Isoglucose (N)
- Management Committee for Dried Fodder
- Management Committee for Wine
- Management Committee for Sheep and Goats
- Joint meeting of agricultural management committees

Advisory committees:

- Advisory Committee on the Social Problems of Agricultural Workers (N)
- Advisory Committee on Social Questions affecting Farmers and the Members of their Families
- Advisory Committee on Seeds
 - Advisory Committee on Seeds, a special section on the 'approximation of laws'
- Advisory Committee on Cereals
 - Special Rice Section of the Advisory Committee on Cereals
- Advisory Committee on Milk and Milk Products
- Advisory Committee on Beef and Veal
- Advisory Committee on Piguieat
- Advisory Committee on Poultrymeat
- Advisory Committee on Eggs
- Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats
 - Section 'olive and olive products' of the Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats
 - Section 'oilseeds and oleaginous fruit and products thereof' of the Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats
- Advisory Committee on Sugar
 - Joint Working Party of the Consultative Committee on Sugar
- Advisory Committee on Fresh and Processed Fruit and Vegetables
- Advisory Committee on Wine
- Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco
 - Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco
- Advisory Committee on Hops
 - Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Hops
- Advisory Committee on Live Plants

- Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
 - Special ‘silkworm’ section of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
 - Special ‘cotton’ section of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
 - Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
- Advisory Veterinary Committee
- Advisory Committee on Questions of Agricultural Structure Policy
- Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
 - Special section on the ‘harmonisation of legislation’ of the Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
 - Working Group on ‘Statistics’ of the Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
 - Working Group on ‘Proteins’ of the Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
 - Working Group on Dehydrated Fodder of the Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
 - Working Group on Peas and Field Beans of the Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs
- Advisory Committee on Sheepmeat and Goatmeat

Other committees:

- Standing Committee on Agricultural Structures (SCAS)
- Community Committee on the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)
- Standing Committee on Seeds and Propagating Material for Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry
- Standing Veterinary Committee
- EAGGF Committee
- Standing Committee on Feedingstuffs
- Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR)
- Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition
- Standing Committee on Plant Health
- Standing Committee on Zootechnics
- Scientific Committee on Pesticides
- Scientific Veterinary Committee
 - ‘Animal health’ section of the Scientific Veterinary Committee
 - ‘Veterinary public health’ section of the Scientific Veterinary Committee
 - ‘Animal welfare’ section of the Scientific Veterinary Committee
- Community Inspection Committee on the application of the classification scale for carcases of adult bovine animals
- Standing Committee on Agricultural Research
- Trade Mechanisms Committee
- Agri-monetary Committee
- Committee on Conditions of Competition in Agriculture

Transport (VII)

Adaptation committees:

- Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives — Introduction of recording equipment in road transport (tachograph)

Other committees:

- Advisory Committee on Transport (Article 83 Committee)
- Committee of Government Experts appointed to assist the Commission in carrying out Studies on Transport Costs
- Committee on the Adjustment of the National Taxation Systems relating to Commercial Vehicles
- Advisory Committee on Aids to Transport by Rail, Road and Inland Waterway
- Government Experts Committee for the Coordination of Studies of the Utilisation of Transport Infrastructures
- Advisory Committee on Railway Accounts
- Road Haulage Tariff Committee (N)
- Transport Infrastructure Committee
- Advisory Committee on Railway Costing
- Advisory Committee on Transport Aids
- Committee for the adaptation to technical progress on tachographs
- Committee of Experts on International Road Tariffs
- Concerted action committees (COMACs) — Shore-based marine navigation aid system
 - ‘Controllers programme’ subgroup
 - Subgroups/programmes
- Committee on Transport Costs

Development (VIII)

- Finance committees
- European Development Fund Committee (EDF Committee)
- Committee for Aid to Non-Associated Developing Countries (NADC Committee)
- Food Aid Committee
- Committee on safeguard measures provided for in the second ACP–EEC Convention
- Single Committee (of the European Agency for Cooperation)
- Management Committee for the Special Programme to Combat Hunger in the World
- Programming Committee

*Environment and Consumer Affairs Service (SEPC) —
Environment, consumers, nuclear safety (DG XI)*

**Committee for the Adaptation of Directives to (Scientific and) Technical
Progress on ...**

- ... Methods of Textile Analysis
- ... Quality of Bathing Water (N)
- ... Cosmetic Products (N)
- ... Surface Fresh Water Quality
- ... Toxic and Dangerous Waste
- ... Quality of Fresh Waters suitable to Support Fish Life
- ... Construction Plant and Equipment
- ... Conservation of Wild Birds
- ... Surface Water intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water
- ... Quality of Water intended for Human Consumption
- ... Air Quality Limit Values and Guide Values for Sulphur Dioxide and Suspended Particulates
- ... Dangerous Substances and Preparations
- ... Major-accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities
- ... Monitoring of Environments concerned by Waste from the Titanium Dioxide Industry
- ... Limit Value for Lead in the Air
- ... Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide
- ... Cosmetics Directive
- ... Elimination of Technical Barriers to Trade in Dangerous Substances and Preparations
- ... Directives on Determination of the Noise Emission of Construction Plant and Equipment

Other committees:

- Consumers Consultative Committee (CCC)
- Waste Management Committee (WMC)
- Scientific Committee on Cosmetology
- Scientific Advisory Committee on the Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of Chemical Compounds
 - Toxicology Section of the Scientific Advisory Committee on the Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of Chemical Compounds
 - Ecotoxicology Section of the Scientific Advisory Committee on the Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of Chemical Compounds
- Advisory committee on the control and reduction of pollution caused by hydrocarbons discharged at sea
- Advisory committee on the control and reduction of dangerous pollution
- Committee on Cetacean Products

- Committee on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
- Advisory committee on the Community system of information on accidents involving consumer products
- Advisory committee on the Community system for the rapid exchange of information on dangers arising from the use of consumer products
- Advisory committee on action by the Community relating to the environment
- Advisory committee on the management of the Community system of information on accidents involving consumer products following revision of the Directive by lawyer-linguists
- Management Committee on Dangerous Substances
- Advisory Committee on Rapid Exchange
- Committee of Experts on Accidents in the Home

Research, Science and Education (XII)

Advisory committees on programme management (ACPM): Concerted action committee (COMAC), Community–COST concertation committee (CCCC) ⁽¹⁾ on ...

- ... Treatment and use of sewage sludge; Sewage sludge (N)
- ... Research into the growth of large urban concentrations; Urbanism (N)
- ... Analysis of organic micropollutants in water; Organic micropollutants in water; Organic micropollutants in the aquatic environment
- ... Physico-chemical behaviour of atmospheric pollutants; Atmospheric pollutants
- Shore-based marine navigation aid systems
- Treatment and use of organic sludges and liquid agricultural waste
- Air pollution effects on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems
- Use of lignocellulose-containing by-products and other plant residues for animal feeding

Medical research — COMAC ⁽²⁾ on ...

- ... Registration of congenital abnormalities (Congenital abnormalities)
- ... Cellular ageing and decreased functional capacity of organs (Cellular ageing) (N)
- ... Extracorporeal oxygenation
- ... Detection of the tendency to thrombosis (Thrombosis)

⁽¹⁾ In this list, when the first part 'Concerted action committee (COMAC)' or 'Community–COST concertation committee (CCCC)' forms a part of the titles, it is not repeated but is represented by '...'.

⁽²⁾ In this list, when the first part 'Concerted action committee (COMAC)' forms a part of the titles, it is not repeated but is represented by '...'.

- ... Understanding, evaluation and treatment of hearing impairment (Hearing impairment)
- ... Criteria for perinatal monitoring (Perinatal monitoring)
- ... Common standards for quantitative electrocardiography (Quantitative electrocardiography)
- Epidemiology, statistics and clinical trials
- Biomedical engineering, technology assessment, transfer and standardisation (Biomedical engineering)
- Applied biology, physiology and biochemistry
- Research on health services

Other committees:

- Scientific and Technical Committee (STC)
- Fast Reactors Coordinating Committee (FRCC)
- European Research and Development Committee (ERCD)
- Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CREST)
- Advisory Committee on Fusion (CCFP)
- Advisory Committee on Scientific and Technical Training (ACSTT)
- Committee for the European Development of Science and Technology (Codest)
- Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) — ex CORDI
- Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development (CORDI) (N)

Information Market and Innovation (XIII)

- Committee for Scientific and Technical Information and Documentation (CSTID)
- Consultative Committee for Innovation and Technology Transfer (CIT)

Fisheries (XIV)

- Advisory Committee on Fishery Products
- Standing Committee on the Fishing Industry
- Management Committee for Fishery Products
- Scientific and Technical Committee on Fisheries (STCF)
- Management Committee for Fishery Resources

Taxation and Financial Institutions (XV)

- Advisory Committee on Value Added Tax
- Banking Advisory Committee
- Advisory Committee on the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and the Advisory Committee on the Coordination of Banking Legislation (N)
- Contact Committee Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing

Regional Policy (DG XVI)

- Regional Policy Committee (RPC)
- European Regional Development Fund Committee (ERDF)
- Ad hoc Belfast Committee

Energy (XVII)

Adaptation committee:

- Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives — Indication by Labelling of the Energy Consumption of Household Appliances

Advisory Committees on the Management of Demonstration Projects (ACMDP)

- Liquefaction and gasification of solid fuels
- Exploitation of alternative energy sources
- Energy saving
- Substitution of hydrocarbons

Other committees:

- Standing Committee on Uranium Enrichment (Copenur)
- Energy Committee
- Advisory Committee on measures of Community interest relating to energy strategy
- Advisory Committee on the Management of Demonstration Projects in the Field of Energy Saving (N)
- Advisory Committee on the Management of the Projects to Exploit Alternative Energy Sources (N)
- Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Exploitation of Solar Energy (N)

- Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Liquefaction and Gasification of Solid Fuels (N)
- Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Exploitation of Geothermal Energy (N)
- Advisory Committee on the Programme for Research and Technological Development in the field of Non-nuclear Energy

Budgets (XIX)

- Advisory Committee on the Communities' Own Resources
- Committee on supplementary measures in favour of the United Kingdom

3. Advisory committee on programme management on ... ⁽¹⁾ (ACPMs not included in DG XII and/or the JRC)

- ... Reactor safety (N)
- ... Plutonium fuels and actinide research (N)

Direct action on ...

- ... Measurements, standards and reference techniques (METRE) — Nuclear (N)
- ... Operation and utilisation of the HFR (High Flux reactor) (HFR reactor)
- ... High-temperature materials (N)
- ... Informatics (N)
- ... Fissile material control (N)
- ... Forecasting and assessment in the field of science and technology (FAST)

Indirect action on ...

- ... Plutonium recycling in light-water reactors (Plutonium recycling) (N)
- ... Energy conservation (N)
- ... Geothermal energy (N)
- ... Systems analysis: development of models (N)
- ... Biology — health protection (radiation protection) (Radiation protection) (N)
- ... Primary raw materials (N)
- ... Uranium exploration and extraction (N)

⁽¹⁾ In this list, when the first part 'Advisory committee on programme management on ... (ACPM)' forms a part of the titles, it is not repeated but is represented by '...'.

- ... Decommissioning of nuclear power plants (N)
- ... Urban and industrial waste recycling (secondary raw materials) (Urban and industrial waste recycling) (N)
- ... Climatology (N)

Direct and indirect action on ...

- ... Solar energy (N)
- ... Production and utilisation of hydrogen (N)
- ... Environment and resources (N)
- ... Reference materials and methods (N)
- ... Management and storage of radioactive waste
- ... Fusion and plasma physics (N)
- Community plan of action in the field of radioactive waste
- Eurotra (Machine translation system of advanced design)

Advisory committees on programme management, subsequently management and coordination advisory committees

- Industrial technology
- Scientific and technical standards
- Biotechnology
- Raw materials and other materials
- Nuclear fission energy: reactors and safety, control of fissile materials
- Nuclear fission energy, fuel cycle/processing and storage of waste
- Non-nuclear energy
- Development-linked research
- Medical and health research
- Radiation protection
- Environment and climatology
- Linguistic problems

FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU

Sources and guide to further reading

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Historical Archives of the European Commission, Brussels (HAEC)

ECSC, EEC, EAEC and EC archives: BAC

Archive of speeches

Minutes of the meetings of the College of Commissioners of the European Communities, 1973–86

Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU)

MAEF (Ministère des affaires étrangères français) archives

Archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels

2. Archives held by other European players

Archives deposited with an institution

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Émile Noël archives: EN

Private papers

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Hermann da Fonseca-Wollheim archives

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Hans Carle archives

Georges Rencki archives
 Louis Mordrel archives
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3. Archives in the Member States

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Luxembourg

Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg

Netherlands

International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam

European Trade Union Confederation archives

United Kingdom

All Souls College, Oxford

Crispen Tickell papers

The National Archives, Kew

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4. Oral archives

Testimonies collected as part of the Histcom2 project, with a view to writing the history of the Commission from 1973 to 1986

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Index of names

A

Abate, Antonino 558, 564
 Abbott, Roderick 420, 422, 558
 Adonnino, Pietro 454–456, 479
 Agnelli, Giovanni 274
 Agnelli, Umberto 274
 Alban-Hansen, Erik 41
 Allgeier, Herbert 283, 290, 558
 Amin Dada, Idi 401
 Amory, Michel 558, 560
 Andreopoulos, Athanase 45, 179, 387
 Andreotti, Giulio 444
 Andriessen, Frans 44, 46–47, 84, 199, 237, 292,
 294–299, 314, 325, 327, 478–479, 519–523,
 558, 565
 Angelini, Enrico 52
 Anouil, Gilles 558
 Antici, Paolo 108, 225
 Appleyard, Raymond 41, 43, 45, 47, 287, 558
 Areilza, Jose Maria (de) 439
 Armstrong, Robert 160–161
 Audland, Christopher 26, 45, 47, 104–107,
 109–110, 112, 126, 128–130, 132–134,
 161–162, 178, 186, 190, 224–225, 377, 383,
 414, 427, 435, 559, 564

B

Baichère, Pierre 40, 42, 170–172, 174–175, 178
 Barendregt, Nel 42, 518

Barlebo-Larsen, Kaj 47
 Barre, Raymond 93, 158, 302, 355, 386
 Bath, Alan 462
 Baxter, Jeremy 67, 171, 175
 Beck, Hans 109, 132, 190, 559
 Beetham, Roger 98, 565
 Béjart, Maurice 191
 Benda, François 107, 331, 334, 559
 Bendixen, Hans Jørgen 185, 559
 Bernard, Daniel 523
 Bernard-Reymond, Pierre 220
 Bernet, Hélène 118, 131, 134, 559
 Beseler, Hans-Friedrich 422, 559, 561
 Biesheuvel, Barend 133, 197, 214
Blaabjerg Sørensen, see *Sørensen*
 Bladbjerg, Bjarne 46–47, 160, 523, 559
 Blanc, Christian 44, 88, 521
 Blonk, Wim 399, 559
 Bockstael, Pierre 94, 171, 175, 216, 450, 456, 461,
 557, 559
 Bodson, Victor 370
 Boissieu, Pierre (de) 42–45, 90, 521
 Bonanni, Massimo 86
 Boon, Christine 100
 Borschette, Albert 40, 52–53, 55, 78–79, 167, 170,
 175, 296, 475, 513–515
 Bosscher, Annette 358–359, 559
 Bourdeau, Philippe 559
 Boyer de La Giroday, Frédéric 303
 Brackeniers, Eduard 69, 171, 173, 559
 Brandt, Willy 352, 409, 440

Braun, Fernand 41, 42, 44, 46, 140, 179, 265,
271–273, 275, 285, 293
Braun, John 559
Brittan, Leon 296, 299
Brunner, Guido 32, 41–43, 280, 282, 287, 460, 475,
477, 514, 516–517
Brusasco, Amadeo 559
Brusasco-Mackenzie, Margaret 185, 559
Budd, Stanley 447
Burghardt, Günter 93, 415, 423, 559
Burke, Richard 32, 42–45, 65, 82, 158, 170, 237,
370, 436, 469, 477–478, 516, 517, 519–521,
564
Buschmann, Karl 176
Busquin, Philippe 280

C

Cabral da Fonseca, Eurico Luís 47, 523
Cadieux, Jean-Louis 292, 294–295, 298, 559
Cafagna, Luciano 43, 517
Callaghan, James 148, 157, 248, 440
Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo 442
Camhis, Marios 525, 559
Caprioglio, Pietro 41
Cardoso e Cunha, António José Baptista 47, 479,
522–523
Carle, Hans 396, 398–400, 403–404, 407, 557, 559
Carpegna, Ranieri (di) 319, 325, 557, 560
Carpentier, Annick 190
Carpentier, Michel 41, 43–44, 46–47, 190, 286,
386–389, 391, 559
Carré, Hervé 303, 308, 559
Carrington, Peter 249
Carter, Jimmy 477
Caspari, Manfred 41, 44, 46, 179, 293–294, 296, 514
Castelbajac, Philippe (de) 340
Cecchini, Paolo 55, 274–275
Cerf, Paul 448
Chapperon, Jean 40, 41, 514
Chevallard, Giancarlo 79, 96–97, 100, 185–186,
389, 559
Cheysson, Claude 32, 40–42, 44, 46, 78–80, 84,
113, 116, 133, 202, 246, 396, 398, 403–405,
407–409, 415, 420–421, 438, 448, 475,
477–479, 504, 513–514, 516–517, 520–
523, 564
Christophersen, Henning 46–47, 160, 170, 180,
479, 522–523
Ciancio, Antonio 164
Ciavarini Azzi, Giuseppe 27, 104, 107, 109–113,
126, 132–133, 217, 219, 225, 430, 459, 558

Cioffi, Enrico 45, 47
Clappier, Bernard 71
Clarotti, Paolo 559
Clinton Davis, Stanley 46–47, 370, 376, 389, 466,
479, 522–523
Cockfield, Arthur 46–47, 77, 80, 82, 84, 133,
271–274, 365, 436, 468, 479, 522–523, 564,
569, 574
Cohen, Robert 42, 518
Colasanti, Fabio 95, 100, 102, 306, 559
Collowald, Paul 95, 97, 446–449, 451, 456, 559
Colombo, Emilio 136, 230, 234, 249, 478
Colonna di Paliano, Guido 264–265, 276
Contogeorgis, Giorgios 44–45, 328, 370, 373, 478,
519, 520
Contzen, Jean-Pierre 47, 281–282, 289, 559
Coombes, David 170, 172
Coppé, Albert 370
Cox, Robert 401, 450, 559
Crijns, Léo 352
Crozier, Michel 172

D

da Fonseca-Wollheim, see *Fonseca-Wollheim*
Dahrendorf, Ralf 41, 79, 279–280, 282, 460, 475,
513–514, 564
Dalsager, Poul 44, 78, 84, 160, 314, 318, 323, 451,
478, 519, 520
Dankert, Piet 235–236, 252
Davignon, Étienne 20–22, 32, 42–45, 76, 82,
84–85, 99, 105, 131, 160, 201, 205, 226,
263–271, 275, 282–288, 293, 296, 346, 363,
383, 417, 425, 439, 477–478, 516–517,
519–520, 559, 564–565
Day, Catherine 159, 296, 559
de Areilza, see *Areilza*
De Bauw, Robert 377, 379, 559
de Boissieu, see *Boissieu*
Debré, Michel 409
de Castelbajac, see *Castelbajac*
De Clercq, Willy 46, 415, 418, 466, 479, 505,
522–523
Defraigne, Pierre 42, 44, 89, 517, 520, 559
Defrenne, Gabrielle 140, 356
de Gaulle, see *Gaulle*
de Geus, see *Geus*
Degimbe, Jean 40, 42, 44, 46, 354–355, 357, 359,
364–366, 559
de Kergorlay, see *Kergorlay*
Dekker, Wisse 273
De Koster, Frans 106–107, 114, 461, 559–560

Dell, Edmund 132, 197, 214
 Della Briotta, Libero 182
 Delorme, Jean 44, 521
 Delors, Jacques 24, 28, 46–48, 60, 76, 78, 80–84,
 90–93, 100, 102, 105, 108, 112–113, 123,
 128–129, 132, 134, 136, 159–160, 169, 178,
 180, 190, 200, 205–206, 209–212, 218,
 220, 224, 229, 232, 238–239, 253, 266–267,
 271–272, 274, 276, 290, 302–303, 305–306,
 309, 311, 325, 339, 350–351, 353, 364–366,
 376, 406–407, 414, 465–471, 479, 522–523,
 560, 565
 Delouvrier, Paul 176
de Margerie, see *Margerie*
de Milly, see *Milly*
 Deniau, Jean-François 40–41, 78–79, 396, 475,
 514, 565
 Denman, Roy 42, 44, 82, 84, 423–424, 527, 565
 Depaus, Lucien 114
 Deprez, Gérard 174, 175
 Derisbourg, Jean-Pierre 560
de Sédouy, see *Sédouy*
 Deshormes La Valle, Fausta 447–450, 560
de Silguy, see *Silguy*
 Dibelius, Otto 46–47, 524, 560
di Carpegna, see *Carpegna*
 Dinkespiler, Jean-Albert 45, 47
 Dohmes, Johannes 524
 Dohnanyi, Klaus (von) 218, 220, 249
 Donat, Marcell (von) 101, 105, 108, 158, 163,
 182–183, 186–187, 190, 564
 Dornonville de la Cour, Aage 43, 45
 Dreyfus, Pierre 274
 Dubois, Ivo 58, 106, 109, 114, 165, 186, 190, 446,
 558, 560
 Dubois, Jean 293–294, 297, 560
 Duchâteau, Pierre 40–41, 514
 Dunkel, Arthur 418
 Durieux, Jean 44–45, 93, 136, 517, 521

E

Eeckhout, Jean-Claude 27, 104, 106–107,
 109–110, 459, 568
 Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter 43, 45, 47, 94, 116–119,
 128, 136, 172, 179, 190, 296, 374, 427, 560,
 565
 Emerson, Michael 145, 185, 303, 306–308, 560
 Emringer, Lucien 56, 560
 Erdmenger, Jürgen 374, 560
 Erdmenger, Karen 560
 Ersbøll, Niels 107, 159, 160, 211, 218, 220, 560

Esch, Bastian (van der) 296
 Étienne, Henri 60, 213–214, 225, 230, 421, 437

F

Facini, Carlo 41, 43, 45, 47, 179
 Fairclough, Anthony John 47
 Fasella, Paolo 45, 47, 283
 Feffer, Marc-André 60
 Ferrandi, Jacques 398–399
 Fielding, Leslie 44, 46, 319, 415, 419, 422–424,
 560
 Filippone, Maria Pia 129, 173, 560
 Fischer-Dieskau, Christian 560
 Fitchew, Geoffrey 47
 FitzGerald, Garret 53, 223
 Fitzgibbon, Edwin 40, 44, 158, 514
 Fogarty, Robin 158
 Foley, Maurice 398, 408
 Fonseca-Wollheim, Almut (da) 189, 559
 Fonseca-Wollheim, Hermann (da) 425–427, 557
 Fortescue, Adrian 46–47, 161, 271–272, 523
 Fossati, Emiliano 394, 405, 407–408, 560
 Fouchet, Christian 200
 Fouéré, Erwan 560
 Franco, Francisco 431, 438, 476
 Franklin, Michael 83, 85, 314, 316, 318, 321, 560
 Frisch, Dieter 44, 46, 403, 405–408, 411, 560
 Froschmaier, Franz 40–42, 45–46, 78, 186, 190, 247,
 415, 424, 448, 450, 456, 514, 517, 520, 560

G

Gabolde, Jean 560
 Gachot, Rodolphe 106
 Gallagher, Eamonn 43, 45, 47, 159, 328
 Gardiner, Robert 396
 Gaudet, Michel 115–119
 Gaulle, Charles (de) 73, 409, 442
 Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis 40, 42, 43, 73, 93, 129,
 247, 515, 518, 560
 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 136, 230, 478
 Geus, Pieter (de) 45
 Giacomello, Giacomo 269, 560
 Giolitti, Antonio 32, 43, 45, 78, 293, 340, 344, 348,
 350, 477–478, 516–517, 519–520
 Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry 23, 76, 143, 145–146,
 197, 201, 204, 207–210, 216–217, 308, 409,
 436, 442
 Gläser, Hans 41, 514
 Gómez-Reino Lecoq, Santiago 46, 524
 González, Felipe 211, 443

Goybet, Philippe 560
 Grégoire, Robert 112, 459–463
 Grierson, Ronald 40
 Groeben, Hans (von der) 294
 Groux, Jean 116, 560
 Guazzaroni, Cesidio 40–41, 475, 514–515
 Guibal, Jean-Claude 560
 Gulden, Arié 560
 Gundelach, Finn Olav 32, 41–43, 79, 153, 159–160, 202, 218, 220, 240, 314, 316–317, 319, 438–439, 475, 477–478, 513–514, 516–517, 520
 Gyllenhammar, Pehr G. 139–140

H

Haferkamp, Wilhelm 32, 40–42, 44, 78–79, 82, 85, 99, 109, 132, 234, 247, 275, 302–303, 415–417, 421, 424, 437–438, 448, 475, 477–478, 513–514, 516–517, 519–520
 Hallstein, Walter 88, 105, 115–116, 127, 129, 170, 172, 176, 232, 239, 291
 Hannay, David 40, 146, 153–155, 158–159, 161–163, 319, 328, 415, 423–424, 430, 433, 440, 515, 560, 565
 Hardy, Michael 560
Hauge Pedersen, see Pedersen
 Hay, Richard 42–43, 46, 154, 161, 163, 170, 173, 180, 184, 247, 518, 560
 Hayes, Eric 414–415, 422, 560
 Heath, Edward 143, 153, 155, 160, 163, 248
 Hélin, Willy 97, 99–101, 448, 560
Helveg Petersen, see Petersen
 Henriksen, Ole Bus 43, 45, 47, 179, 271–272, 561
 Hertz, Thomas 524
 Hijzen, Theodorus 40, 419, 426
 Hillery, Patrick John 40, 78–79, 140, 152, 158–159, 331, 355, 475, 513–514
 Hirsch, Étienne 189, 459
 Hogan, John 42–43, 517
 Hommel, Nicolas 220
 Hourican, Liam 44, 520
 Howe, Geoffrey 81
 Hughes, Aneurin 44, 97–98, 101, 105–106, 115, 154, 163, 181, 186–187, 447–448, 521, 561

I

Indurain, Miguel 458

J

Jackson, Christopher 274

Jackson, Robert 154, 328, 561
 Jacoangeli, Giuseppe 40, 515
 Jacob, Bärbel 561
 Jacquot, Michel-Jean 90, 314, 319, 327, 561
 Jaedtke, Eckhard 561
 Jakus, Jean 191
 Janne, Henri 463
 Jarrett, Robert 184, 451, 561
 Jenkins, Michael 41, 105, 112, 515
 Jenkins, Roy 16, 20–22, 32, 42–43, 76, 78, 80–82, 84–85, 88, 90–93, 97–98, 108, 112, 116, 126–128, 130–131, 140, 143–149, 161, 163, 165, 170, 172, 176–177, 197, 210, 215–216, 229–234, 237–238, 240–241, 243, 246–250, 261, 264, 302–303, 307–308, 359, 383, 405, 419, 421, 426–427, 431, 433–434, 436, 442, 447–449, 468, 477, 516–517
 John Paul II 468
 Johnson, Stanley 389, 561
 Jonczy, Marie Josée 356
 Jones, Hywel Ceri 462–463, 561
 Jørgensen, Ove Juul 44, 520
 Juan Carlos I 438
 Junger, Jean-Marie 561
Juul Jørgensen, see Jørgensen

K

Karamanlis, Konstantinos 147, 430, 434, 436–437
 Kawan, Louis 87, 425, 561
 Keery, Neville 561
 Kergorlay, Roland (de) 130–131, 434–435, 441
 Klein, Friedrich 43, 45, 47, 271–272, 561
 Klein, Liselotte 100
 Klitzing, Georg (von) 45, 47
 Knaff, Louis N. 41
 Koenig, Dieter 105, 561
 Kohl, Helmut 24, 211, 290
 Kohlhase, Norbert 561
 Kohnstamm, Max 80
 Kolte, Lars 561
 Krämer, Ludwig 389, 561
 Krawielicki, Robert 116
 Krenzler, Horst Günter 105, 185–187, 415, 561
 Krohn, Hans Broder 40, 399
 Kühn, Jürgen 42–43, 517

L

Lacroix, Jean-Louis 112
 Lambert, Lamberto 171, 175
 Lamoureux, François 200, 217, 219

Lamy, Pascal 46, 90, 92–93, 113, 129, 468, 522–523
 Landaburu, Eneko 47, 347, 350, 561
 Lang, Jack 461
 Lapie, Pierre-Olivier 171
 Lardinois, Pierre 40, 78, 85, 314–315, 322, 475, 513–514
 Larsen, Arne 42–43, 159, 517, 561
 Larsson, Hannes 561
 Lastenouse, Jacqueline 27, 445–446, 448–449, 561
 Le Bail-Elles, Françoise 100
 Lecomte, Jacques 561
 Le Goy, Raymond 40, 42, 174, 370
 Legras, Guy 46, 62, 314, 561
 Lemaignan, Robert 71, 86
 Leng, Jean-Pierre 423, 561
 Lepoivre, Marc 561
 Lever, Paul 45, 214, 521
 Lizin, Anne-Marie 464, 561
 Løkkegaard, Knud 42–43
 Lopes Sabino, Amadeu 561
 Louet, Roger 363
 Loy, Michael 55
 Luyten, Paul 414, 418–419, 422, 561
 Lynch, Jack 152
 Lyrtoft-Petersen, Erik 42–43, 517, 520

M

MacDougall, Donald 307–308
 Macioti, Manfredo 280, 283, 561
 Mackenzie Stuart, Alexander 466
 Macmillan, Harold 155
 Maes, Albert 561
 Malfatti, Franco Maria 93, 98, 126, 129, 630
 Malvé, Pierre 561
 Mandl, Vladimiro 386
 Maniatopoulos, Konstantinos 134, 561
 Mansholt, Sicco 72, 93, 98, 314, 318, 340, 386
 Marchini-Camia, Antonio 136, 187, 561
 Marchipont, Jean-François 275
 Marengo, Giuliano 118, 561
 Margerie, Philippe (de) 40, 93–94, 247, 515
 Margue, Tung-Lai 273–274
 Marín, Manuel 46, 77–78, 365, 479, 522, 524, 565
 Marjolin, Robert 71, 133, 197, 214, 297, 302, 306–307, 340
 Mark, Eric 561
 Marquand, David 108, 112, 149, 165, 187–188, 232, 234, 561
 Massimo, Luigi 282, 561

Mathijsen, Petrus (Pierre) 43, 45, 47, 293, 296, 340, 561
 Mattera Ricigliano, Alfonso 267, 271, 561
 Matutes, Abel 46–47, 479, 522, 524, 565
 Mayer, Jacques 41
 Mayer, René 61
 Mayhew, Alan 46
 Mazio, Aldo 423
 Meadows, Dennis 386
 Meadows, Graham 46–47, 370, 523
 Meijer, Rolf 562
 Mennicken, Jan-Baldem 43, 45
 Mercereau, Félix-Paul 459–460
 Mercouri, Melina 461
 Messina, Carmelo 337, 339, 562
 Meyer, Klaus 42, 44, 104, 107, 129, 163, 187, 223, 225–226, 399, 403, 426, 562
 Michelmann, Hans J. 92, 175
 Milly, Gérard (de) 560
 Mingasson, Jean-Paul 303, 306, 562
 Mitsos, Achilleas 47, 525
 Mitterrand, François 24, 29, 202, 204, 211, 216–217, 290, 309, 332, 404, 409, 444, 454, 465
 Mittler, Karlheinz 189
 Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré 405
 Modigliani, Franco 303
 Möhler, Rolf 41–43, 272–273, 293, 514, 517, 562
 Moltke, Heinrich (von) 44–47, 265, 282, 521, 524, 564
 Mombelli, Gerardo 448, 461, 524, 562
 Monnet, Jean 61, 78, 80, 169–170, 423, 446, 477
 Mordrel, Louis 330, 334, 558, 562
 Moreau, Jean 449
 Morel, Jean-Claude 44, 46–47, 55, 64–65, 170–171, 173, 178–179
 Morelli, Giampietro 562
 Morgan, Gwyn 41, 447, 515
 Mosar, Nicolas 47, 479, 522, 524
 Mosca, Ugo 40, 42, 247, 303
 Moussis, Nicolas 562
 Moussis, Sophie Élisabeth 562
 Much, Walter 41, 116
 Mundell, Robert 307
 Murphy, Michael N. 253
 Muylle, Noël 166–167, 562

N

Napoli, Daniela 104, 106, 110, 459, 558, 562
 Narjes, Karl-Heinz 44–47, 76, 78–79, 136, 140, 265, 271–272, 285, 287, 325, 365, 389–390, 478–479, 519, 521–522, 524, 565

Natali, Lorenzo 32, 43–46, 78, 81–82, 111, 237, 349,
389, 406–407, 415, 435, 441, 443, 448, 451,
456, 477–479, 516, 518–519, 521–522, 524
Neville-Jones, Pauline 42–43, 45, 518, 521
Nicoletti, Antonino 41, 43, 45
Nielsen, Inger 442
Nixon, Richard 17, 417
Noël, Émile 18, 26, 41, 43, 45, 47, 68, 77, 80, 82,
87–89, 92, 103–111, 113–115, 126, 128–
132, 154, 158, 161, 170–171, 174, 178–180,
199, 207–208, 214–215, 217–218, 221–
222, 225–226, 228, 241, 247, 249, 365, 414,
423–426, 434–435, 437–438, 448, 450, 461,
513, 516, 519, 522, 557, 562
Nonon, Jacqueline 67, 355, 356, 562
Nuttall, Simon 105

O

Oboussier, Félix 41
O'Dwyer, Tom 521
O'Hagan, see *Strachey*
O'Kennedy, Michael 44–45, 79, 170, 250, 478,
520–521, 565
Oldekop, Dieter 421, 562
Olivi, Benjamino (Bino) 41, 97, 99, 447, 565
Olivier, Gérard 116, 129
Olmi, Giancarlo 116
O'Neill, Con 155
Ortoli, François-Xavier 20, 21–22, 26, 32, 40–45,
49, 71–84, 86, 88, 90–94, 96, 126–127, 129,
131, 144, 146, 154, 159–161, 163, 170–171,
173, 176, 178, 201, 208, 210, 226, 228–229,
231–233, 239–240, 246–248, 261, 265,
271, 274–275, 302, 306, 308–310, 323, 355,
359, 432, 440, 475, 477, 478, 513, 515–516,
518–519, 521
O'Sullivan, David 159, 562
O'Toole, Richard 46, 524

P

Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso 42, 44, 303, 309–310,
558
Paemen, Hugo 42–45, 47, 102, 293, 517, 520
Papaligouras, Panayiotis 434–435
Papandreou, Andreas 20
Pas, Nikolaus (van der) 99, 101, 563
Paye, Jean-Claude 93, 158
Pearson, John 186, 562
Pedersen, Jens Hauge 319, 560
Pedersen, Ufe Toudal 563

Peña Abizanda, Eduardo 46, 370, 562
Pendville, Robert 97, 445–446, 448, 450
Pensa, Paolo 44–46, 518, 521, 524
Perissich, Riccardo 40–41, 45–46, 86, 293,
514–515, 520, 524
Perlot, Enzo 42, 98, 448
Peters, John 47, 524
Petersen, Niels Helveg 41, 514
Petite, Michel 272, 562
Petit-Laurent, Philippe 126, 171, 173, 176–177,
179–180, 562
Petrella, Riccardo 284
Petrilli, Giuseppe 176
Pfeiffer, Alois 46–47, 78–79, 302, 305, 365, 479,
522, 524
Pflimlin, Pierre 28
Phan Van Phi, Raymond 414, 419, 423, 562
Phillips, Hayden 78, 98, 165, 233, 246, 562, 565
Piccarolo, Marco 448, 450, 562
Pingel, Klaus 41, 43
Pinochet, Augusto 421, 424
Pino, Eugenio 86, 329, 333, 562
Pisani, Edgard 44, 78, 80, 88, 202, 403–407,
409–411, 478, 519–521
Pleinevaux, Claude 386–387, 562
Pompidou, Georges 72–73, 156, 163, 210, 409
Ponzano, Paolo 27, 103–107, 109–111, 113, 115,
190, 200, 207, 225, 454, 459, 558, 562
Pooley, Peter 314, 562
Pouillet, Edouard 174–175
Pratley, Alan 562
Prat y Coll, Juan 46–47, 524, 562
Prévert, Jacques 109
Previdi, Ernesto 264, 562
Pryce, Roy 97, 184, 186, 190, 446, 448, 562

Q

Quintin, Odile 355, 562

R

Rabier, Jacques-René 446, 449, 562
Rabot, Louis Georges 40, 42, 314
Reagan, Ronald 99, 301
Rencki, Georges 27, 293, 317–318, 339–340, 346,
348, 431–432, 558, 562
Rey, Jean 88, 127, 239
Rhein, Eberhard 44, 190, 415, 418, 424, 427, 520, 562
Richard, Ivor 44, 80–82, 84–85, 106, 363–364,
464, 478, 519, 521, 562, 565
Ries, Adrien 44, 93, 202, 521

Rifflet, Raymond 353, 355
 Ripa di Meana, Carlo 28, 46, 199, 448, 455–456,
 461, 479, 522, 524
 Rippon, Geoffrey 160
 Rocard, Michel 409
 Rocca, Gianfranco 86, 295, 562
 Roeh, Klaus 406, 562
 Rogalla, Dieter 61
 Rohrsted, Tue 562
 Roland-Gosselin, Yves 563
 Ronan, Seán 40, 159, 446–447
 Ronchetti, Silvio 47
 Rossi, Ernesto 78
 Ruberti, Antonio 280
 Rueff, Jacques 61
 Ruggiero, Renato 41–42, 93, 97–98, 129, 339–341,
 447–448
 Rui Vilar, Emilio 47
 Russo, Massimo 44, 46, 303, 311, 563
 Rutten, Charles 28
 Ryelandt, Bernard 401, 563

S

Santarelli, Manuel 45, 99, 102, 448, 563
 Santer, Jacques 169
 Sauvy, Alfred 449
 Savoini, Carlo 365
 Scarascia Mugnozza, Carlo 40–41, 236, 370, 387,
 389, 447–448, 458, 475, 513, 515, 565
 Schaeffer, Maurice 270, 563
 Schaub, Alexander 46, 415, 523
 Schaus, Lambert 369–370
 Schlieder, Willy 40, 42, 128, 292, 294
 Schmidhuber, Peter 479, 524
 Schmidt, Helmut 143, 145, 210, 308, 436
 Schmitt, Paul 296
 Schubert, Ludwig 305–306, 563
 Schuijt, Wilhelmus 446
 Schüler, Jürgen 325
 Schulze, Martin 187
 Schuman, Robert 71, 476
 Schuringa, Tjakko 563
 Schuster, Günter 41–42, 283, 285
 Schwed, Jean-Joseph 60
 Scotti, Vincenzo 461
 Séché, Jean-Claude 118, 131, 134, 358, 559
 Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (de) 40–41, 514
 Seefeld, Horst 183, 374
 Shanks, Michael 40, 355
 Sigrist, Helmut 129
 Silguy, Yves-Thibault (de) 76, 560
 Silkin, John 332
 Simonet, Henri 40–41, 77, 82, 84, 88, 269, 438,
 475, 513, 515
 Simonnet, Raymond 328
 Sliben, Niels Henrik 563
 Soames, Christopher 40, 78, 84–85, 153–154, 157,
 159–162, 247, 331, 415, 417–418, 423,
 432–433, 440, 475, 513, 515
 Soares, Mario 430
 Solima, Rosario 340
 Somers, Jean 41, 97, 515, 563
 Sorasio, Denise 563
 Sørensen, Tove Blaabjerg 164, 563
 Soubestre, Philippe 40–42, 44, 46, 415, 448, 514,
 517, 520, 523
 Spaak, Fernand 41, 44, 93, 202, 377, 442, 521, 632
 Spénale, Georges 233
 Spierenburg, Dirk 16, 32, 49, 65, 67–68, 84, 130,
 148, 170–171, 173–178, 196–197, 436
 Spinelli, Altiero 40, 75, 78–79, 86, 116, 136, 195,
 199, 208, 264, 274, 279–280, 285, 296–297,
 386–387, 389, 432–433, 438, 440, 454,
 458–460, 462, 475, 479, 513–515
 Sprey, Adriaan 449
 Stathatos, Stefanos 432
 Stavaux, Michel 266, 268, 270, 563
 Steele, John Roderic 44, 46, 179, 370, 374, 563
 Stefani, Umberto 111, 225, 563
 Stempels, Jacobus Nicolaas 130
 Stendevad, Ejner 160, 563
 Stevens, Anne 173
 Stief-Tauch, Peter 386, 390, 563
 Stoel, Max (van der) 440
 Strachey, Charles Towneley (Lord O'Hagan) 181, 184
 Strasser, Daniel 43, 45, 47, 130, 179, 248, 258
 Strauss, Robert 415
 Stuart, Nick 94, 128, 172
 Stuffmann, Claus 86, 386, 459
 Sunnen, Robert 40, 42, 298, 447, 514–515, 518
 Sutherland, Peter 46, 78, 159, 295–296, 298–299,
 365–366, 479, 522, 524, 563, 565

T

Taschner, Hans 563
 Taverne, Dick 176
 Tavitian, Ronald 352–353, 355, 360, 364, 563
 Temple Lang, John 294–296, 334, 563
 Tent, Hendrik 283, 563
 Thatcher, Margaret 16, 20, 80, 82–83, 105, 154,
 157, 211, 216, 247, 250, 252, 332, 427, 454
 Thøgersen, Niels Jørgen 448, 563

Thomson, George 41, 78, 154, 157, 160, 331,
339–340, 344, 438, 475, 513, 515
Thorn, Gaston 22, 44, 45, 58, 60, 76, 78–79,
81–82, 88, 90–93, 98–99, 105, 112, 123,
127, 131, 134, 136, 195, 199, 201–206,
210–211, 217, 229–231, 234–236, 238, 247,
250–253, 261, 265, 416, 424, 442, 444, 451,
460, 467–468, 478, 519, 521, 565
Thurmes, Fernand 47, 524
Tickell, Crispin 42, 85, 93, 126, 145, 147, 197, 210,
238, 249, 442, 516–517, 558, 563, 565
Tindemans, Leo 58, 196–198, 236, 252, 435,
452–453, 476
Toledano-Laredo, Armando 40, 447, 515
Toudal Pedersen, see *Pedersen*
Toulemon, Robert 274, 454, 563
Trappeniers, Félix 40–41, 515
Triffin, Robert 303, 308, 310
Trojan, Carlo 44, 46–47, 325, 520, 523, 563
Trudeau, Pierre 415, 423
Tugendhat, Christopher 32, 42–43, 45, 80, 82, 161,
202, 214, 243, 245, 250, 252, 348, 437, 451,
477–478, 516, 518–519, 521, 563, 565

U

Ungerer, Herbert 563

V

Valsesia, Gianluigi 61, 281, 563
Vance, Cyrus 297
Vanden Abeele, Michel 41, 88, 112, 202, 210, 515,
563
van der Esch, see *Esch*
Van der Meulen, Joseph 221
van der Pas, see *Pas*
van der Stoel, see *Stoel*
Van der Vaeren, Charles 190, 404, 563
van der Zee, see *Zee*
Van Ginderachter, Josef 563
Van Gronsveld, Jozef 41
Vanhaeverbeke, Guy 560
Van Hoeck, Fernand 134, 563
Van Hoof, Renée 45, 47, 166
Van Lierde, Jacques 330
Varfis, Grigoris 84, 257, 344, 350, 437, 479, 522,
525, 563
Vasey, Martin 95, 101, 190, 563
Vaulont, Nikolaus 163, 563
Veil, Simone 234, 241
Ventrella, Francesco 563

Ventura, Sergio 324, 564
Verdiani, Daniele 266–268, 293, 564
Verger, Christine 564
Verheyden, Walter 41, 43, 45, 47
Verploeg, Elias 190, 564
Verrue, Robert 302–303, 564
Verschuer, Helmut (von) 190–191, 318, 322, 327,
564
Verstrynge, Jean-François 564
Vignon, Jérôme 90, 112, 271, 564
Villain, Claude 42, 44, 314–315, 321, 323–324, 564
Villani, Stelio 37, 41, 43, 45
Volpi, Edoardo 424
von der Groeben, see *Groeben*
von Dohnanyi, see *Dohnanyi*
von Donat, see *Donat*
von Klitzing, see *Klitzing*
von Moltke, see *Moltke*
von Verschuer, see *Verschuer*
Vouel, Raymond 32, 40, 42, 295, 475, 477,
514–516, 518
Vredeling, Henk 32, 42, 78, 80, 84, 138, 353, 360,
362–364, 477, 516, 518

W

Wägenbaur, Rolf 558, 564
Walker, Peter 332
Waterschoot, Paul 293, 564
Wathelet, Pierre 564
Weimar, Eduard 106, 109, 111–112, 190, 400, 564
Wellenstein, Edmund 40, 129, 414–415, 419–420,
425, 427, 564
Werner, Pierre 53, 60, 301
Werthauer, Philippe 564
Wijnmaalen, Johannes P. (Hans) 40, 514, 523
Wilkinson, Christopher 564
Williams, Leonard 41, 43
Williamson, David 129, 211, 315, 564
Wilson, Barrie 564
Wilson, Harold 143, 153, 155, 157, 161, 196, 247,
292
Wyndham White, Eric 423

Y

Yennimatas, Ioannis (Jean) 44–45, 437, 520, 564

Z

Zamaron, Bernard 564
Zee, Theo (van der) 563
Ziller, Jacques 125

List of acronyms

A

AACM: Associated African Countries and Madagascar

ACEA: European Automobile Manufacturers' Association

ACP (country): African, Caribbean and Pacific States (party to the Lomé Convention)

AIIC: International Association of Conference Interpreters

AIPN: Autorité investie du pouvoir de nomination (appointing authority)

AMUE: Association for the Monetary Union of Europe

ARD: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (consortium of public broadcasters in the Federal Republic of Germany)

ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations

ASEM: Asia–Europe Meeting

AU: African Union

AUA: agricultural unit of account

AURA: Association universitaire de recherche en administration (university association for research in administration)

B

Benelux: Economic Union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

BEUC: European Bureau of Consumers' Unions

BIO: Bureau Information Only

BPI: press and information offices

BRITE: basic research in industrial technologies for Europe

C

Caddia: cooperation in automation of data and documentation for imports/exports and agriculture

CAEU: Council of Arab Economic Unity

CAP: common agricultural policy

CCC: Customs Cooperation Council

CCCC: Community–COST Concertation Committee

CCD: COST

CCMC: Committee of Common Market Automobile Manufacturers

CCNR: Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine

CCT: Common Customs Tariff

Cedefop: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training

CEGOS: General Commission of the Scientific Organisation of Labour

CEMT: European Conference of Ministers of Transport

CEN: European Committee for Standardisation

Cenelec: European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation

CERD: Comité européen de la recherche et du développement

CERE: Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman

CFP: common fisheries policy

CGC: Management and Coordination Advisory Committee

CIEC: Conference on International Economic Cooperation

CLCA: Liaison Committee for the Motor Industry in the EEC countries

CMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CNOF: Comité national de l'organisation française

Codest: Committee for the European Development of Science and Technology

Cogeca: General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union

COIT: Central Office for International Railway Transport

COMAC: concerted action committee

Comett: Community Programme for Education and Training for Technologies

COPA: Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations

CORDI: Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development

Coreper: Committee of Permanent Representatives

COST: European Cooperation in Science and Technology

CREST: Scientific and Technical Research Committee

CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CUS: Customs Union Service

D

DAC: Development Assistance Committee (OCED)
DC: developing country
DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Confederation of Trade Unions)
DOM: French overseas department
DOM-TOM: French overseas departments and territories
DREE: Direction des relations économiques extérieures (Directorate for External Economic Relations)

E

EAC: European Association for Cooperation
EAEC: European Atomic Energy Community
EAGGF: European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
ECA: Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECAFE: Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECJ: European Court of Justice
ECLA: Economic Commission for Latin America (UN)
Ecosoc: Economic and Social Council
ECPS: Environment and Consumer Protection Service
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
ECU: European currency unit
ECWA: Economic Commission for Western Asia (UN)
EDF: European Development Fund
EEB: European Environmental Bureau
EEC: European Economic Community
EEZ: exclusive economic zone (zone extending 200 miles)
EFTA: European Free Trade Association
EIB: European Investment Bank
Eliamep: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EMCF: European Monetary Cooperation Fund
EMS: European Monetary System
EMU: economic and monetary union
ENA: École nationale d'administration
ENSAE: École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique
EPC: European political cooperation
Erasmus: European community action scheme for the mobility of university students
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund

ERT: European Round Table of Industrialists

ESC: Economic and Social Committee

ESCAP: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN)

ESF: European Social Fund

Esprit: European strategic programme for research and development in information technology

ETUC: European Trade Union Confederation

EUA: European unit of account

EURAM: European research on advanced materials

Euratom: European Atomic Energy Community

Eureka: European Research Coordination Agency

Eurodif: European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium

Eurofer: European Confederation of the Iron and Steel Industry

Eurofound: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

Eurotecnet: European Technical Network (demonstration projects in the field of vocational training in new information technologies)

Eurydice: education information network in the European Community

F

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

FAST: forecasting and assessment in science and technology

FEDOM: Federation of Overseas Companies

FFPE: Fédération de la fonction publique européenne (European Civil Service Federation)

FIDE: International Federation for European Law

FORCE: action programme for continuing vocational training

FRG: Federal Republic of Germany

G

G7: Group of Seven

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP: gross domestic product

GEEF: Groupe d'études économiques et financières dans la Communauté élargie

GEMA: Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte

GIIT: Groupe de travail interinstitutionnel de terminologie et de documentation, (Interinstitutional Working Party on Terminology and Documentation)

GNP: gross national product

GSP: Generalised System of Preferences (instrument defined in the Unctad)

I

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IAMLADP: Inter-Agency Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and Publications (UN)

IBM: International Business Machines Corporation

IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

ICEM: Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

ICS: interservice consultation

IEA: International Energy Agency (OECD)

IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO: International Labour Organisation

IMCO: Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IMP: integrated Mediterranean programme

Insead: European Institute of Business Administration

IRDAC: Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee

ISE: International Steel Entente

ISO: International Organisation for Standardisation

J

JET: Joint European Torus

JICS: Joint Interpreting and Conference Service

JNRC: Joint Nuclear Research Centre

JRC: Joint Research Centre

L

Lingua: programme for increasing foreign language competence in the European Community

M

MAGP: multiannual guidance programme

MCA: monetary compensatory amount

MEDIA: measures to promote the development of the European audiovisual industry

MLTS: Medium- and Long-term Translation Service

N

NAA: North Atlantic Assembly

NARIC: National Academic Recognition Information Centre

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)

NGO: non-governmental organisation

NPM: new public management

O

OAPEC: Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

OAS: Organisation of American States

OCAM: Common Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Organisation

OCT: overseas countries and territories

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OJ: Official Journal

OPOCE: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

P

PETRA: action programme for the training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life

PSEO: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish socialist workers' party)

R

RACE: research and development in advanced communication technologies in Europe

RDP: rural development programme

RIA: regional impact assessment

S

SCA: Special Committee on Agriculture

SEA: Single European Act

SFIE: Syndicat des fonctionnaires des institutions européennes (Union of International and European Civil Servants)

SG: Secretariat-General

SGCI: Secrétariat général des affaires européennes (General Secretariat for European Affairs)

SJ: Service Juridique (Legal Service)

SME: small and medium-sized enterprise

SNE: seconded national expert

SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)

Stabex: system for the stabilisation of export earnings (ACP countries and OCTs)

STAR: special telecommunications action for regional development (programme for the development of certain disadvantaged areas within the Community by providing better access to advanced telecommunications services)

Sysmin: system for safeguarding and developing mineral production (special financing facility for mining products from ACP countries and OCTs)

T

TAC: total allowable catch

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

U

UA: unit of account

UCL: Université catholique de Louvain

UIECS: Union of International and European Civil Servants

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

Uncitral: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

Unctad: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP: UN Development Programme

Unesco: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme

UNHCR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICE: Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe

Unicef: United Nations Children's Fund

UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

US: Union Syndicale, European Public Service

V

Valoren: programme for the development of certain less-favoured regions by exploiting endogenous energy potential

VAT: value-added tax

W

WFC: World Food Council

WFP: World Food Programme (UN)

WHO: World Health Organisation

WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organisation

WTO: World Trade Organisation (successor to GATT)

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The 13 years which saw the enlargements of the European Communities to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom on 1 January 1973, Greece on 1 January 1981 and Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986, and the signature of the Single European Act in February 1986, are often portrayed as a period of stagnation after the hopes raised by the The Hague Summit of December 1969.

However, this volume — based on hitherto unpublished sources — shows that, despite the less propitious climate, the plans, ideas and changes initiated in the 1970s would set the scene for the fresh impetus given by the Single European Act and the upturn in the mid-1980s. A new sense of direction was thus breathed into a number of policies, including those on the internal market, innovation, research, regional policy, energy and the environment.

Faced with the challenges of those years, it was up to the Commission, then the Commission of the European Communities, to drive the European project further and deeper, taking due account of the social and economic backdrop and seizing opportunities as and when they arose. Between 1973 and 1986, there were four Colleges and 45 commissioners. The institution itself had to adapt and introduce reforms in the wake of the successive enlargements and deepening integration, exemplified by the creation of the European Council and the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, whose members were elected by universal suffrage from 1979.

Twenty-two professors or researchers from 15 universities joined forces to produce this work, under the coordination of the Université catholique de Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve. They were granted privileged access to the Commission's archives and were able to interview numerous former commissioners and officials who were working at the coalface at the time.

A similar project had already resulted in the publication of a book about the institutions' formative years between 1958 and 1972.



